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Viewing cable 95LONDON8776, NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS "CRISIS"

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
95LONDON8776 1995-06-21 18:00 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy London
R 211800Z JUN 95
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0145
INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 008776 
 
 
DEPT FOR P, EUR AND EUR/UBI 
 
NSC FOR SODERBERG AND STEPHENS 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS UK EI
SUBJECT:  NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS "CRISIS" 
 
REFS:  (A) FBIS MS1506142395, (B) DUBLIN 2913, 
       (C) DUBLIN 2812, (D) DUBLIN 2820, (E) DUBLIN 2778 
 
1. (U) PARAGRAPHS CLASSIFIED AS MARKED.  OADR FOR 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
2. (C) SINN FEIN LEADERS HAVE AUTHORITATIVELY RULED OUT 
ANY DECOMMISSIONING OF WEAPONS -- EVEN A SYMBOLIC 
GESTURE -- UNTIL THE SHAPE OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT IS CLEAR, AND HAVE DEMANDED THAT HMG 
IMMEDIATELY CONVENE ALL-PARTY TALKS.  THEY SAID THEIR 
EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH HMG WAS FINISHED, BUT LEFT 
OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MEETINGS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS 
TO PREPARE FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS.  SINN FEIN HAS LAUNCHED 
A CAMPAIGN TO FORGE "PAN-NATIONALIST" CONSENSUS BEHIND 
ITS POSITION, AND TO ISOLATE THE UNIONISTS AND HMG. 
 
3. (S) BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED BY THE SUCCESS OF 
SINN FEIN'S CAMPAIGN, BUT UNSURE HOW THEY CAN COUNTER 
IT.  THEY DO NOT WANT THE PEACE PROCESS TO BECOME 
STALLED, AND ARE WORRIED BY INTELLIGENCE INDICATING A 
POTENTIAL SPLIT IN THE IRA IN LATE SUMMER/EARLY AUTUMN. 
THEY WANT TO MOVE ON ISSUES AT THE TOP OF THE REPUBLICAN 
GENDA LIKE PRISONERS AND POLICING, BUT SINN FEIN HAS 
REFUSED TO DISCUSS THEM SERIOUSLY.  THE BRITISH INSIST 
THAT SOME MOVEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING IS ESSENTIAL IF 
UNIONISTS AND TORY MP'S ARE TO BE KEPT ON BOARD:  THERE 
CAN BE NO ALL-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT AN UNEQUIVOCAL 
DEMONSTRATION OF IRA INTENT NOT TO RESUME VIOLENCE.  THE 
OPPOSITION LABOUR PARTY STRONGLY SUPPORTS THIS VIEW. 
 
4. (S) THE BRITISH ARE LESS WORRIED THAN THEIR IRISH 
COUNTERPARTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A BREAKDOWN IN THE 
PEACE PROCESS.  THEY BELIEVE THE IRA WOULD HAVE LITTLE 
COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR A FULL-SCALE RETURN TO TERRORISM 
AND THAT A DEFECTION OF ONE OR MORE IRA BRIGADES COULD 
BE CONTAINED.  THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THEIR POSITION ON 
DECOMMISSIONING IS BOTH RIGHT AND POLITICALLY 
DEFENSIBLE, AND THAT THEY HAVE NO FURTHER ROOM TO 
MANEUVER.  IF THE BRITISH PERSIST, SOMETHING WILL HAVE 
TO GIVE:  EITHER SINN FEIN AND THE IRA WILL FIND A WAY 
TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT TO NONVIOLENCE, OR THE 
PEACE PROCESS WILL BREAK DOWN.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NO TO DECOMMISSIONING 
--------------------- 
5. (U) SINN FEIN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SIGNALING FOR OVER 
A MONTH THAT THE IRA WOULD NOT DECOMMISSION ITS ARMS 
UNTIL POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS PRODUCED A BLUEPRINT FOR 
IRELAND'S FUTURE THAT IT FOUND ACCEPTABLE.  IN A LONG 
ARTICLE IN THE JUNE 14 "IRISH TIMES" (REF A), GERRY 
ADAMS MADE IT OFFICIAL: 
 
--   "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS DEMANDING THE SURRENDER 
     OF IRA WEAPONS AS A PRECONDITION TO ALL-PARTY PEACE 
     TALKS ON THE FUTURE OF IRELAND.  THE LOGIC OF THAT 
     POSITION, IF ADHERED TO, IS THAT THERE WILL BE NO 
     INCLUSIVE PEACE TALKS AND NO DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT." 
 
--   "IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS 
     SIMPLY ASKING FOR A SYMBOLIC GESTURE.  BUT IT IS A 
     GESTURE WHICH WOULD SYMBOLIZE AN IRA SURRENDER.... 
     THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS, IN EFFECT, DEMANDING THE 
     SURRENDER OF THE IRA." 
 
--   "SINN FEIN CANNOT, AND WILL NOT, INVOLVE ITSELF IN 
     A FUTILE EXERCISE TO BRING ABOUT AN IRA SURRENDER." 
 
6. (U) IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES, SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS 
OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, ADAMS AND OTHER SINN FEIN 
LEADERS REPEATED THIS MESSAGE ENDLESSLY.  ON JUNE 17, 
ADAMS TOLD AN INTERVIEWER THAT A RETURN TO VIOLENCE WAS 
"ABSOLUTELY" POSSIBLE, BUT DENIED THE NEXT DAY THAT HE 
HAD INTENDED THIS STATEMENT AS A THREAT.  MARTIN 
MCGUINNESS MADE THE SAME POINTS IN THE ANNUAL WOLFE TONE 
COMMEMORATION SPEECH JUNE 18 (REF B), CALLING HMG'S 
INSISTENCE ON AT LEAST TOKEN DECOMMISSIONING "DANGEROUS 
AND DISHONORABLE," AND A "CYNICAL GAME."  ADAMS AND 
MCGUINNESS INSISTED THAT SINN FEIN AND THE IRA WERE 
WILLING TO COUNTENANCE DISARMAMENT, BUT ONLY AS PART OF 
A "UNIVERSAL DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS, BRITISH AND IRISH, 
ONCE AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND 
FRAMEWORK IS AGREED UPON." 
 
DEMAND FOR ALL-PARTY TALKS 
-------------------------- 
7. (U) THE SINN FEIN LEADERS ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THEY 
WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY MORE "EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE" 
MEETINGS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS.  NATIONAL CHAIRMAN 
MITCHEL MCLAUGHLIN TOLD THE BBC ON JUNE 12 THAT "WE 
BELIEVE THAT WE'VE COVERED THOSE ISSUES WHICH WERE 
RELEVANT AND LEGITIMATE AND NOW IT IS TIME TO MOVE ON TO 
A COMMITMENT TO OPEN ALL-PARTY TALKS."  MCGUINNESS MADE 
THE SAME POINTS IN HIS JUNE 18 SPEECH. 
 
8.   ADAMS, IN HIS "IRISH TIMES" ARTICLE AND WEEKEND 
INTERVIEWS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, ADDED THAT: 
 
--   "ALL-PARTY PEACE TALKS SHOULD BE INITIATED AS A 
     MATTER OF URGENCY AND WITHIN AN AGREED TIME FRAME." 
 
--   "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO 
     DICTATE THE TERMS OF THIS ACCOMMODATION, NOR CAN IT 
     BE ALLOWED TO DETERMINE WHO CAN OR CANNOT 
     PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTITIONS...." 
 
--   "... THE BRITISH HAVE, AS EVER, USED THE CONVENIENT 
     COVER OF THE UNIONISTS.  IN DOING SO THEY ARE 
     ENCOURAGING, RATHER THAN DISCOURAGING, UNIONIST 
     INTRANSIGENCE." 
 
A FEW LOOPHOLES 
--------------- 
9. (C) DESPITE THE CATEGORICAL TONE OF THE SINN FEIN 
STATEMENTS, IT MAY PROVE SIGNIFICANT THAT THEY LEFT OPEN 
A FEW LOOPHOLES THROUGH WHICH THE PARTY MIGHT EVENTUALLY 
SLIDE OFF ITS HARD-LINE POSITION.  THE REJECTIONS OF 
DECOMMISSIONING GENERALLY SET UP A STRAW MAN TO ATTACK: 
ADAMS AND MCGUINNESS REJECTED A UNILATERAL SURRENDER OF 
ALL IRA WEAPONS BEFORE TALKS COULD BEGIN, KNOWING FULL 
WELL THAT THIS IS NOT WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DO. 
 
10. (C) ON DIALOGUE, THE SINN FEIN LEADERS CAREFULLY 
ALLOWED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS 
UNDER ANOTHER NAME.  SINCE HMG IS ALREADY CONDUCTING ITS 
TALKS WITH BOTH UNIONIST PARTIES UNDER VARIOUS DODGES 
AND LINGUISTIC SUBTERFUGES, THIS NEED NOT BE AN 
INSUPERABLE OBSTACLE TO CONTINUING THE EXPLORATORY 
DIALOGUE UNDER A NEW NAME. 
 
PAN-NATIONALIST CAMPAIGN 
------------------------ 
11. (C) SINN FEIN'S LOBBYING CAMPAIGN TO GENERATE A 
"PAN-NATIONALIST CONSENSUS" IN SUPPORT OF ITS POSITION 
HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SEVERAL WEEKS.  IT ECHOES THE 
PATTERN OF PREVIOUS CAMPAIGNS FOR VISAS AND FUNDRAISING 
PERMISSION, SEEKING FIRST TO WIN OVER SDLP LEADER JOHN 
HUME, IRISH OFFICIALS AND FIANNA FAIL, THEN PUTTING 
PRESSURE THROUGH THEM ON JOHN BRUTON AND DICK SPRING. 
HUME APPEARS TO BE ON BOARD, THOUGH SDLP DEPUTY LEADER 
SEAMUS MALLON URGED THE IRA ON JUNE 16 TO "DO THIS THING 
ON DECOMMISSIONING FOR THE REST OF US, FOR THE IRISH 
PEOPLE AND CALL THE BRITISH BLUFF."  REFS C-E INDICATE 
THAT IRISH OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN WON OVER.  SPRING AND 
BRUTON HAVE WAVERED, AND MEDIA REPORTS INDICATE THAT 
BRUTON HAS PROPOSED AN ANGLO-IRISH STUDY OF MODALITIES 
OF DECOMMISSIONING, PRESUMABLY AS A DELAYING TACTIC. 
 
12. (U) A KEY PART OF THE CAMPAIGN IS TO CREATE A 
CLIMATE OF OPINION THAT THE BRITISH AND UNIONIST DEMANDS 
DO NOT MEAN WHAT THEY SAY, THAT DECOMMISSIONING IS BOTH 
IMPOSSIBLE AND UNREASONABLE, AND THAT HMG IS ISOLATED 
INTERNATIONALLY.  ADAMS WROTE THAT: 
 
--   "THERE IS NO INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT AND CERTAINLY 
     NO PRECEDENT IN IRELAND FOR THE HANDING OVER OF 
     WEAPONS." 
 
--   "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ... WISH TO DEFLECT AND 
     DILUTE THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A 
     DEMOCRATIC AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BY CREATING AN 
     UNNECESSARY AND DIVISIVE ARGUMENT OVER IRA WEAPONS." 
 
--   "THEY MAY, IN FACT, WISH TO CAUSE DIVISIONS AND 
     FRACTIONS WITHIN THE IRA ITSELF IN AN ATTEMPT TO 
     UNDERMINE THE STRENGTH OF THE REPUBLICAN POSITION. 
     IN SHORT, THEY WISH TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO." 
 
--   "THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND ALL POLITICAL PARTIES 
     WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UNIONISTS HAVE CALLED FOR 
     SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN.  THE BRITISH 
     GOVERNMENT IS REFUSING TO TAKE THIS ESSENTIAL STEP 
     AND IS PREVENTING PROGRESS TOWARDS AN AGREED AND 
     LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT." 
 
13. (U) SIMILARLY, MCLAUGHLIN POINTED TO BRUTON'S 
INVITATION TO ALL PARTIES TO TALK, AND SAID THIS PROVED 
THAT HMG WAS "THE OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT ON PEACE IN 
IRELAND."  AND MCGUINNESS CLAIMED THAT "THE CONCEPT OF 
ALL-PARTY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN IRELAND WAS SUPPORTED BY 
AN EXPECTANT AND WATCHING WORLD.  ONLY THE BRITISH 
GOVERNMENT STOOD IN THE WAY OF REAL PEACE TALKS." 
 
14. (C) IN ALL THESE STATEMENTS, NONE OF THE SINN FEIN 
SPOKESMEN ACKNOWLEDGED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CALL AT THE 
WASHINGTON INVESTMENT CONFERENCE FOR PROGRESS TOWARD 
DECOMMISSIONING, OR FORMER COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT OSCAR 
ARIAS' SIMILAR APPEAL FOR PARAMILITARY DISARMAMENT AT A 
RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE IN BELFAST. 
 
BRITISH PERPLEXED 
----------------- 
15. (C) BRITISH MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS HAVE WATCHED THE 
SINN FEIN CAMPAIGN DEVELOP, BUT ARE AT A LOSS HOW BEST 
TO COUNTER IT.  THEY BELIEVE THAT THEIR CURRENT POSITION 
IS BOTH REASONABLE, MORALLY RIGHT AND POLITICALLY 
DEFENSIBLE.  THEY POINT OUT THAT: 
 
--   THEY HAVE TAKEN A LONG SERIES OF STEPS TO DEFUSE 
     CONFRONTATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND HAVE 
     MODIFIED THEIR POSITION REPEATEDLY IN ORDER TO 
     FACILITATE COMPROMISE WITH SINN FEIN. 
 
--   SINN FEIN AND THE IRA, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE 
     OFFERED VIRTUALLY NO SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY SINCE THE 
     CEASEFIRE. 
 
--   GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT TAKE PLACE IN AN 
     ATMOSPHERE OF TERRORIST THREAT AND COERCION. 
 
--   THEY DO NOT SEEK A UNILATERAL SURRENDER OF ALL IRA 
     WEAPONS, BUT ONLY A TOKEN DECOMMISSIONING AS A 
     GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH AS PART OF THE BEGINNING OF A 
     PROCESS OF PHASED, RECIPROCAL DISARMAMENT IN WHICH 
     THEY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS. 
 
--   THEY ARE ASKING NO MORE OF THE IRA THAN THEY ARE OF 
     THE LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES. 
 
--   THEY HAVE NO FURTHER NEGOTIATING LEEWAY.  UNIONISTS 
     OF ALL STRIPES HAVE MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT 
     THEY WILL NOT SIT DOWN WITH SINN FEIN WHILE THE IRA 
     REMAINS ON A WAR FOOTING, AND ABANDONING THE DEMAND 
     FOR SOME DECOMMISSIONING WOULD GIVE NEW IMPETUS FOR 
     TORY BACKBENCH DEMANDS FOR MAJOR'S RESIGNATION. 
 
16. (C) NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) OFFICIALS TOLD US 
JUNE 15 THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO LEAVE ADAMS' ARTICLE 
UNCHALLENGED, AND WERE PREPARING A REPLY TO IT.  THEY 
HOPED THEY COULD SUSTAIN THE SUPPORT OF BRUTON AND 
SPRING, AS WELL AS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. 
 
READY TO MOVE 
------------- 
17. (S) WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAIM 
THAT HMG IS TRYING TO STALL PROGRESS ON THE PEACE 
PROCESS, AS SINN FEIN AND SOME IRISH OFFICIALS SUGGEST. 
THE BRITISH ARE ANXIOUS TO SUSTAIN THE MOMENTUM 
GENERATED BY THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.  THEY HAVE 
OFFERED SINN FEIN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE ANY ISSUE IT 
WANTS IN THE EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE, AND TO MEET WITH ANY 
NIO MINISTER ON APPROPRIATE ISSUES -- PUTTING SINN FEIN 
EFFECTIVELY ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE NONVIOLENT 
PARTIES.  THEY BELIEVE THE LOYALISTS ARE PREPARED TO 
MOVE ON DECOMMISSIONING IF THE IRA DOES SO.  AND THEY 
ARE READY TO AUTHORIZE THE WITHDRAWAL OF MORE BRITISH 
ARMY BATTALIONS AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT. 
 
18. (S) THE BRITISH ALSO SHARE THE WORRIES OF THEIR 
IRISH COUNTERPARTS ABOUT A POSSIBLE SPLIT WITHIN THE IRA 
IF THERE IS NO FURTHER PROGRESS BEFORE THE AUGUST 
CEASEFIRE.  INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON THIS ISSUE IS 
MIXED.  SOME REPORTS INDICATE THAT ONE OR MORE IRA 
BRIGADES MAY DEFECT IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER.  OTHER 
REPORTS, HOWEVER, INDICATE THAT SUPPORT FOR THE 
CEASEFIRE IN REPUBLICAN COMMUNITIES CONTINUES TO 
SOLIDIFY, AND THAT THE IRA WOULD FACE GREAT DIFFICULTIES 
IN RESUMING FULL-SCALE VIOLENCE. 
 
19. (C) FOR THIS REASON, THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN TRYING TO 
ENGAGE SINN FEIN ON ISSUES PRESUMED TO BE AT THE TOP OF 
ITS AGENDA:  PRISONERS, POLICING, AND ECONOMIC 
REGENERATION.  UNFORTUNATELY, IN THE EXPLORATORY 
DIALOGUE SINN FEIN HAS REFUSED TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES 
IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY.  A SENIOR NIO OFFICIAL TOLD US 
JUNE 15 THAT SINN FEIN, WHILE COMPLAINING ABOUT HMG'S 
"SINGLE ISSUE AGENDA," HAD ITSELF REFUSED TO DISCUSS ANY 
SUBJECT EXCEPT DECOMMISSIONING (IN ORDER TO REJECT IT). 
 
20. (S) THE BRITISH, HOWEVER, DO NOT FULLY SHARE THEIR 
IRISH COUNTERPARTS' SENSE OF URGENCY.  AS NOTED ABOVE, 
THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE THREAT OF A FULL-SCALE 
RESUMPTION OF THE IRA'S TERRORIST CAMPAIGN IS CREDIBLE 
BECAUSE OF THE TRANSFORMATION IN COMMUNITY ATTITUDES. 
THE DEFECTION OF ONE OR MORE IRA BRIGADES WOULD BE 
UNFORTUNATE, BUT SHOULD BE CONTAINABLE AND NEED NOT 
NECESSARILY END THE PEACE PROCESS.  THEY ARE MORE 
WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRA WOULD CONDUCT 
A PARTIAL RESUMPTION OF ITS BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN GREAT 
BRITAIN ONLY, BUT BELIEVE THAT CAVING IN TO REPUBLICAN 
DEMANDS NOW WOULD BE BOTH FUTILE AND MORE DANGEROUS IN 
THE LONG TERM. 
 
OPPOSITION SUPPORT 
------------------ 
21. (U) JOHN HUME CLAIMED JUNE 19 THAT HMG WAS STALLING 
ON TALKS BECAUSE OF "INTERNAL SQUABBLING" OVER THE 
LEADERSHIP OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY.  THIS IS NOT OUR 
ASSESSMENT:  THERE IS NO DISSENT WITHIN THE TORY PARTY 
OVER THE NEED FOR DECOMMISSIONING, AND THE GOVERNMENT 
ALSO ENJOYS STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE MAIN OPPOSITION 
PARTIES.  AFTER MEETING FIANNA FAIL LEADER BERTIE AHERNE 
IN LONDON JUNE 19, LABOUR LEADER TONY BLAIR SAID: 
LABOUR ENTIRELY SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT'S EMPHASIS ON 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE TO AVOID DEADLOCK 
IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND THEIR INSISTENCE THAT, BEFORE 
SUBSTANTIVE TALKS CAN TAKE PLACE, BOTH REPUBLICAN AND 
LOYALIST REPRESENTATIVES MUST ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF 
DECOMMISSIONING OF ARMS, AGREE ON THE MEANS AND SIGNAL 
THE START OF THE PROCESS AS A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH."  HE 
HAS MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS TO THE AMBASSADOR. 
 
22. (C) SHADOW NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY MO MOWLAM 
REITERATED THIS POSITION TO US JUNE 20.  SHE SAID THAT, 
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW ON THE FAR LEFT FRINGE OF 
THE PARTY, LABOUR ACCEPTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS 
TAKING THE RIGHT LINE ON THE POLITICS OF NORTHERN 
IRELAND.  IF LABOUR CAME TO POWER IN THE NEAR FUTURE, 
ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT, BUT ITS POLITICAL 
POLICY WOULD BE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CURRENT ONE. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
23. (C) WHILE ALL BRITISH OFFICIALS, AND ALL UNIONIST 
PARTIES, HAVE TOLD US THAT SOME DECOMMISSIONING OF IRA 
ARMS IS ESSENTIAL IF FURTHER PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE, 
MOST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DECOMMISSIONING PER SE IS NOT THE 
REAL ISSUE.  POLICE AND ARMY OFFICIALS HAVE ADMITTED, 
MORE OR LESS PUBLICLY, THAT THE IRA COULD EASILY REPLACE 
ANY TOKEN AMOUNT OF AGING WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IT 
CHOSE TO GIVE UP AT THIS POINT.  ITS MOST DAMAGING 
ATTACKS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE EMPLOYED HOMEMADE WEAPONS, 
ON WHICH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES.  BUT 
GETTING RID OF ANY AMOUNT OF WEAPONS, HOWEVER OBSOLETE, 
WOULD CONSTITUTE THE FIRST GENUINE DEMONSTRATION OF THE 
INTENT OF THE CURRENT IRA LEADERSHIP NOT TO RESUME THE 
ARMED CONFLICT.  AS CHURCH OF IRELAND PRELATE ROBIN 
EAMES TOLD THE DUBLIN PEACE FORUM RECENTLY, THE KEY IS 
FOR THE REPUBLICANS TO FOSTER A CLIMATE OF TRUST "BY 
SHOWING THAT WE CAN BELIEVE YOUR WORDS." 
 
24. (C) WE CAN SEE SEVERAL POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE 
CURRENT STALEMATE: 
 
--   SINN FEIN AND THE IRA COULD CONCLUDE THAT 
     DECOMMISSIONING WAS ESSENTIAL AND BEGIN THE 
     PROCESS.  THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT INTERNALLY, AND 
     MIGHT RESULT IN SOME DEFECTIONS, BUT WOULD UNLOCK THE 
     DOOR TO RAPID MOVEMENT ON SEVERAL OTHER FRONTS. 
 
--   THE REPUBLICANS COULD FIND AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF 
     DEMONSTRATING THEIR INTENT TO END VIOLENCE FOR 
     GOOD.  THEY COULD CONVENE A GENERAL ARMY CONVENTION 
     TO DECLARE AN END TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE, OR ISSUE A 
     UNANIMOUS PROVISIONAL ARMY COUNCIL STATEMENT TO THE 
     SAME EFFECT.  THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE ENOUGH TO 
     RENDER THE WEAPONS ISSUE IRRELEVANT IN MOST EYES, 
     BUT MIGHT BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR REPUBLICAN 
     ACTIVISTS TO ACCEPT. 
 
--   THE IRA COULD USE THE IMPASSE AS A PRETEXT TO 
     RESUME ITS ARMED CAMPAIGN.  THIS IS UNLIKELY, 
     BECAUSE THE COMMUNITY REACTION WOULD RISK FAILURE 
     AND COLLAPSE.  MORE LIKELY WOULD BE A LIMITED 
     NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATION BOMBINGS IN ENGLAND. 
 
--   HMG COULD CAVE IN, DROP ITS INSISTENCE ON 
     DECOMMISSIONING AND CALL ALL-PARTY TALKS.  THE 
     UNIONISTS WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY REJECT NOT ONLY THE 
     TALKS BUT ANY FURTHER DEALINGS WITH THE GOVERNMENT, 
     AND THEIR FRIENDS ON THE TORY BACKBENCHES WOULD 
     REBEL, THUS BRINGING TO AN ABRUPT END THE POLITICAL 
     PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND POSSIBLY THE MAJOR 
     GOVERNMENT. 
 
--   THE STALEMATE COULD CONTINUE FOR MANY MONTHS.  IF 
     THE CEASEFIRE HELD (BY NO MEANS A SURE BET), 
     UNIONISTS MIGHT EVENTUALLY ACCEPT SINN FEIN'S 
     COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND HMG COULD MOVE TOWARD 
     ALL-PARTY TALKS.  SINN FEIN COULD TRUMPET THIS AS A 
     VICTORY, BUT THE RISKS OF LOST MOMENTUM AND RISING 
     ANGER ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE VERY SEVERE. 
 
 
CROWE