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Viewing cable 96BANDARSERIBEGAWAN308, BRUNEI: A FRIEND WORTH CULTIVATING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
96BANDARSERIBEGAWAN308 1996-04-25 23:38 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
P 252338Z APR 96
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5642
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000308 
 
 
DEPT. FOR EAP/PIMBS 
SINGAPORE FOR ARMA 
CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA - AMB. SALMON 
NSC FOR ASIA DIRECTOR SANDRA KRISTOFF 
 
E.O.  12958:  4/25/16 
TAGS: PREL BX
SUBJECT:  BRUNEI:  A FRIEND WORTH CULTIVATING 
 
1.  CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR THERESA A. TULL. 
REASONS:  1.5(B) AND (D). 
 
2.  SUMMARY:  BRUNEI HAS PROVEN INCREASINGLY 
OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS THAT IT IS A FRIEND OF 
THE UNITED STATES, GRATEFUL FOR OUR FORWARD 
DEPLOYED PACIFIC PRESENCE, AND COOPERATIVE IN 
OUR EFFORTS ON SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, 
INCLUDING KEDO, BOSNIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
PEACE PROCESS.  FOR VERY LITTLE ADDITIONAL 
INVESTMENT IN TIME AND FUNDS, THE UNITED STATES 
COULD ENHANCE ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
BRUNEI AND, I AM CONFIDENT, GENERATE EVEN MORE 
COOPERATION FROM THIS OIL-RICH SULTANATE. 
 
3.  AS I CONCLUDE MY TOUR IN BRUNEI, I RECOMMEND 
(A) THAT THE PRESIDENT GIVE THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI 
SOME "FACE" TIME, BEGINNING WITH SCHEDULING A 
BILATERAL ON THE FRINGES OF THE MANILA APEC 
LEADERS MEETING, AND POSSIBLY INCLUDING A 
POST-ELECTION WASHINGTON INVITATION; (B) TO 
FURTHER INCREASE BILATERAL INTERACTION, THAT THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFER TO ESTABLISH A JOINT 
COMMISSION WITH BRUNEI, AND THAT SENIOR USG 
OFFICIALS FROM VARIOUS GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT 
VISIT BRUNEI OCCASIONALLY, AND THAT THEIR 
BRUNEIAN COUNTERPARTS BE INVITED MORE OFTEN TO 
THE UNITED STATES; AND (C) THAT A MINIMUM 
INTERNATIONAL VISITOR GRANT AND FULBRIGHT 
PROGRAM BE RETAINED FOR BRUNEI, DESPITE USIA 
BUDGET CUTBACKS.  GIVEN THE SULTAN'S 
PREDISPOSITION TOWARDS A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE U.S., THIS MODEST EFFORT WOULD PAY 
DIVIDENDS IN TERMS OF ADDITIONAL COOPERATION, 
INCLUDING FINANCIAL, ON BRUNEI'S PART IN CAUSES 
OF IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S. ECLIPSING GREAT BRITAIN AS IMPLICIT 
GUARANTOR OF BRUNEIAN SECURITY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  GREAT BRITAIN CONTINUES TO LOOM LARGE IN 
BRUNEI, WITH THE RESIDUAL GURKHA PRESENCE, ITS 
LOAN OFFICERS IN SERVICE WITH THE BRUNEIAN 
MILITARY, AND THE TIES OF A CENTURY OF THE 
BRITISH PROTECTORATE, REINFORCED BY BRUNEIAN 
LINKS TO BRITISH UNIVERSITIES--AND ASSIDUOUS 
CULTIVATION OF THE WEALTHY SULTAN BY BRITISH 
ROYALTY.  BUT GREAT BRITAIN DOES NOT HAVE THE 
SEVENTH FLEET, AND IS NOT VIEWED AS THE 
STABILIZER OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, OR AS THE 
BENIGN PROVIDER OF SECURITY IN THE UNCERTAIN 
DAYS AHEAD AS CHINA DEVELOPS AS A SUPERPOWER AND 
FLEXES ITS MUSCLES IN THE REGION.  INCREASINGLY 
I SENSE THAT FOR BRUNEI, THE UNITED STATES IS 
REGARDED AS THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF ITS 
SECURITY--NOT THAT BRUNEI NECESSARILY EXPECTS 
THE U.S. TO COME TO THE RESCUE IF INVADED, BUT 
IN THE SENSE THAT THE U.S. PRESENCE, 
PARTICULARLY IN THE FORM OF THE SEVENTH FLEET, 
WILL KEEP POTENTIALLY AGGRESSIVE REGIONAL POWERS 
AT BAY. 
 
5.  BRUNEI'S APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. PRESENCE 
WAS HEIGHTENED BY CHINA'S RECENT AGGRESSIVE 
BEHAVIOR TOWARDS TAIWAN.  IN RECENT WEEKS 
SEVERAL SENIOR BRUNEIAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE 
SULTAN, HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO ME ABOUT 
CHINA'S INTENTIONS, AND GRATITUDE FOR THE U.S. 
RESPONSE. 
 
BRUNEI'S COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. INCREASING 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, BRUNEI HAS INCREASED 
ITS COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IN KEY AREAS. 
FIRST, WE CONCLUDED A LONG-STALLED NEGOTIATION 
AND IN NOVEMBER 1994 SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING ON DEFENSE COOPERATION, ON TERMS 
FAVORABLE TO THE U.S. WITH REGARD TO CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY 
OFFENDERS--BETTER TERMS, I BELIEVE, THAN 
SINGAPORE WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT.  DESPITE SOME 
RESIDUAL BRUNEIAN NERVOUSNESS THAT THE TINY 
COUNTRY NOT BE SEEN (BY ITS POTENTIALLY 
AGGRESSIVE NORTHERN NEIGHBOR) AS TOO CLOSELY 
LINKED WITH THE UNITED STATES, AT THE VERY TOP 
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IT WAS DECIDED THAT A CLOSER 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BENIGN PROVIDER OF 
SECURITY IN THE REGION, THE UNITED STATES, WAS 
WORTH THE RISK OF AROUSING CONCERN IN CHINA. 
 
7.  BRUNEI HAS ALSO MARKEDLY INCREASED ITS 
COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN.  THE 
COUNTRY HAS RESPONDED GENEROUSLY TO OUR APPEALS 
FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION 
(KEDO), FOR AID TO THE PALESTINIANS IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, 
AND HAS SUPPORTED THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS, MOST 
RECENTLY WITH A US $8 MILLION DOLLAR PLEDGE FOR 
REFUGEE RELIEF AT THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE. 
 
8.  IN APEC AND IN ASEAN, BRUNEI HAS BEEN 
GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. GOALS.  BRUNEI'S 
SKILLFUL DIPLOMACY IN THE CRITICAL INITIAL 
STAGES HELPED SHAPE THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM IN 
DIRECTIONS COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. AIMS FOR THIS 
IMPORTANT FORUM. 
 
9.  BRUNEI HAS ALSO GIVEN U.S. BIDDERS VALUABLE 
CONTRACTS IN RECENT MONTHS (SIKORSKY, BOEING 
ARGOSYSTEMS, AIRWAYS ENGINEERING).  MCDONNELL 
DOUGLAS AND RAYTHEON ARE COMPETING FOR SHIPBOARD 
MISSILE SALES AND APPEAR TO HAVE A GOOD CHANCE 
OF WINNING THE CONTRACTS. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE COOPERATION 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10.  ALL OF THIS COOPERATION LEADS TO ONE 
CONCLUSION:  FOR THE U.S., BRUNEI IS 
INCREASINGLY A FRIEND, AND ONE WORTH CULTIVATING 
A BIT MORE THAN WE HAVE IN THE PAST.  WITH A 
VERY SMALL INVESTMENT IN TIME, EFFORT, AND 
FUNDS, THE U.S. COULD SOLIDIFY THIS COOPERATION, 
AND MOST LIKELY GAIN MORE, INCLUDING ADDITIONAL 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CAUSES 
OF MUTUAL CONCERN, AND POSSIBLY SOME MORE 
LUCRATIVE CONTRACTS FOR AMERICAN FIRMS. 
 
11.  I OFFER THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
A.  REQUEST BILATERAL FOR THE SULTAN WITH 
PRESIDENT CLINTON ON THE MARGINS OF THE MANILA 
APEC LEADERS MEETING, TO REPLACE THE ABORTED 
OSAKA BILATERAL.  PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE SO 
IMPORTANT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND PARTICULARLY IN 
BRUNEI.  THE SULTAN FEELS A RAPPORT WITH THE 
PRESIDENT, WHICH BEGAN WITH THE SEATTLE APEC 
LEADERS SUMMIT.  A SMALL MEASURE OF PERSONAL 
CONTACT WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE THE SULTAN 
EVEN MORE RESPONSIVE TO OUR APPEALS FOR 
ASSISTANCE. 
 
B.  INVITE THE SULTAN FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON.  I BELIEVE THAT BRUNEI IS THE ONLY 
ASEAN COUNTRY (EXCEPT NEWLY ADMITTED VIETNAM) 
WHOSE HEAD OF STATE AT ONE TIME OR THE OTHER HAS 
NOT BEEN INVITED TO WASHINGTON.  ONE RESPECTED 
SENIOR OFFICIAL TOLD ME THAT PERHAPS IF THE 
SULTAN MADE NASTY PUBLIC SPEECHES AGAINST THE 
U.S., HE, LIKE MALAYSIA'S MAHATIR, MIGHT ALSO BE 
INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE.  THE ABSENCE OF AN 
OFFICIAL INVITATION IS AWKWARD BECAUSE THE 
SULTAN WAS IN FACT INVITED ORALLY BY THE 
PRESIDENT HIMSELF DURING THE SEATTLE LEADERS 
MEETING.  PROVING THAT THIS WAS NOT JUST A 
CASUAL "HOPE YOU CAN COME TO MY COUNTRY 
SOMETIME" REMARK, PRESIDENT CLINTON REPEATED THE 
INVITATION TO BRUNEI'S AMBASSADOR WHEN HE 
PRESENTED CREDENTIALS AT THE WHITE HOUSE A 
COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER THE SEATTLE MEETING.  I 
RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT, IN 1997, EXTEND A 
FORMAL INVITATION TO THE SULTAN TO VISIT 
WASHINGTON. 
 
C.  ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMISSION BETWEEN THE 
U.S. AND BRUNEI TO REVIEW ON AN ANNUAL BASIS THE 
OVERALL STATE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. 
BRUNEI HAS THESE JOINT COMMISSIONS WITH MANY 
COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CHINA, OMAN, PAKISTAN, 
ETC.  THE MEETINGS ARE USUALLY CHAIRED AT THE 
PERMANENT SECRETARY LEVEL, AND ARE HELD IN 
ALTERNATE CAPITALS.  THE COMMISSIONS CONSIDER 
WAYS TO ENHANCE COOPERATION IN THE POLITICAL, 
ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
FIELDS.  FOR THE U.S., A COMMISSION WOULD BE A 
MEANS TO SHOW BRUNEI THAT WE BELIEVE THE 
RELATIONSHIP TO BE MORE THAN A SERIES OF TIN CUP 
EXERCISES.  IT WOULD BRING THE ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY TO BRUNEI BIANNUALLY FOR BILATERAL 
DISCUSSIONS, GIVING VISIBLE EVIDENCE THAT WE 
CARE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP. 
 
D.  SCHEDULE MORE FREQUENT VISITS BY SENIOR USG 
CIVILIAN OFFICIALS TO BRUNEI FOR BILATERAL 
DISCUSSIONS.  (U.S. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS 
VISIT BRUNEI REGULARLY; THESE VISITS SHOULD BE 
MAINTAINED AT CURRENT LEVELS.)  THESE SHOULD 
INCLUDE THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, DEPUTY 
SECRETARY OF STATE (AND THE SECRETARY, IF HE IS 
TOURING THE REGION), THE USTR, AND OUR 
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS.  AGAIN, THESE 
OCCASIONAL VISITS WOULD HAVE AS THEIR GOAL 
SIMPLY SHOWING BRUNEI THAT WE DO NOT TAKE THEM 
FOR GRANTED.  WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE 
TANGIBLE BENEFITS, BUT OVER TIME SHOWING THAT WE 
TAKE BRUNEI SERIOUSLY WILL, I AM CONFIDENT, PAY 
DIVIDENDS IN TERMS OF INCREASED COOPERATION.  AT 
THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD INVITE SENIOR BRUNEIAN 
OFFICIALS TO THE U.S. MORE FREQUENTLY. 
 
E.  FUND A SMALL INTERNATIONAL VISITOR AND 
FULBRIGHT PROGRAM.  USIA STOPPED FUNDING THE 
SMALL USIS EFFORT IN BRUNEI JANUARY 1, 1996. 
BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS EFFORT, I HAVE 
CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THE RUDIMENTS OF A USIS 
OPERATION, SUCH AS DISTRIBUTING THE WIRELESS 
FILE AND MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH BRUNEI'S ONE 
UNIVERSITY, DRAWING FROM THE EMBASSY'S MINISCULE 
BUDGET.  WE HAVE TWO INTERNATIONAL VISITOR 
CANDIDATES IN THE PIPELINE FOR FY-96 PROGRAMS. 
AT PRESENT WE HAVE AN OUTSTANDING FULBRIGHT 
PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY, AND A SIMILARLY 
OUTSTANDING USIA-PROVIDED LIBRARY FELLOW HELPING 
TO ESTABLISH THE LIBRARY AT THE NEW UNIVERSITY 
CAMPUS.  THE BRUNEIAN GOVERNMENT PAYS FOR ALL 
EXPENSES FOR THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS, EXCEPT FOR 
THEIR STIPEND.  DESPITE USIA'S SHRINKING BUDGET, 
FUNDS SHOULD BE FOUND TO CONTINUE A MODEST IV 
AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAM HERE.  THREE IV GRANTS PER 
YEAR, AND ONE FULBRIGHTER, WOULD COST THE USG NO 
MORE THAN $100,000 PER YEAR, AND WOULD BE MONEY 
WELL SPENT.  EXPOSURE TO THE US BY MID-LEVEL 
BRUNEIAN OFFICIALS, AND THE REGULAR INCLUSION OF 
A FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR ON THE FACULTY OF THE 
UNIVERSITY, WHICH IS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE 
TO "ISLAMICIZE", YET WANTS TO EXPAND AND GROW 
ACADEMICALLY, WOULD BE MONEY WELL SPENT. 
FURTHER, STOPPING THESE PROGRAMS COULD BE VIEWED 
BY THE BRUNEIAN GOVERNMENT AS A SNUB AND COULD 
IMPACT NEGATIVELY ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE COOPERATION WITH US IN OTHER AREAS. 
 
12.  THESE ARE MODEST PROPOSALS--A LITTLE FACE 
TIME, A MODEST USIA EFFORT.  I URGE THAT THEY BE 
FAVORABLY CONSIDERED, AND WISH MY SUCCESSOR WELL 
IN BRINGING THEM TO FRUITION. 
 
 
TULL