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Viewing cable 94STATE183691TOSEC140193, TFKN01: DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG ABSORBS BOTH KOREAS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
94STATE183691TOSEC140193 1994-07-11 12:11 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Secretary of State
O 111211Z JUL 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T STATE 183691 TOSEC 140193 
 
FOLLOWING SEOUL 05848 DATED 11 JUL 94 SENT ACTION SECSTATE 
INFO GENEVA, DUBLIN, BEIJING, TOKYO, MOSCOW, USUN NEW YORK, 
USVIENNA, LONDON, PARIS, SECDEF WASHDC, JOINTSTAFF WASHDC, 
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KOR, SACINCUNC SEOUL KOR, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, 
AND USCINCUNC SEOUL KOR REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO 
QUOTE 
 
S E C R E T SEOUL 05848 
 
GENEVA FOR AS GALLUCCI; DUBLIN FOR AMB LANEY; USVIENNA FOR 
UNVIE 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:  OADR 
TAGS: PREL KS KN
SUBJECT:  TFKN01:  DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG ABSORBS BOTH KOREAS 
 
REF:  A. SEOUL 57989  B. TOKYO 9565 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY.  THE DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG HAS MONOPOLIZED 
MEDIA, GOVERNMENT, AND PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS IN SOUTH KOREA 
SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON JULY 9.  ROKG POLICY PLANNERS 
CONTINUE TO DISCUSS OFFICIAL REACTIONS, INCLUDING AT A 
PRIME MINISTER-CHAIRED POLICY COORDINATION MEETING TODAY. 
FM HAN SUNG JOO TOLD US THAT THE ROKG EXPECTS PYONGYANG TO 
SEEK A SOUTH-NORTH SUMMIT AS SOON AS THE SUCCESSION IS 
SETTLED.  THE ROK WILL BE WILLING TO DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR A SUMMIT AFTER THAT HAPPENS.  DOMESTIC POLITICAL 
REACTION HAS SUPPORTED THE ADMINISTRATION TO DATE, WITH 
MOST POLITICIANS STATING THEIR BELIEF THAT KIM JONG IL 
WILL CONTINUE THE POLICIES OF HIS FATHER, IN ORDER TO LEND 
LEGITIMACY TO HIS RULE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FOREIGN MINISTER HAN'S VIEWS 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  AS EXPECTED BOTH KOREAS CONTINUE TO BE FULLY ABSORBED 
BY THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEATH OF KIM IL SUNG.  DURING A 
LATE AFTERNOON MEETING WITH CHARGE (SEPTEL), FM HAN SUNG 
JOO CONFIRMED ROKG RECEIPT OF DPRK WORKERS PARTY SECRETARY 
KIM YOUNG SUN'S LETTER EXPRESSING DPRK DESIRE TO POSTPONE 
THE PLANNED JUNE 25-27 SUMMIT.  HAN TOLD CHARGE THAT THE 
ROKG IN ITS RESPONSE WILL EXPRESS ITS COMMITMENT TO THE 
"SPIRIT AND PRINCIPLE" OF THE SUMMIT AGREEMENT, AND THAT 
ONCE THE SITUATION STABILIZES AND THE ROKG KNOWS WHO IS IN 
CHARGE IN NORTH KOREA THE ROKG WILL BE WILLING TO DISCUSS 
THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT.  HAN PREDICTED THAT THE NORTH 
KOREANS WOULD WANT TO QUICKLY ESTABLISH A DATE FOR THE 
SUMMIT; THE ROK WOULD NOT BE IN A HURRY, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH 
SEOUL WOULD NOT REFUSE OR UNNECESSARILY DELAY SUCH A 
MEETING. 
 
4.  IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUERY, HAN SAID THAT THE ROKG 
HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOMEONE OTHER THAN KIM JONG 
IL WOULD ASSUME POWER IN NORTH KOREA.  HE ADDED, HOWEVER, 
THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KIM MIGHT ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR MEETING FOREIGNERS TO SOMEONE ELSE, GIVEN KIM'S 
COMPLETE LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THIS REGARD.  IN THIS 
CONTEXT, HAN NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SPECULATION 
THAT THERE MIGHT BE A SEPARATE HEAD OF STATE VERSUS LEADER 
OF THE PARTY, THE ROKG INCLINATION WAS TO BELIEVE THAT KIM 
WOULD ASSUME BOTH POSITIONS. 
 
5.  FINALLY, HAN COMMENTED ON THE EXISTENCE OF 
AUTHORITATIVE VOICES IN THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD 
PREFER A MORE MEASURED USG APPROACH TOWARD NORTH KOREA TO 
AVOID ENABLING PYONGYANG TO FEEL OVERCONFIDENT ABOUT ITS 
NEW POSITION IN THE AFTERMATH OF KIM IL SUNG'S DEATH. 
STRESSING THE UNUSUAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE REGIME IN 
PYONGYANG, HAN CITED THE EXAMPLE OF OUR EXTENSION OF 
CONDOLENCES TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE AS SOMETHING THE REGIME 
MIGHT MISREAD IN A WAY TO DIMINISH THE RESPECT PYONGYANG 
MIGHT HOLD FOR US IN OUR FUTURE DEALINGS.  HAN ALSO CITED 
HIS VIEW THAT IT WAS USEFUL FOR CHINA TO MAINTAIN GOOD 
RELATIONS WITH THE NEW REGIME. 
 
6.  COMMENT.  HAN IS FEELING SOME PRESSURE, PERHAPS FROM 
MND, IN CONNECTION WITH OUR EXPRESSION OF CONDOLENCES.  HE 
DESCRIBED THE KOREANS AS SPLIT BETWEEN THOSE WHO REVILE 
KIM AND THOSE WHO ARE MORE FORWARD-LOOKING.  THE FORMER 
MAY BLAME HIM FOR NOT PREVENTING ANY EXPRESSION OF 
CONDOLENCE FROM THE U.S.  HAN'S COVERSATION WITH SECRETARY 
OF STATE CHRISTOPER HELPED HIM, AND THERE MAY BE AN EFFORT 
TO HAVE PRESIDENT KIM SPEAK TO PRESIDENT CLINTON ON THE 
TELEPHONE LATER IN THE WEEK.  END COMMENT. 
 
WHAT NEXT 
--------- 
 
7.  SOUTH KOREAN MEDIA HAVE CONCENTRATED ON ALL ASPECTS OF 
THE ISSUE TO THE VIRTUAL EXCLUSION OF OTHER STORIES, WHILE 
THE NORTH IS STEEPED IN MOURNING AND, PRESUMABLY, 
BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER AROUND 
HEIR-APPARENT KIM JONG IL.  THE DPRK HAS YET TO MAKE A 
MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT SINCE THE SENIOR KIM'S DEATH. 
ANALYSTS IN SOUTH KOREA PREDICTED SUCH A STATEMENT WILL BE 
MADE WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. 
 
8.  KIM IL SUNG'S FUNERAL WILL BE HELD ON JUL 17, WITH NO 
FOREIGN DELEGATIONS EXPECTED TO BE INVITED OR ALLOWED. 
THE DPRK REFUSED AN OFFER OF A "CONDOLENCE VISIT" FROM 
PRESIDENT CARTER (THEN IN TOKYO) ON SATURDAY (REF B), 
ALTHOUGH YONHAP REPORTED JULY 11 THAT THE DPRK INTENDS TO 
INVITE PRESIDENT CARTER TO THE FUNERAL.)  A SENIOR ROKG 
OFFICIAL SPECULATED THAT THE DPRK MAY EXCLUDE FOREIGN 
DELEGATIONS BECAUSE IT IS AFRAID THAT IF INVITED, THEY 
WILL NOT COME, THUS EXPOSING TO THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE 
THE LIE OF KIM IL SUNG AS A WORLD-REVERED GREAT LEADER. 
 
KIM JONG IL SUCCESSION PROGRESSES 
--------------------------------- 
 
9.  KIM JONG IL HAS NOT YET APPEARED IN PUBLIC, NOR HAS 
THERE BEEN A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS SUCCESSION TO THE 
LEADERSHIP OF THE DPRK.  NEVERTHELESS, INDICATIONS 
CONTINUE TO PILE UP THAT THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO KIM IL 
SUNG'S OLDEST SON AND HEIR APPARENT IS PROCEEDING.  DPRK 
MEDIA HAVE PRODUCED A STEADY STREAM OF LAUDATORY COMMENTS 
ON THE JUNIOR KIM, AS WELL AS PUBLIC PLEDGES OF LOYALTY BY 
VARIOUS OFFICIALS OF THE DPRK GOVERNMENT AND PARTY 
HIERARCHY. 
 
10.  ALL MEMBERS OF THE WORKERS PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
AND THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY WERE TOLD TO GATHER IN 
PYONGYANG BY JULY 11 FOR CONDOLENCES.  IT WOULD BE 
REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THEY WILL ELECT KIM JONG IL TO 
THE TWO TOP POSITIONS OF PRESIDENT AND WORKERS PARTY 
SECRETARY.  (OF COURSE, HE ALREADY HOLDS THE THIRD TOP 
POSITION OF CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF 
THE WORKERS PARTY.) 
 
NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT "POSTPONED" 
------------------------------ 
 
11.  ON THE MORNING OF JULY 11, THE DPRK SENT A VERY BRIEF 
MESSAGE TO THE ROKG STATING THAT IN LIGHT OF KIM IL SUNG'S 
DEATH, THE SUMMIT "COULD NOT BUT BE POSTPONED."  THE 
MESSAGE WAS SENT TO ROK DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR 
UNIFICATION LEE HONG-KU FROM HIS COUNTERPART AT THE 
HIGH-LEVEL TALKS OF JUNE 28, DPRK WORKERS PARTY SECRETARY 
KIM YOUNG-SUN. 
 
12.  DURING A BRIEFING FOR THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS HELD ON 
MONDAY AFTERNOON, ASSISTANT MINISTER CHOI DONG JIN 
STRESSED THAT THE ROKG'S BASIC PRINCIPLES ON PEACE, 
SECURITY AND COOPERATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA REMAIN 
THE SAME, AND THE ROK LEADERSHIP HOPES THAT BOTH SIDES CAN 
RESUME PLANNING FOR A SUMMIT "IF OR WHEN A NEW ENVIRONMENT 
IS CREATED THAT IS CONDUCIVE TO HOLDING A SUMMIT." 
 
13.  ROKG PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE CONTINUALLY STRESSED THE 
GOVERNMENT'S CONFIDENCE IN ITS READINESS TO RESPOND TO ALL 
EVENTUALITIES.  APPEARING BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 
JULY 11, DPM LEE PREDICTED A "QUIET FRONT" IN THE DPRK 
WHILE THE TRANSFER OF POWER IS COMPLETED AND THE NEW 
REGIME STABILIZED.  HE FORESAW NO MAJOR CHANGES IN 
NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS. 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL REACTION 
--------------------------- 
14.  A STAFF ASSISTANT TO FORMER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE 
AND OPPOSITION LEADER KIM DAE JUNG SPOKE WITH POLOFF TODAY 
AND LAID OUT KIM'S ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE 
NORTH.  KIM BELIEVES THAT KIM JONG IL WILL STAY WITH THE 
COURSE SET BY HIS FATHER, AS THIS WILL BE THE SUREST WAY 
TO LEGITIMIZE HIS RULE.  IF HE IS INCLINED TO PURSUE HIS 
OWN POLICIES, HE WILL NOT DO SO UNTIL HE FIRMLY 
ESTABLISHES HIS RULE. 
 
15.  KIM DAE JUNG SEES TWO PRIORITIES FOR KIM JONG IL ONCE 
HE ASSUMES POWER.  HIS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL BE TO 
RESUME TALKS WITH THE USG, BECAUSE OF THE INSPECTION 
DEADLINE RELATING TO THE SPENT FUEL RODS.  SECONDLY, KIM 
WILL NEED TO IMPROVE HIS CREDIBILITY AS A LEADER BY 
PROVIDING IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE PEOPLE.  THE 
EASIEST WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WOULD BE TO IMPROVE 
ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD.  THUS, KIM DAE JUNG 
IS OPTIMISTIC THAT KIM JONG IL WILL CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH 
THE US., WITH THE HOPE OF OBTAINING ECONOMIC 
CONCESSIONS.  THE CHIEF OBSTACLE KIM SEES AT THE MOMENT, 
HOWEVER, IS THE ROKG.  KIM IS CONCERNED THAT THE SOUTH MAY 
SEIZE THIS PERIOD AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO TEST THE DPRK, AND 
ADD MORE CONDITIONS TO THE TALKS.  IF SO, KIM BELIEVES 
THAT RATHER THAN ACQUIESCE TO FURTHER DEMANDS, THE NORTH 
WOULD RETRENCH, AND HOPES FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR 
PROBLEM WOULD BE RUINED. 
 
16.  REP. PARK CHUNG SOO, A RULING DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL 
PARTY (DLP) ASSEMBLYMAN, AND MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
COMMITTEE, SPOKE WITH POLOFF AND ECHOED KIM DAE JUNG'S 
ANALYSIS.  ADDITIONALLY, PARK STATED THAT THE PARTY FELT 
THAT IF AND WHEN NORTH KOREA PROPOSES ANOTHER SUMMIT, THE 
FORMAT MUST BE REEVALUATED COMPLETELY.  ALTHOUGH MEMBERS 
SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF A SUMMIT WITH KIM JONG IL, IT WOULD 
HAVE TO BE HELD IN ANOTHER LOCATION, AND WITH A DIFFERENT 
AGENDA. 

 
STATEMENT BY THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
--------------------------------- 
17.  THE MAIN OPPOSITION DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DP) PROVIDED 
THE EMBASSY WITH THE FOLLOWING ENGLISH TEXT ON THE 
AFTERNOON OF JULY 11: 
 
"1.  WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AND 
NEGOTIATION POSITIVELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA FOR SUMMIT TALKS. 
THOUGH THERE COULD BE SOME DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION AND 
OPINIONS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE NORTH KOREA'S REGIME, IT 
IS UNDER THE CONTEXT THAT REGIME UNDER KIM JONG IL COULD 
STILL BE THE OBJECT OF NEGOTIATION AND DIALOGUE WHEN THE 
KIM JONG IL'S REGIME WILL BE IN POWER IN THE CASE OF LATE 
KIM IL SUNG. 
 
2.  WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM ANY PROVOCATIVE 
ACTIONS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY AREAS AGAINST NORTH 
KOREA UNTIL NORTH KOREA RESTORES THE PEACE WITHIN THE 
REGIME. 
 
3.  WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO SHOW ANY POSTURE WHICH 
MAY INFLUENCE ON NORTH KOREA'S POWER FORMATION. 
 
(ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN RELATION'S COMMITTEE OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY.)" 
 
18.  COMMENT:  THE INSISTENCE BY THE DP THAT THE SUMMIT GO 
AHEAD AS SCHEDULED RUNS AT ODDS WITH PUBLIC SENTIMENT. 
SOUTH KOREANS DO NOT HOLD A SOFT SPOT FOR THE YOUNGER KIM, 
AND A TRIP BY KIM YOUNG SAM TO PYONGYANG TO MEET WITH 
SOMEONE HIS JUNIOR IN BOTH AGE AND LEADERSHIP TENURE WOULD 
INVITE WIDESPREAD PUBLIC CRITICISM.  END COMMENT. 
 
QUOTE OF THE DAY 
---------------- 
19.  EMBOFF WAS TOLD BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT FORMER 
PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER IS NOW REFERRED TO IN ROKG CIRCLES 
AS "THE ANGEL OF DEATH." 
 
KARTMAN UNQUOTE 
 
TALBOTT