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Viewing cable 98ISLAMABAD8066, PAKISTAN: FUNDAMENTALISM AND SUPPORT FOR OSAMA BIN LADEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
98ISLAMABAD8066 1998-10-27 13:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
O 271308Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1169
INFO USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA 
COMUSNAVCENT //POLAD, IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPB J5//
USMISSION GENEVA 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 
AMEMBASSY ALMATY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008066 
 
DEPT FOR D, P, SA/PAB; LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR 
POL/RAVELING 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  10/27/08 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: FUNDAMENTALISM AND SUPPORT FOR OSAMA BIN LADEN 
AND THE TALIBAN IN THE PUNJABI COUNTRYSIDE (C-NA8-01076) 
 
REFS:  (A) STATE 190698, (B) ISLAMABAD 7155 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN R. SCHMIDT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR.  REASON 1.5(D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH A SAMPLING OF RURAL 
PUNJABI POLITICIANS PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT RECRUITMENT TO MILITANT 
RELIGIOUS GROUPS IS INCREASING IN POORER AREAS OF THE PUNJABI 
COUNTRYSIDE (PRIMARILY SOUTHERN PUNJAB), BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT A MASS FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT IS IN THE PROCESS OF 
DEVELOPING.  THESE SAME SOURCES ALSO CONTEND THAT OSAMA BIN LADEN 
AND THE TALIBAN ARE HIGHLY POPULAR AMONG POORLY EDUCATED PEOPLE 
IN RURAL AREAS (AND PROBABLY URBAN AREAS AS WELL).  SUCH 
POPULARITY DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED, BUT 
EXISTS AT THE LEVEL OF POPULAR CULTURE, REFLECTING THE NEED FOR 
SUCCESSFUL ROLE MODELS ON THE PART OF ORDINARY MUSLIMS FED UP 
WITH THE FAILURE OF SUCCESSIVE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS TO MEET 
BASIC HUMAN NEEDS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL A, POLCOUNS HAS RECENTLY SPOKEN 
WITH THREE PML MNAS REPRESENTING RURAL CONSTITUENCIES IN THE 
PUNJABI COUNTRYSIDE.  THE THREE ARE MUMTAZ AHMED TARAR, A NAWAZ 
SHARIF LOYALIST WHO SERVES AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSEMBLY PUBLIC 
SERVICES COMMITTEE, COL (R) GHULAM SARWAR CHEEMA, A PARTY 
SWITCHING FORMER PPP MINISTER OF STATE WHO NOW SERVES AS CHAIRMAN 
OF THE ASSEMBLY DEFENSE COMMITTEE, AND SARDAR MANSOOR HAYAT KHAN 
TAMMAN, A LIBERAL-MINDED MNA NOW SERVING AS CHAIRMAN OF THE 
FINANCE COMMITTEE, TO WHOM POLCOUNS PAID A REPEAT VISIT.  THE 
SUBJECT WAS SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE TALIBAN IN 
THE PUNJABI COUNTRYSIDE. 
 
3.  (C) IN THE JUDGMENT OF POLCOUNS, TARAR WAS THE MOST 
COMPELLING WITNESS.  IN A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION, HE CONTENDED 
THAT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM (DEFINED AS SUPPORT FOR MILITANT 
RELIGIOUS GROUPS) IS A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM ONLY IN RURAL 
DISTRICTS CHARACTERIZED BY LARGE LANDHOLDINGS (I.E., QUASI-FEUDAL 
AREAS), WHERE THERE WAS A STARK DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HAVES AND HAVE 
NOTS.  THE ECONOMIC DISPARITY IN THESE REGIONS HELPED TO FUEL 
EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES.  HE CITED THE MULTAN, BAHAWALPUR, 
MIANWALI AND SARGHODA AREAS AS EXAMPLES.  IN OTHER DISTRICTS, 
WHERE SMALL LANDHOLDERS PREVAIL AND THERE IS A FUNCTIONING MIDDLE 
CLASS, THERE ARE FEWER SOCIAL TENSIONS AND EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS 
ATTITUDES ARE HELD BY ONLY BY A FEW.  HIS OWN DISTRICT, MANDI 
BAHAUDIN IN CENTRAL PUNJAB, FELL INTO THE LATTER CATEGORY.  LESS 
THAN ONE PERCENT OF HIS CONSTITUENTS BELONGED TO MILITANT GROUPS, 
USUALLY THE SUNNI SECTARIAN SIPAH-E-SAHABA PAKISTAN (SSP). 
 
4.  (C) TARAR SAID THE CASE WAS QUITE DIFFERENT WITH RESPECT TO 
SUPPORT FOR OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE TALIBAN.  HE BELIEVED THAT 
UPWARDS OF NINETY PERCENT OF THE CONSTITUENTS IN HIS DISTRICT 
AND, INDEED, THROUGHOUT URBAN AND RURAL PUNJAB, HAVE A HIGHLY 
FAVORABLE OPINION OF BOTH BIN LADEN AND THE TALIBAN.  HE OPINED 
THAT BIN LADEN IS THE HERO OF THE MOMENT IN PAKISTAN AND WOULD 
WIN ANY ELECTION IN A LANDSLIDE.  THIS WAS NOT DUE TO ANY 
WELLSPRING OF FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS SUPPORT.  HIS OWN 
CONSTITUENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE NOT PARTICULARLY RELIGIOUS.  IT 
WAS DUE RATHER TO THE FACT THAT BIN LADEN AND THE TALIBAN 
APPEARED TO ORDINARY FOLK AS ISLAMIC HEROES WHO HAD NOT ONLY 
STOOD UP TO THE ANTI-ISLAMIC WEST BUT WERE SUCCESSFUL IN SO 
DOING.  THIS WAS A HEADY CONTRAST TO THE PERCEIVED INEFFECTUALITY 
OF THEIR OWN LEADERS. 
 
5.  (C) TARAR ADDED THAT SUPPORT FOR THE 15TH AMENDMENT WAS 
SIMILARLY WIDESPREAD IN HIS DISTRICT.  THIS WAS NOT DUE TO 
RELIGIOUS CONVICTION, BUT BECAUSE HIS CONSTITUENTS BELIEVED THAT 
IT WOULD EMPOWER THE GOVERNMENT TO BRING SWIFT JUSTICE AND LAW 
AND ORDER TO THE COUNTRY.  DESPITE THE POPULARITY OF BIN LADEN 
AND THE TALIBAN IN RURAL AREAS, TARAR SAW LITTLE DANGER THAT 
PEOPLE FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE COULD BE PERSUADED TO TAKE MILITANT 
ACTION.  THEY WERE INVOLVED IN THE DAY TO DAY STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE 
AND TOO REMOVED FROM THE CENTERS OF POWER.  HIS OWN CONSTITUENTS 
WERE MUCH MORE FOCUSED ON OBTAINING GOVERNMENT LOANS WHICH COULD 
BE USED TO PAY AGENTS TO SMUGGLE THEM INTO WESTERN COUNTRIES.  HE 
ESTIMATED THAT FIVE TO TEN PERCENT OF HIS CONSTITUENTS WERE 
WORKING OR HAD WORKED ABROAD.  THE REAL DANGER CAME FROM THE 
URBAN AREAS, WHERE THERE WAS A MUCH LARGER CADRE OF 
FUNDAMENTALIST RABBLE ROUSERS WHO COULD POTENTIALLY MOBILIZE 
LARGE NUMBERS OF DISAFFECTED YOUNG PEOPLE. 
 
6.  (C) THE URBANE, HIGHLY POLISHED COL CHEEMA REPRESENTS A RURAL 
PUNJABI CONSTITUENCY NEAR GUJRANWALA AND OWNS PROPERTY IN THREE 
OTHERS (NEAR LAHORE, FAISALABAD AND JHANG).  HE WAS MUCH MORE 
IMPRESSIONISTIC AND LESS SPECIFIC IN HIS OWN VIEWS ABOUT 
FUNDAMENTALISM IN RURAL PUNJAB.  HIS OWN BELIEF WAS THAT THE 
FAILURE OF SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE 
PEOPLE HAD DESTROYED THE FAITH OF ORDINARY PAKISTANIS IN THE 
ABILITY OF THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL CLASS (MILITARY AND 
CIVILIAN) TO PROVIDE GOOD GOVERNMENT AND SATISFY BASIC ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL NEEDS.  THIS, IN TURN, HAD MADE THEM MORE SUSCEPTIBLE 
TO ALTERNATIVE MESSAGES, SUCH AS THOSE CONVEYED TWO DECADES AGO 
BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND, MORE RECENTLY, BY THE TALIBAN. 
 
7.  (C) RICH WITH ANECDOTES, HE TOLD THE STORY OF AN ELDERLY 
WOMAN WHO HAD COME TO HIM FOR HELP DURING A RECENT VISIT TO HIS 
DISTRICT.  ALTHOUGH THE ONLY ELECTRICAL ITEM IN HER ONE ROOM 
HOUSE WAS A LIGHT BULB HER BILL AMOUNTED TO 3000 RUPEES (60 
DOLLARS, A FORMIDABLE SUM).  ALTHOUGH SHE HAD A FAN, SHE COULD 
NOT AFFORD TO RUN IT.  CHEEMA SAID THAT, WHILE HE HAD MANAGED TO 
GET HER BILL REDUCED TO 2500 RUPEES, THE WOMAN WAS TYPICAL OF THE 
CASES HE GETS DURING HIS WEEKLY AUDIENCES WITH CONSTITUENTS.  HIS 
CONSTITUENTS WERE BENDING UNDER THE WEIGHT OF INCREASING POVERTY, 
WHICH MADE THEM MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO RADICAL RELIGIOUS MESSAGES. 
 
8.  (C) CHEEMA ALSO BEMOANED THE MANY FUNDAMENTALIST MADRASSAS 
(RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS) THAT HAD SPRUNG UP RECENTLY.  HE TOLD THE 
STORY OF THE SON OF A CONSTITUENT WHO HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO DROP 
OUT OF STANFORD BY A VISITING PAKISTANI "TABLIGHI" (LAY ISLAMIC 
PROSELYTIZER) AND RETURN TO PAKISTAN TO ENROLL IN A MADRASSA NEAR 
LAHORE.  HE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN LOST TO HIS FAMILY, WHO 
STRUGGLED TO GAIN PERMISSION TO SEE HIM AND RECEIVED FOR THEIR 
TROUBLES A PERFUNCTORY HELLO AND GOOD-BYE.  HIS SENSE WAS THAT 
RECRUITMENT TO RADICAL MADRASSAS HAD BEEN SHARPLY ON THE INCREASE 
RECENTLY, SERVING AS A MAGNET FOR DISAFFECTED YOUTH.  MUHAMMAD 
KHALID MASUD, PROFESSOR OF ISLAMIC LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ECHOED THIS IN A CONVERSATION WITH POLCOUNS 
ON OCTOBER 24 CONTENDING THAT EXTREMIST VIEWS WERE COMING TO 
DOMINATE THE ENTIRE MADRASSA SYSTEM. 
 
9.  (C) CHEEMA SAID IT WAS HIS SENSE THAT SUCH TRENDS WERE 
FRAYING AT THE VERY FABRIC OF PAKISTANI SOCIETY, CAUSING THE 
COUNTRY TO BEGIN COMING APART AT THE SEAMS.  SWITCHING METAPHORS, 
HE LIKENED PAKISTAN TO A DRIED OUT BALE OF HAY THAT NEEDED ONLY 
THE SLIGHTEST OF SPARKS TO SET IT ALIGHT.  NOTING THE SHARP 
INCREASE IN SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND APPEARANCE OF MYRIAD SECTS ALL 
HOLDING THEIR OWN MONOPOLIES ON THE TRUTH, HE FEARED THAT ONCE 
THE SPARK WAS LIT ALL THESE GROUPS WOULD BE AT EACH OTHERS 
THROATS.  LOOKING AT POLCOUNS RUEFULLY, HE COMMENTED THAT WHILE 
POLCOUNS WOULD SERVE IN PAKISTAN FOR ONLY A YEAR OR TWO, HE AND 
HIS COUNTRYMEN WERE CONDEMNED TO REMAIN BEHIND. 
 
10.  (C) IN ADDITION TO MEETING WITH TARAR AND CHEEMA, POLCOUNS 
ALSO PAID A RETURN VISIT TO SARDAR MANSOOR HAYAT KHAN TAMMAN, WHO 
HAD EARLIER REPORTED A SHARP INCREASE IN FUNDAMENTALISM AND PRO- 
TALIBAN SENTIMENT IN HIS RURAL PUNJABI DISTRICT (REFTEL B). 
TAMMAN DID NO BACKING AWAY FROM HIS EARLIER COMMENTS ABOUT 
FUNDAMENTALISM TAKING HOLD IN HIS DISTRICT.  HE SAID THE POVERTY 
IN HIS DISTRICT HAD HELPED ATTRACT CONVERTS TO RADICAL RELIGIOUS 
GROUPS.  AKRAM AWAN, A MIDDLE CLASS LANDLORD AND FOUNDER OF THE 
RADICAL AKHAN UL MUSLIMIN PARTY, ALSO HAILS FROM HIS DISTRICT. 
LIKE TARAR HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT, SINCE THE U.S. CRUISE MISSILE 
STRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE FORMERLY UNKNOWN OSAMA BIN LADEN HAD 
BECOME A CELEBRITY AND SOMETHING OF A FOLK HERO AMONG THE 
ORDINARY PEOPLE IN HIS DISTRICT. 
 
11.  (C) SOME OF THE ABOVE OBSERVATIONS HAVE BEEN ALSO BEEN NOTED 
BY CONSULATE LAHORE.  PO WAS STRUCK BY THE LARGE NUMBER OF FLAGS, 
BANNERS AND SLOGANS FOR THE JIHADIST LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (LT) HE 
NOTED IN SAHIWAL DISTRICT DURING A RECENT VISIT TO HARAPPA.  THIS 
GROUP SPECIALIZES IN RECRUITING YOUNG PUNJABIS TO FIGHT IN 
KASHMIR.  CONSULATE CONTACTS HAVE ALSO NOTED A CONTINUING 
STRENGTHENING IN SUPPORT FOR THE SSP IN RURAL PARTS OF KHANEWAL, 
TOBA TEK SINGH AND MULTAN DISTRICTS.  THE SSP ALSO RECENTLY 
CAPTURED CONTROL OF THE JHANG MUNICIPALITY (ITS URBAN BIRTHPLACE) 
ALTHOUGH THE RURAL JHANG HINTERLAND REMAINS FIRMLY UNDER THE 
CONTROL OF THE LOCAL SHIA LANDLORD.  ACCORDING TO CONSULATE 
LAHORE, MILITANT GROUPS SUCH AS THE SSP AND THE LT APPEAR TO BE 
EXPANDING THEIR SUPPORT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MORE TRADITIONAL 
RELIGIOUS PARTIES, SUCH AS JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI AND JAMAAT-ULEMA-I- 
ISLAM. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT: IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO BUILD A CLEAR PICTURE 
OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES IN THE PUNJABI COUNTRYSIDE 
BASED ON A SMALL HANDFUL OF CONVERSATIONS.  WE DO NOT BELIEVE 
THAT THERE IS ANYTHING LIKE A MASS FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT 
DEVELOPING IN THE RURAL AREAS.  OUR SENSE, RATHER, IS THAT THE 
CONTINUING DETERIORATION IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IS FUELING A 
STEADY INCREASE IN THE RECRUITMENT OF DISAFFECTED YOUNG PEOPLE 
INTO RADICAL RELIGIOUS GROUPS LIKE THE SSP IN AREAS OF RURAL 
PUNJAB (PRIMARILY THE SOUTH) WHERE POVERTY BITES THE HARDEST.  IN 
RAISING A RED FLAG, TAMMAN IS PROBABLY REACTING MORE TO AN 
IMPROVEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY OF A LOCAL MILITANT 
GROUP WITH PRO-TALIBAN SYMPATHIES THAN TO A LARGESCALE INCREASE 
IN NUMBERS.  FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THE DANGER IS NOT THAT RURAL 
PUNJAB IS TURNING FUNDAMENTALIST, BUT THAT RADICAL RELIGIOUS 
GROUPS ARE MAKING INROADS HERE JUST AS IN URBAN AREAS, FRAYING 
GRADUALLY BUT INEXORABLY AT THE STABILITY OF THE STATE. 
 
13.  COMMENT CONT.  AS FOR THE ALLEGED WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR 
OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE TALIBAN AMONG ORDINARY PEOPLE, OUR 
INSTINCTS TELL US THIS MAY WELL BE CORRECT, BUT FOR THE REASONS 
CITED BY TARAR.  SUCH ATTITUDES DO NOT REFLECT RADICAL RELIGIOUS 
SENTIMENT OR EVEN ACTIVIST POLITICAL SUPPORT BUT OPERATE AT THE 
LEVEL OF POPULAR CULTURE, WITH BIN LADEN AND THE TALIBAN VIEWED 
AS A SUCCESSFUL ISLAMIC ROLE MODELS.  (PUNJABIS, AFTER ALL, ARE 
MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS IN KASHMIR THAN IN 
AFGHANISTAN.) 
 
14.  COMMENT CONT.  NONETHELESS, THE FACT THAT BIN LADEN AND THE 
TALIBAN CAN FUNCTION AS CULTURAL ICONS IS CLEARLY AN INDICTMENT 
OF THE PAKISTANI POLITICAL CLASS, WHICH HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO 
PROVIDE EITHER GOOD GOVERNMENT OR POSITIVE ROLE MODELS.  IT IS 
ALSO AN INDICATION OF THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF ORDINARY PAKISTANIS 
TO ANTI-WESTERN PROPAGANDA, ITSELF NOURISHED BY THE FAILURE OF 
SUCCESSIVE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS TO DELIVER THE GOODS, BUT 
REFLECTING ALSO THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF YEARS OF WHAT HAS BEEN 
PERCEIVED HERE AS ANTI-ISLAMIC BEHAVIOR BY THE UNITED STATES. 
END COMMENT. 
 
 
MILAM