R 121356Z NOV 96
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1592
INFO USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//
COMUSNAVCENT //
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
IRAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 007350 
 
FROM AMCONSUL DUBAI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL PTER AF IR
SUBJECT: TEHRAN SEES TALEBAN AS U.S. TOOL AGAINST IRAN 
 
¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: DAVID PEARCE, CONSUL GENERAL 
DUBAI.  REASON: 1.6, X6 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2. (C) ABDUL HAQ, A FORMER LEADER OF THE AFGHAN 
COMMANDERS SHURA, SAYS THE TALEBAN HAVE APPROACHED HIM 
ABOUT SERVING AS FOREIGN MINISTER, BUT HE HAS DECLINED. 
HAQ SAID HE WOULD ONLY ACCEPT SUCH A POSITION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF A CREDIBLE MEDIATION WHERE HE COULD HELP 
NUDGE THE TALEBAN IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.  HE SAID 
TEHRAN VIEWED THE TALEBAN AS A U.S. TOOL AIMED AT 
DESTABILIZING IRAN.  HE ALSO FELT THE CONTINUATION OF 
THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN WAS DRIVING IRAN AND SUNNI 
EXTREMISTS INTO EACH OTHER'S ARMS AND IF THIS CONTINUES 
"OUR MAIN EXPORT WILL BE TERRORISM."  END SUMMARY. 
 
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A BUSINESS TRIP TO IRAN 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) CONSUL GENERAL MET IN BOTH MID AND LATE OCTOBER 
WITH ABDUL HAQ, A FORMER LEADER OF THE AFGHANISTAN 
COMMANDERS' SHURA.  HAQ VISITS DUBAI REGULARLY ON 
BUSINESS AND IN LATE OCTOBER HAD JUST RETURNED FROM 
THREE DAYS IN IRAN.  THE TRIP FOLLOWED A JUNE VISIT TO 
IRAN AIMED AT NEGOTIATING A FUEL OIL PURCHASE (HE CALLED 
IT "FURNACE OIL") FOR AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE DEAL 
REPORTEDLY FELL THROUGH WHEN THE TALEBAN DEMANDED 50 
PERCENT OF THE SHIPMENT FOR THEIR OWN CONSUMPTION.  ON 
THE SECOND TRIP, HAQ HAD SOUGHT TO ARRANGE A COMMERCIAL 
BUY OF 30,000 TONS FOR DELIVERY TO A CUSTOMER IN THE 
UAE.  CG QUIZZED HIM AS TO WHETHER THE PRODUCT MIGHT BE 
SMUGGLED IRAQI GASOIL.  HAQ REPLIED THAT IT WAS LOW- 
GRADE IRANIAN FUEL OIL, THE BY-PRODUCT OF IRANIAN 
REFINING OPERATIONS, AND NOT THE HIGHER-GRADE IRAQI 
DIESEL OR GASOIL.  HE SAID NOTHING HAD COME OF HIS 
DISCUSSIONS IN IRAN BECAUSE IRANIAN MIDDLEMEN HAD WANTED 
TOO MUCH "COMMISSION" TO MAKE THE PROJECT WORTHWHILE. 
THE MIDDLEMEN APPARENTLY ARE AFFILIATED WITH THE BONYAD- 
E MOSTAZAFAN VA JUNBAZAN, IRAN'S FOUNDATION FOR THE 
DEPRIVED AND WAR DISABLED, A MASSIVE STATE HOLDING 
COMPANY THAT CONTROLS CONFISCATED ASSETS OF THE SHAH'S 
REGIME.  HAQ SAID HE MIGHT GO TO TURKMENISTAN TO EXPLORE 
POSSIBILITIES THERE. 
 
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TALEBAN PROBE HAQ ON FOREIGN MINISTER'S JOB 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) ABDUL HAQ SAID MANY OF HIS LOCAL COMMANDERS NOW 
HELD PROMINENT POSITIONS WITH THE TALEBAN AND THAT HE 
HAD RECEIVED PROBES FROM THE TALEBAN ABOUT ASSUMING A 
HIGH-LEVEL POSITION LIKE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID HE 
WAS NOT INTERESTED, PREFERRING TO STAY IN PRIVATE 
BUSINESS. HE DIDN'T LIKE THE TALEBAN, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED 
HIS SYMPATHIES LAY MORE WITH THEM THAN RABBANI, SAYYAF 
AND MASOOD, WHOM HE TERMED "FUNDAMENTALISTS."  AT THE 
SAME TIME, HAQ DID NOT RULE OUT ACCEPTING A POSITION 
WITH THE TALEBAN IF IT WERE IN TANDEM WITH A CREDIBLE 
MEDIATION EFFORT UNDERWAY BY A "DISINTERESTED" THIRD 
PARTY.  (COMMENT: HE SEEMED TO HAVE THE U.S., NOT THE 
U.N., IN MIND.  END COMMENT.)  HE SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER 
STEPPING FORWARD IF HE COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN 
NUDGING THE TALEBAN IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FROM THE 
INSIDE. 
 
¶5. (C) ABDUL HAQ COMMENTED AT ONE POINT THAT TELEVISION 
COVERAGE OF THE TALEBAN HAD BEEN VERY NEGATIVE -- 
MASOOD'S GAINS WERE GIVEN MORE ATTENTION THAN TALEBAN 
GAINS, AND MASOOD SHELLING OF CIVILIAN AREAS WAS GIVEN 
LESS ATTENTION THAN SIMILAR TALEBAN SHELLING.  CG 
OBSERVED THAT THE TALEBAN HAD EARNED A LOT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ILL WILL FROM THEIR TREATMENT OF WOMEN AND 
GROTESQUE PUBLIC MOCKING OF THE BODIES OF NAJIBULLAH AND 
HIS BROTHER.  HAQ ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, SAYING HE HAD MADE 
SOME EFFORT TO MODERATE TALEBAN POLICIES, ESPECIALLY 
THOSE REGARDING WOMEN, BUT TO NO AVAIL.  HE SAID THE 
IDEA OF BEING A PUBLIC SPOKESMAN FOR THE TALEBAN WAS ONE 
OF THE REASONS HE WAS SO RELUCTANT TO TAKE ON A JOB LIKE 
FOREIGN MINISTER.  "I DON'T AGREE WITH THESE THINGS AND 
I CAN'T DEFEND THEM," HE SAID. 
 
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HAQ SEES IRAN AND SUNNI EXTREMISTS COMING TOGETHER 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENTING ON HIS VISITS TO IRAN, ABDUL HAQ SAID 
THE IRANIANS HATE THE TALEBAN.  HE SAID THEY ARE 
CONVINCED THAT THE TALEBAN ARE NOT MERELY CONTROLLED BY 
PAKISTAN, BUT ARE PART OF A SINISTER U.S. DESIGN TO 
DESTABILIZE IRAN.  THE REASONING APPEARS TO BE THAT A 
HARDLINE SUNNI ISLAMIST REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN MIGHT 
APPEAL TO THE LARGE SUNNI ETHNIC MINORITIES THAT INHABIT 
IRAN'S PERIPHERY, E.G. IN BALUCHISTAN.  HE ALSO SAID 
THAT, LIKE IT OR NOT, THE U.S. WAS IDENTIFIED WITH THE 
TALEBAN AMONG AFGHANS.  IF THEY WIN, THE U.S. WILL BE 
SEEN TO GAIN.  IF THEY LOSE, IRAN WILL BE SEEN TO HAVE 
GAINED. 
 
¶7. (C) ANOTHER THING IRAN DOESN'T LIKE ABOUT THE 
TALEBAN, HE SAID, IS THAT IT HAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF 
GAINING SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER THEM.  NOTING THAT 
IRAN HAD BEEN SUPPORTIVE BOTH OF THE RABBANI GOVERNMENT 
AND THE HAZARA SHIA, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE 
CONTINUATION OF THE AFGHAN CONFLICT WAS HAVING THE 
UNDESIRABLE EFFECT OF DRIVING THE IRANIANS AND SUNNI 
EXTREMISTS TOGETHER.  HE SAID RABBANI, HEKMATYAR ET AL 
HAD OPENED THE DOOR TO EXTREMISTS LIKE OSAMA BIN LADIN 
WHO NEED AN UNSTABLE COUNTRY WITH A WEAK GOVERNMENT IN 
ORDER TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT BASE OF OPERATIONS. 
"IF THIS CONTINUES," HE SAID, "OUR MAIN EXPORT WILL BE 
TERRORISM."  HE NOTED THAT THE TALEBAN'S FOCUS WAS ON 
AFGHANISTAN, BUT IRAN SUPPORTED MASOOD, RABBANI AND 
SAYYAF, WHO HE SAID HAD LINKS TO SUNNI GROUPS WITH AN 
EXTERNAL AGENDA.  HAQ PREDICTED EXCEEDINGLY NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES IF THE COUNTRY WERE DIVIDED ALONG ETHNIC 
PASHTO AND NON-PASHTO, MAINLY TAJIK, LINES.  "IT NEVER 
WAS A PASHTO-TAJIK CONFLICT BEFORE," HE SAID, "BUT IT IS 
BECOMING MORE AND MORE SO." 
 
¶8. (C) HE SAID IRAN IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT A PAKISTAN- 
AFGHANISTAN COMMERCIAL ALLIANCE COMPETING WITH IRAN FOR 
ACCESS TO THE MARKETS OF THE CIS.  IF THE TALIBAN IS 
ABLE TO RESTORE STABILITY TO AFGHANISTAN, HAQ EXPLAINED, 
IMPORTERS TO THE CIS MIGHT SHIP THEIR GOODS THROUGH 
PAKISTANI PORTS TO LINK WITH ROAD NETWORKS THROUGH 
AFGHANISTAN, TAKING BUSINESS AWAY FROM THE IRANIAN ROUTE 
THAT BEGINS AT BANDAR ABBAS. 
 
--------------------------------- 
RUSSIA: DELIBERATELY SOWING CHAOS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) HAQ SAID HE WAS DISTURBED BY THE IMMEDIACY AND 
STERNNESS OF THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO THE TALEBAN VICTORY 
AT KABUL, INCLUDING THE CONVENING OF A SECURITY 
CONFERENCE OF THE BORDERING CIS STATES.  MOSCOW WAS 
CLEARLY EAGER TO USE THE SITUATION TO SERVE ITS OWN 
STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE CIS, HE SAID.  HAQ MAINTAINED 
THAT AFTER THE SOVIET PULLOUT FROM AFGHANISTAN, MOSCOW 
HAD CYNICALLY FUNDED OPPOSING TAJIK GROUPS TO SOW CHAOS 
IN POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN AND JUSTIFY CONTINUED RUSSIAN 
MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER. 
 
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NO ONE CAN WIN, SOME OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE FUTURE, ABDUL HAQ CHARACTERIZED 
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AS A "GREAT BIG MESS". 
HOWEVER, THE ONE POSITIVE ELEMENT WAS THAT NO ONE WAS IN 
A POSITION TO WIN.  WHEN ANY GROUP HAS THE ADVANTAGE, IT 
IS UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.  RIGHT NOW, THE 
FORCES ARE SOMEWHAT IN BALANCE, WHICH OPENS SOME 
OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION.  HE SAID THE 
"FUNDAMENTALISTS" IN PARTICULAR (RABBANI, MASOOD ET AL) 
ARE UNDER PRESSURE.  IT WAS THESE GROUPS WHO HAD BEEN 
THE PRIME MOVERS IN SCUTTLING PREVIOUS UNITY PLANS, IN 
BLOCKING THE RETURN OF ZAHIR SHAH, AND IN UNDERMINING 
VARIOUS U.N. MEDIATION EFFORTS.  BUT FACED WITH A CHOICE 
BETWEEN, FOR EXAMPLE, A UNITY GOVERNMENT UNDER THE 
MANTLE OF ZAHIR SHAH AND A GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED BY THE 
TALEBAN, THEY WOULD OPT FOR ZAHIR SHAH.  "FOR THEM IT 
WOULD BE THE LEAST WORST," HE SAID. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11. (C) DESPITE HAQ'S PESSIMISM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR 
A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT, HE 
APPEARED HOPEFUL THAT THE U.S. MIGHT STEP UP TO A MORE 
ACTIVE ROLE.  IN SUCH CASE, HE MADE CLEAR, HE AND OTHERS 
LIKE HIM INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY MIGHT BE WILLING 
TO ALSO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE PART.  BUT FOR NOW, HE'LL 
STICK TO PRIVATE BUSINESS.  END COMMENT. 
 
LITT