P 310639Z DEC 96
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4069
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY ASMARA 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 013851 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ENA AND AF/E 
NAIROBI FOR AMBASSADOR CARNEY 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 12/31/06 
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC KISL SU EG
SUBJECT: EL-SADIQ EL-MAHDI ON THE FUTURE OF SUDAN 
 
REF: STATE 262749 
 
 
¶1.  CLASSIFIED BY DCM VINCENT BATTLE, REASON 1.5 (D). 
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2.  DRAWING ON REFTEL TALKING POINTS, DCM MET WITH 
EL-SADIQ EL-MAHDI IN CAIRO ON DECEMBER 30 TO DISCUSS 
HIS FUTURE PLANS, SUDANESE OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, THE 
POLITICAL SITUATION INSIDE SUDAN, AND HIS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE 
(NDA).  MUBARAK EL-MAHDI AND THE HEADS OF THE UMMA 
PARTY'S CAIRO AND ASMARA OFFICES WERE ALSO PRESENT. 
DISCOUNTING THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY VICTORY FOR 
THE NDA, EL-MAHDI ASSERTED THAT A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN 
OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE NIF, COMBINED WITH 
ACTIVE, MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION, WAS THE 
KEY TO BRINGING DOWN THE NIF GOVERNMENT WITH MINIMAL 
VIOLENCE.  HE ARGUED THAT SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD 
DEMORALIZE THE GOVERNMENT AND DEEPEN EXTANT DIVISIONS 
WITHIN THE NIF, WHILE ENCOURAGING OPPOSITION FORCES 
INSIDE SUDAN.  IN THIS REGARD, HE SUPPORTED OFFERING 
A "SOFT LANDING" FOR NIF LEADERS, ANTICIPATING THAT 
SUCH A PROPOSITION WOULD FURTHER PROMOTE DISSENSION 
IN THE NIF RANKS. 
 
¶3.  WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT MANY COUNTRIES, EGYPT 
INCLUDED, WERE RELUCTANT TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH 
THE NDA'S POLICY OF VIOLENT OPPOSITION TO THE 
GOVERNMENT, HE OBSERVED THAT THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN 
WAS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE SUDANESE OPPOSITION'S PLAN 
TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT.  HE ARGUED THAT THE NIF 
THROUGH ITS POLICY OF JIHAD WAS PROMOTING INSTABILITY 
IN THE REGION, AND SUDAN'S NEIGHBORS MUST RESPOND. 
 
¶4.  REGARDING THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, EL-MAHDI AVOWED 
THAT INTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE CORE BELIEFS OF THE NIF 
WAS ERODING, AND DEEP SCHISMS WERE DEVELOPING BETWEEN 
ELEMENTS OF THE NIF.  HE EXPECTED A POPULAR UPRISING 
TO OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND PREDICTED SUPPORT 
FOR SUCH AN UPRISING FROM THE ARMY AND POLICE FORCES, 
CITING MANY RECENT EXAMPLES OF DISAFFECTION WITHIN 
THE SECURITY FORCES TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT.  ON HIS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NDA, HE WAS EXTREMELY POSITIVE 
ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN THE ASMARA 
DECLARATION AND IMPRESSED WITH GARANG'S DEVELOPMENT 
FROM A MILITARY LEADER INTO A GENUINE POLITICAL 
PLAYER.  HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WITH THE 
RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN KHARTOUM 
WOULD ALSO COME PEACE AND NATIONAL UNITY.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
SUDAN'S PROBLEMS HAVE BECOME THE WORLD'S CONCERN 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5.  EL-MAHDI BEGAN HIS COMMENTS BY STATING THAT THE 
CURRENT REGIME IN KHARTOUM HAS INTERNATIONALIZED THE 
INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF SUDAN.  BY SPONSORING AND 
ENCOURAGING ORGANIZATIONS DEDICATED TO THE VIOLENT 
OVERTHROW OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE ARAB 
AND ISLAMIC WORLDS, THE NIF HAD THREATENED THE 
STABILITY OF THESE COUNTRIES AND FORCED THE WORLD TO 
BECOME INVOLVED.  HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS THEREFORE 
UNACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRIES IN SUDAN'S NEIGHBORHOOD, 
EGYPT AMONG THEM, TO SIT BACK AND DO NOTHING WHILE 
THE NIF ENGAGED IN POLICIES OF JIHAD.  HE REALIZED 
THAT SOME COUNTRIES DID NOT WANT TO ASSOCIATE 
THEMSELVES WITH THE MILITARY GOALS OF THE SUDANESE 
OPPOSITION.  HOWEVER, HE OBSERVED, THIS WAS NOT THE 
ONLY PROCESS THROUGH WHICH THE OPPOSITION HOPED TO 
INSTIGATE CHANGE. 
 
¶6.  REGARDING HIS OWN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NDA'S 
POLICY OF VIOLENT OPPOSITION, EL-MAHDI NOTED THAT 
VIOLENCE WAS "PART AND PARCEL OF THE REGIME'S OWN 
INITIATIVES."  IT WAS NATURAL, THEREFORE, THAT SOME 
SUDANESE WILL MEET FIRE WITH FIRE.  HE PREDICTED, 
HOWEVER, THAT MILITARY OPPOSITION WOULD NOT SUCCEED 
IN OVERTHROWING THE NIF GOVERNMENT ON ITS OWN.  HE 
ARGUED THAT ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT 
ANTICIPATED THAT THIS WOULD COME ABOUT THROUGH A 
SPONTANEOUS, NATIONAL UPRISING.  SUCH AN UPRISING 
WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE, DESPITE LARGE-SCALE 
PURGES AND FORCED RETIREMENTS WITHIN THE ARMY AND 
POLICE, THERE REMAINED A STRONG "NATIONAL CHARACTER" 
WITHIN THESE FORCES WHICH OPPOSED THE NIF.  THIS 
"WILL DECIDE THE ISSUE IN FAVOR OF AN UPRISING." 
 
 
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LOYALTY OF SECURITY FORCES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  WHEN ASKED TO CITE EXAMPLES OF THIS NATIONALIST 
THREAD WITHIN THE ARMY AND POLICE, EL-MAHDI OBSERVED 
THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SIX ARMY COUP ATTEMPTS IN THE 
LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, REFLECTING AN OBVIOUS 
UNEASINESS WITHIN THE ARMY REGARDING THE NIF. 
FURTHERMORE, DURING INTERROGATION THE OFFICERS 
INVOLVED REFUSED TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE 
COUPS, OPENLY DEFYING THE REGIME AND DEMANDING 
CHANGE.  HE ALSO CORROBORATED OTHER REPORTS THAT THE 
POLICE REFUSED TO INTERVENE DURING POPULAR 
DEMONSTRATIONS IN SEPTEMBER, FORCING NIF MILITIAS TO 
CRACK DOWN ON THE DEMONSTRATORS. 
 
¶8.  HE POINTED TO PERIODIC FORCED RETIREMENTS OF 
POLICE AND SOLDIERS AS EVIDENCE OF INSECURITY WITHIN 
THE REGIME REGARDING THE LOYALTY OF THESE FORCES. 
FINALLY, HE RELATED AN ANECDOTE RECOUNTED BY THE 
MESSENGER HE HAD ENTRUSTED TO DELIVER HIS FAREWELL 
LETTERS OF CRITICISM TO GENERAL OMAR BASHIR AND HASAN 
EL-TURABI.  UPON RECEIVING THESE LETTERS FROM THE 
MESSENGER, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF INQUIRED IF EL- 
MAHDI HAD ESCAPED SAFELY.  WHEN INFORMED THAT HE HAD, 
THE CHIEF OF STAFF REPORTEDLY SAID "AL-HAMDUL'ILLAH 
(PRAISE GOD)." EL-MAHDI ASSERTED THAT THESE WERE NOT 
EXAMPLES OF AD HOC REACTIONS; RATHER, THERE WAS AN 
ORGANIZED REPRESENTATION OF AN ANTI-NIF VIEW WITHIN 
THE ARMY AND POLICE. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE THE KEY TO PEACEFUL CHANGE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  DURING EL-MAHDI'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DCM, HE 
REPEATEDLY RETURNED TO THE LEITMOTIF THAT 
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WAS INDUCING PSYCHIC CHANGE 
WITHIN THE NIF GOVERNMENT.  EVERY EVENT WHICH 
HIGHLIGHTED THE FAILURE OF THE NIF REGIME OR SUPPORT 
FOR THE SUDANESE PEOPLE VICE THE GOVERNMENT WAS 
DECREASING THE MORALE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND 
INCREASING THAT OF THE OPPOSITION.  THIS, IN TURN, 
WAS EXACERBATING EXISTING SCHISMS WITHIN THE NIF 
ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
¶10.  HE THEREFORE ENCOURAGED EXTERNAL PRESSURE OF 
EVERY SORT ON THE REGIME.  HE BELIEVED THESE 
PRESSURES WOULD CREATE "THE CUMULATIVE AFFECT WE ARE 
SEEKING," FURTHER DIVIDING THE GOVERNMENT AND 
BRINGING IT CLOSER TO DISSOLUTION.  EL-MAHDI 
EMPHASIZED THAT THIS POLICY REPRESENTED THE GREATEST 
HOPE FOR NON-VIOLENT CHANGE WITHIN SUDAN.  IN 
RESPONSE TO THE DCM'S INQUIRY ABOUT THE NATURE OF 
PRESSURES OUTSIDERS COULD EXERT, HE CITED THE 
HARDENING ATTITUDES OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AND 
PRESSURE FROM OTHERS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) TO RESTORE PEACE AND 
DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN AS EXAMPLES OF SUCH CUMULATIVE 
PRESSURE. 
 
¶11.  IN THIS REGARD, HE HOPED TO ENCOURAGE THE 
PARTICIPATION OF ARAB STATES SURROUNDING SUDAN IN 
THIS POLICY, SPECIFICALLY CITING EGYPT, LIBYA AND 
SAUDI ARABIA.  HE SUGGESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THEY 
JOIN THE FRIENDS OF IGAD.  HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT ANY 
LEADER AMONG THE IGAD MEMBERS COULD ORGANIZE A SUMMIT 
TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF REGIONAL STABILITY AND FOCUS 
A SPOTLIGHT ON SUDAN'S DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES.  HE 
ALSO AGREED WITH THE DCM THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC 
SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN WAS A POWERFUL TOOL FOR 
BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SUDAN, NOTING THAT THE 
MORE THE REGIME WAS ISOLATED AND PUNISHED FOR ITS 
ACTIONS, THE MORE PRESSURE WILL ACCUMULATE.  HE 
STATED THAT HE INTENDS TO EXPRESS THESE VIEWS IN HIS 
DISCUSSIONS WITH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS. 
 
¶12.  FINALLY, HE EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH THE LACK 
OF INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE SUDANESE 
OPPOSITION, CLAIMING THAT IT WAS AMONG THE LEAST WELL 
FUNDED OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS IN THE WORLD.  HE NOTED 
THAT THERE IS A SENSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
THAT SUDAN HAS BEEN ISOLATED BY UNSC SANCTIONS AND 
DIPLOMATIC CONDEMNATION.  HE ARGUED THAT THIS IS 
UNTRUE: SUDAN RECEIVED ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM MANY 
PARTIES, INCLUDING IRAN, IRAQ, QATAR, AND WEALTHY 
INDIVIDUAL ARABS (IN ADDITION TO OSAMA BIN LADEN) WHO 
AGREE WITH ITS POLITICAL AGENDA.  THIS SUPPORT CAN 
ONLY BE NEUTRALIZED BY COMPARABLE SUPPORT TO THE 
OPPOSITION. 
 
¶13.  THE DCM AGREED WITH THE NEED TO INFLUENCE THE 
NIF BY EXERTING "CALIBRATED" PRESSURE.  AT THE SAME 
TIME, THE US MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN TO DISCUSS ITS BEHAVIOR BOTH AT 
HOME AND ABROAD.  EL-MAHDI ENCOURAGED THIS DIALOGUE, 
NOTING THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY THE 
ISSUES.  HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE US POSITION WAS NOT 
ANTI-ISLAMIC, NOR WERE WE SUPPORTING SOUTHERN 
SECESSION.  RATHER, THE US WAS CONCERNED WITH HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY.  HE ARGUED THAT THE NIF WAS 
PRESENTING US POLICY IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT AND TWISTING 
THE FACTS TO CLOUD THE ISSUES.  EL-MAHDI ALSO 
SUPPORTED WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS US EFFORTS TO 
PROMOTE A "SOFT LANDING" FOR THE NIF, BELIEVING THAT 
ENCOURAGING SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD FURTHER INCREASE 
DISSENSION WITHIN NIF RANKS. 
 
 
--------------------- 
IS THE NIF IMPLODING? 
--------------------- 
 
¶14.  REFERRING TO ALLEGED SCHISMS WITHIN THE NIF, THE 
DCM INQUIRED ABOUT THE NATURE OF THESE SCHISMS AND 
EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE DEVELOPING.  EL-MAHDI STATED 
THAT A DEEP DIVISION HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN 
PRAGMATISTS, WHO PERCEIVED THE FAILURE OF THE NIF 
EXPERIMENT AND BELIEVED THAT THE NIF SHOULD 
ACKNOWLEDGE THIS FAILURE; AND THE "DOCTRINAIRES," WHO 
FEARED THAT ADMITTING ANY FAILURE WOULD DEMONSTRATE 
WEAKNESS AND BRING DOWN THE REGIME. 
 
¶15.  HE CITED THE RECENT DEBATE OVER THE BUDGET AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF THIS DIVISION.  ROUGHLY ONE THIRD OF 
CURRENT BUDGET OUTLAYS INVOLVE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR 
"PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATIONS," WHICH ARE IN REALITY 
NIF BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN FINANCING PRO-GOVERNMENT 
POLITICAL AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND ARE RIFE WITH 
CORRUPTION.  THE CURRENT MINISTER OF FINANCE, AN NIF 
PRAGMATIST, REALIZED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT 
FUNCTION WITH SUCH A BUDGET AND DEMANDED THAT THE 
EXEMPTIONS BE ELIMINATED.  A RAGING DEBATE ENSUED 
WITH HARD-LINERS, WHO FEARED THAT ELIMINATING THE 
EXEMPTIONS WOULD UNDERMINE THE REGIME.  TO DATE THIS 
ISSUE IS UNRESOLVED.  SCHISMS HAD ALSO ERUPTED 
REGARDING NORMALIZATION WITH EGYPT AND OTHER FRONT- 
LINE STATES, AS WELL AS THE ROLE OF THE ARMY VICE THE 
POPULAR DEFENSE FORCES.  AS A RESULT OF THESE 
SCHISMS, SOME LEADERS WITHIN THE NIF HAD BEGUN TO 
STATE OPENLY THAT SUDAN MUST EMBRACE POLITICAL 
PLURALITY, NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBORS, 
AND OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE OPPOSITION.  EL-MAHDI 
STRESSED THAT THE MORE EXTERNAL PRESSURE WAS BROUGHT 
TO BEAR, THE MORE THESE SCHISMS WOULD GROW. 
 
¶16.  TURNING AGAIN TO THE UNSC SANCTIONS, EL-MAHDI 
STATED THAT, PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, HE HAD BEEN 
ENCOURAGING THE GOVERNMENT TO COME UP WITH CREATIVE 
WAYS TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF THE UN.  HE ARGUED 
THAT THE THREE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO ASSASSINATE 
PRESIDENT MUBARAK WERE SYMPTOMS, NOT THE CAUSE OF 
SUDAN'S PROBLEMS.  RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON THESE 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSISTING THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER 
INSIDE SUDAN, EL-MAHDI HAD ARGUED THAT THE GOS OFFER 
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO THE UN DEMONSTRATING 
THEIR COMMITMENT TO COMBATING TERRORISM AND 
RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS.  SUCH CBMS SHOULD INCLUDE 
DISMANTLING THE TERRORISM INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
DISCUSSING WHY THIS APPARATUS EXISTED. 
 
 
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ARMY REFUSES TO ENGAGE NDA 
-------------------------- 
 
¶17.  REFERRING TO REPORTS ON BBC RADIO ON 12/30 THAT 
AN UPRISING HAD ERUPTED NEAR THE BORDER CITY OF 
KASSALA, THE DCM REQUESTED FURTHER INFORMATION. 
WHILE UNAWARE OF THE INCIDENT, MUBARAK EL-MAHDI BROKE 
IN TO SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FOCUSING ITS 
EFFORTS IN THIS AREA DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF NDA 
FORCES INSIDE THE SUDANESE BORDER, AND HAD RECENTLY 
SENT A BRIGADE TO OUST THE NDA FROM THE REGION.  THE 
BRIGADE HAD ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTED GHOST MANEUVERS IN 
THE AREA, REFUSING TO ENGAGE THE NDA WHILE REPORTING 
TO KHARTOUM THAT THE OPPOSITION FORCES HAD RETREATED 
INSIDE ERITREA.  HE DID NOT KNOW IF THERE WAS A 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE EVENTS AND THE REPORTED 
UNREST. 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
TRAVEL PLANS: CAMPAIGN FOR SUPPORT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  TURNING TO HIS FUTURE PLANS, EL-MAHDI STATED 
THAT HE HOPES TO TRAVEL SOON TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THEN 
BACK TO ERITREA.  IN THE NEAR TERM HE HOPED TO VISIT 
OTHER FRONT-LINE STATES.  ULTIMATELY, HE INTENDED TO 
VISIT THE US (ONCE THE NEW CABINET WAS CONFIRMED AND 
SWORN IN), THE UK, AND OTHER EU NATIONS TO ELICIT 
MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION.  NOTING THAT EL- 
MAHDI HAD MENTIONED LIBYA AS A POSSIBLE SUPPORTER OF 
THE OPPOSITION CAUSE, THE DCM QUESTIONED WHETHER 
LIBYA COULD INDEED PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE.  EL-MAHDI 
AGREED THAT LIBYA HAD OF LATE BEEN MORE A HINDRANCE 
THAN A HELP, OBSERVING THAT LIBYA HAD BEEN PROVIDING 
DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR THE NIF.  HOWEVER, HE ALSO 
OBSERVED THAT THE NIF HAD REPAID THE FAVOR BY 
SUPPORTING RADICAL LIBYAN ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED TO 
THE GOVERNMENT.  HE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT LIBYA 
WOULD ULTIMATELY ALIGN ITSELF WITH THE EGYPTIAN 
POSITION, WHATEVER THAT TURNED OUT TO BE. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
RELATIONS WITH NDA, GARANG 
-------------------------- 
 
¶19.  EL-MAHDI ASSERTED THAT THE ASMARA DECLARATION 
WAS "ONE OF THE GREATEST ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SUDANESE 
OPPOSITION."  THE FORMATION OF THE NDA REPRESENTED 
TWO IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS: A) AGREEMENT BY ALL 
PARTIES ON BASIC PRINCIPLES; AND, B) A CLEAR 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NORTHERN OPPOSITION AND THE 
SPLM ON A FUTURE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN SUDAN.  IN 
THE LAST TWO UPRISINGS AGAINST DICTATORSHIPS IN 
SUDAN, IN 1964 AND 1985, THE REGIMES WERE TOPPLED BUT 
THE CIVIL WAR CONTINUED.  EL-MAHDI EXPRESSED OPTIMISM 
THAT, BASED ON THIS ALLIANCE, FOR THE FIRST TIME 
SUDAN COULD SEE BOTH DEMOCRACY AND PEACE AT THE SAME 
TIME. 
 
¶20.  AS FOR HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH JOHN GARANG, EL- 
MAHDI NOTED THAT HE HAS ONLY MET GARANG TWICE, ONCE 
IN 1986 AND AGAIN LAST WEEK.  HE COMMENTED ON A 
REMARKABLE EVOLUTION IN GARANG'S PERSONA IN THE 
INTERIM PERIOD.  WHILE IN 1986 GARANG WAS FOCUSED 
SOLELY ON THE MILITARY STRUGGLE, HE HAS BECOME 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL, WITH A STRONG COMMAND OF THE 
DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF HIS POSITION. 
 
¶21.  ASMARA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
 
WALKER