P 031313Z APR 95
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6903
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY HARARE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GABORONE 001886 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/DAS COOK FROM AMBASSADOR 
ALSO FOR AF, AF/RA AND AF/S - JACKSON 
LONDON FOR YOUNG 
 
E.O.  12356:  DECL:  OADR 
TAGS: PREL SADC BC
SUBJECT:  SADC CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFERENCE: AMBASSADOR'S 
MEETING WITH BDF COMMANDER KHAMA 
 
REF:  STATE 73668 
 
¶1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
¶2.  AS REQUESTED REFTEL, AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND ODC 
CHIEF, MET WITH BDF COMMANDER IAN KHAMA MARCH 29 FOR A READOUT 
ON THE GABORONE CONFERENCE OF SADC MEMBER STATE ARMY CHIEFS OF 
STAFF.  KHAMA SAID ONLY ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND LESOTHO WERE 
UNREPRESENTED AT THE MEETING, WHICH FOCUSSED ON CONFLICT 
PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT.  SOUTH AFRICA, AN ACTIVE 
PARTICIPANT, WAS REPRESENTED BY SANDF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF 
MEIRING.  ACCORDING TO KHAMA, THE FOLLOWING FOUR SUBJECTS WERE 
ADDRESSED: 
 
-- THE TYPE OF STRUCTURE BEST SUITED TO TRY TO PREVENT 
CONFLICTS AND TO MANAGE THEM IF THEY DO BREAK OUT; 
 
-- THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF COUPS; 
 
-- DISCUSSION OF THE HARARE PEACEKEEPING SUMMIT TO EXPLORE THE 
POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL OR CONTINENT-WIDE APPROACHES TO 
PEACEKEEPING; 
 
--THE EFFECT OF REFUGEES ON STABILITY AND HOW TO REDUCE THEIR 
NEGATIVE IMPACT. 
 
STRUCTURE/ AREAS OF INTER-STATE COOPERATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFIED AREAS IN WHICH THEY SHOULD ENGAGE 
IN REGULAR COOPERATION.  KHAMA CITED THE FOLLOWING AS DIRECTLY 
RELATED TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT:  OPERATIONS, 
INTELLIGENCE FOR EARLY WARNING, LOGISTICS, AVIATION, MARITIME 
ASSETS.  MEDICINE (E.G. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON REGIONAL 
OUTBREAKS OF DISEASE, AIDS) AND OTHER UNSPECIFIED AREAS WERE 
IDENTIFIED FOR COOPERATION EVEN OUTSIDE THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
CONTEXT.  THESE PROPOSED AREAS OF COOPERATION WERE ALLOCATED TO 
MEMBER STATES REPRESENTED.  EACH WILL ORGANIZE A MEETING TO 
FURTHER EXPLORE EACH RESPECTIVE TOPIC AND PREPARE 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL APPROVAL AT A JUNE DEFENSE 
MINISTERS MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
PREVENTION OF COUPS 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  KHAMA SAID MANY, INCLUDING HIMSELF, "POINTED FINGERS AT THE 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP" ON THIS ISSUE.  THEY FELT THAT POOR 
MANAGEMENT BY THE POLITICAL LEVEL, RESULTING IN ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS, CONTRIBUTED TO CREATING FERTILE GROUND FOR COUPS. 
KHAMA CITED UNBALANCED DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION, AND FAVORITISM 
ALONG TRIBAL LINES, INCLUDING IN THE ARMED FORCES, AS 
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE PROBLEM.  POOR TREATMENT OF THE MILITARY 
POSES ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS, KHAMA SAID, CITING THE FACT THAT 
JUNIOR RANKS, NOT JUST COMMANDERS ARE NOW ENGAGING IN COUPS. 
THE ARMY COMMANDERS CONCLUDED THAT THE AVOIDANCE OF COUPS COULD 
ONLY BE ADDRESSED BY POLITICAL LEADERS, NOT MILITARY MEN. 
 
REFUGEES AND STABILITY 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  THIS FOURTH POINT CENTERED ON THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON 
STABILITY AND MEANS TO REDUCE THEIR NEGATIVE IMPACT.  AS WITH 
THE AGENDA ITEM ON COUPS, KHAMA SAID THE MEETING CONCLUDED THE 
IMPACT AND MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEES WAS A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED BY 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NOT THE ARMED FORCES.  THE DISRUPTION 
CAUSED BY REFUGEE FLOWS, AND THE PERCEPTION IN SOME COUNTRIES 
THAT BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS, REFUGEES ACHIEVE 
A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING THAN LOCAL CITIZENS, CAUSED REAL 
PROBLEMS.  HE CITED TANZANIA AS A COUNTRY PARTICULARLY HARD HIT 
BY THIS PROBLEM. 
 
HARARE PEACEKEEPING SUMMIT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  KHAMA TOLD AMBASSADOR THE GABORONE MEETING ACHIEVED THE 
LEAST ON THIS IMPORTANT TOPIC.  THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION, HE 
SAID, OF REGIONAL LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, BUT NO 
ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS : "WHO WILL EQUIP AND FUND 
PEACEKEEPERS?" AND "WHO WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS TO STORES OF 
EQUIPMENT FOR PEACEKEEPING, AND WHEN?" 
 
¶7.  AT THE MEETING, KHAMA REMINDED HIS COUNTERPARTS THAT IN THE 
LESOTHO CRISIS ONLY SOUTH AFRICA AND BOTSWANA HAD BEEN ABLE TO 
MOBILIZE AND TRANSPORT THEIR FORCES.  ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, BY 
CONTRAST, REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION FOR THEIR TROOPS AND 
MATERIEL.  THE BDF COMMANDER STRESSED TO THE AMBASSADOR HIS 
CONVICTION -- WHICH HE ALSO CONVEYED TO THE GABORONE MEETING -- 
THAT "ALL NATIONS MUST HAVE A COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT ANY TROOPS 
THEY SEND.  THEY MUST NOT ASK JUST ONE COUNTRY (I.E. SOUTH 
AFRICA) FOR HELP."  ANY PEACEKEEPING ENGAGED IN BY REGIONAL 
FORCES, HE UNDERLINED, WOULD HAVE TO BE ENDORSED IF NOT 
REQUESTED BY THE UN AND/OR OAU.  THIS ENDORSEMENT WOULD OPEN 
THE WAY TO REQUESTS FOR DONOR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION. 
 
¶8.  IN SOUTH AFRICA IN JUNE DEFENSE MINISTERS WILL MEET TO TRY 
TO COME UP WITH A FORMULA FOR FIRST USING MEMBER STATES' OWN 
RESOURCES  FOR PEACEKEEPING, THEN TURNING TO THE UN FOR 
SUPPORT.  KHAMA STRESSED HIS VIEW THAT INITIATING REGIONAL 
PEACEKEEPING SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON RECEIVING DONOR SUPPORT 
FROM THE OUTSET.  INSTEAD, HE SAID, THERE MUST BE NATIONAL 
POLITICAL COMMITMENT IN EACH COUNTRY.  EACH COUNTRY'S ARMED 
FORCES SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO COMMIT NATIONAL RESOURCES TO 
PEACEKEEPING IN ADVANCE OF REQUESTING INTERNATIONAL DONOR HELP. 
THIS, KHAMA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR, IS WHAT HE INTENDS TO "WHISPER 
IN (HIS) MINISTER'S EAR" AT THE MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
THUMBS DOWN ON STANDING FORCE BUT SUPPORT FOR EARMARKING 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶9.  THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR KHAMA'S VIEWS ON THE STANDING 
FORCE CONCEPT.  KHAMA SAID HE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF 
A "COMBINED STANDING FORCE," PRIMARILY FOR TWO REASONS.  FIRST, 
BECAUSE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT WOULD HAVE TO TRAIN TOGETHER -- 
SOMETHING MOST COUNTRIES IN THE REGION CANNOT AFFORD.  SECOND 
BECAUSE, IN KHAMA'S VIEW, PARTICIPATION IN A COMBINED STANDING 
FORCE WOULD AMOUNT TO BOTSWANA SIGNING AWAY ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT 
TO DECIDE, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, WHEN AND WHERE TO SEND ITS 
TROOPS.  BY CONTRAST, KHAMA FAVORED CREATION OF A FORCE BASED 
ON EARMARKING SPECIFIC CONTINGENTS IN EACH PARTICIPATING 
MILITARY AND PREPARING THEM TO BE MOBILIZABLE WITHIN 48 HOURS. 
ODC CHIEF NOTED THAT EVEN UNDER NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY 
COMMAND EACH NATION RETAINS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER OR NOT TO RELEASE ITS EARMARKED FORCES TO NATO COMMAND. 
 
LOTS OF QUESTIONS; NO DECISIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  KHAMA REITERATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MEETING DID NOT/NOT 
AGREE ON ANY STANDBY FORCE OPTION.  MANY QUESTIONS REMAINED, 
INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIZE OF SUCH A FORCE, 
COORDINATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE 
UN, AND WHETHER A REQUEST TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT 
SITUATION WOULD BE INITIATED BY THE UN OR BY THE REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATION.  THERE WAS AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THAT A COUNTRY 
ASKED BY THE UN TO DEPLOY FORCES SHOULD IN TURN SEEK UN 
SUPPORT.  RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM THE ODC CHIEF KHAMA 
SAID DEPLOYABILITY HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.  HE EXPLAINED THAT 
IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON A FORCE 
PERTAINING ONLY TO THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN (SADC) REGION, NOT 
BEYOND (E.G. TO BURUNDI). 
 
¶11.  THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAS NO FIXED FORMULA 
IN MIND BUT IS EAGER TO RECEIVE AND EXAMINE OTHERS' VIEWS ON 
REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING, PARTICULARLY IN PREPARATION FOR THE MAY 
MEETING AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE.  KHAMA REITERATED HIS 
LONG-STANDING CONCERN THAT ANY PEACEKEEPING ARRANGMENT FULLY 
RESPECT AND PRESERVE A COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DECIDE, ON 
A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, WHETHER, WHERE, AND WHEN TO DEPLOY ITS 
TROOPS.  HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PROPOSALS SUCH AS A 
CANADIAN ONE (UNFAMILIAR TO US) TO CREATE A STANDING RAPID 
DEPLOYMENT FORCE. 
 
THE FLS/ASAS/SADC CONNECTION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12.  AMBASSADOR CLOSED BY ASKING HOW THE INTERSTATE COMMITTEE 
ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY FITS WITH SADC.  IN RESPONSE, KHAMA 
RECALLED THAT LAST YEAR IN ARUSHA COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAD DECIDED 
THEY DID NOT WANT TO BECOME PART OF SADC.  WHILE THE TRANSITION 
FROM OLD TO NEW ORGANIZATIONS IS CURRENTLY A BIT CONFUSED, 
KHAMA SAID THAT IN THE END, THE FRONTLINE STATES (FLS) WILL BE 
TRANSFORMED INTO THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES 
(ASAS) AND "WE (I.E. THE COMMITTEE) SEE OURSELVES LINKED WITH 
ASAS."  IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KHAMA WENT ON TO 
SAY HE EXPECTED NO COORDINATION PROBLEMS BETWEEN ASAS AND SADC 
SINCE THE SAME COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF BOTH GROUPS AND 
POLITICAL DECISIONS ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING ARE 
MADE BY THE SAME LEADERS. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  THREE THINGS STRUCK US ABOUT THE KHAMA BRIEFING:  ONE IS 
THE DETERMINATION AND SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH KHAMA AND HIS ARMY 
COMMANDER COLLEAGUES ARE APPROACHING THESE ISSUES; TWO IS THE 
ACTIVE AND SUPPORTIVE ROLE THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS NOW PLAYING IN 
THESE DISCUSSIONS; AND THREE IS THE DIFFICULTY OF COMING TO 
GRIPS WITH THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION/MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 
 
¶14.  WHILE WE ARE UNSURE OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MAY 
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE MEETING, IT SEEMS, FROM WHERE WE SIT, THAT 
WE COULD MAKE A LARGE CONTRIBUTION BY HELPING COUNTRIES IN THIS 
REGION TO WORK OUT THE CONCEPTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS ON 
WHICH FUTURE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT/PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS MAY 
REST. 
 
 
JETER