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Viewing cable 93LIMA56, THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
93LIMA56 1993-01-04 22:51 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Lima
Appears in these articles:
elcomercio.pe
R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056 
 
 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM OAS PE
SUBJECT:    THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO 
 
1. (U)  SUMMARY:  IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF DEPA...

id: 594
date: 1/4/1993 22:51
refid: 93LIMA56
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 
header:
R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM


----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056 
 
 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM OAS PE
SUBJECT:    THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO 
 
1. (U)  SUMMARY:  IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENTAL VOTING PATTERNS, 
POVERTY LEVELS PROVED A MUCH BETTER PREDICTOR OF 
VOTING TURNOUT IN THE NOVEMBER 22 CCD ELECTIONS 
THAN DID THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO 
TERRORIST GROUP.  THE IMPACT ON ABSTENTIONISM OF 
RELATIVE POVERTY WAS ALSO MUCH GREATER THAN ITS 
IMPACT ON SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT PARTY. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U)  SLIGHTLY LESS THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE 
OAS RENDERED ITS VERDICT AND EIGHTEEN DAYS LATER 
THAN PERU'S NATIONAL ELECTION BOARD PROMISED, 
THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 22 
CONSTITUENT CONGRESS ELECTIONS WERE ANNOUNCED. 
FOLLOWING IS A FIRST ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
POVERTY AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO 
ON VOTING TURNOUT AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
IN THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS (CCD) ELECTIONS. 
 
POVERTY AND THE VOTE 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C)  BASED UPON DEPARTMENTAL VOTING FIGURES, 
THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, ABSENTEEISM AND SUPPORT 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ANALYZED USING 
SIMPLE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TECHNIQUES FOR 
BIVARIATE DISTRIBUTIONS. 
 
4. (C)  IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT POVERTY AND 
POLITICAL VIEWS ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED  IN THE 
CASE OF PERU, POVERTY APPEARS TO HAVE A MUCH 
GREATER IMPACT ON THE DECISION TO VOTE THAN IT 
DOES ON WHICH CANDIDATE OR PARTY A VOTER CHOSES. 
 
5. (C)  TO LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, THE 
VOTE IN DEPARTMENTS WITHIN WHICH 48 OF PERU'S 50 
MOST IMPOVERISHED PROVINCES (ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT 
TO COUNTIES IN THE UNITED STATES) WAS COMPARED 
TO THE REST OF PERU.  WHEN ABSENTEEISM AND 
SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S "NEW 
MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" PARTY WERE COMPARED IN THE 
MOST POOR AND LEAST POOR DEPARTMENTS, THE IMPACT 
ON ABSTENTEEISM WAS MARKED.  APPROXIMATELY 29.4 
PERCENT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN NON-VOTING RATES 
CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY THE 
POVERTY FACTOR.  IN CONTRAST, ONLY 10.8 PERCENT 
OF THE DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT'S "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE 
CAN BE EXPLAINED BY ECONOMIC IMPROVERISHMENT. 
 
6. (C)  WHY DID RELATIVE POVERTY APPEAR TO HAVE 
SUCH AN IMPACT ON THE VOTE?  ALTHOUGH VOTING IS 
COMPULSORY IN PERU, CHANGING ONE'S VOTING 
LOCATION IS A DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING 
PROCESS.  THE OPTION OPEN TO PERUVIANS IS TO NOT 
VOTE AND EITHER PAY, OR HOPE TO EVADE THE 12 
DOLLAR FINE FOR NON-VOTING.  FOR THE POOR, WHO 
HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN ANY 
EVENT, THE RISK OF THE FINE EVER BEING COLLECTED 
IS MINIMAL.  CONSTITUTIONS ARE SEE AS ABSTRACT 
DOCUMENTS WITH LITTLE IMPACT ON DAILY LIFE. 
THUS, IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION, IT APPEARS 
THAT IRRELEVANCE COMBINED WITH ECONOMIC 
NECESSITY COMBINED TO REDUCE VOTER TURNOUT IN 
PERU'S POOREST AREAS. 
 
THE SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE VOTE 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C)  MANY COMMENTATORS IN THE WAKE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION CONGRATULATED PERUVIANS FOR 
DEFYING SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) THREATS AND 
CASTING THEIR BALLOTS.  IN 1992, APPROXIMATELY 
25 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY WAS DECLARED TO BE IN 
A STATE EMERGENCY.  JUST UNDER HALF OF PERU'S 
POPULATION (47.45 PERCENT) LIVED IN THESE 
EMERGENCY ZONES.  TWO WAYS TO MEASURE THE IMPACT 
OF TERRORISM ON THE VOTE WOULD BE TO LOOK AT 
PERCENTAGES OF NON-VOTERS (THE FEAR FACTOR), OR 
LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT (REJECTION 
OF GUERRILLAS FACTOR) IN EMERGENCY ZONES VERSUS 
AREAS DECLARED FREE OF SUBSTANTIAL GUERRILLA 
INFLUENCE. 
 
8. (C)  WHEN NON-VOTING RATES IN DEPARTMENTS ALL 
OR PART OF WHICH WERE DECLARED "EMERGENCY ZONES" 
AS OF NOVEMBER 3 WERE COMPARED WITH DEPARTMENTS 
WITHOUT EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 9.1 PERCENT OF THE 
DIFFERENCE COULD BE STATISTICALLY ACCOUNTED FOR. 
 
9. (C)  WHEN THE DIFFERENCE IN VOTING RATES IN 
DEPARTMENTS WHERE THERE WERE EMERGENCY ZONES IN 
NOVEMBER WERE COMPARED TO THOSE WHICH HAD BEEN 
ON THE LIST IN FEBRUARY, TEN MONTHS EARLIER, BUT 
REMOVED IN NOVEMBER, NO STATISTICALLY SIGNFICANT 
DIFFERENCES WERE DETECTED. 
 
GUERRILLAS AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C)  IF THE ACT OF VOTING IS TAKEN AS A 
HIGHLY SYMBOLIC STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO 
TERRORISM, THIS SHOULD ALSO TRANSLATE INTO SOME 
DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. 
PARTICULARLY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SL FOUNDER AND 
LEADER ABIMAEL GUZMAN AND MUCH OF THE SL'S TOP 
LEADERSHIP, MANY EXPECTED THE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE 
RECEIVED A SURGE OF SUPPORT.  YET WHEN THE 
PERCENTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT VOTE (SUPPORT FOR 
THE "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE) IN 
DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT ANY EMERGENCY ZONE IS 
COMPARED SIMILAR VOTES IN DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT 
EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 6.2 PERCENT OF THE 
DIFFERENCE CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY 
THIS VARIABLE.  THE DIFFERENCE ESSENTIALLY 
DISAPPEARS WHEN THE DEPARTMENTS WHICH HAD 
EMERGENCY ZONES IN FEBRUARY ARE COMPARED TO THE 
REST OF PERU.  APPARENTLY, WHAT HAROLD WILSON 
SAID ABOUT POLITICS ALSO APPLIES TO PERUVIAN 
VOTERS' MEMORIES.  THIS FINDING TALLIES WITH THE 
RESULTS OF FOCUS GROUP ANALYSES WHICH A 
GOVERNMENT POLITICAL CONSULTING FIRM PERFORMED. 
THIS FIRM FOUND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WERE 
INCREASINGLY THE FOCUS OF VOTER'S ATTENTION WITH 
THE PRESUMED RESOLUTION OF THE GUERRILLA PROBLEM 
FOLLOWING GUZMAN'S CAPTURE. 
 
THE 1992 CONSTITUENT CONGRESS 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (U)  FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL LIST OF 
INDIVIDUALS ELECTED TO THE CONSITUTENT CONGRESS 
IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTIONS: 
 
PARTY - NAMES OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
"NUEVA MAYORIA- CAMBIO 90" 
 
JAIME YOSHIYAMA TANAKA 
LUZ SALGADO RUBIANES 
CARLOS TORRES Y TORRES LARA 
VICTOR JOY WAY ROJAS 
ANDRES REGGIARDO SAYAN 
MIGUEL VELIT NUNEZ 
CARLOS BLANCO OROPEZA 
JOSE GAMONAL CRUZ 
GILBERTO SIURA CESPEDES 
JAIME FREUNDT-THURNE 
ANASTACIO VEGA ASCENCIO 
REYNALDO ROBERTS BILLIG 
MANUEL LA TORRE BARDALES 
JUAN HERMOZA RIOS 
MARTHA CHAVEZ COSSIO 
JORGE NAKAMURA HINOSTROZA 
DEMETRIO PASTIAS MELLA 
CESAR FERNANDEZ ARCE 
CARLOS FERRERO COSTA 
MARIA LOZADA DE GAMBOA 
ROMULO GUERRA AYALA 
JORGE VELASQUEZ URETA 
DANIEL ZEVALLOS RIOS 
MIGUEL PAJARES RUIZ 
HUGO ZAMATA AGUIRRE 
OSWALDO SANDOVAL AGUIRRE 
JUAN HUAMANCHUMO ROMERO 
PABLO TELLO TELLO 
JUAN CRUZADO MANTILLA 
SAMUEL MATSUDA NISHIMURA 
PEDRO VILCHEZ MALPICA 
TITO CHAVEZ ROMERO 
CARLOS LEON TRELLES 
MARIA VICTOR ALFARO 
JORGE FIGUEROA VIZCARRA 
NICOLASA VILLAR MARTINEZ 
GENARO COLCHADO ARELLANO 
GAMANIEL BARRETO ESTRADO 
PEDRO GARCIA SAAVEDRA 
VICTOR MELENDEZ CAMPOS 
CARLOS REATEGUI TRIGOSO 
ROGER AMURUZ GALLEGOS 
RICARDO MARCENARO FRERS 
GUILLERMO YSISOLA FARFAN 
 
"PARTIDO POPULAR CRISTIANO" 
 
LOURDES FLORES NANO 
ANTERO FLORES ARAOZ 
ALEXANDER KOURI BUMACHAR 
LUIS BEDOYA DE VIVANCO 
XAVIER BARRON CEBREROS 
CELSO SOTOMARINO CHAVEZ 
HECTOR CRUZ ARRUNAATEGUI 
MARIO OCHARAN ZEGARRA 
 
"FRENTE INDEPENDIENTE MORALIZADOR" 
 
FERNANDO OLIVERA VEGA 
ERNESTO GAMARRA OLIVARES 
CARLOS CUARESMA SANCHEZ 
CESAR LARRABURE GALVEZ 
JULIO CHU MERIZ 
HUMBERTO SABUCETTI PEDRAGLIO 
WILLY SERRATO PUSE 
 
"RENOVACION" 
 
RAFAEL REY REY 
GONZALO ORTIZ DE ZEVALLOS 
ENRIQUE CHIRINOS SOTO 
JUAN CARPIO MUNOZ 
FRANCISCO TUDELA VAN BREUGEL 
JUAN CARRION RUIZ 
 
"MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRACTICO DE IZQUIERDA" 
 
GLORIA HELFER PALACIOS 
HENRY PEASE GARCIA 
JULIO CASTRO GOMEZ 
JULIO DIAZ PALACIOS 
 
"COORDINADORA DEMOCRATICA" 
 
JOSE BARBA CABALLERO 
JORGE DONAIRE LOZANA 
LUIS TORD ROMERO 
JORGE TORRES VALLEJO 
 
"FRENATRACA" 
 
ROGER CACERES VELASQUEZ 
PEDRO CACERES VELASQUEZ 
JORGE VELASQUEZ GONZALES 
 
"FREPAP" 
 
MARIO PAREDES CUEVA 
EUSEBIO VICUNA VASQUEZ 
 
"SODE" 
 
MANUEL MOREYRA LOREDA 
 
"MOVIMIENTO INDEPIENTE AGRARIO" 
 
GUSTAVO GARCIA MUNDACA 
 
12. (C) COMMENT:  BASED UPON A DEPARTMENTAL 
LEVEL ANALYSIS OF VOTING PATTERNS, POVERTY 
APPEARS TO HAVE HAD A MUCH STRONGER IMPACT ON 
THE VOTING DECISION IN THE CCD ELECTIONS THAN 
THE SENDERO.  THE TERRORIST GROUP'S RELATIVE 
LACK OF IMPACT ON THE VOTING MAY BE DUE IN PART 
TO A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY.  IT WAS WIDELY 
BELIEVED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS THAT THE 
SL CONSIDERED THE CCD ELECTIONS ESSENTIALLY 
UNIMPORTANT.  WHILE THE SL CONDUCTED A TERROR 
BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN LIMA IN THE WEEK BEFORE THE 
ELECTION, THE ATTACKS HAD TAPERED OFF SEVERAL 
DAYS BEFORE THE VOTING.  IF THE SL HAD HOPED TO 
HAVE AN IMPACT IN NOVEMBER WITH THIS LAST MINUTE 
EFFORT, IT APPARENTLY FAILED.  IF THE GOVERNMENT 
HAD HOPED TO RECEIVE A "GRATITUDE VOTE" FROM A 
GRATEFUL POPULATION, IT TOO WAS DISAPPOINTED. 
WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DID GAIN A MAJORITY IN THE 
CCD, THE RESULTS REFLECT MOSTLY THEIR BETTER 
ORGANIZATION AND FULLER COFFERS.  CONTRIBUTING 
TO THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJORITY WAS ALSO HIGH 
LEVELS OF OPPOSITION DISORGANIZATION AND POOR 
TACTICAL DECISIONS BY APRA AND ACCION POPULAR TO 
BOYCOTT THE ELECTION. 
 
13. (C)   THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 
IN PERU IS CONSIDERED A SUB-FIELD OF LEGAL 
STUDIES AND THIS TRADITIONAL, NON-QUANTATIVE 
BENT IS REFLECTED IN THE ANALYSIS OF PERUVIAN 
SOCIAL INVESTIGATORS.  SINCE EMERGENCY ZONES DO 
NOT, IN MOST CASES, CORRESPOND EXACTLY WITH 
POLITICAL BOUNDARIES, A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS 
COMPARING PRECINCT TALLIES WITH EMERGENCY ZONES 
AND POVERTY WILL BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE 
EXACT NATURE AND IMPACT OF THESE VARIABLES. 
 
14. (C)  SUCH A DETAILED, QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS 
MAY BE A LONG-TIME COMING.  MOST OF THE 
COMMENTARY THUS FAR PRODUCED BY PERUVIAN 
POLITICIANS, INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICIANS 
FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION HAS BEEN 
IMPRESSIONISTIC, HISTORICAL AND SUBJECTIVE.  ONE 
LONG-TIME STUDENT OF THE IMPACT OF GUERRILLAS 
AND VOTING INSISTED TO POLOFFS DECEMBER 31 THAT 
THE SL OBVIOUSLY HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE 
NOVEMBER 22 VOTE.  UNFORTUNATELY, SHE HAD NO 
DATA OR ANALYSIS TO BACK UP HER GUT FEELING. 
 
 
BRAYSHAW## 

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