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Viewing cable 96RIYADH4784, SAUDI ROYAL WEALTH: WHERE DO THEY GET ALL THAT MONEY?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
96RIYADH4784 1996-11-30 13:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Riyadh
R 301345Z NOV 96
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO TREASURY WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 7168
USDOC WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//J2//
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
USDOE WASHDC
GCC COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RIYADH 004784 
 
 
DEPT PASS TO EXIM ELECTRONICALLY 
DEPT FOR EB/IFD/OMA, NEA/ARP 
EXIM FOR MAYBURY-LEWIS 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
COMMERCE FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/DGUGLIELMI 
LONDON FOR TUELLER, PARIS FOR LEAF 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: OADR 1.6X6 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV PINR SOCI SA
SUBJECT:  SAUDI ROYAL WEALTH:  WHERE DO THEY GET ALL THAT MONEY? 
 
1.  (U)  CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM ALBERT THIBAULT.  REASON: 1.5 
(B).  THIS MESSAGE FULFILLS A POST REPORTING PLAN REQUIREMENT. 
 
------------------------ 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (C)  SAUDI PRINCES AND PRINCESSES, OF WHOM THERE ARE THOUSANDS, 
ARE KNOWN FOR THE STORIES OF THEIR FABULOUS WEALTH--AND TENDENCY TO 
SQUANDER IT.  THIS CABLE EXAMINES THE MECHANISMS, NOT COUNTING 
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES, THROUGH WHICH SAUDI ROYALS OBTAIN THEIR MONEY. 
THESE MECHANISMS OFTEN PROVIDE THE SEED MONEY FOR ROYALS TO LAUNCH 
LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES.  A SUBSEQUENT CABLE WILL 
EXAMINE THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF SAUDI ROYALS. 
 
3.  (S)  THE MOST COMMON MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTING THE NATION'S 
WEALTH TO THE ROYAL FAMILY IS THE FORMAL, BUDGETED SYSTEM OF 
MONTHLY STIPENDS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE AL SAUD, MANAGED BY THE 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE'S "OFFICE OF DECISIONS AND RULES."  THE 
STIPENDS RANGE FROM $270,000 PER MONTH ON THE HIGH END TO $800 PER 
MONTH FOR THE LOWLIEST MEMBER OF THE MOST REMOTE BRANCH OF THE 
FAMILY.  BONUS PAYMENTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR MARRIAGE AND PALACE 
BUILDING.  THE EMBASSY ESTIMATES THAT THE STIPENDS SYSTEM PUTS AN 
ANNUAL DRAIN OF ABOUT $2 BILLION ON THE $40 BILLION GOVERNMENT 
BUDGET. 
 
4.  (S)  ASIDE FROM THE STIPENDS SYSTEM, A HANDFUL OF THE 
SENIORMOST PRINCES ENRICH THEMSELVES BY CONTROLLING SEVERAL BILLION 
DOLLARS IN ANNUAL EXPENDITURES IN "OFF-BUDGET" PROGRAMS.  WITH NO 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE OVERSIGHT OR CONTROLS, THESE PROGRAMS ARE 
WIDELY VIEWED AS SOURCES OF ROYAL RAKEOFFS.  AS CHARACTERIZED BY 
BILLIONAIRE PRINCE AL-WALID BIN TALAL (STRICTLY PROTECT) TO THE 
AMBASSADOR, THROUGH THESE OFF-BUDGET PROGRAMS, FIVE OR SIX PRINCES 
CONTROL THE REVENUES FROM ONE MILLION BARRELS PER DAY (B/D) OF THE 
KINGDOM'S EIGHT MILLION B/D OF CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION. 
 
5.  (S) OTHER WAYS SOME PRINCES OBTAIN MONEY INCLUDE BORROWING FROM 
THE BANKS, AND NOT PAYING THEM BACK.  WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION 
OF NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK (NCB), WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN VIEWED 
HERE AS THE ROYAL FAMILY'S BANK, SAUDI BANKS GENERALLY TURN ROYALS 
AWAY UNLESS THEY HAVE A PROVEN REPAYMENT TRACK RECORD.  PRINCES 
ALSO USE THEIR CLOUT TO CONFISCATE LAND FROM COMMONERS, ESPECIALLY 
IF IT IS KNOWN TO BE THE SITE FOR AN UPCOMING PROJECT AND CAN BE 
QUICKLY RESOLD TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR A PROFIT.  ANOTHER COMMON 
MONEYMAKING SCHEME IS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRINCES TO "SPONSOR" SOMETIMES 
HUNDREDS OF EXPATRIATE WORKERS WHO ARE UNLEASHED TO FREELANCE ON 
THE LOCAL ECONOMY AND IN RETURN PAY THEIR ROYAL SPONSOR A SMALL 
MONTHLY FEE, USUALLY AROUND $100. 
 
6.  (S)  IN THE END, ROYALS STILL SEEM MORE ADEPT AT SQUANDERING 
THAN ACCUMULATING WEALTH.  DESPITE THE HANDOUTS, THERE ARE MORE 
COMMONER BILLIONAIRES THAN ROYAL BILLIONAIRES IN THE KINGDOM.  THE 
WEALTHIEST ROYALS AND THEIR PERSONAL FORTUNES BY OUR ESTIMATES ARE: 
AL-WALID BIN TALAL BIN ABD AL-AZIZ -- $13 BILLION, KING FAHD -- $10 
BILLION, DEFENSE MINISTER PRINCE SULTAN BIN ABD AL-AZIZ -- $10 
BILLION, KHALID BIN SULTAN BIN ABD AL-AZIZ -- $2 BILLION. 
 
7.  (S)  ROYALTY HERE IS EXPECTED TO HAVE WEALTH AND THE TRAPPINGS 
OF POWER TO A CERTAIN DEGREE.  FOR EXAMPLE, IMPORTANT ROYAL FAMILY 
MEMBERS HOLD 'MAJLISES' WHERE VISITORS WILL DISCUSS THEIR CONCERNS 
AND SEEK ROYAL INTERCESSION WITH AUTHORITIES.  CROWN PRINCE 
ABDULLAH'S WEEKLY MAJLIS ATTRACTS MANY DOZENS TO HUNDREDS OF 
PETITIONERS MOST OF WHOM RECEIVE SOME GIFT OR ATTENTION TO THEIR 
PROBLEMS.   PRINCES CUSTOMARILY PROVIDE HOSPITALITY, TOO.  ONE 
FORMER EASTERN PROVINCE GOVERNOR, FAHD BIN SALMAN, CLAIMS THAT HE 
SPENDS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF SR 4 MILLION OUT OF HIS OWN POCKET ON 
LARGESSE AND FEASTS FOR COMMONERS DURING THE HOLY MONTH OF RAMADAN. 
HOWEVER, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN APPROPRIATE ROYAL LARGESSE 
AND GREED.  MANY BELIEVE THAT ROYAL GREED HAS GONE BEYOND THE 
BOUNDS OF REASON, TO INCLUDE WIDESPREAD INTERLOPING ON THE BUSINESS 
COMMUNITY'S TURF, TRADITIONALLY OFF LIMITS TO ROYALS.  (SEE SEPTEL 
EXAMINATION OF PRINCES IN BUSINESS.)  AS LONG AS THE ROYAL FAMILY 
VIEWS THIS COUNTRY AND ITS OIL WEALTH AS AL SAUD INC., THE 
THOUSANDS OF PRINCES AND PRINCESSES WILL SEE IT AS THEIR BIRTHRIGHT 
TO RECEIVE DIVIDEND PAYMENTS AND RAID THE TILL.  IT IS OUR VIEW 
THAT OF THE PRIORITY ISSUES THE COUNTRY FACES, GETTING A GRIP ON 
ROYAL FAMILY EXCESSES IS AT THE TOP.  END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
---------------------- 
THE SYSTEM OF STIPENDS 
---------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  EVERY PRINCE AND PRINCESS FROM BIRTH GETS A MONTHLY 
ALLOWANCE, WHICH IS PART OF THE STATE BUDGET AND DISTRIBUTED 
THROUGH AN OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE CALLED THE "OFFICE OF 
DECISIONS AND RULES" (IDARAT AL-MUQARRARAT WA AL-QAWA'ID).  ECONOFF 
RECENTLY PAID A COURTESY CALL ON THE OFFICE'S DIRECTOR, ABD AL-AZIZ 
AL-SHUBAYLI.  THE OFFICE, IN AN OLD BUILDING IN WHAT PASSES AS 
RIYADH'S BANKING DISTRICT, WAS BUSTLING WITH SERVANTS PICKING UP 
CASH FOR THEIR MASTERS.  AL-SHUBAYLI, WHO SPOKE NOT A WORD OF 
ENGLISH, HOSTED ECONOFF FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS IN AN OPEN-DOOR 
SESSION THAT WAS INCESSANTLY INTERRUPTED BY PETITIONERS.  BASED ON 
AL-SHUBAYLI'S COMMENTS, ECONOFF'S OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS BY A 
SAUDI FAMILIAR WITH THE ORGANIZATION, THE OFFICE APPEARS TO SERVE 
AT LEAST THREE FUNCTIONS: 
 
  -- DISTRIBUTION OF STIPENDS TO THE ROYAL FAMILY. 

  -- DISTRIBUTION OF STIPENDS TO OTHER FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS 
     GRANTED MONTHLY STIPENDS IN PERPETUITY.  EXAMPLES INCLUDE THE 
     AL AL-SHAYKH FAMILY--DESCENDENTS OF THE ORIGINAL "WAHHABI," 
     MEMBERS OF THE AL-SUDAYRI FAMILY, CADET BRANCHES OF THE ROYAL 
     FAMILY, SUCH AS THE BIN JILUWI--FAMOUS COMRADES-IN-ARMS WITH 
     THE KINGDOM'S FOUNDER ABD AL-AZIZ, AND DESCENDANTS OF 
     INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS WHO ASSISTED ABD AL-AZIZ IN HIS CONQUEST 
     OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. 
 
  -- FULFILLMENT OF FINANCIAL PROMISES MADE BY SENIOR PRINCES, SUCH 
     AS CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH OR RIYADH GOVERNOR SALMAN, TO AVERAGE 
     SAUDIS, MOST LIKELY DURING A MAJLIS WHEN NUMEROUS SAUDIS 
     PERSONALLY APPROACH AND PETITION SENIOR LEADERS. 
 
9.  (S)  THE STREAM OF PETITIONERS INTO AL-SHUBAYLI'S OFFICE DURING 
THE MEETING GENERALLY WERE OF TWO TYPES:  THOSE SEEKING FOLLOW- 
THROUGH OF A ROYAL COMMITMENT, AND THOSE SEEKING TO VERIFY 
LEGITIMATE REGISTRATION ON THE ROLES AS RECIPIENTS OF MONTHLY 
STIPENDS. 
 
10.  (S) THE FIRST TYPE INCLUDED MANY PETITIONERS WHO HAD SLIPS OF 
PAPER WITH ROYAL DIWAN LETTERHEAD CARRYING HAND-SCRAWLED ARABIC 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ASSISTANCE.  AL-SHUBAYLI GENERALLY GRUDGINGLY 
APPROVED THESE, BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO ECONOFF THAT AN IMPORTANT PART 
OF HIS JOB, AT LEAST IN TODAY'S MORE FISCALLY DISCIPLINED 
ENVIRONMENT, IS TO PLAY THE ROLE OF BAD COP.  FOR EXAMPLE, HE 
INTENSELY AND RUDELY GRILLED A NEARLY BLIND OLD MAN ON WHY AN EYE 
OPERATION PROMISED BY A PRINCE AND CONFIRMED BY ROYAL DIWAN NOTE 
HAD TO BE CONDUCTED OVERSEAS AND NOT FOR FREE IN ONE OF THE FIRST 
CLASS EYE HOSPITALS IN THE KINGDOM.  AFTER LISTENING FOR SOME 
MINUTES TO THE REQUISITE GROVELING AND PLEADING, AL-SHUBAYLI SIGNED 
OFF ON THE REQUEST.  AFTER THIS PARTICULAR EPISODE, AL-SHUBAYLI 
TURNED TO ECONOFF AND NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN THE U.S. TWICE FOR 
MEDICAL TREATMENT HIMSELF, ONCE FOR A CHRONIC ULCER AND ONCE FOR 
CARPEL TUNNEL SYNDROME.  HE CHUCKLED, SUGGESTING THAT BOTH WERE 
PROBABLY JOB-INDUCED. 
 
11.  (C)  AL-SHUBAYLI HAS BEEN THE ONLY DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE 
SINCE ITS CREATION UNDER KING ABD AL-AZIZ ALMOST HALF A CENTURY AGO 
WHEN IT WAS CALLED THE RIYADH FINANCE OFFICE.  HE CLEARLY REALIZES 
THAT DISCRETION IS KEY TO KEEPING HIS JOB.  WHEN ASKED BY ECONOFF 
WHAT HIS OFFICE DOES, HE SAID "FINANCIAL THINGS, LIKE ANY OFFICE OF 
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE."  WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SAG'S AUSTERITY 
BUDGETS WERE AFFECTING HIS OFFICE, HE INITIALLY JUST ANSWERED, "OF 
COURSE."  HE LATER NOTED THAT THE OFFICE HAD RECENTLY PUT OUT THE 
WORD THAT ALL RECIPIENTS OF MONTHLY STIPENDS HAD TO COME INTO THE 
OFFICE TO VERIFY THEIR RIGHT TO BE ON THE ROLLS.  HE MENTIONED THAT 
HE HAD DISCOVERED CASES OF SERVANTS WHO WERE STILL PICKING UP 
MONTHLY STIPENDS FOR RECIPIENTS WHO HAD DIED.  THIS EXPLAINED THE 
SECOND TYPE OF PETITIONERS PRESENT DURING ECONOFF'S VISIT.  ONE 
SAUDI SUCCESSFULLY VERIFIED HIS RIGHT TO A STIPEND WITH A SERIAL 
NUMBER FROM THE RIFLE HIS FATHER HAD USED IN BATTLE WITH ABD AL- 
AZIZ.  ANOTHER, WHOM ECONOFF VAGUELY RECOGNIZED, INTRODUCED HIMSELF 
AS THE SAUDI TV WEATHERMAN.  AFTER JOKING ABOUT THE MONOTONY OF HIS 
JOB--ALWAYS FORECASTING "HOT AND DRY"--HE TOLD ECONOFF THAT HE WAS 
IN RIYADH TO VERIFY THAT HIS INFIRM UNCLE IN JEDDAH BELONGED ON THE 
ROLLS. 
 
12.  (S)  EVEN WITH HIS RETICENCE, AL-SHUBAYLI NOTED THE OBVIOUS, 
THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF THE OFFICE IS TAKING FINANCIAL 
CARE OF ROYALS.  WHILE AL-SHUBAYLI REFUSED TO ELABORATE, ACCORDING 
TO A VARIETY OF SOURCES, ROYAL FAMILY STIPENDS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
 
  -- THE REMAINING SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF ABD AL-AZIZ ARE ON 
     INDIVIDUAL PAY SCALES, RANGING FROM ABOUT $200,000 TO $270,000 
     PER MONTH ($1 EQUALS 3.75 SR). 
 
  -- GRANDCHILDREN OF ABD AL-AZIZ RECEIVE IN THE RANGE OF $27,000 
     PER MONTH, ACCORDING TO ONE CONTACT FAMILIAR WITH THE 
     STIPENDS.  PRINCE AL-WALID BIN TALAL TOLD BUSINESS WEEK THAT 
     HE, AS A GRANDSON, RECEIVED ABOUT $19,000 PER MONTH. 
 
  -- GREAT GRANDCHILDREN GENERALLY RECEIVE ABOUT $13,000, AND GREAT 
     GREAT GRANDCHILDREN RECEIVE $8,000 PER MONTH. 
 
  -- UPON MARRYING, A PRINCE CAN RECEIVE A STIPEND OF ABOUT $1 - 3 
     MILLION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A PALACE, THOUGH THIS GRANT IS NOT 
     AUTOMATIC AND REQUIRES SOME INFLUENCE WITH THE ROYAL DIWAN. 
     MONTHLY STIPENDS ALSO VARY DEPENDING ON WHETHER A ROYAL IS 
     SINGLE OR MARRIED. 
 
  -- AMOUNTS FOR DISTANT ROYALS OR PRIVILEGED NON-ROYALS IS 
     SUBSTANTIALLY LESS.  THE LEAST ONE RECEIVES IS $800 PER MONTH. 
     A TYPICAL MID-LEVEL MEMBER OF A NON-ROYAL RECIPIENT FAMILY 
     WOULD RECEIVE ABOUT $5,000 PER MONTH. 
 
13.  (C)  BASED ON THE ABOVE SCALE AND ASSUMING ABOUT 60 REMAINING 
     SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF ABD AL-AZIZ, AND AN AVERAGE 7 CHILDREN PER 
     PARENT (420 GRANDCHILDREN, 2,900 GREAT GRANDCHILDREN, AND PROBABLY 
     ONLY ABOUT 2,000 GREAT GREAT GRANDCHILDREN AT THIS POINT), TOTAL 
     ANNUAL STIPEND PAYMENTS WOULD AMOUNT TO OVER $2 BILLION.  THE 
     STIPENDS ALSO PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL INCENTIVE FOR ROYALS TO 
     PROCREATE SINCE THE STIPENDS BEGIN AT BIRTH.  A SAUDI WHO RECENTLY 
     ATTENDED PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY TOLD ECONOFF THAT THERE IS A 
     PRINCE IN THE SMALL PORTLAND, OREGON SAUDI STUDENTS ASSOCIATION WHO 
     HAS CONVINCED A LOCAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE TO CARRY HIM ON THE ROLLS 
     EVEN THOUGH HE WOULD NEVER ATTEND A CLASS.  ACCORDING TO THIS 
     SAUDI, THE PRINCE'S MAIN GOAL IN LIFE IS TO HAVE MORE CHILDREN SO 
     HE CAN INCREASE HIS MONTHLY ALLOWANCE. 
 
 
------------------- 
OFF-BUDGET PROGRAMS 
------------------- 
 
14.  (S)  WHILE THE STIPEND SYSTEM IS THE OFFICIAL MECHANISM FOR 
TAKING CARE OF ROYALS' FINANCIAL NEEDS, IT IS CLEARLY NOT ENOUGH 
FOR MANY PRINCES, AND SEVERAL OTHER ENRICHING PRACTICES, GENERALLY 
VIEWED AS CORRUPT, OCCUR.  BY FAR THE LARGEST IS LIKELY ROYAL 
SKIMMING FROM THE APPROXIMATELY $10 BILLION IN ANNUAL OFF-BUDGET 
SPENDING CONTROLLED BY A FEW KEY PRINCES, PRIMARILY DEFENSE 
MINISTER SULTAN.  TWO OF THESE PROJECTS--THE TWO HOLY MOSQUES 
PROJECT (ABOUT $5 BILLION PER YEAR) AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE'S 
STRATEGIC STORAGE PROJECT (ABOUT $1 BILLION PER YEAR)--ARE HIGHLY 
SECRETIVE, SUBJECT TO NO MINISTRY OF FINANCE OVERSIGHT OR CONTROLS, 
TRANSACTED THROUGH THE NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK (SEE BELOW), AND 
WIDELY BELIEVED TO BE A SOURCE OF SUBSTANTIAL REVENUES FOR THE KING 
AND A FEW OF HIS FULL BROTHERS.  IN A RECENT MEETING WITH THE 
AMBASSADOR, SAUDI BILLIONAIRE PRINCE AL-WALID BIN TALAL, ALLUDING 
TO THESE OFF-BUDGET PROGRAMS, LAMENTED THE TRAVESTY THAT REVENUES 
FROM "ONE MILLION BARRELS OF OIL PER DAY" GO ENTIRELY TO "FIVE OR 
SIX PRINCES." 
 
 
----------------- 
GOING TO THE BANK 
----------------- 
 
15.  (S)  THE TWELVE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE COUNTRY ARE GENERALLY 
LEARY OF LENDING TO ROYALS BECAUSE THE BANKS HAVE LIMITED RECOURSE 
SHOULD A PRINCE DEFAULT ON A LOAN.  NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK (NCB) 
HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY BANK OF THE ROYAL FAMILY FOR MANY YEARS.  IN 
THE LATE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S, NCB'S NON-PERFORMING ROYAL LOAN 
PROBLEMS WERE SO SEVERE THAT THE BANK NEARLY COLLAPSED.  KING FAHD 
REPORTEDLY INJECTED $2 BILLION OF PERSONAL FUNDS INTO THE BANK TO 
RESTORE ITS FINANCIAL INTEGRITY.  THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF A MAJOR 
BANK IN THE KINGDOM TOLD EMBOFFS THAT HIS BANK, WITH LOANS TO FEWER 
THAN A DOZEN PRINCES, WAS PROBABLY AT THE LOW END OF THE SPECTRUM 
IN TERMS OF EXPOSURE TO ROYALS.  HE IS CARRYING TWO NON-PERFORMING 
LOANS--ONE FOR 300 MILLION SR TO PRINCE SATTAM BIN ABD AL-AZIZ, AND 
ANOTHER SMALLER LOAN TO A SON OF PRINCE SALMAN BIN ABD AL-AZIZ. 
THE BANK WITH PROBABLY THE LOWEST EXPOSURE TO ROYALS IS THE 
KINGDOM'S ONLY ISLAMIC BANK--AL-RAJHI.  ACCORDING TO ITS TOP 
OFFICER, THE BANK HAS A STRICT POLICY AGAINST LENDING TO THE AL 
SAUD.  HE SAYS THE BANK HAS ONLY MADE TWO EXCEPTIONS, TO PRINCES 
WHO HAVE BEEN LONGSTANDING RELIABLE CUSTOMERS OF THE BANK.  AT THE 
HIGH END ARE NCB AND SAUDI AMERICAN BANK (SAMBA).  IN ITS LATEST 
FINANCIAL REPORT, FOR THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1996, SAMBA REPORTED 
LOWER PROFITS THAN LAST YEAR DUE IN PART TO A 200 MILLION SR 
PROVISION FOR A BAD LOAN, WHICH, ACCORDING TO A SAMBA OFFICER, IS 
TO ONE OF THE BROTHERS OF KING FAHD'S WIFE.  THE BANKS HAVE THE 
FREEDOM TO REFUSE DOING BUSINESS WITH ROYALS, BUT BANKS SUCH AS NCB 
AND SAMBA HAVE HAD A POLICY OF ATTRACTING SUCH "HIGH NET WORTH 
CLIENTS" TO THEIR PRIVATE BANKING DEPARTMENTS TO ADD PRESTIGE TO 
THE BANK. 
 
16.  (S)  THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF A MAJOR BANK IN THE KINGDOM TOLD 
THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE VIEWS ROYALS IN FOUR TIERS, WHICH DETERMINE 
HOW HIS BANK DEALS WITH THEM:  THE TOP TIER IS THE SENIORMOST 
PRINCES, GENERALLY THE MOST WELL-KNOWN SONS OF ABD AL-AZIZ.  SOME 
OF THESE HAVE ACCOUNTS AT THE BANK, BUT, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THEIR 
EXORBITANT WEALTH, THEY NEVER ASK THE BANK FOR LOANS.  THE SECOND 
TIER INCLUDES SENIOR PRINCES KNOWN TO BE INCREDIBLY WEALTHY BUT WHO 
OFTEN SEEK LOANS FROM THE BANK.  THE BANK INSISTS THAT SUCH LOANS 
BE 100 PERCENT COLLATERALIZED BY DEPOSITS IN OTHER ACCOUNTS AT THE 
BANK.  HE SAYS SUCH ARRANGEMENTS HAVE WORKED WELL FOR THE BANK. 
THE THIRD TIER ARE THE THOUSANDS OF LESSER PRINCES WHOM THE BANK 
REFUSES TO LEND TO.  THE FOURTH TIER, NOT REALLY ROYALS, ARE WHAT 
THIS BANKER CALLED THE "HANGERS ON"--PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR PRINCES 
AND WHOSE "CASH FLOWS" CAN CHANGE DRAMATICALLY FROM ONE DAY TO THE 
NEXT.  THESE, HE SAID, HAVE MOST RECENTLY GIVEN THE BANK THE MOST 
TROUBLE. 
 
17.  (S)  WITH A FEW NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS, THERE IS NOT EXTENSIVE 
ROYAL OWNERSHIP OF THE TWELVE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
PRINCE AL-WALID BIN TALAL IS THE MAJORITY OWNER OF UNITED SAUDI 
COMMERCIAL BANK AND HE IS TRYING TO ACQUIRE SAUDI CAIRO BANK. 
RUMORS ARE THAT OTHER PRINCES, JEALOUS OF HIS SUCCESS, ARE TRYING 
TO BLOCK THE ACQUISITION.  THE BANKING COMMUNITY EXPECTS THAT HE 
WILL MERGE THE TWO BANKS IF HE SUCCESSFULLY ACQUIRES SAUDI CAIRO 
BANK.  A SECOND RUMOR IN THE BANKING COMMUNITY IS THAT THE MONEY 
BEHIND KHALID BIN MAHFUZ'S RECENT ACQUISITION OF 100 PERCENT 
OWNERSHIP OF NCB--THE LARGEST BANK IN THE KINGDOM--CAME FROM THE 
KING'S SON, ABD AL-AZIZ BIN FAHD, WHO IS THE SHADOW OWNER.  IT IS 
WIDELY VIWED IN BANKING CIRCLES THAT KHALID BIN MAHFUZ, A FORMER 
BCCI INDICTEE, COULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN CENTRAL BANK APPROVAL TO FULLY 
OWN NCB WITHOUT THE MOST SENIOR ROYAL BACKING.  SAUDI HOLLANDI BANK 
IS MAJORITY OWNED BY THE CONGLOMERATE AL-MAWARID, WHICH IN TURN IS 
OWNED BY PRINCES.  THE MAJORITY OWNERS OF THE OTHER BANKS ARE 
GENERALLY THE LARGE NON-ROYAL BUSINESS FAMILIES IN THE KINGDOM. 
 
 
---------- 
LAND GRABS 
---------- 
 
18.  (C) STORIES ABOUND OF SOME GREEDY PRINCES EXPROPRIATING LAND 
FROM COMMONERS.  GENERALLY, THE INTENT IS TO RESELL QUICKLY AT HUGE 
MARKUP TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR AN UPCOMING PROJECT.  DISCONTENT OVER 
ROYAL USURPATION OF LANDS HAS BEEN EXACERBATED BY SAG CUTBACKS IN 
LAND DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS WHICH PRIMARILY BENEFITED THE MIDDLE 
CLASS.  FROM THE MID-1970S TO THE LATE 1980S THE SAG UNDERTOOK AN 
AMBITIOUS, AND POPULAR, LAND GRANT PROGRAM DESIGNED TO SETTLE 
NOMADIC POPULATIONS AND TO GARNER THE SUPPORT OF THE SAUDI 
POPULACE.  OVER 1.3 MILLION RESIDENTIAL PARCELS WERE DISTRIBUTED 
FREE OF CHARGE THROUGHOUT THE KINGDOM, WITH LITTLE MORE THAN A 
PETITION TO THE LOCAL GOVERNOR REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THE DEED.  AN 
EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM WAS ADMINISTERED BY ARAMCO, WHOSE 
ENVIRONS TODAY ARE SURROUNDED BY UPSCALE NEIGHBORHOODS SETTLED BY 
EMPLOYEES WITH THE HELP OF A COMPANY-DEEDED PIECE OF PROPERTY AND 
NO-INTEREST LOANS. 
 
19.  (C)  THE LAND GRANT PROGRAM HAS NOW DWINDLED TO AN EPISODIC 
GESTURE OF ROYAL LARGESSE, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE NUMBER OF GRANTS WAS 
STRESSING THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE -- 
WATER, ELECTRICITY, AND ROADS.  SIMILARLY, ARAMCO, HAVING 
DISTRIBUTED OVER 30,000 PLOTS OF LAND, RAN OUT OF DESIRABLE ACREAGE 
AND NOW OFFERS A LUMP SUM CASH PAYMENT.  WHEN COMBINED WITH THE 
ABSENCE OF MORTGAGE LOANS FROM THE COMMERCIAL BANKS, A DECADE-LONG 
WAITING LIST FOR A GOVERNMENT HOME LOAN, THE RESULT IS THAT HOME 
OWNERSHIP IS BECOMING AN ELUSIVE GOAL FOR YOUNG, NON-ROYAL SAUDIS. 
 
20.  (S)  AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, ROYAL LAND SCAMS INCREASINGLY HAVE 
BECOME A POINT OF PUBLIC CONTENTION.  IN THE 1993 "MEMORANDUM OF 
ADVICE" PETITION SIGNED BY OVER 100 OF THE KINGDOM'S MORE ACTIVIST 
CLERICS, THE KING WAS URGED TO HALT THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND, 
EXCEPT TO THOSE WITH LIMITED INCOMES OR NO PLACE TO LIVE.  MINISTER 
OF DEFENSE SULTAN, HIS SONS, AND THE OFFSPRING OF KING FAHD ARE THE 
MOST OFT-CITED SENIOR CULPRITS: 
 
  -- ACCORDING TO A BANKER WHO SAYS HE HAS A COPY OF THE WRITTEN 
     INSTRUCTIONS, DEFENSE MINISTER SULTAN ORDERED LOCAL 
     AUTHORITIES IN THE MECCA AREA TO TRANSFER TO HIS NAME A 
     "WAQF"--RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENT--OF A SMALL PARCEL OF LAND THAT 
     HAD BEEN IN THE HANDS OF ONE FAMILY LITERALLY FOR CENTURIES. 
     THE BANKER NOTED THAT IT WAS THE BRAZENNESS OF THE LETTER, 
     WITH NO EFFORT TO HIDE THE SIMPLE INTENT OF CONFISCATING LAND, 
     THAT WAS PARTICULARLY EGREGIOUS. 
 
  -- THE KING'S SON, ABD AL-AZIZ BIN FAHD, WAS REPORTEDLY GRANTED 
     THE HUGE EXPANSE OF LAND THAT THE KING KHALID INTERNATIONAL 
     AIRPORT OUTSIDE OF RIYADH WAS BUILT ON FOR RESALE TO THE 
     GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROJECT. 
 
  -- PRINCE MISHAL BIN ABD AL-AZIZ (ELDER HALF-BROTHER OF SULTAN), 
     WHO ACCEDED TO BEING PASSED OVER IN THE LINE OF SUCCESSION, IS 
     FAMOUS FOR THROWING FENCES UP AROUND VAST STRETCHES OF 
     GOVERNMENT LAND.  ONE CONTRACTOR REPORTS BEING ORDERED BY 
     MISHAL TO KEEP EXTENDING THE PERIMETER OF THE FENCE ENCIRCLING 
     HIS DESERT PROPERTY OUTSIDE OF RIYADH UNTIL AN ADDITIONAL 80 
     SQUARE KILOMETERS OF LAND WERE INCORPORATED INTO HIS PRIVATE 
     ESTATE.  LIKEWISE, MISHAL HAS ACQUIRED A 450 SQUARE KILOMETER 
     TRACT ENVELOPING THE KING KHALID MILITARY CITY OUTSIDE OF HAFR 
     AL-BATIN. 
 
  -- MISHAL'S FULL BROTHER, MITIB BIN ABD AL-AZIZ, IS THE 
     BENEFICIARY OF ALL LAND RECLAMATION PROJECTS ALONG THE ARABIAN 
     GULF.  THIS RIGHT WAS GRANTED AFTER MITIB INSISTED THAT HIS 
     FATHER, KING ABD AL-AZIZ, HAD PROMISED HIM ALL OF THE 
     KINGDOM'S FISHERY RIGHTS.  THE FAMILY'S COMPROMISE WAS TO 
     CREATE THE NATIONAL FISHERIES COMPANY, OF WHICH MITIB WAS MADE 
     A PARTNER, AND TO CEDE HIM THE RIGHTS TO ALL RECLAIMED LANDS 
     IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE. 
 
21.  (S)  THE CONFISCATION OF LAND BY SOME GREEDY PRINCES EXTENDS 
TO BUSINESSES AS WELL.  ONE PROMINENT AND WEALTHY SAUDI BUSINESSMAN 
REPORTS THAT ONE REASON SOME WEALTHY SAUDIS KEEP SO MUCH MONEY 
INVESTED OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY IS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT FACE THE 
RISK ABROAD OF "ROYAL EXPROPRIATION" OF BUSINESS ASSETS.  ACCORDING 
TO THIS BUSINESSMAN, AS SOON AS A SMALL BUSINESS SHOWS SIGNS OF 
HIGH GROWTH AND PROFIT POTENTIAL, THE OWNER, PARTICULARLY IF HE IS 
KNOWN TO BE WELL-OFF, WILL COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM ROYALS TO SELL 
OR GO INTO PARTNERSHIP.  AS A RESULT, MANY OF THE MORE PROMINENT 
BUSINESSMEN NOW CHOOSE TO USE A LESSER NAME SAUDI AS A SHADOW OWNER 
OF A BUSINESS TO AVOID DRAWING THE ATTENTION OF BUSINESS-HUNGRY 
PRINCES. 
 
 
--------------- 
THE VISA RACKET 
--------------- 
 
22.  (C)  A PHENOMENON OF THE PAST FIVE OR SO YEARS HAS BEEN THE 
ROYAL SPONSORSHIP OF EXPATRIATE LABOR FOR PROFIT.  EVERY FOREIGN 
WORKER IN THE COUNTRY HAS TO BE SPONSORED BY A SAUDI TO OBTAIN AN 
IQAMA--RESIDENCE PERMIT.  PERMISSION TO SPONSOR FOREIGN WORKERS IS 
GRANTED BY THE MINISTRY OF LABOR.  THE AVERAGE SAUDI CAN SPONSOR 
FIVE OR SO, ENOUGH TO HIRE MAIDS, NANNIES, AND DRIVERS. 
BUSINESSMEN CAN GENERALLY GET PERMISSION TO HIRE EXPATS TO FILL 
JOBS IN THEIR COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH THIS IS GETTING HARDER WITH THE 
SAG PUSH TO SAUDIIZE THE WORKFORCE.  ROYALS CAN GET PERMISSION FROM 
THE MINISTRY TO SPONSOR SEEMINGLY UNLIMITED NUMBERS OF EXPATS, EVEN 
THOUGH THEY HAVE NO WORK FOR THEM. 
 
23.  (C)  IT IS COMMON FOR A PRINCE TO SPONSOR A HUNDRED OR MORE 
FOREIGNERS, KNOWN HERE AS "FREELANCERS," WHO ARE ALLOWED TO FIND 
THEIR OWN JOBS, MOST OFTEN AS SERVANTS OR UNSKILLED LABORORS.  IN 
EXCHANGE FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING IN SAUDI ARABIA, THESE 
FOREIGNERS PAY THEIR ROYAL SPONSOR A NOMINAL FEE--$30 TO $150 PER 
MONTH, WHICH ADDS UP TO A SUBSTANTIAL TAKE FOR SOMEONE SPONSORING 
OVER A HUNDRED EXPATS--ON AVERAGE ABOUT $10,000 PER MONTH PER 100 
EXPATS UNDER SPONSORSHIP. 
 
24.  (C)  WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PRACTICE WAS LARGELY BEHIND THE 
RAPID GROWTH IN THE EXPATRIATE POPULATION, FROM ABOUT 4.2 MILLION 
TO 6.5 MILLION, BETWEEN 1992 AND 1995.  WITH THE ECONOMY GROWING AT 
1 PERCENT OR LESS DURING THOSE YEARS, JOB EXPANSION WAS NOT 
JUSTIFYING THE RAPID EXPATRIATE POPULATION GROWTH.  IN JANUARY 
1995, THE SAG RAISED THE PRICE FOR A 2-YEAR IQAMA TO A HEFTY 2,000 
SR ($533).  THIS COMBINED WITH THE COST OF HOMEWARD PASSAGE FOR 
WORKERS WHICH MUST BE BORNE BY SPONSORS IS NOW MAKING IT 
UNECONOMICAL TO ENGAGE IN THE WIDESPREAD SPONSORSHIP OF 
FREELANCERS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE EXPAT POPULATION HAS LEVELED 
OFF OR IS IN DECLINE AS A RESULT.  ONE INDICATION OF THIS IS THAT 
THE CENTRAL BANK HAS REPORTED THAT EXPATRIATE WORKER REMITTANCES 
ARE DOWN FROM $12 BILLION IN THE FIRST 9 MONTHS OF 1995 TO $9.9 
BILLION FOR THE SAME PERIOD IN 1996. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PRINCES BETTER AT SPENDING THAN SAVING 
-------------------------------------- 
 
25.  (S)  ALL THE WEALTH THAT HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO PRINCES OVER 
THE PAST 20 YEARS HAS NOT CREATED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SUPER- 
RICH PRINCES.  THERE ARE MORE NON-ROYAL BILLIONAIRES THAN ROYAL 
ONES.  THE HEADS OF THE BIG BUSINESS FAMILIES--AL-JOMAIH, AL- 
JUFFALI, BIN MAHFUZ, AL-RAJHI, OLAYAN, JAMEEL, AL-RASHID, FOR 
EXAMPLE--ARE KNOWN BILLIONAIRES WHILE ONLY A HANDFUL OF PRINCES ARE 
IN THE SAME LEAGUE. THE LONE EXCEPTION OF A PRINCE WHO HAS TURNED 
HIS SEED MONEY INTO A MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR EMPIRE IS AL-WALID BIN 
TALAL--THE SON OF AN OUTCAST SON OF ABD AL-AZIZ.  WE CALCULATE THAT 
HIS FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INVESTMENTS GIVE HIM A NET WORTH OF ABOUT 
$13 BILLION.  THE OTHER BILLIONAIRE PRINCES AND OUR ESTIMATE OF 
THEIR WORTH ARE KING FAHD -- $10 BILLION, DEFENSE MINISTER PRINCE 
SULTAN -- $10 BILLION, AND HIS SON KHALID BIN SULTAN -- $2 BILLION. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  AL SAUD INC. -- NO END IN SIGHT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
26.  (S)  WHILE ROYALTY HERE IS EXPECTED TO HAVE WEALTH AND THE 
TRAPPINGS OF POWER TO A CERTAIN DEGREE, THERE IS A BROAD SENTIMENT 
THAT ROYAL GREED HAS GONE BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF REASON.  ROYAL 
EXCESS IS A COMMON TOPIC OF CONVERSATION AMONG NON-ROYAL SAUDIS AND 
EXPATRIATES ALIKE.  PALACE CONSTRUCTION, KNOWN TO BE FINANCED FOR 
EVERY PRINCE THROUGH THE STIPEND SYSTEM, IS A VISIBLE SIGN OF SUCH 
EXCESS.  ONE PALACE IN DOWNTOWN RIYADH HAS NEVER BEEN OCCUPIED 
BECAUSE THE ROYAL BUILDER SIMPLY DIDN'T LIKE IT.  IT NOW STANDS AS 
A MONOLITHIC REMINDER OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION.  SUCH EXCESSES 
WERE TOLERABLE WHEN THE ECONOMIC TIDE WAS RISING FOR EVERYONE. 
NOW, WITH FLAT PER CAPITA GDP AND A GENERAL SENSE THAT QUALITY OF 
LIFE IS DECLINING FOR THE AVERAGE SAUDI, THE TRANSFER OF SO MUCH 
STATE WEALTH IS RESENTED AND ONE OF THE COMBUSTIBLE MIXES BESETTING 
SAUDI ARABIA'S FUTURE.  AS IF THIS WEREN'T ENOUGH, THE ROYAL FAMILY 
IS INCREASINGLY ALIENATING THE MERCHANT CLASS (AS EXAMINED SEPTEL) 
VIA PERVASIVE VIOLATION OF A DICTUM BY THE KINGDOM'S FOUNDER, ABD 
AL-AZIZ, THAT ROYALS STAY OUT OF BUSINESS. 
 
27.  (S)  THERE IS SOME SENTIMENT THAT CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH, AS 
KING, WOULD INTERCEDE TO ROLL BACK THE ROYAL TAKE.  IT IS NOT CLEAR 
YET, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD HAVE THE POWER OR INCLINATION TO MAKE 
SWEEPING CHANGES, BY, FOR EXAMPLE, ELIMINATING OFF-BUDGET PROGRAMS 
OR EVEN CURTAILING THE STIPEND SYSTEM.  EVEN WITH STIPEND AMOUNTS 
REMAINING FLAT, DISBURSEMENTS ARE GROWING WITH THE HIGH POPULATION 
GROWTH OF THE ROYAL FAMILY.  SUCH CUTTING BACK INTERNALLY MIGHT 
FURTHER FRACTURE THE RULING CLAN. 
 
28.  (S)  IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT OF THE PRIORITY ISSUES THE 
COUNTRY FACES, GETTING A GRIP ON ROYAL FAMILY EXCESSES IS AT THE 
TOP.  BUT AS LONG AS THE ROYAL FAMILY VIEWS THIS COUNTRY AS "AL 
SAUD INC.," EVER INCREASING NUMBERS OF PRINCES AND PRINCESSES WILL 
SEE IT AS THEIR BIRTHRIGHT TO RECEIVE LAVISH DIVIDEND PAYMENTS, AND 
DIP INTO THE TILL FROM TIME TO TIME, BY SHEER VIRTUE OF COMPANY 
OWNERSHIP. 
 
 
FOWLER