This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  01822  01 OF 05  111610Z 
BAKU FOR DCM FINN 
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 
TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK
SUBJECT:  AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS 
          DECISION ON AIR STRIKES 
 
REF:  STATE 112876 
 
¶1.  CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶2.  AT A MAY 10 MEETING AT UN HQ IN ZAGREB, UNSYG SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE YASUSHI AKASHI TOLD AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH 
THAT "RSK PRESIDENT" MILAN MARTIC APPEARED TO HAVE A 
"FIRMER GRIP ON REALITY" DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS THE 
PREVLOUS DAY IN BELGRADE AND THAT THE "HIGH POINT OF 
TENSIONS" SEEMS TO HAVE PASSED.  HE DEFENDED HIS FAILURE 
TO INFORM ZAGREB DIPLOMATS OF MARTIC'S THREAT TO BOMB THE 
CITY BY SAYING HE BELIEVED IT WAS A BLUFF, ONLY POSTURING. 
- 
¶3.  FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH TUDJMAN'S CHIEF OF 
STAFF SARINIC EARLIER IN THE DAY, AKASHI SAID HE FELT THE 
CROATS "WERE TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE" WITH THE UN IN 
"SECTOR WEST."  THE UN'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT HAD BEEN 
ALMOST COMPLETELY RESTORED AND SARINIC HAD AGREED TO UN 
MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS.  NEVERTHELESS, AKASHI WAS 
CONCERNED ABOUT THE SLOW PACE FOR THE RELEASE OF SERBIAN 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  01822  01 OF 05  111610Z 
DETAINEES.  THE SERBS WERE STILL REQUIRING A "SOLUTION" TO 
SECTOR WEST BEFORE THEY WOULD COME TO THE NEGOTIATING 
TABLE IN GENEVA. 
 
¶4.  TURNING TO BOSNIA, AKASHI CLAIMED THAT SARAJEVO 
COMMANDER GENERAL RUPERT SMITH HAD WAFFLED ON THE DECISION 
TO CALL AIR STRIKES, INITIALLY ARGUING AGAINST THEM, LATER 
CHANGING HIS MIND, AND FINALLY COMING AROUND TO HIS 
ORIGINAL POSITION.  THE AMBASSADOR ARGUED THAT THE UN'S 
PREFERENCE FOR TALKS AND ACCOMMODATION TO BRING THE SERRS 
AROUND HAD BEEN TRIED FOR THREE YEARS AND PROVEN A 
FAILURE.  THE TIME HAD COME TO SEND TO THE SERBS THE ONLY 
KIND OF SIGNAL THEY UNDERSTAND.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
MARTIC LESS "DERANGED"; FIRMER GRIP ON REALITY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.  AKASHI TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HIS MEETING IN 
BELGRADE MAY 9 WITH THE "RSK" LEADERSHIP (MARTIC, MIKELIC, 
AND BABIC) WAS BETTER THAN THEIR PREVIOUS ENCOUNTER ON MAY 
5 IN KNIN.  HE FELT THAT THE HIGHEST POINT OF TENSION HAD 
PASSED.  ON MAY 5, AKASHI FOUND MARTIC "UPTIGHT, NERVOUS, 
BITTER, DAZED BY DEFEAT AND SOMEWHAT DERANGED, SHOWING 
SIGNS OF HAVING LOST HIS GRIP ON REALITY."  ON MAY 9, HE 
SEEMED TO HAVE RECOVERED SOME OF HIS COMPOSURE, AND HE 
REFRAINED FROM REPEATING MOST OF THE THREATS HE HAD MADE 
AT THE EARLIER MEETING (INCLUDING FURTHER ROCKETING OF 
ZAGREB).  NEVERTHELESS, HE STILL HAD A LONG LIST OF 
GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  01822  01 OF 05  111610Z 
¶6.  THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE U.S. WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED 
THAT MARTIC'S THREAT, IN THE MAY 5 MEETING, TO "FLATTEN 
ZAGREB" HAD NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE DIPLOMATIC 
COMMUNITY IN ZAGREB.  AKASHI SAID THAT, DURING THE 
MEETING, MARTIC HAD INITIALLY THREATENED TO BOMB ZAGREB 
WITHIN 24 HOURS, THEN 48, AND FINALLY FOUR DAYS.  TOWARDS 
THE END OF THE TALKS, HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING THE CROATS 
HAD A WEEK TO COMPLY WITH HIS DEMANDS.  IN THE END, AKASHI 
CLAIMED, HE FELT THAT IT WAS MOSTLY BLUFF AND POSTURING 
AND THAT IF MARTIC SAW A SINCERE COMMITMENT AND REASONABLE 
SPEED IN RELEASING THE DETAINEES HE WOULD NOT FOLLOW 
THROUGH ON HIS THREAT.  AKASHI ALSO FELT THAT BY 
COMMUNICATING THE THREAT IT WOULD LEAD THE SERBS TO 
BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY, WHICH WOULD 
BE PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS. 
 
¶7.  THE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT, GIVEN AKASHI'S 
DESCRIPTION OF MARTIC'S STATE OF MIND, SUCH THREATS SHOULD 
BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.  LITTLE WOULD HAVE BEEN RISKED RY 
INFORMING THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY OF HIS CONVERSATION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NNNNPTQ3390 
 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3390 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  01822  02 OF 05  111610Z 
ACTION EUR-01 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-01  CIAE-00  OASY-00  DODE-00  TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-10    L-01     ADS-00   NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02 
      PM-00    P-01     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    SNIS-00  NISC-01 
      PMB-00     /017W 
                  ------------------C49B20  111610Z /38 
O 111710Z MAY 95 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5738 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT 
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE 
USLO SKOPJE 
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 
AMEMBASSY BAKU 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BONN 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  01822  02 OF 05  111610Z 
BAKU FOR DCM FINN 
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 
TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK
SUBJECT:  AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS 
          DECISION ON AIR STRIKES 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
CROATS "TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  AKASHI SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH TUDJMAN'S CHIEF OF 
STAFF SARINIC AND ACTING HEAD OF CROATIA'S ARMED FORCES 
GENERAL CERVENKO EARLIER IN THE DAY.  HE BELIEVED THAT THE 
CROATS WERE "TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE WITH US."  THE UN'S 
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN "SECTOR WEST" HAD BEEN ALMOST 
COMPLETELY RESTORED.  NEVERTHELESS, AKASHI WAS CONCERNED 
BY THE SLOWNESS OF PROCESSING THE SERB DETAINEES AND 
PERMITTING THEM TO LEAVE FOR BOSNIA OR RETURN TO THEIR 
HOMES IN CROATIA.  THE AMBASSADOR AGREED, RECOUNTING HOW 
HE HAD CALLED SARINIC FROM STARA GRADISKA TO OBJECT TO THE 
INEXCUSABLE DETENTION OF OLD MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM 
OKUCANI AND THERERY OBTAINED THEIR RELEASE. 
 
¶9.  AKASHI SAID THAT MARTIC SEEMED TO HAVE CUT BACK ON HIS 
EXPECTATIONS ALTHOUGH HE WAS STILL INSISTING ON A 
"RESOLUTION" IN "SECTOR WEST."  IN THE MAY 9 MEETING THE 
SERBS HAD FOCUSSED ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BEING HELD, 
THEIR TREATMENT, AND THE PROCEDURES FOR SCREENING.  (NOTE: 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  01822  02 OF 05  111610Z 
ICFY AMBASSADOR ALFREDO MATACOTTA TOLD US THAT AT THE 
MEETING ON MAY 9 EVEN MILOSEVIC WAS STILL INSISTING ON A 
RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO BEFORE THE CONFLICT IN SECTOR 
WEST.)  SARINIC HAD TOLD AKASHI THAT ONE OF THE DETAINEES 
WAS SUSPECTED OF KILLING 18 CROATS AND MAY BE TRIED FOR 
WAR CRIMES.  SINCE THE MAY 3 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES 
AGREEMENT CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS WITHOUT 
ANY EXCEPTIONS, AKASHI WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SERRS WOULD 
REACT VERY NEGATIVELY IF THE CROATS FAIL TO COMPLY. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
CROATS AGREE TO MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SECTOR WEST 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶10.  IN THE SARINIC-AKASHI MEETING IT WAS AGREED THAT THE 
UN COULD MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SECTOR. 
SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UN WOULD: 
 
- SUPPORT AND FACILITATE THE RETURN OF PEOPLE TO THEIR 
HOMES OR HELP TRANSPORT THEM TO BOSNIA IF SO DESIRED, 
 
- MONITOR THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PEOPLE TO THE SECTOR, 
 
- ASSIST WITH DEMINING AND IMPLEMENTING THE ECONOMIC 
AGREEMENT, 
 
- ASSURE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN FRIENDS AND 
RELATIVES, 
 
- MONITOR PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS, 
 
- PROTECT MINORITIES, AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  01822  02 OF 05  111610Z 
 
- MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL. 
 
THESE NEAR- TERM TASKS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN COOPERATION 
WITH UNHCR, ECMM, AND ICRC.  TO THAT END, A COORDINATION 
GROUP HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SERBS STILL BALKING AT TALKS WITH CROATS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  AFTER "SECTOR WEST," AKASHI SAID HIS NEXT PRIORITY 
WAS TO EASE TENSIONS IN THE OTHER SECTORS, ESPECIALLY 
SECTOR EAST.  THE CROATS HAVE PROPOSED A MEETING OF THE 
MILITARY COMMANDERS BUT THE SERBS HAVE BEEN DRAGGING THEIR 
FEET, INSISTING ON A SOLUTION IN "SECTOR WEST" FIRST. 
MILOSEVIC HAD ARGUED THAT THERE COULD BE NO MILITARY 
SOLUTION WITHOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION COMING OUT OF FACE 
TO FACE TALKS IN GENEVA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NNNNPTQ3391 
 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3391 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  01822  03 OF 05  111610Z 
ACTION EUR-01 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-01  CIAE-00  OASY-00  DODE-00  TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-10    L-01     ADS-00   NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02 
      PM-00    P-01     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    SNIS-00  NISC-01 
      PMB-00     /017W 
                  ------------------C49B34  111610Z /38 
O 111710Z MAY 95 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5739 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT 
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE 
USLO SKOPJE 
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 
AMEMBASSY BAKU 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BONN 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  01822  03 OF 05  111610Z 
BAKU FOR DCM FINN 
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 
TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK
SUBJECT:  AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS 
          DECISION ON AIR STRIKES 
 
¶12.  AKASHI SAID THAT SARINIC WAS WILLING TO HOLD BOTH 
MILITARY AND POLITICAL TALKS AND AGREED TO HOLD AT LEAST 
THE INITIAL TALKS IN GENEVA (WITH SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN 
CROATIA).  MEANWHILE, THE UN WAS TRYING TO CONVINCE THE 
SERBS NOT TO TACKLE THE ISSUES SEQUENTIALLY (I.E., 
INSISTING ON RESOLVING "SECTOR WEST" FIRST) BUT RATHER 
OPEN UP DISCUSSION TO ALL ISSUES SIMULTANEOUSLY. 
 
¶13.  WHEN ASKED IF THE SERBS UNDERSTOOD THAT RESOLVING 
"SECTOR WEST" DID NOT MEAN A RETURN OF "RSK" AUTHORITY IN 
THE SECTOR, AKASHI SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE.  MIKELIC, 
ALTHOUGH HE MOUTHED MARTIC'S DEMANDS, SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND 
THAT THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE MAY 3 AGREEMENT 
(I.E., A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, SURRENDER OF WEAPONS, 
AND THE CHOICE OF REMAINING IN CROATIA OR LEAVING FOR 
BOSNIA) AND NOT THE MAY 2 AGREEMENT WHICH CALLED FOR A 
RETURN TO THE ST 
ATUS QUO ANTE. 
 
¶14.  THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE USG STRONGLY SUPPORTED 
THE RETURN OF UN AUTHORITY IN THE SECTOR, ESPECIALLY IN 
THE AREA OF MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS.  AKASHI REPLIED THAT 
THE UN WOULD SOON BE NEEDING GUIDANCE FROM THE SECURITY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  01822  03 OF 05  111610Z 
COUNCIL IN DEFINING ITS MANDATE IN THE SECTOR AND IT WOULD 
BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE USG WERE TO TAKE SUCH A POSITION. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
AKASHI CLAIMS SMITH WAFFLED, ARGUED AGAINST ON AIR STRIKES 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶15.  THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE USG WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT 
THE UN'S FAILURE TO RESPOND MORE FORCEFULLY TO THE RECENT 
SERB ATTACKS AROUND SARAJEVO IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE 
HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE. 
 
¶16.  AKASHI CLAIMED THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY, 
GENERAL RUPERT SMITH INITIALLY CAME DOWN AGAINST AIR 
STRIKES.  A FEW HOURS LATER, SMITH APPARENTLY CHANGED HIS 
MIND AND CALLED FOR AIR STRIKES, WHICH WERE DENIED BASED 
ON SMITH'S PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS.  A FEW HOURS LATER, AKASHI 
SAID, SMITH CAME AROUND TO HIS ORIGINAL POSITION.  AKASHI 
QUOTED FROM THE GENERAL'S INITIAL ANALYSIS, WHICH WE 
PROVIDE BELOW. 
 
¶17.  BEGIN TEXT AS HEARD. 
 
BEFORE REQUESTING NATO TO ATTACK IN WHAT SEEMS TO BE A 
CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE THERE ARE CERTAIN 
FACTORS WHICH NEED TO BE BORNE IN MIND. 
 
¶A.  THE AIR STRIKES MIGHT NOT STOP THE SERB ATTACKS. 
- 
¶B.  UNPROFOR IN BOSNIA IS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM THE 
SERBS DUE TO EVENTS IN CROATIA AND GETTING CONVOY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  01822  03 OF 05  111610Z 
CLEARANCE HAS BECOME HARDER. 
 
¶C.  IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT SUCH A RESPONSE WILL HAVE 
AN IMPACT ON THE CROATIAN SITUATION AND THE ONGOING 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KRAJINA SERBS. 
 
¶D.  UNPROFOR IS NOT IN TOUCH WITH MLADIC OR OTHER BOSNIAN 
SERB LEADERS. 
 
¶E.  IT IS CLEAR THAT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO 
PROVOKE AN INTERNATIONAL REACTION AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS 
MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE TO SEIZE HOSTAGES. 
 
SO, MILITARY ACTION MAY NOT ACHIEVE THE DESIRED OBJECTIVES 
AND MAY HAVE FAR-REACHING NEGATIVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. 
 
END OF TEXT AS HEARD. 
 
¶18.  AKASHI SAID THAT HE AND FORCE COMMANDER JANVIER 
SHARED SMITH'S ANALYSIS AND FELT THAT THE DISADVANTAGES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NNNNPTQ3393 
 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3393 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  01822  04 OF 05  111611Z 
ACTION EUR-01 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-01  CIAE-00  OASY-00  DODE-00  TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-10    L-01     ADS-00   NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02 
      PM-00    P-01     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    SNIS-00  NISC-01 
      PMB-00     /017W 
                  ------------------C49B48  111611Z /38 
O 111710Z MAY 95 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5740 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT 
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE 
USLO SKOPJE 
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 
AMEMBASSY BAKU 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BONN 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  01822  04 OF 05  111611Z 
BAKU FOR DCM FINN 
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 
TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK
SUBJECT:  AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS 
          DECISION ON AIR STRIKES 
 
OUTWEIGHED THE ADVANTAGES.  SINCE AT THAT TIME THE UN WAS 
ENGAGED IN DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS IN KNIN AND SINCE AN AIR 
STRIKE, UNLIKE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT WHERE LIVES ARE AT RISK, 
DOES NOT HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY, (HE NOTED THE 
DELAYED STRIKE ON UDBINA AIRFIELD), AKASHI AND JANVIER 
FELT THEY HAD TIME TO REFLECT AND ANALYZE. 
 
¶19.  THEY CONSULTED WITH NEW YORK AND THE UNSYG IN MOSCOW 
AND, CONSIDERING "THE TERRIBLE MOOD OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS," 
DECIDED THAT AIR STRIKES MIGHT HAVE MEANT THE END OF THE 
UN MISSION IN BOSNIA.  "AND MAY STILL," AKASHI ADDED. 
 
---------------------------- 
BOSNIAN SERBS UNDER PRESSURE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶20.  THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE 
UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE.  THEIR SITUATION WAS GROWING 
WORSE AS THAT OF THE ROSNIAN GOVERNMENT GREW STRONGER, 
WHICH EXPLAINED WHY THEY WERE DESPERATELY TRYING TO FOR A 
DECISION NOW.  HENCE, THE ATTACKS ON SAFE HAVENS, THE 
CLOSING DOWN OF THE AIRPORT AND CONVOYS, AND THE ATTACKS 
ON PEACEKEEPERS.  THE UN NEEDED TO SHOW RESOLVE, INCLUDING 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  01822  04 OF 05  111611Z 
AIR STRIKES, SO THAT THE SERBS WOULD UNDERSTAND THEY 
CANNOT GET AWAY WITH THEIR STRATEGY. 
 
¶21.  AKASHI EXPRESSED HIS DOUBT THAT AIR POWER ALONE COULD 
DO IT.  THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT NATO HAS 
CONSIDERABLE AIR POWER.  AKASHI ARGUED THAT UNDER THOSE 
CIRCUMSTANCES UN PEACEKEEPERS WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN. 
THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF 
HARM'S WAY, ESPECIALLY POTENTIAL HOSTAGES LIKE THE UN 
MILITARY OBSERVERS.  AKASHI SAID THE UN HAD NOT DONE THAT 
YET AND NEEDED ADVANCE NOTICE.  HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT AIR 
STRIKES MIGHT SOLIDIFY THE POSITION OF THE EXTREMISTS. 
THE AMBASSADOR COUNTERED THAT IT MIGHT HAVE THE OPPOSITE 
EFFECT, NOTING THAT MARTIC APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN 
CONSIDERABLY WEAKENED AFTER 
 THE CROATIAN ACTION IN SECTOR 
WEST. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
"TRIED UN WAY FOR THREE YEARS, NOW ITS TIME TO TRY OURS" 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶22.  THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE UN HAD TRIED AKASHI'S 
APPROACH OF NEGOTIATION AND ACCOMMODATION FROM THE 
BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT AND THE RESULT HAD REEN THAT THE 
BOSNIAN SERBS HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO GET AWAY WITH 
OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT.  MEANWHILE, THE ONLY SUCCESSES WE HAD 
SEEN TO DATE HAD BEEN AFTER A CREDIBLE THREAT OF USE OF 
FORCE SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCLUSION ZONE 
FOLLOWING THE MARKET PLACE MASSACRE IN SARAJEVO.  THE UN 
AND NATO HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THESE 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  01822  04 OF 05  111611Z 
SITUATIONS, HE ARGUED, "YOU'VE TRIED YOUR WAY FOR THREE 
YEARS, NOW IT'S TIME TO TRY OURS." 
 
¶23.  AKASHI CAUTIONED THAT THE UN PEACEKEEPERS WERE 
VULNERABLE.  THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THEY WERE BEING 
TARGETED ANYHOW.  THE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HUNKER DOWN 
UNTIL THE SERBS WERE FORCED TO BACK OFF.  IF ENOUGH PAIN 
WAS INFLICTED THE SERBS WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO HONOR 
THE SAFE HAVENS AND REOPEN THE AIRPORT. 
 
¶24.  UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, AKASHI ARGUED, THE UN 
WOULD BE UNABLE TO PROTECT THE ENCLAVES, KEEP THE AIRPORT 
OPEN AND PROVIDE SAFE PASSAGE FOR CONVOYS.  HOWEVER, IN 
RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONING HE ACKNOWLEDGED 
THAT TWO MONTHS HAD GONE BY WITH NO CONVOYS TO THE 
ENCLAVES AND THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR A MONTH WITH 
LITTLE PROSPECT FOR ANY CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. 
THE AMBASSADOR ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE UN WAS SUFFERING 
TREMENDOUS DAMAGE TO ITS IMAGE BY ALLOWING ITSELF TO BE 
HELD UP BY A BUNCH OF THUGS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3394 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  01822  05 OF 05  111611Z 
ACTION EUR-01 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-01  CIAE-00  OASY-00  DODE-00  TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-10    L-01     ADS-00   NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02 
      PM-00    P-01     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    SNIS-00  NISC-01 
      PMB-00     /017W 
                  ------------------C49B55  111611Z /38 
O 111710Z MAY 95 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5741 
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT 
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE 
USLO SKOPJE 
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 
AMEMBASSY BAKU 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY BONN 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  01822  05 OF 05  111611Z 
BAKU FOR DCM FINN 
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00 
TAGS: MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK
SUBJECT:  AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS 
          DECISION ON AIR STRIKES 
 
 
¶25.  AKASHI NOTED THAT, SINCE THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS, THE 
UN'S PEACEKEEPING POLICY HAD BEEN THE IMPARTIAL 
POSITIONING OF TROOPS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN A CONFLICT, 
USING FORCE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE.  SO FAR, THERE HAD BEEN 
NO CLEAR DECISION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE TROOP 
CONTRIBUTING NATIONS THAT A MORE ROBUST, "MUSCULAR USE OF 
FORCE" WAS CALLED FOR.  "IT MAY COME TO THAT," HE SAID, 
"BUT FOR NOW THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPEARS TO HAVE OPTED 
FOR THE MORE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING." 
 
¶26.  THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF 
PEACEKEEPING IS APPLICABLE WHEN THERE ARE TWO SIDES THAT 
WANT PEACE, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT THE CASE IN THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA WHERE THE SERBS HAD SHOWN THAT THEY ONLY 
UNDERSTOOD THE USE OF FORCE. 
 
¶27.  AKASHI ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONSIDER THE UN'S 
CAPACITY IN THE REGION, ARGUING THAT ITS FORCES WERE 
NEITHER EQUIPPED, NOR TRAINED, NOR CONFIGURED TO FIGHT A 
WAR AGAINST A NON-COOPERATING PARTY.  UN OBSERVATION POSTS 
WERE LOCATED BETWEEN THE FRONT LINES ONLY BECAUSE THE 
SIDES RESPECT THE UN'S IMPARTIALITY.  THE AMBASSADOR 
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REPLIED THAT THE SERBS HAD ALREADY SHOWN THEY DID NOT 
RESPECT THE UN'S NEUTRALITY AND THEREFORE CONSIDERATION 
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MOVE EXPOSED UN FORCES SUCH AS UNMOS 
OUT OF HARM'S WAY AS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS USE OF FORCE. 
HE REITERATED THE POINT THAT THE UN'S EFFORTS FOR A 
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION HAD NOT WORKED.  THE BOSNIAN SERB 
LEADERS WERE NOT REASONABLE PEOPLE.  AKASHI READILY AGREED 
TO THE LAST POINT. 
 
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