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Viewing cable 95ZAGREB5299, C) FM GRANIC EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER U.S.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
95ZAGREB5299 1995-12-29 16:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 005299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE 
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 12/29/05 
TAGS: 
SUBJECT:  (C) FM GRANIC EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER U.S. 
          STATEMENTS IN NEW YORK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  05299  01 OF 02  291641Z 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY PETER W. GALBRAITH, AMBASSADOR, 
PER 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  (S) CROATIAN FM GRANIC TOLD CHARGE FINN DECEMBER 29 
THAT THE GOC WAS CONCERNED BY REPORTS FROM NEW YORK 
THAT THE U.S. WAS "SUPPORTING" A RUSSIAN-SPONSORED 
CONDEMNATION OF CROATIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.  WAS 
THIS, HE ASKED, A CHANGE IN POLICY?  GRANIC 
ACKNOWLEDGED CROATIA HAD "MADE MISTAKES," BUT ARGUED IT 
WAS WORKING HARD TO CORRECT PROBLEMS AND, MAKING CLEAR 
THERE WAS SOME SPACE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND OTHERS IN THE 
GOC ON THESE ISSUES, EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A 
RESOLUTION LIKE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PUSHING WOULD 
DAMAGE PROSPECTS FOR CROATIA-SERBIA NORMALIZATION, 
REINTEGRATION OF EASTERN SLAVONIA, AND PEACE IN B-H. 
 
3.  (C)  CHARGE ASSURED GRANIC THERE WAS NO SHIFT IN 
U.S. POLICY, BUT RATHER CONTINUITY -- CROATIA'S HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROBLEMS WERE AND WOULD REMAIN A SERIOUS U.S. 
CONCERN, ESPECIALLY SO LONG AS GOC STATEMENTS ABOUT 
REMEDIES WERE NOT FOLLOWED UP WITH EFFECTIVE ACTION. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
GRANIC REVIEWS CROATIA'S POLITICAL, HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  05299  01 OF 02  291641Z 
 
4.  (U)  CHARGE WAS SUMMONED TO THE MFA DECEMBER 29 FOR 
A MEETING WITH FM GRANIC.  ALSO PRESENT WERE ASSISTANT 
MINISTER FOR BILATERAL AFFAIRS BISCEVIC, CHEF DE 
CABINET MATEK, DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AMERICA GRABAR, AND 
U.S. EMBASSY POLOFF. 
 
5. (C)  RECALLING HIS RECENT "VERY PRODUCTIVE" TALKS 
WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, GRANIC EMPHASIZED THAT 
CROATIA WISHED TO COOPERATE FULLY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF DAYTON, AND HAD DONE SO, ESPECIALLY REGARDING THE 
ZUPANJA AREA.  (CHARGE OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS CORRECT 
AND WAS MUCH APPRECIATED.)  GRANIC ADDED THAT THE GOC 
WOULD SEND A DELEGATION TO THE DISARMAMENT TALKS IN 
VIENNA AND COOPERATE FULLY IN EFFORTS THERE.  HE NOTED 
PROGRESS IN EASTERN SLAVONIA, WITH MG KLEIN CURRENTLY 
IN ZAGREB, A UNSC RESOLUTION EXPECTED SOON, AND SOME 
PROGRESS ON THE NECESSARY TROOP CONTINGENTS.  IT HAD 
BEEN AGREED DECEMBER 27 THAT HE WOULD VISIT BELGRADE 
JANUARY 10 (WEATHER PERMITTING).  THERE WAS "NO DOUBT" 
THAT CROATIA WOULD COOPERATE FULLY IN THE NORMALIZATION 
PROCESS WITH SERBIA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE COULD DELAY NORMALIZATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6. (C) IN THIS CONTEXT, HOWEVER, THE UNSYG'S REPORT ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS MIGHT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.  CROATIA HAD 
"SHOWN WHAT IT IS DOING NOW," AND HAD TAKEN MANY STEPS 
TO CLEAN UP ITS ACT AND PREVENT FURTHER "MISTAKES," 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  05299  01 OF 02  291641Z 
ESPECIALLY IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS.  THE GOC HAD MADE 
CLEAR ITS POLICY WOULD BE TO PROSECUTE ALL CRIMES.  ON 
DECEMBER 27, THE GOVERNMENT HAD "RESOLVED THE QUESTION 
OF PROPERTY," AND ON DECEMBER 28 IT HAD MET TO WORK UP 
ITS "PROPOSAL" TO THE SABOR ON THIS.  THE HAGUE 
TRIBUNAL WAS SENDING INVESTIGATORS TO CROATIA JANUARY 
4-5 AND THEY WOULD HAVE FULL COOPERATION. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
U.S. COOPERATING WITH RUSSIA TO PRESSURE THE GOC 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7. (C) BUT RUSSIA HAD SEIZED ON THE BOUTROS-GHALI 
REPORT TO PUSH IN THE UNSC FOR A RESOLUTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CROATIA.  ON DECEMBER 28, THE U.S. REP HAD 
SUPPORTED THE RUSSIAN APPROACH, USING RATHER STRONG 
LANGUAGE.  "WE KNOW THAT YOU HAD PRESSURE FROM 
MILOSEVIC," GRANIC SAID, BUT PRESSURE ON THE GOC NOW 
WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL.  IT WAS ENTIRELY LEGITIMATE THAT 
 
THE U.S., NOW AS IN THE PAST, OFFER "CRITICAL 
SUGGESTIONS" ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, WHICH STIMULATED 
DISCUSSION AND REMEDIAL ACTION.  THE GOC WAS ENTIRELY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NNNNPTQ3476 
 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3476 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  05299  02 OF 02  291641Z 
ACTION EUR-01 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-01  CIAE-00  SMEC-00  OASY-00  SRPP-00 
      EB-01    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-01     ADS-00 
      M-00     NSAE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   PA-01    PM-00    PRS-01 
      P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    SS-00    STR-00   TRSE-00  T-00 
      USIE-00  PMB-00   PRM-10   PRME-01  PRMC-01  DRL-09   G-00 
        /031W 
                  ------------------0C8658  291641Z /38 
P 291642Z DEC 95 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8463 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NATO EU COLLECTIVE 
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ISP// 
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-PMA/J21// 
NSC WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ZAGREB 005299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE 
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEU 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 12/29/05 
TAGS: 
SUBJECT:  (C) FM GRANIC EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER U.S. 
          STATEMENTS IN NEW YORK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  05299  02 OF 02  291641Z 
 
PREPARED TO OWN UP TO ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND TAKE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM, BUT THIS PROCESS MUST APPLY 
THE SAME STANDARD TO ALL, INCLUDING SERBIA. 
 
8. (S) THE U.S. REP, GRANIC CLAIMED, HAD FOR THE FIRST 
TIME SEEMINGLY "LED" AN EFFORT TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE 
GOC ALONE.  GRANIC ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE U.S. 
ACTION IN NEW YORK; WAS THIS, HE ASKED, A "CHANGE OF 
POLICY" TOWARD CROATIA?  CHARGE, NOTING HE HAD NOT YET 
RECEIVED ANY REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK 
DECEMBER 28, SAID U.S. POLICY ON CROATIA HAD NOT 
"SHIFTED," NOR WAS IT DRIVEN BY ANY PRESSURE FROM 
MILOSEVIC.  HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE A LONGSTANDING AND 
MAJOR COMPONENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY; SERIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES HAD BEEN COMMITTED IN CROATIA, AND THE 
U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO CALL ATTENTION TO THEM, 
ESPECIALLY SO LONG AS THERE WAS A CLEAR GAP BETWEEN 
STATED POLICY AND EFFECTIVE ACTION. 
9. (C) GRANIC CONCEDED THERE HAD BEEN A GAP BETWEEN 
POLICY AND ACTION, BUT ARGUED IT WAS BEING CLOSED. 
STEPS WERE BEING TAKEN ON THE PROPERTY ISSUE AND ON 
RETURN OF REFUGEES, THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT 3,000 
REMAINING "REAL" APPLICANTS FOR RETURN WHOSE CASES 
REMAINED UNRESOLVED; PROCEDURES WOULD BE EXPEDITED; IT 
WAS SELF-EVIDENT THAT THOSE WHO WERE APPLYING TO COME 
BACK TO CROATIA WERE NOT WAR CRIMINALS.  BUT EASTERN 
SLAVONIA COULD NOT BE POSTPONED; DELAYS THERE WOULD 
HAVE "INTERNAL REPERCUSSIONS" THAT WOULD ALSO BE FELT 
ON THE BOSNIA PROCESS. 
 
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10. (C)  CHARGE SAID THAT NO ONE IN THE U.S. WAS 
SUGGESTING POSTPONEMENT OF EASTERN SLAVONIA.  ON THE 
CONTRARY, WE WERE PUSHING HARD TO GET THE PROCESS UNDER 
WAY AND WERE WORKING TO HAVE ALL THE ELEMENTS IN PLACE 
BY JANUARY 15.  HE NOTED THAT EASTERN SLAVONIA WOULD 
OFFER THE GOC AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE WITH 
DEEDS THAT IT WANTED TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY 
AND TANGIBLE RESULTS.  THERE HAD BEEN MANY OFFICIAL 
STATEMENTS ON THE RIGHT OF RETURN, BUT SO FAR ONLY A 
HANDFUL HAD BEEN ALLOWED, AND NOT TO THE KRAJINA AREA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
BETWEEN THE LINES, DIVERGENT VIEWS WITHIN THE GOC 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
11. (S) GRANIC EMPHASIZED MORE THAN ONCE HIS OWN 
"PERSONAL" COMMITMENT TO BETTER GOC HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERFORMANCE.  (COMMENT: IT HAS LONG BEEN EVIDENT THAT 
OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT, VIZ. SUSAK AND TUDJMAN, ARE 
LESS PERSUADED OF THIS COURSE).  BISCEVIC, SEEING US 
OUT, ALSO PLEADED FOR U.S. "UNDERSTANDING" OF THE 
"PRACTICAL ASPECTS" OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURES, WHEN 
GRANIC HAD TO DEFEND HIS PRO-HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE WITHIN 
THE GOVERNMENT.  CHARGE SAID THE U.S. UNDERSTOOD, BUT 
CROATIA SHOULD ALSO WORK TO IMPROVE ITS HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERFORMANCE. 
 
12.  (U) SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
GALBRAITH 
 
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