R 251257Z FEB 97
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7200
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE
ALGERIA COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000734 
 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  1/24/2007 
TAGS: PGOV KISL AG
SUBJECT:  ALGERIA'S HAMAS PARTY:  A WINNING ORGANIZATION? 
 
REF:  ALGIERS 437 
 
¶1.  (U)  CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, 
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS, REASON 1.5 D. 
 
¶2.  (C)  SUMMARY:  IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, THE FOCUS 
IN ISLAMIST POLITICS HERE HAS SHIFTED TO THE LEGAL 
ISLAMIC PARTY HAMAS (N0 RELATION TO PALESTINIAN 
HAMAS) AWAY FROM THE BANNED ISLAMIC SALVATI0N FRONT 
(FIS).  S0ME 0BSERVERS SUGGEST THAT WERE THE FIS 
ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE SCENE, THE POPULAR BASE OF 
HAMAS WOULD VANISH (WE ARE SKEPTICAL).  HAMAS' 
LEADER, MAHFOUD NAHNAH IS NOT AS GIFTED AN ORATOR AS 
SOME FIS LEADERS, AND HIS GRADUALIST APPROACH TO 
GAINING P0WER DIMINISHES HIS APPEAL AMONG HARDER 
LINE ISLAMISTS. 
 
¶3.  SUMMARY CONTINUED:  THE FIS, HOWEVER, NO LONGER 
EXISTS AS AN ORGANIZATI0N IN ALGERIA WHILE HAMAS HAS 
A RECENT NATIONAL 0RGANIZATION WITH EXPERIENCE FROM 
TW0 NATI0NAL ELECTI0NS BEHIND IT.  IN ADDITION, 
HAMAS HAS CL0SE TIES T0 NON-POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS 
AND CHARITY 0RGANIZATI0NS.  THE NEW GOVERNMENT LAW 
REGULATING PARTIES MAY LIMIT HAMAS' LINKS WITH 
SUCH GROUPS.  STILL, HAMAS' BIGGEST ORGANIZATIONAL 
WEAKNESS SEEMS TO BE NAHNAH'S DOMINATION OF THE 
PARTY.  WERE HE SUDDENLY TO DEPART THE SCENE, A 
POWER VACUUM AT THE T0P COULD SERIOUSLY DISRUPT 
HAMAS--UNLIKE THE FIS IN 1991 WHEN ITS TOP 
LEADERSHIP WAS ARRESTED, BUT THE FIS WENT 0N TO WIN 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS NONETHELESS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
COMPETITION BETWEEN THE FIS AND HAMAS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  HAMAS HAS GAINED PRESTIGE, AND VOTER 
STRENGTH, SINCE THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT WAS 
BANNED IN 1992, BUT SOME THINK HAMAS WOULD DISAPPEAR 
IF THE FIS WERE ALLOWED T0 RETURN.  DEDICATED FIS 
SYMPATHIZERS BLAME HAMAS PRESIDENT MAHFOUD NAHNAH 
FOR HAVING SPLIT THE ALGERIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN 
1990 (BY SETTING UP HAMAS).  IN ADDITION, 
HARDER-LINE ISLAMISTS REJECT NAHNAH'S GRADUALIST 
APPROACH TO GAINING POWER; THEY ALSO ACCUSE NAHNAH 
OF COLLABORATING WITH THE G0VERNMENT (IN A WIDELY 
WATCHED FEBRUARY 21 MBC TELEVISION BROADCAST, A 
CALLER FR0M L0ND0N LABELLED NAHNAH A GOVERNMENT 
'AGENT.')  MORE0VER, NAHNAH HIMSELF DOES NOT HAVE 
THE CHARISMA 0F SOME FIS 0FFICIALS, NOTABLY JAILED 
VICE PRESIDENT ALI BENHADJ. 
 
INSIDE THE PARTY STRUCTURE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  SHEIKH NAHNAH AND HIS HAMAS PARTY CARRY 
SOME BAGGAGE, BUT THEY HAVE A RELATIVELY ORDERLY 
PARTY WITH PARTICULAR STRENGTHS.  SHEIKH NAHNAH 
DOMINATES A PARTY VERY MUCH HIS CREATION; THERE IS 
LITTLE OF THE DISORDER SO APPARENT INSIDE THE FIS IN 
THE EARLY 1990'S.  NAHNAH IS THE HEAD OF THE PARTY'S 
"EXECUTIVE C0UNCIL," (IN ARABIC, MAJLES ET-TANFITH), 
J0INED THERE BY NINE STAFFERS.  THOSE AIDES FOCUS ON 
DISTINCT FUNCTI0NS SUCH AS MEDIA RELATIONS, 
LEGISLATIVE WORK (HAMAS HAS FIVE MEMBERS IN THE 
SURROGATE PARLIAMENT), ISSUES DEVEL0PMENT AND 
INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.  MOST MAJOR POLICY ISSUES 
ARE DEBATED WITHIN THIS "EXECUTIVE COUNCIL."  A 
"CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL" (MAJLES ESH-SHOURA) SETS 
BROADER GUIDANCE, BUT ITS 100 PLUS MEMBERS, WHO COME 
FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY, MEET IRREGULARLY. 
 
WHICH MAINTAINS A MONOLITHIC FACE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  NOTABLY, HAMAS MAINTAINS ENOUGH ORDER 
WITHIN ITS SENIOR RANKS TO GUARD MANY SECRETS.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, VERY LITTLE OF THE INTERNAL DEBATE INSIDE 
THE EXECUTIVE C0UNCIL FILTERS OUTSIDE.  REPORTERS 
FROM THE ARABIC-LANGUAGE DAILIES EL-ALEM ES-SIYASI 
AND EL-KHABER, WHICH CARRY THE BEST REPORTING ON 
ISLAMISTS HERE, C0NFESS T0 HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY 
PUSHING THEIR HAMAS SOURCES PAST THE OFFICIAL LINE 
T0 DESCRIBE DEBATES INSIDE THE PARTY.  ITS OFFICIALS 
ARE SIMILARLY RETICENT WITH US. 
 
NOT ALL READILY AGREED INSIDE THE MACHINE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  WHILE KEPT QUIET, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME HOT 
POLITICAL ARGUMENTS INSIDE HAMAS.  NAHNAH'S DECISION 
IN 1995 TO RUN F0R PRESIDENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT'S 
GUIDELINES PROMPTED TWO HAMAS MAJLES ASH-SHOURA 
MEMBERS TO QUIT THE PARTY.  ONE 0F THEM TOLD POLOFF 
FEBRUARY 23 THAT THE ARGUMENT INSIDE THE MAJLES 
F0CUSSED ON WHETHER HAMAS WAS HELPING THE GOVERNMENT 
BY JOINING THE 1995 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.  NAHNAH 
AND HIS ALLIES IN THE COUNCIL REPORTEDLY ARGUED THAT 
HAMAS COULD GAIN CONFIDENCE OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS, AND PERHAPS EVEN SOME GOVERNMENT P0STS, 
IF THEY PLAYED THE PRESIDENCY'S GAME. 
 
¶8.  (C)  THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER DISPUTES AS WELL. 
F0R EXAMPLE, ACCORDING T0 THE LOCAL PRESS AND 0NE 
HAMAS OFFICIAL, THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL'S DECISION 
LAST NOVEMBER NOT TO URGE ALGERIANS TO VOTE AGAINST 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, WHICH INCLUDED 
STRICTURES AGAINST MIXING RELIGION AND POLITICS, 
ALSO STIRRED CONTROVERSY.  SIMILARLY, ALGERIAN 
NEWSPAPERS THIS WEEK HAVE REPORTED THAT SOME IN THE 
HAMAS LEADERSHIP REJECT DELETING ISLAMIC REFERENCES 
FROM HAMAS' NAME (HAMAS IS AN ACRONYM F0R 'MOVEMENT 
FOR AN ISLAMIC SOCIETY') IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE 
NEW POLITICAL PARTY LAW.  THE PRESS HAS SPECULATED 
THAT WITH NAHNAH OUTSIDE OF ALGERIA--HE TRAVELS 
ABROAD FREQUENTLY--INTERNAL DEBATES INSIDE THE PARTY 
ARE DIFFICULT T0 SETTLE.  PUBLICLY, H0WEVER, HAMAS 
USUALLY PRESENTS A SINGLE PARTY LINE WHICH CONTRASTS 
TO THE SHARP PUBLIC DISCORD IN THE NATIONAL 
LIBERATION FR0NT AND THE SOCIALIST FORCES FRONT, FOR 
EXAMPLE. 
 
A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
----------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  HAMAS HAS A NATI0NAL POLITICAL 0RGANIZATION 
THE ENVY 0F M0ST 0THER ALGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES. 
OUTSIDE ALGIERS, IT HAS 0FFICES WORKING THE STREETS 
0F NEARLY ALL 0F ALGERIA'S 48 STATES (IN ALGERIAN 
VERNACULAR, WILAYAS), ACCORDING T0 BOTH PARTY 
OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL JOURNALISTS.  A SENIOR HAMAS 
OFFICIAL TOLD P0LOFF RECENTLY THAT THE PARTY 
STRUCTURE REACHES EVEN THE COUNTY LEVEL (DAIRA) IN 
SOME WILAYAS.  THE ORGANIZATION ALSO HAS THE 
EXPERIENCE OF TWO NATIONAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, 
THOSE OF 1991 AND 1995, BEHIND IT.  IN THE LAST SIX 
MONTHS, HAMAS HAS STARTED TUNING ITS WILAYA ENGINES 
AGAIN WITH MEETINGS CRISS-CROSSING ALGERIA. 
N0TABLY, HAMAS IS WORKING WESTERN ALGERIA, OFTEN THE 
ORPHAN OF ALGERIAN POLITICS.  (COMMENT:  OFFICIAL 
FIGURES STATED THAT NAHNAH WON 40 PERCENT OF THE 
VOTES IN 0RAN, ALGERIA'S SECOND LARGEST WILAYA IN 
¶1995.  PRIVATELY, THE SHEIKH'S AIDES SAY THEY 
CAPTURED ABOUT 50 PERCENT, AND WON CLEAR MAJORITIES 
IN SOME ORAN DAIRAS.  END COMMENT.) 
 
HAMAS WOMEN'S GROUP 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE HAMAS 
ORGANIZATION IS ITS SPECIAL SECTION OF WOMEN 
ACTIVISTS, DIRECTED BY A WOMAN FROM THE BERBER 
KABYLIE REGION, MALIKA CHABANI.  CHABANI DIRECTS 
BRANCHES IN MOST MAJOR ALGERIAN CITIES.  THESE 
GROUPS UNDERTAKE COMMUNITY PROJECTS, RANGING FROM 
TEACHING SEWING AND KNITTING TO LITERACY COURSES. 
POLITICAL OBSERVERS HERE IN 1995 TOLD US THAT THE 
HAMAS WOMEN ACTIVISTS WERE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE IN 
DOOR-TO-DOOR CAMPAIGNING, TARGETING WOMEN IN 
LOWER-INCOME DISTRICTS IN AN UNMATCHED STYLE OF 
DIRECT POLITICS.  A JOURNALIST WHO HAS STUDIED THESE 
GROUPS TOLD POLOFF IN FEBRUARY THAT THEY HAVE 
REDUCED THEIR ACTIVITIES IN RECENT MONTHS IN ORDER 
TO MAINTAIN A LOWER PROFILE WITH SUSPICIOUS 
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. 
 
AND ALLIES IN ASSOCIATIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  HAMAS ALSO RECEIVES HELP FROM TWO 
OFFICIALLY NON-POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS.  THE NATIONAL 
CHARITY ASSOCIATION, "EL-ISLAH WEL-IRSHAD" ('REFORM 
AND GUIDANCE') WAS ESTABLISHED BY NAHNAH IN THE MID 
1980'S BEFORE ISLAMIST PARTIES WERE LEGAL.  ONE 
RESEARCHER TOLD US HAMAS IS VIRTUALLY 
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CHARITY GROUP, AS THEIR 
NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEADERSHIPS ARE NEARLY 
IDENTICAL.  EL-ISLAH DONATES FOOD AND CLOTHING TO 
THE POOR, AND HAS AN ACTIVE RAMADAN MEAL PROGRAM. 
IT ALSO WORKS WITH HOME-BASED INDUSTRY PROJECTS WITH 
ALGERIAN W0MEN.  ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS, SOME OF 
ITS MEMBERS OPERATE OPENLY FROM PARTICULAR MOSQUES 
IN WILAYAS SUCH AS ALGIERS AND BLIDA (NAHNAH'S 
HOMET0WN).  DURING THE 1995 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, 
MANY EL-ISLAH ACTIVISTS UNDERTOOK DOOR-TO-DOOR 
CAMPAIGNING 0N BEHALF OF CANDIDATE NAHNAH, ACCORDING 
T0 JOURNALISTS AND POLITICAL PARTY SOURCES. 
 
¶12.  (C)  SIMILARLY, THE GENERAL UNI0N 0F FREE 
STUDENTS (UGEL), ACTIVE ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES, ALSO 
HAS CLOSE LINKS TO THE HAMAS PARTY, ACCORDING TO A 
VARIETY 0F SOURCES.  TWO UGEL LEADERS TOLD US 
FEBRUARY 5 THAT THE UNION HAS 46,000 MEMBERS.  THE 
UGEL'S MAIN WORK IS ON STUDENT ISSUES, SUCH AS 
CAMPUS H0USING AND TRANSPORT.  THE UGEL 0FFICIALS 
SAID SOME MEMBERS SUPPORT NON-ISLAMIST PARTIES, BUT 
THEY RECOGNIZED THE UGEL'S PREVI0US SUPPORT FOR 
HAMAS.  DURING THE 1995 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, MANY 
UGEL MEMBERS CAMPAIGNED ACTIVELY FOR NAHNAH, 
ACCORDING TO J0URNALISTS AND POLITICAL PARTY SOURCES. 
 
¶13.  (C)  THE PRESIDENT OF BLIDA UNIVERSITY TOLD 
POLOFF IN DECEMBER THAT THE UGEL IS BY FAR THE MOST 
ACTIVE 0F THE STUDENT GROUPS ON HIS CAMPUS; HE 
ESTIMATED THE BLIDA CHAPTER HAD "SEVERAL HUNDRED" 
MEMBERS 0N A CAMPUS 0F 17,000 STUDENTS.  THE 
PRESIDENT ALLEGED THAT THE UGEL CHAPTER'S FUNDING 
COMES DIRECTLY FROM THE HAMAS PARTY.  THE UGEL 
LEADERS SAID 0NLY THAT FUNDING C0MES FROM A VARIETY 
OF L0CAL S0URCES; THEY WOULD NOT CONFIRM THAT HAMAS 
PROVIDES FINANCING. 
 
IN SOME MOSQUES TOO 
------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  P0LITICAL PARTY AND JOURNALIST SOURCES 
ALS0 ALLEGE THAT HAMAS HAS A NETWORK OF SUPPORT 
AMONG VARIOUS MOSQUES.  0NE INFORMED REPORTER 
CLAIMED THAT A MEMBER OF HAMAS' MAJLIS ASH-SHURA 
GIVES THE FRIDAY SERMON MOST WEEKS AT THE MAIN 
MOSQUE IN THE ALGIERS DISTRICT 0F BACHDJARRAH (WHERE 
THIS SOURCE LIVES).  AN ISLAMIST DOCTOR WITH FAMILY 
IN THE LARBA, OUTSIDE ALGIERS, CLAIMS THAT THE IMAM 
AT THE MAIN MOSQUE IN LARBA IS A HAMAS ACTIVIST; THE 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS HIM IN ORDER TO STEM THE TIDE OF 
EXTREMISM IN THE VIOLENCE-PLAGUED TOWN.  SIMILARLY, 
WE HAVE HEARD FROM SEVERAL SOURCES THAT HAMAS 
ACTIVISTS ARE PROMINENT IN MOSQUES IN BLIDA, 
NAHNAH'S HOME TOWN. 
 
WHERE DO THEY GET THEIR MONEY? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT HAMAS FINANCING 
OUTSIDE THE PARTY, BUT THE NEWLY PASSED PARTY LAW, 
WHICH GOVERNS FINANCING, MAY IMPEDE HAMAS' 
FUNDRAISING.  HAMAS OFFICIALS WERE VISIBLY UNHAPPY 
WITH THE NEWLY PASSED PARTY LAW'S CEILING ON 
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS (THE LIMIT IS DA 450--IE. 
USD 8--MONTHLY).  IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH US, 
HAMAS OFFICIALS HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY HAVE WEALTHY 
CONTRIBUTORS LOCALLY.  IN ADDITION, MANY OBSERVERS 
HERE THINK HAMAS RECEIVES FINANCIAL HELP FROM SMALL 
AND MEDIUM-SIZE BUSINESSES IN TOWNS SUCH AS BLIDA. 
FINALLY, SEVERAL POLITICAL JOURNALISTS--BOTH PRO- 
AND ANTI-ISLAMIST--ASSUME THAT HAMAS RECEIVES FUNDS 
FROM PRIVATE SOURCES IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. 
(COMMENT:  THE NEW PARTY LAW WOULD BAN SUCH 
CONTRIBUTI0NS.  END COMMENT.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶16.  (C)  HAMAS PROBABLY WILLQOMPLETELY 
ECLIPSE THE FIS--DESPITE GOA EFFORTS TO SURPRESS 
TOTALLY THIS ORGANIZATION--WITHIN ALGERIA'S ISLAMIST 
MOVEMENT.  MANY DEDICATED SUPPORTERS OF THE FIS ARE 
LIKELY T0 REMAIN OPPOSED TO ANY AFFILIATION WITH 
HAMAS, PARTICULARILY SINCE MANY ALSO BELIEVE NAHNAH 
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BETRAYING AN EARLIER ARMED 
ISLAMIST LEADER (BOUYALI) IN THE 1980'S. 
 
¶17.  (C)  NONETHELESS, WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF CLAIMS 
THAT HAMAS' FOLLOWING WOULD EVAPORATE WERE THE FIS 
TO BE AGAIN ALLOWED TO FUNCTION LEGALLY.  FOR ONE 
THING, A P0RTION OF FORMER FIS SUPPORTERS ARE 
REPULSED BY THE TERRORISM FOR WHICH THEY HOLD THE 
FIS ACC0UNTABLE.  IN ADDITION, HAMAS ALSO HAS 
DEVELOPED A DISTINCT BASE OF ITS OWN, LARGELY 
THROUGH PATIENT GRASSR0OTS WORK.  DURING THE 
UPCOMING LEGISLATIVE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, HAMAS WILL 
SEEK TO BROADEN ITS APPEAL T0 THE MASS OF FIS VOTERS 
FROM 1990 AND 1991 WHO PRESUMABLY SEEK ALTERNATIVES 
AFTER YEARS OF DISAPPOINTMENT.  IN 1995, MANY OF 
THESE VOTERS TURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE 
NAHNAH.  (ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL RESULTS, NAHNAH 
WON 25 PERCENT--ABOUT 2.8 MILLION VOTES--IN THE 1995 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTI0N.  WE EVEN HEARD STORIES THAT 
ARMED GR0UPS URGED V0TERS IN SOME ALGIERS 
NEIGHBORH0ODS T0 VOTE F0R NAHNAH.) 
 
¶18.  (C)  THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
FUNDAMENTAL STRENGTH OF THE HAMAS ORGANIZATION. 
FIRST, THE NEW LAW REGULATING POLITICAL PARTIES 
OUTLAWS LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
NON-POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS, SUCH AS STUDENT GROUPS 
AND CHARITY ORGANIZATIONS.  HAMAS WILL REORGANIZE 
THESE TIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW.  SECOND, 
SOME DOUBT THAT HAMAS COULD MAINTAIN COHESION IF 
NAHNAH DEPARTS THE SCENE SUDDENLY.  INDEED, THE 
FOCUS ON NAHNAH PREVENTS OTHER MEMBERS 0F THE HAMAS 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND MAJLES ASH-SHOURA FROM 
BUILDING THEIR OWN REPUTATIONS.  (BY CONTRAST, THE 
FIS HAD, IN BASEBALL TERMS, "DEEP DEPTH;" WHEN 
ABASSI MADANI AND BENHADJ WERE ARRESTED IN JUNE 
1991, ABDELKADER HACHANI AND MOHAMED SAID ABLY LED 
THE PARTY TO ELECTORAL VICTORY IN DECEMBER.)  HAMAS' 
SECOND ECHELON LEADERS ARE USUALLY UNDER FORTY YEARS 
OLD, AND THEY HAVE TIME T0 BUILD THEIR NATIONAL 
CREDENTIALS.  M0REOVER, WITH HAMAS EXPECTED TO WIN 
MANY SEATS IN THE NEXT, ELECTED PARLIAMENT, THESE 
YOUNGER LEADERS MAY GAIN A MORE PROMINENT ROLE. 
0VER COMING WEEKS, IF TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT, WE 
WILL DEVEL0P DETAILS ON THE FUTURE LEADERS 0F 
ALGERIA'S DOMINANT ISLAMIST 0RGANIZATION. 
 
NEUMANN