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Viewing cable 98BEIRUT3570, AMBASSADOR'S CALLS ON PARLIAMENTARY LEADERSHIP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
98BEIRUT3570 1998-09-29 14:20 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
O 291420Z SEP 98
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7429
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003570 
 
NICOSIA FOR ILMG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL 10/01/08 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KISL MEPP LE
SUBJECT:  AMBASSADOR'S CALLS ON PARLIAMENTARY LEADERSHIP 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD.  REASONS 1.5 
(B AND D). 
 
2.  (C) SUMMARY:  DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALLS 
AT THE PARLIAMENT, SPEAKER NABIH BERRI AND HIS DEPUTY ELIE 
FERZLI INDICATED THAT LAF COMMANDER GENERAL EMILE LAHUD IS 
THE MOST OBVIOUS CHOICE TO BECOME THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF 
LEBANON.  THEY HEDGED THEIR BETS BY NOTING THAT SEVERAL 
OTHER CANDIDATES (SUCH AS NASSIB LAHUD AND JEAN OBEID) ALSO 
HAD A CHANCE TO BECOME PRESIDENT.  BOTH EXPRESSED THE NEED 
TO ELECT A STRONG PRESIDENT TO COUNTERBALANCE THE POWER OF 
PRIME MINISTER RAFIQ AL-HARIRI.  THEY ALSO ASSERTED THAT THE 
ELECTION OF A MILITARY LEADER WOULD NOT ENDANGER "DEMOCRACY" 
IN LEBANON.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (C) AMBASSADOR PAID A COURTESY CALL ON SPEAKER BERRI ON 
24 SEPTEMBER.  AFTER EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT POLITICAL 
TURMOIL IN WASHINGTON WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "A PLOT TO 
UNDERMINE THE PRESIDENT," BERRI TURNED TO THE SITUATION IN 
SOUTHERN LEBANON AND DOMESTIC LEBANESE POLITICS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
SITUATION IN THE SOUTH: APPRECIATION FOR ILMG 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) BERRI EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE OF 
THE ISRAEL-LEBANON MONITORING GROUP (ILMG) IN CALMING DOWN 
THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH.  HE SAID THAT THE LOCAL 
POPULATION'S ATTACHMENT TO ILMG HAS BECOME SIMILAR TO THAT 
TOWARDS UNIFIL.  "IF WE DID NOT HAVE THE ILMG, WE DON'T KNOW 
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SOUTH," BERRI EMPHASIZED.  BERRI 
ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE ALWAYS URGES  THE RESISTANCE (I.E., 
HIZBALLAH AND AMAL) NOT TO LAUNCH ATTACKS FROM INSIDE 
VILLAGES.  SUCH ADVICE, IF HEEDED, WOULD DEPRIVE ISRAEL OF 
AN EXCUSE TO RETURN FIRE AGAINST THESE VILLAGES.  BERRI 
BELIEVED THE SITUATION, ALBEIT UNSTABLE, WAS BETTER THAN IN 
THE PAST AND THAT DAMAGES WERE LESS THAN LAST YEAR.  HE WAS 
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE MEPP. 
 
------------------------------------- 
EMILE LAHUD AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR CONGRATULATED BERRI ON HIS RECENT 
REELECTION TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AMAL MOVEMENT. 
REFLECTING ON HIZBALLAH AS A RIVAL FOR POLITICAL PROMINENCE, 
BERRI SAID THAT "ISRAEL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING 
HIZBALLAH ALIVE," BY CONTINUING -- THROUGH ITS OCCUPATION OF 
THE SOUTH -- TO PROVIDE A PLATFORM FROM WHICH HIZBALLAH 
COULD ADVANCE ITS POLITICAL STANDING AS THE "NATIONAL 
RESISTANCE."  BERRI WAS DISMISSIVE OF HIZBALLAH'S ABILITY TO 
SUSTAIN A PROMINENT POLITICAL ROLE ONCE THE "RESISTANCE" 
ENDED.  (COMMENT:  THIS STRIKES US AS AN ALTOGETHER TOO ROSY 
VIEW OF A LIKELY POST-ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.  SHI'A POLITICS: 
AMAL -- AND BERRI IN PARTICULAR -- FACE SERIOUS CREDIBILITY 
AND IDENTITY PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH AND ON A NATIONAL LEVEL. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
6.  (C) TURNING TO PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, BERRI MENTIONED 
THAT GENERAL EMILE LAHUD APPEARED TO HAVE THE BEST CHANCE OF 
BECOMING THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF LEBANON.  HE NOTED IN PASSING 
THAT HE HAD ONCE RECOMMENDED NAMING EMILE LAHUD AS HEAD OF 
THE ARMY DURING AMINE GEMAYEL'S TERM IN OFFICE IN THE EARLY 
1980S, BUT WAS OVERRULED IN FAVOR OF GEMAYEL'S SELECTION OF 
MICHEL AOUN.  OTHER CANDIDATES SUCH AS NASSIB LAHUD AND JEAN 
OBEID ALSO HAD A CHANCE THOUGH, HE QUICKLY HEDGED.  BERRI 
SAID HE WANTED TO FINISH WITH THE ELECTION BEFORE OCTOBER 
15, BECAUSE THERE WERE OTHER IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE MATTERS 
BEFORE PARLIAMENT. 
 
7.  (C) BERRI POSTULATED THAT BUILDING "INSTITUTIONS" WAS 
THE BEST WAY TO FIGHT ENDURING SECTARIANISM WITHIN THE 
LEBANESE BODY POLITIC; HE ALSO DISCOUNTED THE NOTION THAT 
LAHUD'S ELECTION MIGHT RESULT IN THE POLITICIZATION OF THE 
ARMY.  ASKED IF A LAHUD PRESIDENCY RAISED THE SPECTRE IN 
LEBANESE MINDS OF ARMY (OR MORE SPECIFICALLY G-2 MUKHABARAT) 
INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS -- THE LEGENDARY "DUALITY" 
OR "IZDIWAJIYAH" OF PRESIDENT FUAD SHIBAB'S RULE -- BERRI 
STATED FORCEFULLY THAT LAHUD "WOULD BE AN EISENHOWER,"  AND 
SEPARATE HIMSELF FROM THE LAF ONCE IN OFFICE.  "HE KNOWS 
NEITHER WE (THE POLITICIANS) NOR THE SYRIANS WOULD ACCEPT 
ANY "DUALITY."  (COMMENT:  OTHER PROMINENT LEBANESE 
POLITICAL FIGURES -- AND WE -- ARE LESS CERTAIN, GIVEN THE 
PROMINENT ROLE NOW PLAYED BY THE LAF G-2 (AT LAHUD'S -- AND 
UNDOUBTEDLY SYRIAN -- DIRECTION) IN MONITORING POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSONALITIES.  END COMMENT.) 
 
8.  (C) BERRI HIGHLIGHTED THREE MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS FOR A 
SUCCESSFUL PRESIDENT: CREDIBLE TO THE CHRISTIANS, ACCEPTABLE 
TO THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND SATISFACTORY TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (I.E., THE SYRIANS AND OTHER 
"FRIENDS").  HE EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE OTHER CANDIDATES MIGHT 
EXCEL IN SOME OF THESE AREAS, ONLY LAHUD EMBODIED ALL THREE 
CHARACTERISTICS. 
 
9.  (C) BERRI SAID HE WANTED TO HAVE A PRESIDENT WHO WOULD 
BE ABLE TO BRING THE CHRISTIANS BACK INTO THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMICAL LIFE OF THE NATION.  BERRI INSISTED THAT 
CHRISTIANS HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE WAKE OF THE 
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS WHICH WERE CONDUCTED LAST MAY/JUNE. 
CHRISTIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE BALLOTING DOUBLED THAT OF THE 
SHI'A IN PERCENTAGE TERMS AND REACHED 93 PERCENT 
PARTICIPATION IN THE 21 CHRISTIAN MUNICIPALITIES IN SOUTH 
LEBANON.  STRONGER CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP WOULD HELP TO OFFSET 
THE OVERBEARING INFLUENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER "AND CREATE 
A BALANCE" IN THE (TRIPARTITE) PRESIDENCY (I.E., AN ALLY FOR 
ME AGAINST HARIRI).  LAUNCHING INTO A WELL-REHEARSED 
CRITIQUE OF THE PM, BERRI SAID HARIRI WAS NOT "A MAN OF 
INSTITUTIONS."  IN A FINAL JAB AT THE PRIME MINISTER, BERRI 
CLOSED SAYING, "HARIRI IS IMPORTANT FOR THE COUNTRY BECAUSE 
OF HIS INTERNATIONAL STATURE, BUT HARIRI DEALS WITH DOMESTIC 
ISSUES LIKE A PRINCE IN SAUDI ARABIA.  WE HAVE NO PRINCES 
HERE." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
DEPUTY SPEAKER FERZLI ON SYRIAN INTEREST IN THE ELECTION 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
10.  (C) ILY FERZLI, THE GREEK ORTHODOX DEPUTY SPEAKER WHO 
HAS VERY CLOSE TIES WITH THE SYRIANS BUT LIMITED POLITICAL 
CREDIBILITY IN LEBANON, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR IN A SUBSEQUENT 
MEETING THAT GENERAL LAHUD HAD A GOOD CHANCE TO BECOME THE 
NEXT PRESIDENT. REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZING TO THE AMBASSADOR 
THAT HE, FERZLI, SHOULD BE SEEN AS A CHANNEL TO THE SYRIANS 
AND POINTING OUT HOW INTIMATE HIS CONTACTS WERE WITH SENIOR 
SYRIAN OFFICIALS, FERZLI STATED THAT LAHUD WAS BACKED BY 
SYRIA, AND THAT WITHOUT SYRIAN SUPPORT LAHUD WOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN ABLE TO BUILD A UNIFIED ARMY.  "SYRIA PROTECTED LAHUD 
AND MADE HIM A MINI-PRESIDENT," FERZLI ADDED.  FERZLI ECHOED 
BERRI'S COMMENT THAT THE ELECTION OF A MILITARY LEADER WOULD 
NOT ENDANGER "DEMOCRACY IN LEBANON." 
 
11.  (C) FERZLI ALSO HEDGED HIS BETS, HOWEVER, NOTING THAT 
"NOTHING IS FINAL."  AS IF TO EMPHASIZE THAT POINT, FERZLI 
COMMENTED THAT NEITHER BERRI NOR HARIRI HAD A REAL INTEREST 
IN HAVING A STRONG PRESIDENT.  IN RESPONSE TO THE 
AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION ABOUT HIZBALLAH PREFERENCES, FERZLI 
SAID THEY DO NOT WANT A STRONG PRESIDENT EITHER.  QUERIED ON 
WHETHER LAHUD HAD A KNOWN PROGRAM HE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT 
IF ELECTED, FERZLI SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT LAHUD SHOULD NOT 
HAVE A "PROGRAM,"  SINCE THAT WOULD ONLY ENGAGE HIM IN PETTY 
DOMESTIC "POLITICAL SQUABBLES."  (READ:  WOULD INTERFERE 
WITH THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT.)  INSTEAD, THE NEW 
PRESIDENT SHOULD BE A MORAL EXEMPLAR -- UNLIKE HRAWI -- AND 
ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY AND INTEGRITY OF STATE 
INSTITUTIONS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
PROSPECTS FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE HINGE ON THE PRESIDENCY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
12.  (C) FERZLI WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT BETTER GOVERNMENT WAS 
POSSIBLE IN LEBANON IF THERE ARE "ANGELS" AT THE LEVEL OF 
THE TROIKA.  "IF WE HAVE DEVILS AT THE TROIKA LEVEL, ALL 
OTHER OFFICIALS WILL ALSO TURN INTO DEVILS," FERZLI SURMISED 
WRYLY.  FERZLI EXPECTED THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, UPON THE 
RECOMMENDATION OF PRESIDENT HRAWI, TO CALL FOR AN 
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF PARLIAMENT TO CONSIDER A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT SENIOR CIVIL 
SERVANTS SUCH AS LAHUD TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT.  IF THAT 
SCENARIO DOES NOT TRANSPIRE, THE SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT CAN 
PROPOSE SUCH A SESSION ONCE PARLIAMENT CONVENES ON OCTOBER 
20.  AFTER OCTOBER 24, HOWEVER, PARLIAMENT CAN NO LONGER 
CALL A SPECIAL SESSION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION.  (NOTE: 
THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION IS COMPLEX ON THIS PROCEDURAL 
ISSUE, AND IT NOT INTERNALLY CONSISTENT.  IN FACT, MOST 
LEBANESE TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
WITH BROAD SUPPORT COULD BE PASSED WHENEVER NECESSARY, 
THOUGH THE PERIOD BEFORE OCTOBER 24 WOULD SEEM MOST 
CONVENIENT.  END NOTE) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
SYRIAN STRATEGY IN LEBANON: WIN OVER THE CHRISTIANS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
13.  (C) FERZLI BELIEVED THAT SYRIA WAS NOW "INSIDE THE 
LEBANESE REGIME," AND NO LONGER HAD AN INTEREST IN 
DESTABILIZING LEBANON.  FERZLI ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE 
OF THE SYRIAN ROLE IN LEBANON, BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER A 
PEACE AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL. 
HE SAID "SYRIA, AND IN PARTICULAR, HAFEZ AL-ASAD, IS THE 
ONLY ONE WHO CAN GIVE LEGITIMACY TO ANY PEACE BETWEEN THE 
ARABS AND ISRAEL".  HE ALSO STATED THAT SYRIAN MILITARY 
PREPAREDNESS IN LEBANON WAS A GUARANTEE FOR PEACE. 
 
14.  (C) FINALLY, FERZLI -- GETTING IN ONE LAST PRO-SARG 
POINT -- ARGUED THAT ASAD WAS A "STRATEGIC THINKER" WHO 
WANTS TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN WORLD, 
ESPECIALLY THE U.S.  THE PROVING GROUND FOR ASAD TO PROMOTE 
HIS IMAGE ABROAD IS IN LEBANON.  FERZLI BELIEVED THE SYRIANS 
WANTED TO ACHIEVE A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE CHRISTIANS OF 
LEBANON TO FACILITATE THIS END. 
 
--------------------------- 
AMBASSADOR'S PRESS COMMENTS 
--------------------------- 
 
15.  (U) THE AMBASSADOR MADE BRIEF REMARKS TO THE PRESS 
FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS AT THE PARLIAMENT, NOTING THAT "WE 
HAVE CLEARLY UNDERLINED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN LEBANON.  THE 
U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS A 
LEBANESE CHOICE.  WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE LEBANESE 
ELECTIONS." 
 
SATTERFIELD