R 260444Z FEB 97
FM AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
SECSTATE WASHDC 0049
INFO AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 
AMEMBASSY TALLINN 
AMEMBASSY RIGA 
CIS COLLECTIVE
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 YEKATERINBURG 0043 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: PGOV RS
SUBJECT:  THE SUPREMACY OF "STATE POWERS" 
 
REF:  A) 95 YEKATERINBURG 74 B) 96 YEKATERINBURG 72 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  THE LOCAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR OF SVERDLOVSK 
AND THE MAYOR OF YEKATERINBURG IS MORE THAN A PERSONAL 
DISPUTE, REVEALING AS IT DOES A FUNDAMENTAL RUSSIAN 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN "STATE POWERS" AND "LOCAL SELF- 
ADMINISTRATION" THAT IS OFTEN LOST IN TRANSLATION.  FROM 
THIS PERSPECTIVE, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AT THE MUNICIPAL 
LEVEL DO NOT CONFER A LEGITIMACY TO EXECUTE MANY OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS WE TAKE FOR GRANTED.  THE LATTER 
ARE CONSIDERED "STATE POWERS," INHERENT TO THE FEDERAL AND 
OBLAST LEVELS, BUT ONLY DELEGATED TO MUNICIPALITIES AT THE 
PLEASURE OF THE "STATE."  MANY REPUBLICS AND OBLASTS IN 
EFFECT VIEW THE DEVOLUTION OF THE FORMERLY CENTRALIZED 
"STATE POWERS" FROM MOSCOW TO THEM AS SIMPLY MULTIPLYING 
THE NUMBER OF "KREMLINS" IN EXISTENCE, NOT CHANGING THE 
NATURE OF THIS POWER OR GIVING IT TO THE PEOPLE.  THE 
MUNICIPALITIES ARE CONTESTING THIS CONCEPT, BUT ARE 
USUALLY PLAYING FROM A WEAKER HAND.  THE OUTCOME OF THIS 
STRUGGLE WILL TO A LARGE PART DETERMINE THE FATE OF TRUE 
DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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A MISLEADING PREMISE 
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¶2.  THE ONGOING DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER FROM MOSCOW IS 
OFTEN SEEN AS A CONTINUING RIPPLE THAT IS FINALLY REACHING 
TO THE LOWEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT.  THE PROCESS OF 
ELECTING OFFICIALS AT EVERY LEVEL IS OFTEN ASSUMED TO BE 
SOMEWHAT IN ACCORD WITH THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT GOVERNMENT 
AUTHORITY SHOULD REST AT THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE, WHERE 
THE ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE MOST RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE. 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL AND OBLAST LAWS PROVIDING FOR THIS 
LOCAL DEMOCRACY USE THE TERM "MESTNO-SAMOUPRAVLENIYE," 
WHICH IS PRECISELY TRANSLATED AS "LOCAL SELF- 
ADMINISTRATION" BUT OFTEN MISTAKENLY ASSUMED TO MEAN 
"LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT," A VERY DIFFERENT THING INDEED. 
 
¶3.  MANY OF THE BASIC PREMISES OF THE ABOVE RUSSIAN 
CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT ARE REFLECTED IN AMERICAN PRACTICE. 
THE IDEA OF "STATE POWERS" WHICH DO NOT, INDEED CANNOT, 
EXIST AT ALL THREE LEVELS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT--FEDERAL, 
STATE, AND LOCAL--IS SEEN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO 
RAISE ARMIES AND ORGANIZE THE MILITIA.  THE CONCEPT THAT 
ALL MUNICIPALITIES ARE CONSTRUCTS OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
IS ANOTHER SHARED PREMISE.  THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN ALMOST 
EVERY CASE, HOWEVER, EVEN WHERE THE BASIC AMERICAN AND 
RUSSIAN CONCEPTS ARE SIMILAR, IS THE FAR MORE SWEEPING 
AUTHORITY ACCORDED TO THE UPPER LEVELS OF RUSSIAN 
GOVERNMENT, NOT BECAUSE THE EXERCISE OF THIS AUTHORITY MAY 
BE MORE EFFECTIVE THERE BUT BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE THE 
AUTHORITY IS HELD TO COME FROM.  POLITICAL POWER IN RUSSIA 
DOES NOT, AND NEVER HAS, ORIGINATED FROM THE BOTTOM, AS IN 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WHERE CITIES MAY PREDATE STATES 
AND STATES PREDATE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  IN THE RUSSIAN 
SENSE, ELECTIONS THUS DO NOT DELEGATE THE POWER INHERENT 
IN THE PEOPLE TO THE VARIOUS LAYERS OF GOVERNMENT, BUT 
MERELY CONFER A LEGITIMACY TO THE ELECTEES TO EXERCISE 
CERTAIN "STATE POWERS" THAT ALREADY EXIST, INDEPENDENT OF 
THE PEOPLE AND DERIVED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF STATE ITSELF. 
IN THIS SENSE, THESE "STATE POWERS" DO NOT, AND CANNOT, 
EXIST AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL. 
 
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THE SUPREMACY OF THE STATE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  HISTORICALLY, MOSCOVY HAD DEVELOPED AS THE EXTREME 
EXAMPLE OF THE CENTRALLY-ORGANIZED STATE.  THE CZAR WAS 
NOT ONLY THE RULER OF HIS EMPIRE BUT ITS "GOSUDAR'," OR 
LITERAL "SOVEREIGN" OWNER, EXERCISING "GOSUDARSTVENNIYE 
VLASTI" ("GOSVLASTI" FOR SHORT) OR "STATE POWERS."  THESE 
POWERS REFLECTED THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY INHERENT IN 
A SOLE PROPRIETOR, WHICH COULD NEITHER BE FURTHER DIVIDED 
NOR ALIENATED AND WHICH DID NOT REPRESENT ANY AUTHORITY OR 
LEGITIMACY CONFERRED UPON THE PROPRIETOR BY ANYONE ELSE. 
THESE "STATE POWERS" HAD ONE ORIGIN, AND WERE LITERALLY 
SOVEREIGN.  THE COMMUNIST STRUCTURE THAT FOLLOWED 
EXHIBITED IN MANY RESPECTS THE SAME THEORETICAL AND 
PRACTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CENTER. 
 
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THE TREND TOWARDS REGIONALIZATION OF "STATE POWERS" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  RECENT YEARS HAVE SEEN SOMETHING NOT EXISTENT IN 
RUSSIA SINCE THE TIME OF INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPALITIES OR THE 
ANOMALOUS CITY-STATE OF NOVGOROD, I.E., AN INDEPENDENT 
SOURCE OF "STATE POWERS" OUTSIDE OF THE CAPITAL, BE IT 
MOSCOW OR ST. PETERSBURG.  THIS INITIALLY OCCURRED DE 
FACTO, BUT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, IN MANY 
CASES, DE JURE.  SVERDLOVSK OBLAST, FOR EXAMPLE, CLAIMS 
"STATE POWERS" IN ITS CHARTER, AND POINTS TO THE 
AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND 
SVERDLOVSK OBLAST IN JANUARY 1996 AS A RECOGNITION OF ITS 
SOVEREIGNTY BY MOSCOW.  IT CAN THUS LEGITIMATELY CLAIM 
THAT IT ITSELF NOW HAS THE ATTRIBUTE OF "STATE POWERS" 
FORMALLY ONLY HELD BY CZAR OR COMMUNIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 
CURRENT RUSSIAN FEDERALISM, IN THIS SENSE, IS THE 
REPRODUCTION OF THE FORMER CENTRALIZED "STATE POWERS" OF 
THE KREMLIN IN THE EIGHTY-NINE "SUBJECTS OF THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION," BE THEY OBLASTS, REPUBLICS, OR AUTONOMOUS 
OKRUGS. 
 
¶6.  WHILE MOSCOW AND THE REPUBLICS OR OBLASTS, IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANY AND VARIED TREATIES NOW SIGNED 
BETWEEN THEM, MAY HAVE DIVIDED THESE "STATE POWERS" 
BETWEEN THEM, THE REPUBLICS AND OBLASTS ARE NOT ABOUT TO 
FURTHER DIVIDE IT WITH THE MUNICIPALITIES.  THEY WILL 
DELEGATE CERTAIN "GOSUDARSTVENNIYE POLNOMOCHIYE" OR "STATE 
PLENETARY POWERS" TO THE MUNICIPALITIES BY DECREE OF THE 
GOVERNOR OR BY LAW OF THE OBLAST LEGISLATURE, BUT CAN 
QUITE AS EASILY TAKE THEM AWAY.  "LOCAL SELF- 
ADMINISTRATION," FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, THUS DOES NOT 
MEAN THAT THE SUBORDINATE MUNICIPALITIES HAVE ANY INHERENT 
"STATE POWERS" OF THEIR OWN.  THE LATTER CAN MERELY USE 
THEIR DISCRETION IN THE EXECUTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
OBLAST'S "STATE POWERS." 
 
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SVERDLOVSK'S "KREMLIN" ON THE RIVER ISET 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN GOVERNOR EDUARD ROSSEL OF 
SVERDLOVSK AND MAYOR ARKADIY CHERNETSKIY OF YEKATERINBURG 
HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS CABLES (REFTELS).  THIS 
PREVIOUSLY HAD SEEMED TO US MORE OF A CONFLICT OF 
PERSONALITIES THAN OF IDEOLOGIES, AS THEIR TWO PARTY 
PROGRAMS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY SIMILAR.  IF ONE INCLUDES THE 
CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION NOTED ABOVE, HOWEVER, THE CONFLICT 
TAKES ON A DIFFERENT, MUCH DEEPER NATURE.  THAT THIS 
CONCEPT OF "STATE POWERS" IS INDEED DRIVING THE OBLAST IS 
APPARENT IN A WHOLE SERIES OF RECENT ACTIONS. 
 
¶8.  ONE ASPECT OF THIS DIVISION OF SOVEREIGNTY IS THE 
APPOINTMENT OF MANY SENIOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS, WHO ARE 
SUPPOSED TO BE NOMINATED BY THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES IN 
AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNOR AND CONFIRMED BY THE OBLAST 
LEGISLATURE.  (COMMENT: SHADES OF THE LONG STRUGGLE 
BETWEEN SECULAR MONARCHS AND THE PAPACY OVER THE 
APPOINTMENT OF BISHOPS.  END COMMENT)  THIS LIST INCLUDES 
THE MVD CHIEF, AND LOTS OF GRUMBLING WAS RECENTLY HEARD IN 
THE LEGISLATURE WHEN A DEPUTY MINISTER FROM MOSCOW CAME 
OUT AND PRESENTED THE NEW OBLAST UVD HEAD BEFORE ANY VOTE 
ON HIM WAS UNDERTAKEN IN THE OBLAST LEGISLATURE.  EVEN THE 
FEDERAL OFFICIALS WHO CAN BE APPOINTED BY MOSCOW WITHOUT 
REFERENCE TO THE OBLAST, SUCH AS THE MILITARY DISTRICT 
COMMANDER OR THE FSB CHIEF, HAVE BEEN COOPTED BY BEING 
INCORPORATED IN THE GOVERNOR'S OWN "SECURITY COUNCIL." 
 
¶9.  THE OBLAST'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY WAS CLEAR WHEN THE 
DUMA PASSED A LAW, SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR ON 24 DECEMBER 
1996, "ON THE CONFERRING OF DELEGATED STATE PLENETARY 
POWERS TO THE ORGANS OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL 
STRUCTURES IN SVERDLOVSK OBLAST," IN WHICH IT LAID OUT 
EIGHT SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH THE MUNICIPALITIES CAN 
PARTICIPATE WITH THE OBLAST IN PROGRAMS ON THE USE OF 
LAND; THE USE OF MINERAL RIGHTS; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; 
EDUCATION; CULTURE; PUBLIC HEAL; THTHE :  THE OBLAST 
PROGRAM ON THE USE OF LAND;  . 
 
¶10.  PERTINENT EXAMPLES OF THIS LINE OF THINKING WERE 
REVEALED IN THE OBLAST DUMA'S DEBATE ON 17-18 FEBRUARY ON 
THE LAW CREATING THE EASTERN "OKRUG," ONE OF THE SIX NEW 
PREFECTURAL DISTRICTS LONG DESIRED BY THE GOVERNOR AS A 
STATED MEANS OF BRINGING THE OBLAST ADMINISTRATION CLOSER 
TO THE PEOPLE AND OF MAKING IT MORE EFFICIENT.  THE DRAFT 
WAS SURPRISINGLY DEFEATED, WITH SOME LOCAL DEPUTIES SAYING 
THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA NEITHER UNDERSTOOD NOR FELT 
THE NEED FOR SUCH A NEW BUREAUCRATIC ENTITY AND SUGGESTING 
THAT A REFERENDUM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.  THE SPEAKER OF 
THE DUMA, VLACHESLAV SURGANOV, IN TURN STATED THAT THE 
NEED FOR THIS NEW LEVEL OF OBLAST GOVERNMENT STEMMED FROM 
THE FACT THAT THE "ORGANS OF LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION DO 
NOT CORRELATE THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH THE OBLAST 
ADMINISTRATION AND SHOW TOO MUCH INITIATIVE." 
 
¶11.  THE REACH OF THE OBLAST POWERS WAS EVIDENCED IN THE 
OPINIONS OF "REVIVAL OF THE URALS" DEPUTY VENIAMIN 
GOLUBITSKIY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DUMA COMMITTEE ON 
ECONOMIC POLICY, BUDGET, FINANCES, AND TAXES, WHO SAID 
THAT THE LAW WAS ABOUT "IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
"UPRAVLENIYE" (DIRECTION OR ADMINISTRATION) OF THE OBLAST. 
JUST AS WE (THE DUMA) DO NOT DISCUSS CONCRETE TASKS GIVEN 
BY THE HEAD OF THE OBLAST TO HIS DEPUTIES BECAUSE THEY ARE 
AN INTERNAL MATTER OF THE OBLAST, BY THE SAME TOKEN WE 
SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS.  AND WHAT ARE WE DOING HERE?  WE 
ARE DISCUSSING THE 'POLNOMOCHIYE' (AUTHORITY) WHICH THE 
OBLAST ANYWAY POSSESS.  IT IS ONLY A QUESTION OF HOW THIS 
'POLNOMOCHIYE' MATERIALIZES."  (COMMENT:  THE HEAD OF THE 
DUMA BUDGET COMMITTEE CANNOT BE TALKING ABOUT THE CREATION 
OF GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, SINCE HE HAS TO PAY FOR THEM, AND 
LOGICALLY CAN ONLY MEAN THE AUTHORITY INHERENT IN THE 
GOVERNOR'S POSSESSION OF "STATE POWERS."  END COMMENT.) 
GOLUBITSKIY THOUGHT THE PROPOSED IDEA OF A REFERENDUM ON 
THE NEW PREFECTURAL DISTRICT RIDICULOUS, SINCE THE PEOPLE 
WERE UNINFORMED ON SUCH ISSUES. 
 
¶12.  THE NORTHERN PREFECTURE HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED, 
AND A GUBERNATORIAL DECREE WAS ISSUED STATING THAT ITS 
STAFF WOULD CONSIST OF 49 PERSONNEL, TO BE TRANSFERRED 
FROM THE STAFFS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES CONTAINED THEREIN. 
WHEN THE CG ASKED YEKATERINBURG MAYOR CHERNETSKIY HOW THE 
GOVERNOR COULD SO TRANSFER MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL, THE MAYOR 
REPLIED "HE CAN'T.."  ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE OBLAST 
EXECUTIVE'S EXERCISE OF "STATE POWERS" IN THE PERSONNEL 
AREA WAS A GUBERNATORIAL DECREE DECLARING THAT THE HEADS 
OF AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENTS OF MUNICIPALITIES AND RAIONS, 
CLEARLY ORGANS OF LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION, WERE NO 
LONGER TO BE APPOINTED BY THE ELECTED MAYORS OR RAION 
HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION, BUT BY THE GOVERNOR. 
 
¶13.  THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF THIS THINKING IS THE OBLAST 
GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT OF A LAW ON THE STATUS OF YEKATERINBURG 
AS THE OBLAST CAPITAL.  MAYOR CHERNETSKIY, AS A MEMBER OF 
THE LEGISLATURE, SUBMITTED HIS OWN VERSION.  THE DUMA 
COMMITTEE CONSIDERING THESE TWO VERSIONS HAS PRODUCED A 
COMPROMISE, NOTING THAT IT USED CHERNETSKIY'S DRAFT AS THE 
MORE WORKABLE BASIS.  THE GOVERNOR'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
DUMA HAS HOWEVER DECLARED THAT THE GOVERNOR WILL NOT 
ACCEPT ANY COMPROMISE. 
 
¶14.  THE KEY ITEM IN THE GOVERNOR'S PROPOSAL IS THAT, 
BECAUSE OF YEKATERINBURG'S STATUS AS THE "ADMINISTRATIVE 
CENTER OF THE OBLAST," ITS MAYOR SHOULD BE PROPOSED BY THE 
GOVERNOR AND ELECTED BY THE CITY DUMA.  IN ADDITION, THIS 
STATUS MEANS THAT MANY OF THE FUNCTIONS NORMALLY ASCRIBED 
TO LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION MUST NOW BE CONSIDERED AS 
"STATE POWERS," TO BE EXECUTED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORGAN OF 
THE "CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT." 
 
¶15.  CHERNETSKIY HAS ALSO BEEN UNDER ATTACK OF LATE BY A 
NUMBER OF THE OFFICIALS AND DUMA MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNOR'S 
PARTY FOR BEING TOO CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICS AND NOT 
PAYING ENOUGH ATTENTION TO THE GOOD HUSBANDRY OF THE CITY. 
(COMMENT:  THIS IDEA THAT THE MAYOR SHOULD BE A NON- 
POLITICAL FIGURE IS A CLEAR CONFIRMATION OF THE 
SUBORDINATE ROLE FORESEEN FOR THE ORGANS OF LOCAL SELF- 
ADMINISTRATION, HOLDING AS IT DOES THAT POLITICS IS 
SOMETHING APPROPRIATE ONLY AT THE OBLAST LEVEL, THE TRUE 
REPOSITORY OF POLITICAL POWER.  THE DE FACTO REALITY OF 
THIS, FELT BY VOTERS IN THEIR BONES, MAY WELL ACCOUNT FOR 
THE LATTER'S RELATIVE INDIFFERENCE TO MANY ELECTIONS AT 
THE LOCAL LEVEL.   END COMMENT.) 
 
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UDMURTIA'S "KREMLIN" ON THE RIVER IZH 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  THE UDMURT REPUBLIC IS GOVERNED BY A "GOSSOVIET," OR 
STATE SOVIET, THE CHAIRMAN OF WHICH, ALEXANDR A. VOLKOV 
SERVES AS THE HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT.  THE STATE 
SOVIET ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF "STATE POWERS" 
AND "LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION" IN APRIL 1996 BY SIMPLY 
PASSING A LAW ABOLISHING THE POSITIONS OF THE ELECTED 
MAYORS.  ALL OF THESE MAYORS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 
ANATOLIY I. SALTYKOV, THE MAYOR OF THE CAPITAL, ISHEVSK, 
ACCEPTED THE LAW AND BECAME GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED 
OFFICIALS.  DURING THE CG'S VISIT TO UDMURTIA LAST 
NOVEMBER, THERE WERE THUS TWO MAYORS OF ISHEVSK, THE OLD 
POPULARLY-ELECTED ONE, SALTYKOV, AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT- 
APPOINTED ONE, YURIY S. PITKEVICH, WITH THE CITY 
GOVERNMENT AT A STANDSTILL.  VOLKOV AND PITKEVICH, OVER 
THE USUAL SUMPTUOUS LUNCH, ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE THE CG 
THAT DEMOCRACY HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED ONLY SLOWLY IN THE 
REPUBLIC, AND THAT THE UDMURT POPULATION WAS ONLY READY TO 
ELECT OFFICIALS AT THE SUB-MUNICIPAL LEVEL.  THE SMALL 
SIZE OF THE REPUBLIC, AND THE DOMINANT POSITION OF 
ISHEVSK, MEANT THAT A UNIFIED GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO THE 
NECESSARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY WAS IMPOSSIBLE WITH 
AN ELECTED MAYOR IN THE CAPITAL WHO PURSUED HIS OWN 
POLICIES. 
 
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THE CITIES FIGHT BACK 
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¶17.  THIS VIEW OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE REPUBLICS AND 
OBLASTS IS NOT SURPRISINGLY REJECTED BY MUNICIPAL LEADERS, 
WHO ARE SEEKING REAL GOVERNMENTAL POWER.  SALTYKOV TOOK 
THE UDMURT REPUBLIC TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN 
NOVEMBER, AND EFFECTIVELY WON THE CASE AT THE END OF 
JANUARY.  WHILE THE COURT AGREED THAT THE REPUBLIC HAD THE 
RIGHT TO STRUCTURE THE LOCAL ORGANS OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION 
ANY WAY IT WISHED, INCLUDING HAVING APPOINTED HEADS OF 
ADMINISTRATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, IT STIPULATED THAT ONCE 
THE PEOPLE OF THESE LOCAL ENTITIES HAD EXPRESSED THE 
POPULAR WILL THROUGH ELECTIONS FOR THE THEIR MAYORS OR 
HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION, FUTURE CHANGES COULD ONLY BE 
EFFECTED THROUGH POPULAR WILL.  THE EXISTING POSITIONS 
COULD THUS ONLY BE ABOLISHED BY A REFERENDUM, NOT BY ANY 
ACTION OF THE STATE COUNCIL. (COMMENT:  THIS CAVEAT WAS SO 
HARD TO DISCERN FROM THE REPUBLIC-CONTROLLED MEDIA THAT 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT LATER HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE TO 
"CLARIFY" THE OFFICIAL REPUBLIC INTERPRETATION.  END 
COMMENT)  THE STATE COUNCIL IN UDMURTIA IS NOW LOOKING AT 
HOLDING REFERENDUMS ON ABOLISHING THE OFFICES OF ELECTED 
MAYORS, AND APPEARS TO BE CONFIDENT THAT IT COULD WIN IN 
MOST CASES. 
 
¶18.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION WAS SEEN AS A 
GREAT VICTORY BY THE CITY OF YEKATERINBURG.  ONE OF ITS 
DEPUTY MAYORS, ALEXANDR G. KOBERNICHENKO, COMMENTED TO THE 
CG THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED JUST BEFORE A 
MEETING OF THE "UNION OF CITIES OF RUSSIA" ATTENDED BY 
CHERNOMRYDIN AND CHUBAIS.  KOBERNICHENKO NOTED THAT THE 
UNION, WHICH IS AN ORGANIZATION OF THE LARGER CITIES OF 
RUSSIA, IS APPARENTLY NOW BEING SEEN BY THE CENTER AS A 
USEFUL ALLY.  ITS MEMBERS CONTAIN SOME 48 PERCENT OF THE 
COUNTRY'S VOTERS AND, UNLIKE MANY OF THE OBLAST GOVERNORS 
AND REPUBLIC HEADS, THE CITY HEADS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN 
BRINGING ABOUT ANY GREAT DIMINUTION OF THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE FEDERATION.  IN ANY GIVEN INSTANCE, HOWEVER, THE 
CITIES ARE GENERALLY PLAYING THE WEAKER HAND.  IN 
YEKATERINBURG, THE MAYOR HAS TO CONTINUALLY FEND OFF 
ATTACKS INITIATED BY THE OBLAST, INCLUDING SUCH EXTREMES 
AS THE GOVERNOR'S SECURITY COUNCIL INVESTIGATION OF THE 
CITY TELEPHONE RATES IN THE NAME OF "ECONOMIC SECURITY." 

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COMMENT 
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¶19.  THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN THE 
OBLASTS AND REPUBLICS AND THE MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR 
EQUIVALENT RAIONS, MOST CLEARLY REPRESENTED IN SVERDLOVSK 
AND UDMURTIA BUT ONGOING IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IN MOST OF 
THE SUBJECTS OF THE FEDERATION IN OUR CONSULAR DISTRICT, 
WILL HAVE A DECISIVE EFFECT ON THE EVOLUTION OF A REAL 
DEMOCRACY IN THE REGION.  IF THE CONCEPT OF THE SUPREMACY 
OF "STATE POWERS" PREVAILS, THE LOCUS OF POWER MAY HAVE 
CHANGED BUT ITS NATURE WILL BASICALLY REFLECT THE 
CENTURIES-OLD CONCEPT OF A SOCIETY RUN FROM THE TOP DOWN. 
THE VIEW FROM THE URALS IS THAT, IN THIS RESPECT, ONE 
OUGHT TO BE ROOTING FOR THE MUNICIPALITIES. 
 
 
STEERS