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S E C R E T STATE 031692 
 
ALMATY FOR DUSHANBE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/18/09 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: TALIBAN CLAIM BIN LADEN OUT OF THEIR TERRITORY 
 
REF:   A) ISLAMABAD 875 (NOTAL)   B) ISLAMABAD 1171 (NOTAL) 
C)   ISLAMABAD 1273 (NOTAL)  D)   ISLAMABAD 1271 (NOTAL) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY KARL F.  INDERFURTH, A/S,  SA.  REASON:  1.5 (D). 
 
¶1.   (S)  SUMMARY:  TALIBAN UN "PERMREP DESIGNATE" ABDUL 
HAKEEM MUJAHID TOLD SA A/S INDERFURTH FEBRUARY 17 THAT 
USAMA BIN LADEN  (UBL) WAS NO LONGER IN TALIBAN-CONTROLLED 
TERRITORY.   HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS BUT 
IMPLIED THAT UBL WAS ELSEWHERE IN AFGHANISTAN THOUGH EN 
ROUTE TO A FOREIGN DESTINATION.    HE SAID  THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
WOULD BE CLARIFIED IN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS.    A/S INDERFURTH 
EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT UBL HAD NOT BEEN EXPELLED TO 
A JURISDICTION WHERE HE COULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE; THIS 
WAS OUR ULTIMATE GOAL.   HE ALSO ASKED THE TALIBAN TO EXPEL 
UBL'S NETWORK FROM AFGHANISTAN AND CLOSE EXISTING TERRORIST 
TRAINING FACILITIES.   MUJAHID ASKED THAT USG PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS ON THIS DEVELOPMENT NOT DWELL ON EXISTING 
DIFFERENCES WITH THE TALL BAN, NOTING THAT THIS WOULD WEAKEN 
ELEMENTS WITHIN THE TALIBAN OPPOSED TO UBL.    A/S INDERFURTH 
REPLIED THAT WHILE WE COULD NOT WISH AWAY OTHER ISSUES, BIN 
LADEN'S DEPARTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN WOULD REMOVES A MAJOR 
ROADBLOCK TO FUTURE PROGRESS.   END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.   (U)  SA A/S KARL F. INDERFURTH CALLED IN TALIBAN NEW 
YORK "PERMREP DESIGNATE" ABDUL HAKEEM MUJAHID FEBRUARY 1~ 
PRIMARILY TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING USAMA BIN 
LADEN  (UBL) AND AS PART OF OUR SERIES OF CONTACTS WITH THE 
AFGHAN FACTIONS.   MUJAHID WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS ASSISTANT 
NOORULLAH ZADRAN.   SA/PAB DIRECTOR MALINOWSKI AND AFGHAN 
DESKOFF RAPOPORT SAT IN.   THE MEETING LASTED ALMOST 90 
MINUTES. 
 
 
WHERE IS USAMA? 
 
¶3.   (S)  A/S INDERFURTH REVIEWED HIS FEBRUARY 3 MEETING 
WITH TALIBAN "DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER" MULLAH JALIL IN 
ISLAMABAD,  RESTATING POINTS DELIVERED ON THAT OCCASION (REF 
A).  HE NOTED THE TALIBAN RESPONSE THAT THEY HAD IMPOSED 
FURTHER RESTRICTIONS UPON UBL  (REF B) BUT STATED THAT THIS 
DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.   HE CITED RECENT REPORTS OF 
ONGOING THREATENING ACTIVITIES FROM UBL AND HIS NETWORK AND 
MADE THE POINT THAT RECENT REPORTS FROM TALIBAN SOURCES 
THAT UBL HAD "GONE MISSING"  (REF C) CONTRADICTED TALIBAN 
CLAIMS TO HAVE HIM UNDER CONTROL. 
 
¶4.   (S)  MUJAHID CITED THE IMPORTANCE OF A/S INDERFURTH'S 
MESSAGE TO JALIL AND SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY CONTACTED 
VARIOUS TALIBAN AUTHORITIES TO GET A POSITIVE RESPONSE SO 
AS TO PROMOTE A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.  HE 
ASSERTED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE TALIBAN TO EXPEL UBL 
BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT UPON PUBLIC OPINION IN AFGHANISTAN 
AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD, BUT THE TALL BAN HAD IMPOSED 
RESTRICTIONS UPON HIM IN HOPES OF FORCING HIM TO LEAVE 
WILLINGLY.   MUJAHID THEN DECLARED THAT UBL WAS NO LONGER IN 
TALIBAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY BUT WOULD NOT SAY WHERE HE WAS 
OR HOW THIS HAD COME ABOUT, ONLY THAT THE SITUATION WOULD 
BE CLARIFIED IN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS.   HE INTIMATED THAT UBL 
MIGHT STILL BE IN AFGHANISTAN,  PERHAPS WITH A COMMANDER NOT 
LINKED TO THE TALIBAN  (IN THIS CONTEXT HE REFERRED TO UBL'S 
PREVIOUS TIES TO HEKMATYAR,  SAYYAF, AND MASOOD.) BUT THAT 
HIS ULTIMATE DESTINATION WAS AN UNSPECIFIED OTHER COUNTRY. 
HE STATED THAT TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR HAD ANNOUNCED 
UBL'S DEPARTURE PUBLICLY OVER TALIBAN RADIO SHARIAT; HE 
PROCEEDED TO DO THE SAME WITH AWAITING JOURNALISTS AFTER 
THE MEETING. 
 
 
BRING UBL TO JUSTICE 
 
¶5.   (S) A/S INDERFURTH SAID WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE 
TALIBAN HAD NOT EXPELLED UBL TO A JURISDICTION WHERE HE 
COULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.   HE EXPRESSED FURTHER CONCERN 
REGARDING THE TIME NECESSARY TO DETERMINE UBL'S 
WHEREABOUTS, NOTING THAT THE AMBIGUITY POSED CERTAIN RISKS 
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND URGED THAT THE TALIBAN PROVIDE MORE 
INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.  IF UBL STAGED A 
TERRORIST ACT DURING THIS INTERIM PERIOD,  BEFORE HIS 
WHEREABOUTS COULD BE ESTABLISHED,  THE TALIBAN COULD STILL 
BE HELD RESPONSIBLE. HE STATED WE WOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS TO 
LOCATE HIM, ADDING THAT IT WOULD BE TAKEN AS AN ACT OF BAD 
FAITH IF UBL WERE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO TALIBAN-CONTROLLED 
TERRITORY.   MUJAHID RESPONDED THAT UBL WOULD NOT RETURN TO 
TALIBAN TERRITORY, THOUGH HE LATER CAVEATED THAT THIS WAS 
NOT IN HIS OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
 
AND EXPEL HIS FOLLOWERS 
 
¶6.   (S) A/S INDERFURTH ADDED THAT WE WERE ALSO CONCERNED 
ABOUT UBL'S NETWORK AND TRAINING CAMPS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. 
HE HOPED THE TALIBAN WOULD TAKE QUICK ACTION TO REMOVE 
THESE SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND EXPEL THOSE MEMBERS OF HIS 
NETWORK LEFT BEHIND.   MUJAHID RESPONDED THAT AFGHANISTAN 
HAD NEVER BEEN A TERRORIST STATE AND THAT AFGHANS HAD NEVER 
COMMITTED ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,  EVEN AGAINST THE 
SOVIETS.   THE TALIBAN ITSELF DID NOT SUPPORT AN AVOWEDLY 
EXPANSIONIST INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT, 
LIKE IRANIAN-SUPPORTED HEZBOLLAH OR THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, 
AND WAS NOT IN FAVOR OR THE TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN OF 
KASHMIRIS, ARABS,  SAUDIS, SUDANESE OR OTHERS IN TECHNIQUES 
OF TERRORISM.   MUJAHID NOTED THAT BIN LADEN'S PERSONAL VIEW 
OF INTERNATIONAL ISLAM WAS MUCH CLOSER TO THAT OF MANY OF 
THE TALIBAN'S AFGHAN RIVALS THAN TO THAT OF THE TALIBAN 
ITSELF.   MUJAHID EQUIVOCATED ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF CAMPS 
IN TALIBAN TERRITORY BUT A/S INDERFURTH REPEATED THAT THEY 
WERE PRESENT AND THAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO DISMANTLE 
THEM. 
 
 
POSITIVE REINFORCEMENT REQUESTED 
 
¶7.   (S)  NOTING THAT THE TALIBAN HAD PUT ITSELF IN A 
DIFFICULT POSITION REGARDING UBL, MUJAHID ASKED THAT USG 
PUBLIC STATEMENTS NOT DWELL ON DIFFERENCES OVER OTHER 
ISSUES  (I.E.  DRUGS, HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER, ETC.), STATING 
THAT THIS WOULD WEAKEN THOSE WITHIN THE TALIBAN WHO FAVORED 
BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.    HE URGED A POSITIVE 
REFERENCE TO THIS ACTION.    A/S INDERFURTH SAID THAT WE 
WOULD CONSIDER UBL'S DEPARTURE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, 
NOTING THAT BIN LADEN HAD BEEN A MAJOR OBSTACLE,   "A BOULDER 
IN THE ROAD."    WE COULD NOT WISH OTHER ISSUES AWAY, BUT 
ONCE BIN LADEN WAS BEHIND US WE COULD ADDRESS THESE ISSUES, 
INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE UN IN 
AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP.    MUJAHID CITED THE 
STRONG U.S. RELATIONSHIP    WITH ISLAMIC SAUDI ARABIA AND 
SAID WE COULD HAVE EVEN BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN. 
 
¶8.   AS AN EXAMPLE OF A POSITIVE STEP, A/S INDERFURTH NOTED 
HIS SIGNATURE YESTERDAY ON A DISASTER DECLARATION THAT 
WOULD AUTHORIZE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF THE 
FEBRUARY 11 EARTHQUAKE    (REF D) AS A POSITIVE STEP AND 
EVIDENCE OF OUR DESIRE TO HELP THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. 
 
 
TALIBAN EXPANDING CONTACTS 
 
¶9.   (S)  A/S INDERFURTH RAISED UN SPECIAL ENVOY BRAHIMI'S 
UPCOMING VISIT TO THE REGION, NOTING THAT IT WAS COMING AT 
A TIME WHEN THE TALIBAN WAS EXPANDING CONTACTS WITH OTHER 
AFGHAN FACTIONS AND WITH AFGHAN MODERATES.    HE STRESSED OUR 
BELIEF THAT THERE IS NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT 
BUT RATHER A NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND URGED THE 
TALIBAN TO WORK WITH BRAHIMI IN THIS REGARD.    MUJAHID 
ACKNOWLEDGED THE CONTACTS WITH MASOOD AND THE NEUTRALS, 
ADDING THAT THE TALIBAN HAD ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT WITH 
PROFESSOR BURHANUDDIN RABBANI'S PEOPLE IN DUBAL AS WELL. 
HE AGREED THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION WAS "NOT DESIRABLE" BUT 
SAID THAT DIPLOMATIC MEANS DID NOT ALWAYS WORK.  MUJAHID 
WAS SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE AFGHAN MODERATES, WHOM HE 
DESCRIBED AS PARTISANS OF THE FORMER KING.  HE SAID THEY 
CONFINED THEIR ACTIVITIES TO "MAKING INEFFECTIVE STATEMENTS 
ABROAD," BUT THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN TO 
AFGHANISTAN AND WORK WITH THE TALIBAN TO REBUILD THE 
COUNTRY. 
 
¶10.   (S)  COMMENT: MUJAHID HAS LONG INDICATED HIS OWN 
OPPOSITION TO UBL AND SUPPORT FOR BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE U.S. AND THE TALIBAN. IT WAS CLEARLY GRATIFYING FOR 
HIM TO DELIVER THE NEWS THAT UBL HAD LEFT TALL BAN 
TERRITORY. MUJAHID WAS MORE EMOTIONAL DURING THIS SESSION 
THAN IN ANY PREVIOUS ENCOUNTER. 
 
 
TALBOTT