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Viewing cable 98BEIRUT3820, LEBANESE PARLIAMENT ELECTS ARMY COMMANDER EMILE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
98BEIRUT3820 1998-10-15 16:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
O 151605Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7575
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003820 
 
PARIS FOR LEAF 
NICOSIA FOR ERDMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL 10/01/08 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR PREL LE
SUBJECT:  LEBANESE PARLIAMENT ELECTS ARMY COMMANDER EMILE 
          LAHUD AS PRESIDENT 
 
REFS:  A) STATE 190962  B) DAMASCUS 6387 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DAVID M. SATTERFIELD. 
REASONS 1.5 (B AND D). 
 
2.  (C) SUMMARY:  RATIFYING THE NAME WHICH EMERGED FROM LAST 
WEEK'S SUMMIT BETWEEN LEBANESE PRESIDENT HRAWI AND SYRIAN 
PRESIDENT ASAD, THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT TODAY ELECTED LAF 
COMMANDER EMILE LAHUD AS LEBANON'S ELEVENTH PRESIDENT BY A 
QUASI-UNANIMOUS VOTE OF 118 (AND 10 ABSTENTIONS).  WHILE 
UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES NO PRESIDENT COULD BE CHOSEN 
WITHOUT DAMASCUS' BLESSING, LAHUD APPEARS TO BE A GENUINE 
NATIONAL CONSENSUS CANDIDATE -- WITH MOST LEBANESE TAKING 
HOPE FROM LAHUD'S REPUTATION AS THE CORRUPTION-FREE 
REBUILDER OF A DECONFESSIONALIZED NATIONAL ARMY AND ABOVE 
ALL, A LEADER FROM OUTSIDE THE LARGELY DISCREDITED POLITICAL 
CLASS.  WITH MONTHS OF FEVERED SPECULATION OVER THE IDENTITY 
OF THEIR NEXT PRESIDENT NOW ENDED, AN EQUALLY INTENSE FOCUS 
WILL NOW TURN ON LAHUD'S POLITICAL PROGRAM AND THE 
COMPOSITION OF THE NEXT GOVERNMENT.  LAHUD AND HIS SOON-TO- 
BE COLLEAGUES IN THE TRIPARTITE PRESIDENCY, PM HARIRI AND 
SPEAKER BERRI, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE THEIR OWN IDEAS ABOUT 
THE NEW GOVERNMENT SHOULD RUN -- AS WILL DAMASCUS. 
EXPECTATIONS OF POSITIVE CHANGE ARE RUNNING HIGH HERE, AS IS 
SKEPTICISM OVER WHETHER ANY OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED TRULY 
WANT TO SEE SUCH CHANGE TAKE PLACE.  OUR CONTINUED PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE EMPHASIS ON STRENGTHENING LEBANON'S INSTITUTIONS 
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE WILL BE IMPORTANT, BUT WHETHER LEBANESE 
(AND OUR OWN) HOPES WILL BE FULFILLED REMAINS VERY MUCH TO 
BE SEEN.    END SUMMARY. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DAY (IN 
DAMASCUS) MAKES 
 
3.  (C)  MONTHS OF INTENSE SPECULATION AMONG LEBANON'S 
POLITICAL ELITES REGARDING THE IDENTITY OF THE NEXT 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC WERE ENDED WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT 
LATE ON OCTOBER 5 -- FOLLOWING PRESIDENT HRAWI'S SUMMIT WITH 
SYRIAN PRESIOENT ASAD -- THAT ARTICLE 49 OF THE LEBANESE 
CONSTITUTION WAS TO BE AMENDED TO PERMIT SENIOR GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS (LAF COMMANDING GENERAL EMILE LAHUD, FOR EXAMPLE) 
TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT.  WHILE HRAWI CERTAINLY WAS SEEKING 
ASAD'S APPROVAL FOR AN AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 49, IN HIS CASE 
TO PERMIT ANOTHER EXTENSION IN OFFICE, THE GENERAL CAME AWAY 
THE WINNER. 
 
4.  (C) COMMENT: ARTICLE 49 WAS ADDED AT THE TIME OF THE 
TAIF ACCORD TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBLE CANDIDACY OF THEN 
(REBEL)  LAF COMMANDER LTG MICHEL AOUN.  IRONICALLY, TODAY'S 
VOTE  COINCIDED WITH THE ANNIVERSARY OF AOUN'S FORCED 
DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON'S PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AT THE HANDS OF 
THE SYRIAN MILITARY AND THEIR LEBANESE ALLIES (EN ROUTE TO 
ULTIMATE EXILE IN FRANCE) ON 13 OCTOBER 199O.  AOUN TOLD THE 
PRESS IN PARIS THAT HE IS PREPARED TO RETURN TO LEBANON 
SHOULD LAHUD MAKE THE REQUEST -- AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
5.  (C) ACTING IN RECORD TIME AND WITH A VIGOR USUALLY 
UNKNOWN HERE, PRESIDENT HRAWI AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
PROMPTLY SENT TO THE PARLIAMENT THE REQUISITE AMENDMENT OF 
ARTICLE 49 WHICH WOULD PERMIT "FOR ONE TIME ONLY" AND ON AN 
EXCEPTIONAL BASIS THE CANDIDACY OF A SENIOR CIVIL SERVANT. 
MP BOUTROS HARB, A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT AND A DECLARED PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE, VOTED AGAINST THE AMENDMENT IN COMMITTEE.  LEGAL 
ANALYSTS, INCLUDING A MEMBER OF LEBANON'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
COUNCIL, TOLD EMBOFFS THAT THE DEBATE CENTERED ON WHETHER 
THE ONE-TIME EXCEPTION CLAUSE PROPOSED BY HRAWI WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO NULLIFY THE REQUIREMENT, EMBODIED IN LEBANESE 
ELECTORAL LAW, THAT THE CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN OUT OF 
ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS.  SINCE THE 
AMENDMENT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY CONSTITUTIONAL 
COUNCIL, THE POINT BECAME MOOT (ASSUMING THAT, UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, CONSTITUTIONAL SUBSTANCE AS OPPOSED TO FORM 
WAS EVER AT ISSUE) WHEN THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE APPROVED 
IT ON 12 OCTOBER. 
 
6.  (U) ON 14 OCTOBER THE FULL PARLIAMENT PASSED THE 
AMENDMENT BY A VOTE OF 113 TO 4 AGAINST (WITH 11 ABSTENTIONS 
-- COMPRISED MOSTLY OF DRUZE LEADER WALID JUMBLATT'S 
PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY AND ITS ALLIES).  FORMER PRIME 
MINISTER, MP OMAR KARAME, CONTINUED HIS TWO-YEAR BOYCOTT OF 
PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS AND REFUSED TO ATTEND THE SESSION 
DESPITE HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR GENERAL LAHUD.  (COMMENT: 
THE HASTY AMENDMENT PROCESS DID HAVE ONE POSITIVE OUTCOME: 
IT BROUGHT PM HARIRI AND SPEAKER BERRI TO TALK WITH EACH 
OTHER FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY MONTHS.  THE UNVEILING OF A 
STATUE OF LEBANON'S FIRST PRIME MINISTER AND INDEPENDENCE 
HERO, RIYAD SOLH, ON 14 OCTOBER, ALSO PROVIDED AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE TWO POLITICAL FOES TO COME TOGETHER, 
THIS TIME TO BASH THE TURKS (RECALLING OTTOMAN HEGEMONY AND 
OPPRESSION OF LEBANESE PATRIOTS SUCH AS AL-SOLH).  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
7.  (U) MP NASSIB LAHUD, AN UNDECLARED CONTENDER FOR THE 
PRESIDENCY, ARGUED FOR SIMPLY ABOLISHING THE PROBLEMATIC 
CLAUSES OF ARTICLE 49 RATHER THAN ADD A "ONE-TIME ONLY" 
PROVISION WHICH IN HIS VIEW WEAKENED THE CONSTITUTION.  "BY 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION FOR ONE TIME ONLY AND 
EXCEPTIONALLY ON THE EVE OF EVERY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, IS 
A STATE OF LAW AND INSTITUTIONS BEING BUILT?" HE TOLD THE 
PRESS (A SENTIMENT OTHER POLITICIANS AND ANALYSTS HERE HAVE 
EXPRESSED TO US PRIVATELY.)  HOWEVER, LAHUD, ESTRANGED 
COUSIN OF EMILE, SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED HIS INTENTION TO 
VOTE FOR THE GENERAL. 
 
ELECTION DAY ATMOSPHERICS:  A GOOD TIME HAD BY ALL 
 
8.  (U) THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WERE SUMMONED TO ATTEND THE 
ELECTORAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT AT 110O ON 15 OCTOBER.  WITH 
ALL BUT TEN (MOSTLY ALLIES OF DRUZE LEADER AND MINISTER OF 
DISPLACED WALID JUMBLATT) OF THE 128 DEPUTIES IN THEIR 
SEATS, SPEAKER NABIH BERRI MADE THIS TRAIN RUN ON TIME.  A 
SHOUT OF "WHY CAN'T WE JUST DECLARE THIS THING DONE" WAS MET 
BY MIXED LAUGHTER AND CRIES OF "GIVES US THE BALLOTS." 
AFTER COLLECTION OF THE SEALED UNMARKED ENVELOPES CONTAINING 
THE MPS' CHOICE, DEPUTY SPEAKER FERZLI OPENED EACH AND READ 
ALOUD (118 TIMES) THE NAME "EMILE LAHUD."  THIS PROCESS 
ELICITED STILL MORE GALES OF LAUGHTER AND BANTERING ON THE 
FLOOR, WITH BERRI AT ONE POINT ORDERING FERZLI TO "SPEED IT 
UP."  AT 11:25, EMILE LAHUD WAS DECLARED THE PRESIDENT- 
ELECT.  AS THE DIPLOMATS AND DEPUTIES DECAMPED, FRENCH 
AMBASSADOR JOUANNEAU SUMMED UP THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THOSE 
PRESENT BY DRYLY NOTING "QUELLE SURPRISE." 
 
HOPES FOR LAHUD 
 
9.  (C)  WHILE MOST LEBANESE RESENT SYRIAN DIRECTION OF THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE HASTY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 
THERE IS NEAR (AND TO US GENUINE) CONSENSUS SUPPORT FOR 
GENERAL LAHUD AS LEBANON'S NEXT PRESIDENT -- AND AS A 
CATALYST FOR MUCH-NEEDED CHANGE.  THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS AND 
CAVEATS IN THIS SUPPORT, HOWEVER.  JUMBLATT AND HIS DRUZE 
ALLIES REMAIN DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE MILITARY AND HIS 
RELATIONS WITH LAHUD CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE (AT BEST) 
PROBLEMATIC.  WHILE MOST MARONITES SEE LAHUD AS AMONG THE 
BEST OF THE POSSIBLE CANDIDATES (THEIR HEARTS WERE WITH 
NASSIB LAHUD OR BUTROS HARB) AND FAR SUPERIOR TO THE LIKES 
OF JEAN OBEYD OR ELIE HOBEIQA, THERE IS A RESERVOIR OF 
CONCERN THAT SYRIA WILL NOW DICTATE THE CHOICE OF LAHUD'S 
SUCCESSOR IN THE LAF AND WILL THUS HAVE BOTH THE PRESIDENT 
AND ARMY CHIEF BEHOLDEN TO THEIR WILL. 
 
10.  (C) ALTHOUGH FORMER PRESIDENT CHARLES HELOU TOLD THE 
AMBASSADOR ON 14 OCTOBER THAT HE VIEWED A LAHUD PRESIDENCY 
WITH GREAT OPTIMISM, MANY FROM HIS POLITICAL GENERATION 
RECALL THE REIGN OF PRESIDENT FOUAD SHEHAB (ALSO LAF 
COMMANDER BEFORE HIS ELECTION) WHOSE USE OF THE LAF G-2 TO 
MONITOR AND SHAPE POLITICAL DECISIONS WAS WIDELY RESENTED 
AND FEARED.   DESPITE SUCH RESERVATIONS, FROM HIZBALLAH TO 
THE MARONITE LEAGUE, LAHUD HAS A WIDE BODY OF SUPPORT ACROSS 
CONFESSIONAL LINES AND AMONG THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY.  KEY 
LEADERS IN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, NOTABLY PM HARIRI, HAVE 
BEEN QUICK TO PLEDGE PUBLICLY THEIR DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH 
THE NEW PRESIDENT. 
 
ITS THE ECONOMY, STUPID (AND THE SOCIETY, AND POLITICS) 
 
11.  (C) THE UNANSWERED QUESTION HERE IS WHAT, PRECISELY, 
THE NEW PRESIDENT INTENDS TO DO WITH THIS SUPPORT.  LEBANON 
FACES A VARIETY OF SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES:  THE NEED FOR 
URGENT ECONOMIC REFORMS, AN ALMOST WHOLLY DISCREDITED AND 
CORRUPT SPOILS SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND CONTINUING DRIFT IN 
SEARCH OF A NEW, POST-CIVIL WAR IDENTITY AND SENSE OF 
NATIONHOOD.  NOT ONE OF LEBANON'S MANY POLITICIANS, 
ECONOMISTS OR JOURNALISTS CLAIM TO KNOW WHAT IS IN LAHUD'S 
MIND OR WHETHER, IN FACT, HE HAS A PROGRAM FOR GOVERNANCE. 
THE ROLE AND AUTHORITY OF THE POST-TAIF PRESIDENT IS ITSELF 
AMBIGUOUS.  UNLIKE THE PRIME MINISTER AND SPEAKER OF THE 
PARLIAMENT, WHO HAVE CLEARLY DEFINED EXECUTIVE AND 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS AND PREROGATIVES, THE PRESIDENT -- BY THE 
TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION -- PLAYS A LARGELY SYMBOLIC ROLE. 
PERSONAL CORRUPTION, LACK OF INTEREST AND LIMITED 
CREDIBILITY AS A NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL STATESMAN 
RENDERED CURRENT PRESIDENT HRAWI UNFIT OR UNABLE TO TAKE ON 
ANY LARGER, MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES.  MANY HERE 
ARGUE THAT LAHUD CAN INDEED ASSUME A SIGNIFICANT ROLE AS AN 
EXEMPLAR OF PERSONAL ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT AND, BUILDING ON 
HIS SUCCESS WITH THE LAF, IN REBUILDING AND REINFORCING THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
12.  (C) ASSUMING THAT LAHUD DOES HAVE A CONCEPT OF WHAT HE 
WISHES TO DO AS PRESIDENT (THERE ARE SOME WHO ASSERT THAT 
LAHUD WANTS VERY MUCH TO BE PRESIDENT, BUT DOES NOT HAVE A 
CLEAR VISION OF WHAT HE WILL DO ONCE THERE), HE WILL FACE A 
FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE IN THE PERSON OF PM HARIRI -- WHO IS 
VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO CONTINUE AS PRIME MINISTER -- TO ANY 
ATTEMPT TO ACT IN A MANNER WHICH HARIRI WILL VIEW AS 
THREATENING HIS OWN PREEMINENCE.  FOR ALL HARIRI'S TALK OF 
SUPPORT FOR LAHUD AS "A STRONG PRESIDENT," THE CLEAR SUBTEXT 
IS "STRONG PRESIDENT, YES" BUT AS AN ASSET FOR HARIRI'S USE 
TO COUNTER SPEAKER BERRI.  THE PM TOLD AMBASSADOR SHORTLY 
BEFORE THE ELECTION THAT "I HOPE LAHUD WILL BE AN ALLY.  BUT 
IF HE THINKS HE CAN DICTATE TO ME ON HOW A NEW GOVERNMENT 
WILL BE FORMED OR TRIES TO BLOCK ME, I WILL CRUSH HIM." 
 
13.  (C) FOR HIS PART, BERRI WANTS A NEW GOVERNMENT COMPOSED 
OF PARLIAMENTARIANS.  FORMER SPEAKER HUSSEIN HUSSEINI -- NO 
FRIEND OF BERRI BUT LOYAL TO THE PARLIAMENT AND ITS ROLE -- 
TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON 14 OCTOBER THAT HE, TOO, FAVORED A 
GOVERNMENT OF DEPUTIES REPRESENTING ALL CONFESSIONS "IN THE 
SPIRIT OF TAIF."  THIS IS IN CONTRAST, HUSSEINI SAID, TO THE 
KNOWN INTENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO CREATE A CABINET OF 
"TECHNOCRATS." 
 
SYRIA:  WHAT DOES ASAD WANT? 
 
14.  (C) EMBASSY DAMASCUS' EXCELLENT DISCUSSION (REFTEL) OF 
THE VARYING INTERPRETATIONS POSSIBLE FOR SELECTION OF LAHUD 
MATCHES OUR OWN (AND OUR INTERLOCUTORS) UNCERTAINTY WHETHER 
DAMASCUS SEES IN LAHUD A STABILIZING FORCE IN THE BEST SENSE 
(STRENGTHENED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION) OR THE WORST 
(LAHUD AS YET ANOTHER PLAYER TO BE MANIPULATED IN ORDER TO 
PREVENT EMERGENCE OF ANY INDEPENDENT AND THUS THREATENING -- 
TO SYRIA -- LEBANESE POLITY).  THOSE WHO BELIEVE THE LATTER, 
E.G. MINISTER HOBEIQA, STATE FLATLY THAT THE SYRIANS WILL 
CONTROL THE OVERALL PROCESS OF FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT -- 
WHICH WILL MERELY BE A "RESHUFFLING" OF THE MINISTERIAL 
DOSSIERS RATHER THAN ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN APPROACH TO 
GOVERNANCE IN LEBANON.  HOBEIQA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON 9 
OCTOBER THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT "THINGS HAVE CHANGED IN 
SYRIA," BUT BELIEVED THAT IS PRECISELY WHY THE SYRIANS WANT 
A PRESIDENT LIKE LAHUD WHO HAS PROVEN HIMSELF PREDICTABLE, 
AND RELIABLE AS AN ALLY TO ASAD'S SON BASHAR IN DAYS TO 
COME.  HOBEIQA (SPEAKING HERE FOR A WIDE SPECTRUM OF 
LEBANON'S POLITICAL CLASS) DID NOT THINK LAHUD HAD THE 
EXPERIENCE NEED TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE.  "WHO MAKES CHANGE 
HERE?," HOBEIQA ASKED SARCASTICALLY.  "I HOPE THE GENERAL IS 
A GOOD TACTICIAN.  I AM SURE HE IS NOT.  PEOPLE SAY HE IS A 
GOOD GENERAL.  WHAT DOES IT MEAN?  HE NEVER HAD TO FIGHT, 
AND HE WILL FACE TESTS AHEAD." 
 
15.  (C) MOST LEBANESE HOPE LAHUD'S LEADERSHIP WILL MARK AN 
END TO THE SQUABBLING, INEFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
"TROIKA" (I.E., THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, AND SPEAKER). 
INDEED, REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING HERE THAT THE SYRIANS, 
PARTICULARLY ASAD HIMSELF, DO NOT WANT TO CONTINUE RECEIVING 
STREAMS OF LEBANESE VISITORS PLEADING THEIR CASES AND 
PROBLEMS IN DAMASCUS.  LAHUD MAY WELL PUT AN END TO SOME OF 
THIS ACTIVITY (JUST AS HE FORBADE JUNIOR OFFICERS TO HAVE 
CONTACT WITH THE SYRIANS OUTSIDE OF LEBANON).  BUT HERE 
AGAIN, THERE IS A DARKER READING OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS FROM 
SOME OF LEBANON'S MOST ASTUTE ANALYSTS, INCLUDING 
EDITORIALIST SARKIS NAOUM AND FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER FOUAD 
BUTROS.  THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT BEYOND HIS PROVEN RECORD AS 
A DEPENDABLE PARTNER TO SYRIA AND AN ASSET FOR THE FUTURE, 
SYRIA CHOSE LAHUD BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED THE MOST POTENT 
COUNTERWEIGHT THAT COULD BE POSED AGAINST HARIRI -- WHOSE 
PERCEIVED INDEPENDENCE NEEDED A MORE EFFECTIVE BALANCE THAN 
HRAWI COULD PROVIDE.  THEY ASSERT "LAHUD IS SEEN BY THE 
SYRIANS AS AN ANTI-HARIRI." 
 
16.  (C) COMMENT:  WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN FOR US?  LAHUD 
REMAINS A POLITICAL ENIGMA AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS IN 
PERMITTING HIS ELECTION -- ALBEIT TO POPULAR ACCLAIM -- ARE 
EVEN HARDER TO READ.  MUCH OF THE SKEPTICISM PREVALENT HERE 
IS WORTH TAKING ON BOARD, BUT LAHUD WILL STILL HAVE SOME 
TIME TO NAME A NEW GOVERNMENT AND ELABORATE HIS PROGRAM. 
WHETHER THIS WILL AMOUNT TO THE FORMATION OF A "THIRD 
REPUBLIC" CHARACTERIZED BY MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND 
LESS VENAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, OR MORE OF THE SAME SORT OF 
TURF BATTLES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE TROIKA REMAINS TO BE 
SEEN.  WE CLEARLY HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE FORMER.  THE 
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT WELCOMING LAHUD'S ELECTION AND 
EXPRESSING OUR HOPE THAT GOOD GOVERNANCE AND STRENGTHENING 
OF INSTITUTIONS WILL MARK HIS TENURE MAKES THE RIGHT POINTS. 
WE WILL BE PRESSING THOSE SAME THEMES IN OUR OWN DIALOGUE 
WITH LAHUD AND IN OUR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS FUTURE 
COLLEAGUES BERRI AND HARIRI.  END COMMENT 
 
SATTERFIELD