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Viewing cable 98RIYADH3482, SAUDI ARABIA: USAMA BIN LADIN (C-NA8-00989)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
98RIYADH3482 1998-10-13 08:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Riyadh
O 130837Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5417
INFO GCC COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY SANAA 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RIYADH 003482 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, INR 
LONDON FOR SUTPHIN, PARIS FOR LEAF 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  9/23/08 
TAGS: KPRP PTER PGOV PINR SA
SUBJECT:  SAUDI ARABIA:  USAMA BIN LADIN (C-NA8-00989) 
 
REFS:  (A) STATE 171640 (NOTAL)  (B) RIYADH 602 
       (C) RIYADH 1773   (D) RIYADH 1797  (E) RIYADH 1892 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM ALBERT THIBAULT, REASON 1.5 B. 
 
1.  (S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON EX-SAUDI TERRORIST USAMA BIN 
LADIN, WHICH INCLUDES INPUT FROM CONSULATES DHAHRAN AND JEDDAH, 
IS KEYED TO QUESTIONS POSED IN REF A. 
 
A.   (S)  ISLAMIC LEADERS ADMIRED BY BIN LADIN: 
 
BIN LADIN WAS RAISED IN A CONSERVATIVE WAHHABI MUSLIM FAMILY. 
AS A YOUNG MAN HE REPORTEDLY WAS INFLUENCED BY CONSERVATIVE, NEO- 
SALAFI PREACHER MUHAMMAD BIN SALIH AL-UTHAYMIN, IMAM OF THE GRAND 
MOSQUE IN UNAYZAH AND A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL OF SENIOR ULAMA. 
DURING HIS YEARS IN AFGHANISTAN, HE DEVELOPED LINKS WITH MEMBERS 
OF THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD AND AL-GAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYYA 
MOVEMENTS, GROUPS INFLUENCED BY THE WORK OF EGYPTIAN MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD THINKER SAYYID QUTB.  UPON HIS RETURN FROM 
AFGHANISTAN, BIN LADIN WAS TAKEN WITH THE PREACHING OF THE SAUDI 
"AWAKENING MOVEMENT" PREACHERS, ESPECIALLY SAFAR AL-HAWALI AND 
SALMAN AL-AWDAH, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE MUCH DIRECT CONTACT 
WITH THEM SINCE HE LIVED OUTSIDE OF SAUDI ARABIA AFTER 1991. 
LIKE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SAUDI RELIGIOUS LEADER MUHAMMAD IBN ABD 
AL-WAHHAB, THESE PREACHERS ARE STRICT INTERPRETERS OF THE 
TEACHINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY HANBALI THEOLOGIAN IBN 
TAYMIYYA, KNOWN FOR HIS LITERALISM IN INTERPRETING THE QUR'AN, 
OPPOSITION TO INNOVATION, AND VIEW THAT CHRISTIANS AND JEWS 
DISTORTED THEIR SACRED BOOKS.  BIN LADIN FREQUENTLY QUOTES IBN 
TAYMIYYA, ESPECIALLY WHEN JUSTIFYING THE NEED TO FIGHT HERESY IN 
THE ISLAMIC WORLD. 
 
IN A MARCH 1997 INTERVIEW WITH A PAKISTANI JOURNALIST WHO VISITED 
HIS CAMP IN AFGHANISTAN, BIN LADIN WAS ASKED "WHO IS YOUR IDEAL 
PERSONALITY, IN TODAY'S WORLD?"  BIN LADIN RESPONDED, "SHAYKH 
SALMAN AL-AWDAH WOULD BE MY IDEAL."  SALMAN AL-AWDAH, WHO REMAINS 
IMPRISONED AND REPORTEDLY IS IN FAILING HEALTH, ARGUES THAT THE 
MUSLIM "UMMAH" (NATION) IS IN A STATE OF CRISIS THAT REQUIRES ALL 
MUSLIMS TO TAKE UP AN ARMED STRUGGLE TO SAVE IT.  IN A TAPE 
SMUGGLED FROM PRISON IN 1995, HE DECLARED:  "THE ISLAMIC WORLD 
TODAY, I SAY IT FRANKLY TO EVERY FRIEND AND FOE, ...IS 
TRANSFORMING INTO A FACTORY: A BUSY FACTORY TO PREPARE THE 
FIGHTERS.  THE ONE WHO WILL NOT FIGHT OUT OF FAITH AND 
ENTHUSIASM, YOU WILL FIND HIM COMPELLED TO FIGHT FOR HIS OWN 
SURVIVAL BECAUSE HE HAS NO OTHER WAY.  ... IT IS DEATH THAT GIVES 
LIFE, YES, IT IS JIHAD FOR THE SAKE OF ALLAH, THE OBLIGED FATE OF 
THIS UMMAH.  OTHERWISE IT IS EXTINCTION.  IF THE UMMAH ABANDONED 
JIHAD AND IGNORED IT, THEN ALLAH WILL HIT IT AND PUNISH IT BY 
MAKING IT LOW AMONG THE NATIONS, LIKE THE PROPHET... SAID: IF YOU 
ABANDONED JIHAD, AND BECAME SATISFIED WITH GROWING PLANTS, THEN 
ALLAH WILL CAUSE YOU TO BECOME LOW AMONG THE NATIONS, AND YOU 
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COME OUT OF IT UNTIL YOU RETURN TO YOUR 
RELIGION AND DECLARE JIHAD FOR THE SAKE OF ALLAH." 
 
MORE RECENTLY BIN LADIN ALSO SPOKE ADMIRINGLY ABOUT A SERMON BY A 
FORMER IMAM OF THE PROPHET'S MOSQUE IQMADINAH, SHAYKH ALI ABD 
AL-RAHMAN AL-HUTHAYFI.  DURING RAFSANJANI'S VISIT TO THE 
PROPHET'S MOSQUE IN FEBRUARY 1998, AL-HUTHAYFI VIRULENTLY 
ATTACKED SHIAS, PROCLAIMED THAT THERE COULD BE NO ACCOMMODATION 
BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND JEWS, CHRISTIANS AND OTHER "UNBELIEVERS," AND 
CRITICIZED THE PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN THE GULF REGION. 
 
B.  (S)  DOES BIN LADIN CONSIDER HIMSELF TO BE A RELIGIOUS 
LEADER? 
 
WHILE ONLY BIN LADIN HIMSELF CAN DEFINITIVELY ANSWER THIS 
QUESTION, IT WOULD APPEAR FROM HIS STATEMENTS THAT BIN LADIN DOES 
NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF TO BE A RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR OR IMAM.  HE 
PRESENTS HIMSELF AS A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS AND COMMITTED "MUJAHID" 
(JIHAD WARRIOR) FIGHTING TO DEFEND THE ISLAMIC "UMMAH" FROM 
HEREQAND THE THREAT  HE BELIEVES IS POSED BY THE UNITED STATES, 
ISRAEL, AND THEIR  ALLIES. 
 
C.  (S) RELIGIOUS CREDENTIALS: 
 
USAMA BIN LADIN DOES NOT HAVE CONVENTIONAL ISLAMIC CREDENTIALS. 
THAT IS TO SAY, HE DID NOT PURSUE FORMAL ISLAMIC STUDIES IN ANY 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION OR EVEN INDEPENDENTLY UNDER A RELIGIOUS 
SCHOLAR.  HE IS HOWEVER, A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS MAN WHO IS MORE 
INTERESTED IN ACTION THAN IN CONTEMPLATION.   AS FAR AS WE CAN 
DISCERN (NOT HAVING THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT A POLL AMONG HIS 
FOLLOWERS), HE IS VIEWED BY HIS FOLLOWERS NOT AS A RELIGIOUS 
LEADER BUT AS A MUSLIM WARRIOR LEADING THE FIGHT TO PROTECT AND 
DEFEND THE ISLAMIC "UMMAH."  EVEN MANY SAUDIS WHO BELIEVE HE IS 
MISGUIDED ACKNOWLEDGE HIS RELIGIOUS FERVOR; MANY WHO DEPLORE HIS 
CALL FOR VIOLENCE NEVERTHELESS SEE HIS REACTION TO U.S. POLICIES, 
ESPECIALLY ITS SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AS "UNDERSTANDABLE." 
 
D.  (S) DOES BIN LADIN CONSIDER HIMSELF TO BE THE LEADER OR 
MERELY ONE OF MANY LEADERS OF A WORLDWIDE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT? 
 
IN STATEMENTS MADE FOR WESTERN CONSUMPTION, BIN LADIN HAS BEEN AT 
PAINS TO EMPHASIZE THAT DESPITE HIS ISOLATION IN AFGHANISTAN, HE 
IS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. 
 
E.  (S) BIN LADIN'S OBJECTIVES: 
 
BIN LADIN'S IMMEDIATE STATED OBJECTIVE IS THE EXPULSION OF U.S. 
TROOPS FROM SAUDI ARABIA, THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, AND ALL MUSLIM 
COUNTRIES.  BEYOND THAT GOAL, IN MARCH 1997, BIN LADIN TOLD A 
PAKISTANI JOURNALIST THAT "MUSLIMS NEED A LEADER WHO CAN UNITE 
THEM AND ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT WHICH FOLLOWS THE RULE OF THE 
CALIPHS.  THE RULE OF THE CALIPHS WILL BEGIN FROM AFGHANISTAN. 
IT WILL ADOPT INTEREST-FREE BANKING.  THE RULE OF ALLAH WILL BE 
ESTABLISHED.  WE ARE AGAINST COMMUNISM BUT WE ARE ALSO AGAINST 
CAPITALISM.  THE CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH IN JUST A FEW HANDS IS 
UNISLAMIC."  HE DOES NOT SPECIFY WHO IS QUALIFIED TO BECOME A 
CALIPH, OR HOW HIS MOVEMENT WILL SPREAD FROM AFGHANISTAN TO THE 
REST OF THE MUSLIM WORLD.  BIN LADIN'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS TEND TO 
BE MORE EXHORTATORY THAN PRESCRIPTIVE IN NATURE; HE SPEAKS AS A 
WARRIOR URGING HIS FOLLOWERS TO RISE UP AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
AND OTHER ENEMIES OF ISLAM AND NOT AS A REVOLUTIONARY WITH A 
PROGRAM TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC STATE.  IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR, 
FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER HE SEEKS A COMPLETE OVERTHROW OF THE 
MONARCHY IN SAUDI ARABIA.  HE HAS CHARGED THE KING AND OTHER 
MEMBERS OF THE AL SAUD WITH HERESY, BUT HAS ALSO SAID THAT "MANY 
PRINCES SHARE THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN AND PRIVATELY VOICE OPPOSITION 
TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRY IN TERMS OF TERROR, 
REPRESSION, AND CORRUPTION," IMPLYING, PERHAPS, THAT ONE OF THEM 
MIGHT BE QUALIFIED TO RULE.  BIN LADIN'S FIXATION WITH EXPELLING 
JEWS, CHRISTIANS AND OTHER UNBELIEVERS FROM MUSLIM LANDS SUGGESTS 
THAT HE BELIEVES THAT ONCE THEY ARE GONE, ALL PROBLEMS FACED BY 
THE MUSLIM "UMMAH" WILL DISAPPEAR. 
 
F.  (S) TIES WITH HIS FAMILY: 
 
MEMBERS OF BIN LADIN'S FAMILY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY HAVE NOT HAD 
CONTACTS WITH HIM SINCE 1996, WHEN BIN LADIN SENT HIS HALF- 
BROTHER BAKR WORD THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO RETURN TO SAUDI 
ARABIA IF HIS FAMILY WOULD SECURE THE RELEASE OF CERTAIN 
POLITICAL PRISONERS.  THE FAMILY REFUSED.  THE BIN LADIN FAMILY'S 
CONTINUED STRONG TIES WITH THE KING AND OTHER ROYAL FAMILY 
MEMBERS ARE GOOD INDICATORS THAT THERE IS PROBABLY VERY LITTLE 
CONTACT WITH USAMA.  FROM TIME TO TIME INDIVIDUAL BROTHERS HAVE 
CONTACTED USAMA IN FUTILE EFFORTS TO PERSUADE HIM TO GIVE UP HIS 
WAYS AND RETURN TO THE KINGDOM.  HOWEVER, BY NOW THE FAMILY HAS 
LARGELY GIVEN UP ON HIM.  AS ONE OF HIS BROTHERS CONFIDED TO AN 
EMBOFF LATE LAST YEAR, "AS FAR AS THE FAMILY IS CONCERNED, USAMA 
IS DEAD, AND IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER IF HE WERE KILLED." 
 
AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, BUSINESSMEN IN PROMINENT JEDDAH 
MERCHANT FAMILIES CONCEDE THAT WHILE THE BIN LADIN FAMILY HAS 
DISAVOWED USAMA, BLOOD TIES CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DENIED, AND THEY 
HAVE MENTIONED HIS CONNECTIONS WITH HIS MOTHER AND SISTERS WHO 
LIVE IN JEDDAH.  JAMAL KHASHOGGI, AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SPECIALIST 
FOR "AL-HAYAT" NEWSPAPER, TOLD US RECENTLY THAT USAMA'S SON 
ABDALLAH LIVES IN JEDDAH, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSPECT 
USAMA'S RELATIVES OF HAVING ANYTHING TO DO WITH TERRORISM. 
 
ANOTHER ONE OF USAMA'S ELDER BROTHERS, YAHYA BIN LADIN, RECENTLY 
TOLD CONSULATE JEDDAH CONTACTS THAT HE FELT HE HAD MADE TWO 
STRATEGIC MISTAKES WITH RESPECT TO HIS YOUNGER SIBLING.  FIRST, 
HE HAD NOT OFFERED HIM A POSITION IN THE FAMILY COMPANY, AND 
SECOND, HE DID NOT GO TO SUDAN FOUR YEARS AGO TO PERSUADE USAMA 
TO COME BACK TO SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE HE "TURNED AWAY FROM THE 
FOLD."  ANOTHER CONTACT, A SAUDI ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SPECIALIST WHO 
HAS LONG KNOWN USAMA, CLAIMS USAMA NOW HAS NOT MORE THAN 50 
PEOPLE AROUND HIM. 
 
G.  (S) RELATIONS WITH OTHER ISLAMIST GROUPS AND RELATIONS WITH 
SHIA DISSIDENTS: 
 
WHILE BIN LADIN HAS ATTEMPTED TO PORTRAY HIMSELF AS ONE MEMBER IN 
A WORLDWIDE ALLIANCE OF MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS, A LOOK AT WHICH 
ORGANIZATIONS ACTUALLY COOPERATE WITH HIM REVEALS THAT HIS 
NETWORK IS PROBABLY NOT AS BROAD AS BIN LADIN WOULD LIKE TO HAVE 
US THINK.  SINCE HIS EARLY DAYS IN AFGHANISTAN, HE HAS HAD LINKS 
WITH MEMBERS OF THE EGYPTIAN AL-GAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYYA (RIFA'I 
AHMAD TAHA, "AMIR" OF THE GROUP, AND MUHAMMAD SHAWQI AL-ISLAMBULI 
AND MUSTAFA HAMZAH (AKA ABU-HAZIM) HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN LIVING IN 
AFGHANISTAN WITH BIN LADIN) AND THE ISLAMIC JIHAD (AYMAN AL- 
ZAWAHIRI, THE EGYPTIAN JIHAD "AMIR," IS REPORTEDLY HIS CLOSEST 
ASSOCIATE.)   DURING THE AFGHANISTAN WAR, BIN LADIN COLLABORATED 
CLOSELY WITH THE LATE PALESTINIAN ISLAMIST ABDALLAH AZZAM IN 
SETTING UP THE "JIHAD AND RELIEF" GUEST HOUSE IN PESHAWAR TO 
RECEIVE MUJAHIDEEN VOLUNTEERS ON THEIR WAY TO AFGHANISTAN. 
DURING THIS TIME, IN ADDITION TO FINANCING RECRUITMENT, TRAINING 
AND SUPPORT OF THE ARAB VOLUNTEERS, BIN LADIN IS SAID TO HAVE 
PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR GROUPS SUCH AS HAMAS AND THE YEMENI ISLAMIC 
JIHAD GROUP HEADED BY SHAYKH ZINDANI.  DURING HIS TIME IN SUDAN, 
BIN LADIN, AS A GUEST OF HASAN TURABI, IS SAID TO HAVE DEVELOPED 
LINKS WITH THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT IN ALGERIA.  SINCE THEN 
BIN LADIN HAS BEEN A BENEFACTOR TO ISLAMIC MILITANT GROUPS IN 
PAKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN, BOSNIA AND JORDAN.  HIS ROLE VIS A VIS MOST 
OF THESE GROUPS, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE LIMITED TO THAT OF 
FINANCIER AND SUPPORTER; HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE FORGING A 
WORLDWIDE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THESE QUITE DISPARATE GROUPS.  THE SO- 
CALLED FATWA URGING MUSLIMS TO "KILL AMERICANS EVERYWHERE" ISSUED 
IN FEBRUARY 1998 WAS SIGNED ONLY BY AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI OF THE 
EGYPTIAN JIHAD, RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA OF THE AL-GAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYYA, 
SHAYKH MIR HAMZA, SECRETARY OF THE JAMIAT-UL-ULAMA-E-PAKISTAN, 
AND FAZLUL RAHMAN, AMIR OF THE JIHAD MOVEMENT IN BANGLADESH. 
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JAMIAT-UL-ULAMA-E-PAKISTAN SUBSEQUENTLY 
DISAVOWED ANY LINKS WITH BIN LADIN. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT 
AL-GAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYYA HAVE DISTANCED THEMSELVES FROM BIN LADIN. 
 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BIN LADIN HAS LINKS WITH SHIA 
DISSIDENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND WE SUSPECT THAT, GIVEN THE 
THEOLOGICAL SCHISMS BETWEEN THE SAUDI SUNNI RADICALS AND THE 
SHIA, BIN LADIN WOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH 
THEM.  BIN LADIN'S APPLAUSE FOR FORMER MEDINA IMAM AL-HUTHAYFI'S 
VERY PUBLIC INSULT OF IRANIAN EX-PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI IS LIKELY A 
GOOD INDICATOR OF HIS THINKING ON RELATIONS WITH THE SHIA IN 
SAUDI ARABIA AND IN IRAN.  SHIA IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE VIEW BIN 
LADIN AND HIS IDEOLOGY AS ANTI-SHIA. 
 
H.  (S)  CONTACTS WITH NON-MUSLIM (INCLUDING SECULAR) GROUPS 
OPPOSED TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST: 
 
WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SUCH CONTACTS, AND GIVEN BIN LADIN'S 
FANATICISM AND INTENSE INTOLERANCE OF NON-MUSLIMS, WE DOUBT THAT 
HE IS INTERESTED IN MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH NON-MUSLIMS. 
 
I.  (S) SYMPATHY TOWARDS BIN LADIN IN SAUDI INSTITUTIONS: 
 
EMBASSY IS UNABLE TO CONDUCT SURVEYS TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF 
SYMPATHY TOWARDS BIN LADIN IN VARIOUS SAUDI INSTITUTIONS AND 
CONSTITUENCIES.  HOWEVER, BASED ON OUR CONTACTS WITH SAUDIS IN 
THESE INSTITUTIONS, EMBASSY PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF 
LIKELY SAUDI SYMPATHY FOR BIN LADIN: 
 
THE MILITARY: LOW 
 
THE NATIONAL GUARD:  LOW 
 
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR:  LOW 
 
THE ULAMA: HIGH IN SOME QUARTERS, I.E., AMONG NEO-SALAFIS, BUT 
NOT AMONG THE MAINSTREAM IMAMS. 
 
THE ROYAL DIWAN: LOW. IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL THAT THE ROYAL FAMILY'S 
MINIONS ARE INTERESTED IN BITING THE HANDS THAT FEED THEM. 
 
THE MAJLIS AL-SHURA:  LOW, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
RELIGIOUS MEMBERS WERE SYMPATHETIC TO CALLS BY THE AWAKENING 
MOVEMENT FOR A STRICTER APPLICATION OF SHARIA LAW. 
 
ACADEMIA:  MEDIUM; SYMPATHY, IF NOT AGREEMENT WITH BIN LADIN'S 
METHODS, MAY BE HIGHER AMONG CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC SCHOLARS IN 
INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS IMAM MUHAMMAD BIN SAUD UNIVERSITY, WHOSE 
MEMBERS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE AWAKENING MOVEMENT AND OTHER 
OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES.  UNIVERSITY FACULTY ALSO INCLUDE WESTERN 
EDUCATED LIBERALS WHOSE SYMPATHY IS LOW. 
 
ARAB EXPATRIATES:  LOW, ALTHOUGH POSSIBLY HIGHER AMONG YEMENIS 
AND SUDANESE. 
 
BUSINESSMEN: MIXED.  SOME SYMPATHY.  IN GENERAL, JEDDAH MERCHANT 
FAMILIES, MANY OF WHOSE MEMBERS KNOW USAMA FROM HIS YOUNGER DAYS, 
HAVE EMPHASIZED TO US THAT THE U.S. MEDIA IS ELEVATING USAMA AND 
GIVING HIM A POWER HE NEVER WOULD HAVE HAD OTHERWISE.  A NUMBER 
HAVE LAMENTED THAT THE STALEMATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND WHAT IS 
PERCEIVED AS UNLIMITED SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL REGARDLESS OF ITS 
ACTIONS HAS LED SOME SAUDIS TO BE MORE TOLERANT OF USAMA THAN 
THEY MIGHT OTHERWISE BE. 
 
WOMEN: EXTREMELY LOW.  BIN LADIN AND THE CLERICS HE ADMIRES ARE 
OPPOSED TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS; THE AWAKENING MOVEMENT SEEMS TO FIND 
FEW ADHERENTS AMONG SAUDI WOMEN. 
 
THE SAUDI PUBLIC AT LARGE:  BIN LADIN'S CALL TO VIOLENCE IS NOT 
ONE THAT RESONATES WITH MOST SAUDIS.  THE ISLAMIC INJUNCTION 
AGAINST TAKING ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO "FITNA" (SOCIAL CHAOS) 
IS DEEPLY INGRAINED IN THIS SOCIETY.  INTERESTINGLY, OVER THE 
LAST YEAR OR SO, THE RELIGIOUS DEBATE ABOUT WHEN ISLAMIC LAW 
ALLOWS FOR REMOVAL OF A MUSLIM LEADER HAS BEEN PUBLICLY AIRED, 
SUGGESTING A REACTION TO CHARGES BY BIN LADIN AND OPPOSITION 
MEMBERS THAT THE KING AND THE AL SAUD HAVE UNDERTAKEN HERETICAL 
ACTS AND MUST BE REMOVED FROM POWER.  IN A LENGTHY INTERVIEW, 
MAJLIS AL-SHURA PRESIDENT AND SENIOR SCHOLAR SHAYKH BIN JUBAYR 
OPINED THAT REMOVING A RULER IS ALLOWABLE ONLY UNDER THE 
NARROWEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, AND GRAND MUFTI SHAYKH BIN BAZ ISSUED 
A FATWA REMINDING MUSLIMS THAT IN MOST INSTANCES IT IS FORBIDDEN. 
WE THINK THAT MOST SAUDIS PROBABLY AGREE. 
 
HOWEVER, BIN LADIN'S STATEMENTS REFLECT THE FRUSTRATION THAT MANY 
MIDDLE CLASS SAUDIS FEEL ABOUT THEIR ECONOMIC SITUATION, 
FRUSTRATION THAT WILL GROW AS PER CAPITA INCOMES DECLINE.  IN A 
1996 INTERVIEW BIN LADIN CORRECTLY OBSERVED THAT SAUDIS WONDER 
"IS OURS REALLY THE WORLD'S LARGEST OIL EXPORTING COUNTRY?"  IN 
ADDITION, HIS ANTIPATHY TOWARDS U.S. POLICY THAT IS SUPPORTIVE OF 
ISRAEL IS WIDELY SHARED BY MOST SAUDIS.  THERE IS A CERTAIN 
RESPECT FOR BIN LADIN AS A MAN MOTIVATED BY RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE, 
AND, WHILE MOST SAUDIS WOULD NOT FOLLOW HIM, MANY SHARE HIS 
FRUSTRATIONS.  FOR EXAMPLE, THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE RELIGIOUS 
WEEKLY, "AL MUSLIMUN," WHO KNOWS USAMA, TOLD US HE RESPECTS HIM 
FOR HIS ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE WAR AGAINST THE USSR, NOTING THAT HE 
BUILT SOME USEFUL TUNNELS THROUGH THE AFGHAN MOUNTAINS.  AFTER 
THE BOMBINGS OF EMBASSIES NAIROBI AND DAR ES-SALAAM, EMBOFFS 
HEARD FROM MANY SAUDI CONTACTS WHO CONDEMNED THE ATTACKS BUT ALSO 
FELT THEY WERE INEVITABLE GIVEN WHAT THEY SEE AS AMERICA'S 
UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. 
 
ACCORDING TO JAMAL KHASHOGGI, AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SPECIALIST FOR 
"AL HAYAT" NEWSPAPER, FEW PEOPLE IN JEDDAH DISLIKE USAMA, AND 
SOME CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HIM BECAUSE THEY ARE FED UP WITH THE 
AMERICAN PRESENCE/POLICY IN THE REGION.  KHASHOGGI SAID THAT MANY 
PEOPLE CONSIDER USAMA BIN LADIN AS THE "CHE GUEVARA" OF THE ARAB 
WORLD.  HE SAID THAT SOME HOPE THAT USAMA WILL DIE IN BATTLE SO 
THAT PEOPLE WILL NOT HAVE TO SUFFER THE "HUMILIATION" OF SEEING 
HIM TRANSPORTED IN HANDCUFFS TO THE U.S. 
 
J.  (S) IS BIN LADIN VIEWED AS A TERRORIST OR AS AN ISLAMIC 
IDEOLOGUE? 
 
SEE ABOVE.  REACTION VARIES. 
 
K.  (S) HOW IS BIN LADIN'S MESSAGE DISSEMINATED? 
 
THE INTERNET, INTERNATIONAL ARAB PRESS, AND SATELLITE TELEVISION 
GUARANTEE THE DISSEMINATION OF BIN LADIN'S MESSAGES.  THE INTENSE 
FOCUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ON BIN LADIN FOLLOWING THE 
BOMBINGS OF EMBASSIES NAIROBI AND DAR ES-SALAAM HAS ASSURED BIN 
LADIN'S NOTORIETY AMONG EVEN THE MOST ISOLATED SAUDIS. 
INTERNATIONAL ARABIC JOURNALS SUCH AS AL-HAYAT, AL-SHARQ AL- 
AWSAT, AND AL-QUDS AL-ARABI ARE ALSO WIDELY READ HERE. 
 
L.  (S) WHAT COMMUNICATION DOES BIN LADIN HAVE WITH SAUDI 
SOCIETY? 
 
SEE ABOVE. 
 
M.  (S) SAUDI PUBLIC OR PRIVATE FUNDING OF BIN LADIN? 
 
THE SAG DOES NOT PROVIDE FUNDS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO BIN 
LADIN OR HIS FOLLOWERS THROUGH ANY ORGANIZATION.  THE SAG 
MONITORS PRIVATE SAUDI DONATIONS TO PRIVATE CHARITIES, BUT IT IS 
LIKELY THAT SOME MONEY MAKES ITS WAY TO ORGANIZATIONS WITH LINKS 
TO BIN LADIN.  FOR EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO "AL-HAYAT" ISLAMIC 
MOVEMENT SPECIALIST JAMAL KHASHOGGI, JIHAD IS ONE OF THE 
LEGITIMATE USES FOR ZAKAT, THE MANDATORY ISLAMIC TAX.  SAUDI 
GRAND MUFTI SHAYKH BIN BAZ HAS ISSUED A NUMBER OF FATWAS SAYING 
THAT ZAKAT CAN BE GIVEN IN FOR JIHAD IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, 
MOST RECENTLY FOR EXAMPLE, TO SUPPORT THE "JIHAD" IN KASHMIR. 
BIN LADIN IS KNOWN TO HAVE LINKS WITH GROUPS IN KASHMIR. 
 
IT IS WIDELY RUMORED IN THE BUSINESS AND BANKING COMMUNITY IN 
RIYADH THAT THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF USAMA'S MONEY WAS A $300 
MILLION SETTLEMENT HE OBTAINED WHEN HIS FAMILY BOUGHT OUT HIS 
SHARE IN THE MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR BIN LADIN GROUP CONGLOMERATE. 
 
N.  (S)  STATUS OF THE BIN LADIN FAMILY FOLLOWING BOMBINGS: 
 
THE BIN LADIN FAMILY'S STATUS HAS NOT CHANGED.  IT HAS PUBLICLY 
DISASSOCIATED ITSELF FROM USAMA, AND REMAINS CLOSELY LINKED TO 
THE ROYAL FAMILY AND HIGHLY RESPECTED IN BUSINESS CIRCLES. 
 
O.  (S)  ACCOMMODATION WITH THE AL SAUD: 
 
BIN LADIN HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT HE WOULD REACH AN 
"ACCOMMODATION" WITH THE AL SAUD ONLY IF THEY MET HIS CONDITIONS 
OF EXPELLING U.S. TROOPS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND IMPLEMENTING THE 
ISLAMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS HE AND THE AWAKENING PREACHERS HAVE 
DEMANDED. 
 
P.  (S)  CONNECTIONS/OVERLAP BETWEEN BIN LADIN'S MESSAGE AND 
MAINSTREAM SAUDI ULAMA: 
 
THERE IS NOT MUCH OVERLAP BETWEEN BIN LADIN, WHO IS A RADICAL 
ACTIVIST, AND THE "MAINSTREAM" ULAMA, WHOSE JOB IS TO LEGITIMIZE 
AL SAUD RULE, EXCEPT REGARDING THE ISSUE OF ISRAEL, WHERE INTENSE 
FRUSTRATION OVER LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS IS LEADING 
MANY MEMBERS OF THE ULAMA TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION THAT 
ACCOMMODATION WITH ISRAEL IS POSSIBLE. 
 
Q.  (S)  APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC "AWAKENING" MOVEMENT: 
 
THE AWAKENING MOVEMENT'S APPEAL REACHES BEYOND THE UNEMPLOYED AND 
THE RELIGIOUS ELITE.  A LOOK AT WHO SIGNED THE 1992 "MEMORANDUM 
OF ADVICE" TO KING FAHD REVEALS A COALITION OF CLERICS, ACADEMICS 
(INCLUDING WESTERN-TRAINED SCHOLARS AND SCIENTISTS), AND 
RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL SCHOLARS THROUGHOUT SAUDI ARABIA.  RIOTS IN 
BURAYDA FOLLOWING THE FIRST ARREST OF SALMAN AL-AWDAH 
DEMONSTRATED THE WIDE POPULAR FOLLOWING HE ENJOYS IN THE QASSIM 
REGION.  THE AWAKENING MOVEMENT IS IN MANY WAYS A REACTION TO THE 
IMMENSE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES --AND ATTENDANT 
DISLOCATIONS-- THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS UNDERGONE IN THE LAST THIRTY 
YEARS.  IT IS ALSO A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICY 
FAILURES, THE MILITARY  INADEQUACIES REVEALED BY THE GULF WAR, 
AND A RELIGIOUSLY-BASED EDUCATION SYSTEM THAT HAS FAILED TO TRAIN 
SAUDI YOUTH TO FUNCTION IN A MODERN ECONOMY.  IN THE FACE OF 
DECLINING STANDARDS OF LIVING, GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE 
COMPLEXITIES IMPOSED BY MODERNIZATION, THE AWAKENING MOVEMENT'S 
SIMPLE PRESCRIPTION OF A RETURN TO CORE ISLAMIC VALUES HAS WIDE, 
AND WE BELIEVE, GROWING APPEAL, DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S MASSIVE 
EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS THE MOVEMENT.  IT IS BOTH BROADER-BASED AND 
DEEPER IN ITS SUPPORT THAN BIN LADIN'S "AL-QA'IDAH." 
 
R.  (S)  COMMUNICATIONS OF JAILED PREACHERS AL-AWDAH AND AL- 
HAWALI WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD: 
 
AS FAR AS WE ARE ABLE TO DISCERN, THE PREACHERS' COMMUNICATIONS 
WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD HAVE BEEN VERY LIMITED OF LATE.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE MANAGED TO SMUGGLE 
OUT ANY LETTERS OR TAPED MESSAGES TO THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE LAST 
YEAR, WHEREAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR INCARCERATION, REPORTS OF 
SUCH MESSAGES APPEARED PERIODICALLY. 
 
S.  (S)  EXPECTATIONS AMONG SUPPORTERS OF AL-AWDAH AND AL-HAWALI 
THAT THE PREACHERS WILL NOT RENOUNCE THEIR BELIEFS, AND WILL BE 
RELEASED: 
 
THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY EXPECTATION THAT EITHER AL-AWDAH 
OR AL-HAWALI WILL RENOUNCE HIS BELIEFS IN EXCHANGE FOR FREEDOM. 
HOWEVER, GIVEN THAT ANOTHER FIREBRAND PREACHER, SHAYKH AYIDH AL- 
QARNI, WAS RELEASED ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER AWAKENING PREACHERS 
AND SYMPATHIZERS LAST RAMADAN (RIYADH 292), IT IS POSSIBLE THAT 
SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW FOR THEIR RELEASE MIGHT 
BE REACHED.  APPARENTLY BOTH PREACHERS ARE IN POOR HEALTH, AND IT 
IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD BE RELEASED FOR HEALTH REASONS. 
 
T.  (S)  COMMON SAUDI VIEW OF CHRISTIANS/JEWS: 
 
ACCORDING TO THE PURITANICAL AND XENOPHOBIC WAHHABI BRAND OF 
ISLAM PRACTICED IN SAUDI ARABIA, ALL NON-MUSLIMS ARE CONSIDERED 
TO BE "UNBELIEVERS."  SOPHISTICATED SCHOLARS WILL EXPLAIN THAT 
THIS MEANS THAT NON-MUSLIMS ARE CONSIDERED "UNBELIEVERS" VIS A 
VIS THE MESSAGE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD, BUT THAT CHRISTIANS AND 
JEWS, AS "PEOPLE OF THE BOOK," ARE DUE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION 
SINCE THEY WORSHIP THE SAME GOD AND FOLLOW MANY OF THE SAME 
PROPHETS.  LESS SOPHISTICATED SAUDIS TEND TO SIMPLY VIEW ALL NON- 
MUSLIMS AS UNBELIEVERS WITHOUT MAKING THIS DISTINCTION.  EDUCATED 
SAUDIS WHO HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO THE WEST TEND NOT TO BE TROUBLED 
BY THIS, BUT SOME CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS SAUDIS ARE CONCERNED 
ABOUT DEALING WITH NON-MUSLIMS TO THE POINT WHERE THEY WONDER IF 
IT IS PROPER TO USE THE TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC GREETING, "PEACE BE 
UPON YOU," WITH A NON-MUSLIM.   GROWING FRUSTRATION WITH THE 
PEACE PROCESS AND THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE AND THE DAMAGE TO 
IRAQI SOCIETY AS A RESULT OF EIGHT YEARS OF U.N. SANCTIONS ALSO 
COMPLICATE VIEWS OF JEWS AND CHRISTIANS; A WIDELY SHARED BELIEF 
IS THAT THE U.S. INABILITY TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO MAKE CONCESSIONS 
IN THE PEACE PROCESS OR REMOVE SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER ARE 
ACTUALLY INTENTIONAL AND STEM FROM AN INNATE HOSTILITY TO THE 
MUSLIM WORLD.  THIS BELIEF IS SKILLFULLY EXPLOITED BY PEOPLE LIKE 
BIN LADIN. 
 
THERE IS A DEBATE AMONG SAUDI SCHOLARS ABOUT CONTACT WITH NON- 
MUSLIMS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER MUSLIMS SHOULD VISIT NON-MUSLIM 
COUNTRIES, AND WHETHER CHRISTIANS AND JEWS TODAY CAN BE 
CONSIDERED "PEOPLE OF THE BOOK."   AT THE HEART OF THE DEBATE ARE 
TWO SAYINGS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD:  FIRST, "I WILL 
MOVE THE JEWS AND THE CHRISTIANS OUT OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND 
I WILL LEAVE ONLY MUSLIMS IN IT."  AND SECOND, "THERE CANNOT BE 
TWO RELIGIONS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA."  THE FIRST IS A SAYING 
WHOSE AUTHENTICITY IS WELL-DOCUMENTED AND ACCEPTED BY MOST MUSLIM 
SCHOLARS; THE SECOND IS CONSIDERED FLAWED SINCE IT IS MISSING 
SOME OF THE DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED FOR COMPLETE AUTHENTICATION. 
USAMA BIN LADIN AND THE AWAKENING PREACHERS POINT TO THE FIRST 
SAYING AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENCE OF NON- 
MUSLIM TROOPS IN THE KINGDOM.  SOME CONSERVATIVE CLERICS SAY IT 
MEANS THAT JEWS AND CHRISTIANS DISTORTED THEIR HOLY BOOKS TO THE 
POINT THAT THEY CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED "PEOPLE OF THE BOOK" 
WORTHY OF SPECIAL TREATMENT, AND THEREFORE MUST BE REMOVED FROM 
THE KINGDOM.  SOME SCHOLARS, SUCH AS FORMER MADINAH IMAM SHAYKH 
AL-HUTHAYFI, USE THIS SAYING TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTION THAT 
THERE CAN BE NO ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND JEWS AND 
CHRISTIANS.  MORE TOLERANT SCHOLARS SAY THAT THIS SAYING MUST BE 
CONSIDERED IN ITS CONTEXT, THAT THE PROPHET WAS REFERRING TO 
JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN FIGHTERS AND WAS NOT REFERRING TO ALL JEWS 
AND CHRISTIANS.  THE SECOND SAYING IS WHAT MANY CONSERVATIVE 
SCHOLARS CONSIDER TO BE THE BASIS FOR THE INJUNCTION AGAINST 
PUBLIC NON-MUSLIM WORSHIP IN THE KINGDOM. 
 
U.  (S)  DOES SAG TOLERANCE OF PRIVATE NON-MUSLIM WORSHIP 
EXACERBATE ANTI-CHRISTIAN, ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS AMONG SAUDIS? 
 
THE SAG'S MORE TOLERANT POLICY HAS NOT BEEN IN EFFECT FOR VERY 
LONG AND IS NOT PUBLICIZED, SO IT IS PERHAPS TOO EARLY TO 
DETERMINE IF A BACKLASH HAS DEVELOPED.  THUS FAR, EMBASSY HAS NO 
EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASE IN ANTI-CHRISTIAN OR ANTI-AMERICAN 
FEELINGS ATTRIBUTABLE TO SAG TOLERANCE OF PRIVATE NON-MUSLIM 
WORSHIP. 
 
V.  (S)  SHIFT IN TONE OR CONTENT OF AVERAGE FRIDAY SERMON OVER 
THE LAST FIVE YEARS: 
 
SINCE THE SAG CRACK-DOWN ON THE AWAKENING MOVEMENT THAT BEGAN IN 
1994, FRIDAY SERMONS HAVE BEEN LARGELY DE-POLITICIZED.  THE SAG'S 
RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT IN 1994 PUT THE 
MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC AFFAIRS IN CHARGE OF IMAMS AND THE CONTENT OF 
SERMONS, STRICTLY LIMITING THE ABILITY OF ANY PREACHER TO DO 
ANYTHING BUT TOE THE AL SAUD LINE.  POLITICAL TOPICS OCCASIONALLY 
COME UP, AS IN THE CASE OF THE PUBLIC INSULT OF FORMER IRANIAN 
PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI AT THE PROPHET'S MOSQUE IN MADINAH, BUT 
IMAMS WHO STRAY FROM THEIR APPROVED TEXT RARELY GET A SECOND 
CHANCE.  ON THE SOCIAL FRONT, HOWEVER, IMAMS ARE GIVEN MUCH MORE 
FREEDOM, AND TOPICS SUCH AS THE ROLE OF WOMEN, TREATMENT OF 
SERVANTS, PROPER BEHAVIOR DURING RAMADAN, FOREIGN TRAVEL, 
CONTACTS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN, ETC., ARE VIGOROUSLY DEBATED FROM 
PULPITS AROUND THE COUNTRY. 
 
 
2.  (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
FOWLER