R 231224Z JUL 92
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7184
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BOGOTA 10667 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT THROUGHOUT) 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS: KPRP PINR PINS PGOV CO
SUBJECT:  "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" -- BIOS OF 
FARC'S 5-MAN SECRETARIAT 
 
¶1.  CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY:  THE HIGHEST DECISION-MAKING BODY OF THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC), COLOMBIA'S 
OLDEST AND LARGEST GUERRILLA GROUP, IS ITS FIVE-MEMBER 
GENERAL SECRETARIAT, COMPOSED SINCE AUGUST 1990 OF 
LEGENDARY FARC HEAD MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ ("TIROFIJO"), 
POLITICAL CHIEF ALFONSO CANO, RAUL REYES, TIMOLEON JIMENEZ 
AND IVAN MARQUEZ.  THE FIVE COME FROM DIVERSE BACKGROUNDS, 
AND THE FARC'S HISTORICAL DISTINCTIONS -- CAMPESINOS VS. 
INTELLECTUALS, OLDTIMERS VS. NEWCOMERS -- ARE EVIDENT 
AMONG THEM.  THE SECRETARIAT, WHICH HAS BEEN REFERRED TO 
AS "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" TO ILLUSTRATE THE 
DIFFERENCE IN STATURE BETWEEN MARULANDA AND THE REST, CAN 
ALSO BE CHARACTERIZED AS FOUR HARDLINERS VS. ONE MODERATE, 
CANO.  A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE FARC IS THAT THERE 
APPEARS TO BE NO ONE CAPABLE OF REPLACING MARULANDA, THE 
GLUE THAT HOLDS THE FARC TOGETHER.  THIS CABLE PROVIDES 
BIOGRAPHIES OF THE FIVE FARC SECRETARIAT MEMBERS, AND 
FULFILLS THE POST REPORTING PLAN REQUIREMENTS FOR BIOS ON 
THE SECRETARIAT (JUNE) AND MARULANDA (AUGUST).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
¶3.  POLOFF GLEANED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM MANY 
CONVERSATIONS OVER THE BETTER PART OF A YEAR WITH SEVERAL 
CONTACTS, INCLUDING, FIRST AND FOREMOST, COLOMBIAN 
BUSINESSMAN MORITZ AKERMAN.  AKERMAN IS AN EX-COMMUNIST 
PARTY ACTIVIST WHO IS CLOSE TO ALFONSO CANO AND KNOWS IVAN 
MARQUEZ.  INFORMATION WAS ALSO DERIVED FROM CANO'S 
BROTHER, ROBERTO SAENZ (HIMSELF A COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST 
UNTIL NOVEMBER 1991); CARLOS EDUARDO JARAMILLO, A GOC 
PEACE NEGOTIATOR FOR FIVE YEARS WHO KNOWS CANO AND MARQUEZ 
WELL AND HAS MET MARULANDA AND THE REST AT THE FARC'S 
FORMER CASA VERDE SANCTUARY; ACADEMIC GUERRILLA EXPERT 
EDUARDO PIZARRO, EX-COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST AND BROTHER 
OF ASSASSINATED M-19 HEAD CARLOS PIZARRO, AND OTHERS. 
 
¶4.  BECAUSE OF THEIR WORK AS GUERRILLA PEACE NEGOTIATORS 
FRON, JUNE 1991-JUNE 1992, CANO AND MARQUEZ ARE WELL-KNOWN 
OUTSIDE OF THE FARC.  CANO IS BY FAR THE BEST-KNOWN 
SECRETARIAT MEMBER IN BOGOTA, DESPITE HIS DOZEN YEARS IN 
CLANDESTINITY.  AKERMAN, PIZARRO AND JARAMILLO WERE 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CLASSMATES OF CANO'S.  MARULANDA, A 
LIVING LEGEND, OBVIOUSLY IS WELL-KNOWN.  RAUL REYES IS 
KNOWN IN BOGOTA BECAUSE OF HIS LINKS TO THE PARTY'S 
HIERARCHY.  THE LEAST KNOWN BY FAR (AT LEAST IN THE 
CAPITAL) IS TIMOLEON JIMENEZ, A CAMPESINO WHO GREW UP IN 
THE INSURGENCY. 
 
 
MANUEL MARULANDA:  MORE CAMPESINO THAN COMMUNIST 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶5.  THE FARC HAS BEEN CALLED AN ARMY OF SEVERAL COLONELS 
BUT ONLY ONE GENERAL;  MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ IS THAT 
GENERAL.  AT 64, MARULANDA IS LATIN AMERICA'S OLDEST AND 
MOST EXPERIENCED GUERRILLA LEADER.  HE'S BEEN AN INSURGENT 
FOR 43 YEARS, SINCE BEFORE CASTRO'S REVOLUTION. 
 
¶6.  IN 1949, DURING COLOMBIA'S LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE CIVIL 
WAR, KNOWN AS "LA VIOLENCIA," MARULANDA (REAL NAME PEDRO 
ANTONIO MARIN), JOINED THE LIBERAL GUERRILLA OPPOSITION TO 
THE CONSERVATIVE DICTATORSHIP.  WHILE MARULANDA BEGAN AS A 
LIBERAL GUERRILLA, BY THE TIME LA VIOLENCIA HAD ENDED HE 
HAD BECOME A COMMUNIST REBEL LEADER.  LIKE MANY OF THE 
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY'S EARLY LEADERS, MARULANDA HAILS FROM 
AND BEGAN HIS GUERRILLA CAREER IN TOLIMA. 
 
¶7.  THE NOM DE GUERRE MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ WAS ADOPTED 
FROM THE COMMUNIST LABOR LEADER OF THE SAME NAME, A 
PARTICIPANT IN THE VIOLENT 1925 LABOR STRIFE AND LATER A 
FOUNDER OF THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC).  THE 
COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES GAVE MARULANDA (MARIN) THE 
NICKNAME "TIROFIJO" (SURE SHOT), WHICH HAS STUCK.  INSIDE 
THE INSURGENCY, HOWEVER, WHERE IT'S CONSIDERED SOMEWHAT 
PEJORATIVE, NO ONE CALLS HIM THAT; HE'S "COMANDANTE 
MARULANDA" TO HIS FARC UNDERLINGS. 
 
¶8.  THERE ARE MANY SIDES TO MARULANDA.  HE'S A CAMPESINO, 
GUERRILLA, COMMUNIST, SOLDIER, POLITICIAN, ALL ROLED INTO 
ONE.  HE IS, HOWEVER, A CAMPESINO LEADER FIRST, A 
COMMUNIST SECOND; MORE ZAPATA OR PANCHO VILLA THAN LENIN 
OR STALIN. 
 
¶9.  VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT SINCE LEADING HIS 
OWN "GREAT MARCH" OF HUNDREDS OF FOLLOWERS AFTER THE ARMED 
FORCES' EXPLUSION OF THE FARC FROM ITS CASA VERDE 
SANCTUARY IN DECEMBER 1990 (FOUR MONTHS AFTER BECOMING FARC 
HEAD) MARULANDA HAS BEEN FEELING MESSIANIC AND SOMEWHAT 
LIKE MAO, WHOSE 1949 REVOLUTION STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE 
PCC AND FARC. 
 
¶10.  AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO, MARULANDA IS RESPECTED BOTH 
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE INSURGENCY FOR HIS MILITARY SKILLS, 
BUT HAS NEVER PROFESSED TO HAVE POLITICAL SAVVY.  NOR DOES 
HE HAVE POLITICAL AMBITIONS; HE HAS NO INTEREST IN A 
POST-INSURGENCY POLITICAL CAREER. 
 
¶11.  MARULANDA HAS NEITHER A GRAND VISION FOR COLOMBIA, 
NOR A SPECIFIC POLITICAL AGENDA.  HE DOESN'T KNOW 
PRECISELY WHAT HE'S FIGHTING FOR.  HIS MOTIVATION IS THE 
WELFARE OF "HIS PEOPLE," I.E., CAMPESINOS.  WHILE THE 
GOVERNMENT TALKS ABOUT ENDING THE INSURGENCY, MARULANDA'S 
CONCERN IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO CAMPESINOS IF THEIR 
SELF-DEFENSE ARMY (THE FARC) DISAPPEARS. 
 
¶12.  OTHER THAN HIS ADOPTED COMMUNISM, MARULANDA HAS NO 
FIRM POLITICAL BELIEFS.  HE USUALLY SIDES WITH FARC/PCC 
HARDLINERS, BUT A MORE PROMINENT FEATURE OF HIS 
PERSONALITY APPEARS TO BE HIS MALLEABILITY; MARULANDA IS 
OPEN TO PERSUASION.  HE VARYINGLY HAS BEEN REPORTED TO BE 
A HARDLINER AND TO HAVE BEEN WON OVER TO HIS POLITICAL 
CHIEF ALFONSO CANO'S PRO-NEGOTIATED-PEACE POSITION.  AT 
THE SAME TIME, HE HAS BEEN REPORTED TO BE MORE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF BOTH THE PCC AUD THE ELN THAN HIS 
PREDECESSOR, JACOBO ARENAS. 
 
¶13.  INDEED, ONE CRITICISM OF MARULANDA IS THAT HE HAS 
PRESIDED OVER THE "ELENIZATION" OF THE FARC, I.E., THAT 
UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP (BEGINNING WITH THE DEATH OF JACOBO 
ARENAS IN AUGUST 1990) THE FARC HAS ADOPTED MANY OF THE 
ELN'S MILITARY TACTICS (E.G., ECONOMIC TERRORISM) WHILE 
MARULANDA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN INCREASING UNDER ELN HEAD 
MANUEL PEREZ' IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL INFLUENCE. 
 
¶14.  ONE PERSON'S ADVICE MARULANDA NEVER HAS SOUGHT IS 
FIDEL CASTRO'S.  MARULANDA NEVER HAS HAD VERY CLOSE 
RELATIONS WITH THE CUBAN LEADER, WHOM MARULANDA PREDATES 
AS A GUERRILLA AND NEVER HAS FIGURED HE HAD MUCH TO LEARN 
FROM.  MARULANDA HAS TURNED DOWN SEVERAL INVITATIONS TO 
VISIT CUBA.  ONE RESULT IS THAT, TYPICAL OF FARC MILITARY 
LEADERS, MARULANDA HAS NO FORMAL MILITARY TRAINING. 
 
¶15.  VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE TALKED ABOUT MARULANDA'S 
ISOLATION IN THE JUNGLE; HE IS SAID TO BE OUT OF TOUCH 
WITH REALITY.  MARULANDA RECEIVES VERY LITTLE INFORMATION 
FROM THE WORLD OUTSIDE HIS JUNGLE RETREATS OTHER THAN THAT 
EDITED BY HIS PCC VISITORS.  CANO IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO 
COMMUNICATE TO HIM WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE WORLD OUTSIDE 
HIS JUNGLE HAUNTS. 
 
¶16.  MARULANDA LAST VISITED A CITY, NEIVA IN HUILA 
DEPARTMENT (1985 POP. 178,000; HARDLY A METROPOLIS), IN 
¶1963.  HE REPORTEDLY NEVER HAS FLOWN ON AN AIRPLANE, NEVER 
LEFT COLOMBIA.  ONE REASON HE REFUSES TO COME DOWN FROM 
THE MOUNTAINS IS HIS PARANOID FEAR FOR HIS LIFE.  HE IS 
SAID TO FULLY TRUST NO ONE.  THE PERSONS HE TRUSTS MOST 
ARE THOSE FEW FELLOW FARC GUERRILLAS WITH HIM SINCE THE 
EARLY YEARS. 
 
¶17.  FARC CONFIDANT MORITZ AKERMAN RELATED THE STORY OF 
HOW MARULANDA ONCE RECEIVED A GIFT BOTTLE OF WHISKEY (HIS 
FAVORITE DRINK) FROM CASTRO.  FEARING BEING POISONED, 
TIROFIJO REFUSED TO DRINK IT, INSISTING ON THE BOTTLE 
BEING BROKEN IN FRONT OF HIM.  TIROFIJO ALSO, ACCORDING TO 
AKERMAN, REFUSED TO TAKE PILLS CANO BROUGHT BACK FOR HIM 
FROM HIS NOVEMBER 1991 VISIT TO CUBA. 
 
 
ALFONSO CANO:  CITY-SMART BOY STUCK IN A CAMPESINO ARMY 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶18.  THE FARC'S SECRETARIAT CAN BE VIEWED IN GENERAL AS 
FOUR PRO-ARMED STRUGGLE HARDLINERS AGAINST ONE 
PRO-NEGOTIATED PEACE MODERATE, ALFONSO CANO.  GUILLERMO 
LEON SAENZ VARGAS (ALIAS ALFONSO CANO) IS THE SECOND IN 
COMMAND AND THE FARC'S IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADER. 
CANO, MID-40S, IS FROM BOGOTA, WHERE HE STUDIED 
ANTHROPOLOGY AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, WHERE THE BEST 
BRAINS IN A GENERATION OF COLOMBIAN LEFTISTS WERE 
GATHERED.  AT THE TIME, SAENZ (THE NON DE GUERRE WAS 
ADOPTED WHEN HE JOINED THE INSURGENCY) WAS ACTIVE IN THE 
COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S YOUTH MOVEMENT, JUCO.  IN THE 
EARLY 1980S, JUST BEFORE COMPLETING HIS STUDIES, CANO LEFT 
TO JOIN THE FARC'S RURAL INSURGENCY. 
 
¶19.  CANO HAS NEVER COMMANDED A FRONT; INDEED, HE HAS NO 
MILITARY EXPERIENCE.  FROM DAY ONE, HIS JOB HAS BEEN TO 
PROVIDE THE CAMPESINO ARMY WITH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.  HE 
REPORTEDLY WAS CLOSE TO FARC HEAD JACOBO ARENAS UNTIL HIS 
AUGUST 1990 HEART-ATTACK DEATH, AT WHICH TIME CANO 
REPLACED ARENAS AS THE FARC'S POLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL CHIEF. 
 
¶20.  CANO WAS THE BEST AND BRIGHTEST OF A CROP OF JUCO 
ACTIVISTS THE PARTY SENT TO THE FARC IN THE EARLY 1980S 
OSTENSIBLY TO PROVIDE THE GUERRILLA GROUP WITH POLITICAL 
ADVICE, BUT ACTUALLY TO MAINTAIN THE PARTY'S INFLUENCE 
OVER THE RAPIDLY EXPANDING INSURGENCY. 
 
¶21.  ARENAS' DEATH LEFT CANO FAR AND AWAY THE MOST 
INTELLECTUALLY CAPABLE GUERRILLA LEADER, FARC OR ELN. 
THAT SUPERIOR INTELLECT, HOWEVER, COMBINED WITH HIS LACK 
OF MILITARY SKILLS AND THE FACT THAT HE IS AN EDUCATED 
"CITY BOY" IN A CAMPESINO ARMY, HAS STEERED HIM TOWARD 
BECOMING A SPOKESMAN/NEGOTIATOR/DIPLOMAT FOR THE 
INSURGENCY, RATHER THAN A LEADER OF IT.  (FOR EXAMPLE, A 
PROBLEM FOR THE PEACE TALKS IS THAT CANO HAS LACKED 
DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY.) 
 
¶22.  SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE REPORTED CANO TO BE THE 
CONSUMATE DIPLOMAT, NEVER LOSING CONTROL OF HIMSELF OR 
HIS TEMPER, ALWAYS CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY.  THAT'S 
EVIDENT IN BROADCAST INTERVIEWS.  CARLOS EDUARDO 
JARAMILLO, WHO AS A GOC NEGOTIATOR SAT ACROSS THE TABLE 
FROM CANO FROM JUNE-NOVEMBER 1991 IN CARACAS, CREDITED 
CANO WITH KEEPING THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS MOVING 
FORWARD.  BY CONTRAST, JARAMILLO CHARACTERIZED THE OTHER 
CGSB NEGOTIATORS, INCLUDING IVAN MARQUEZ, AS "MILITARY 
TYPES" WHO WOULD STATE THEIR POSITION, THEN REFUSE TO 
BUDGE.  HE CREDITED CANO WITH ALWAYS MANEUVERING TO AVOID 
OR RESOLVE QUARRELS. 

¶23.  EVERYONE AGREES CANO IS THE CGSB'S MOST ACTIVE 
CATALYST FOR A NEGOTIATED END TO THE INSURGENCY.  CANO 
UNDERSTANDS THAT THE INSURGENCY IS DEFEATED POLITICALLY, 
IF NOT YET MILITARILY.  HE KNOWS THE ARMED STRUGGLE HAS NO 
FUTURE, NOR HE IN IT.  CANO ALSO MAY BE EXPERIENCING A 
"MID-LIFE CRISIS," DREADING SPENDING THE REST OF HIS LIFE 
AS A GUERRILLA, AS DID ARENAS.  HE WOULD LIKE TO DO 
SOMETHING ELSE BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE.  AS AKERMAN ONCE TOLD 
POLOFF, "CANO WOULD RATHER BE NO. 50 IN SOMETHING THAT HAS 
A FUTURE THAN NO. 2 IN A DEAD-END VENTURE."  CANO WOULD 
LIKE TO TRY HIS HAND AT POLITICS, BUT IS TRAPPED IN THE 
INSURGENCY.  HE REALIZES THAT THE ONLY WAY TO GET OUT 
ALIVE IS TO BRING THE REST OF THE FARC WITH HIM, I.E., TO 
NEGOTIATE AN END TO THEIR ARMED STRUGGLE.  BECAUSE HE IS 
THE INSURGENCY'S MOST PRO-PEACE LEADER, THE GOC WOULD 
PREFER TO DEAL WITH CANO THAN ANY OTHER GUERRILLA. 
 
¶24.  CANO HAS HIS FOLLOWERS IN THE FARC, AND IF HE LEFT 
THE INSURGENCY, POSSIBLY COULD TAKE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION 
(ESTIMATES VARY FROM 30-70 PERCENT) OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP 
WITH HIM.  CANO, HOWEVER, PREFERS TO STRUGGLE FROM WITHIN 
TO DRAG TIROFIJO AND THE ENTIRE FARC INTO A PEACE 
AGREEMENT.  THAT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE.  IN TAKING THE SLOW, 
INTEGRAL APPROACH, CANO RISKS LOSING THE GOVERNMENT ALONG 
THE WAY (AS THE RECENT GOC TURN TOWARD A MORE MILITARISTIC 
APPROACH HAS SHOWN).  AKERMAN HAS COUNSELED CANO THAT "HE 
HAS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN 30,000 INSURGENTS/SYMPATHIZERS AND 
30 MILLION COLOMBIANS." 
 
¶25.  CANO'S PERSISTENCE IN PUSHING A NEGOTIATED END TO THE 
INSURGENCY HAS EARNED HIM THE WRATH OF HIS HARDLINE 
COMRADES IN BOTH THE FARC AND THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST 
PARTY (PCC).  THE PARTY IS NO MORE MONOLITHIC THAN THE 
FARC, HOWEVER, AND DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE, CANO 
OCCASIONALLY ENJOYS THE PARTY'S SUPPORT.  FOR EXAMPLE, 
BOTH CANO AND THE PARTY (HISTORICALLY, THE "BRAINS" OF THE 
CAMPESINO ARMY) FEAR THEIR LOSS OF INFLUENCE AS MARULANDA 
HAS TURNED TOWARD GREATER IDEOLOGICAL AND TACTICAL ACCORD 
WITH THE ELN. 
 
¶26.  FEBRUARY'S DISAPPEARANCE OF CANO'S ASSISTANT IN 
PUSHING PEACE, FARC MEMBER DANIEL GARCIA, IS EVIDENCE THAT 
FARC/PCC HARDLINERS ARE WILLING TO GET TOUGH.  SHORTLY 
BEFORE HE VANISHED, GARCIA (WHOM THE FARC "TRIED" TWICE 
FOR THE BOTCHED 1989 "COPACABANA" ARMS DEAL) REPORTEDLY 
SAID HIS ORDEAL WAS "THE FIRST CHAPTER IN A BOOK ABOUT 
CANO."  AT THE JULY 4 RECEPTION, GEN. MANUEL BONNET, THE 
PREVIOUS HEAD OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, TOLD POLOFF HE 
COULDN'T BELIEVE CANO RECENTLY HAD OPTED TO RETURN TO HIS 
GUERRILLA COMRADES IN THE COLOMBIAN JUNGLE.  CANO, WHO WAS 
VILIFIED (ALONG WITH GARCIA) AND TEMPORARILY DUMPED AS 
FARC NEGOTIATOR AT A JOINT FARC/PCC MEETING THE LAST TIME 
HE RETURNED HOME, IS KNOWN TO FEAR THAT EACH RETURN TO THE 
BUSH COULD REPRESENT THE BOOK'S FINAL CHAPTER. 
 
 
RAUL REYES:  THE PARTY'S MAN 
---------------------------- 
¶27.  RAUL REYES, THE FARC'S THIRD-RANKING LEADER, IS IN 
CHARGE OF LOGISTICS AND FINANCES.  IT'S REYES WHO 
DISPENSES FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE PCC AND THE FARC'S URBAN 
FRONTS.  LIKE CANO, REYES IS A POLITICAL LEADER WITH NO 
MILITARY EXPERIENCE. 
 
¶28.  REYES IS THE KEY MAN INSIDE THE FARC IN THE GUERRILLA 
GROUP'S SIBLING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST 
PARTY.  WHILE ALL FIVE FARC SECRETARIAT MEMBERS ARE PCC 
MEMBERS, REYES SERVES AS "THE PARTY'S MAN" INSIDE THE 
FARC.  WHILE HIS FELLOW SECRETARIAT MEMBERS, WHETHER 
MILITARY OR POLITICAL TYPES, WHETHER CAMPESINOS OR 
INTELLECTUALS, HAVE CLOSER TIES TO THE INSURGENCY THAN TO 
THE PARTY, REYES IS MORE COMMUNIST THAN GUERRILLA.  IN 
THAT RESPECT, REYES IS UNIQUE IN THE FARC HIERARCHY.  FROM 
JACOBO ARENAS TO ALFONSO CANO, THE PARTY, AS A RULE, HAS 
LOST CONTROL OVER THE YOUNG ACTIVISTS IT HAS SENT TO THE 
FARC TO MAINTAIN ITS CONTROL OVER THE INSURGENCY. 
 
¶29.  REYES IS LINKED TO THE PARTY'S MOST INFLUENTIAL AND 
RADICAL FACTION, LED BY PARTY SECRETARIAT MEMBER MANUAL 
CEPEDA.  REYES' MAIN POINT OF CONTACT IN THE PCC IS PARTY 
ORGANIZATION SECRETARY (AND CEPEDA-FACTION NUMBER) MILLER 
CHACON ("MISAEL"), WHO REGULARLY TRAVELS FROM BOGOTA TO 
THE FARC'S SECRETARIAT. 
 
 
TIMOLEON JIMENEZ:  A BROWN-NOSE TO HIS MENTOR, TIROFIJO 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶30.  TIMOLEON JIMENEZ ("TIMOCHENCO") IS FOURTH IN COMMAND 
AND IN CHARGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. 
 
¶31.  A CAMPESINO, JIMENEZ JOINED THE FARC AT 13, AND EARLY 
WAS "ADOPTED" BY MARULANDA, WITH WHOM HE HAS BEEN EVER 
SINCE.  THE ADOLESCENT JIMENEZ FIRST WAS USED AS A GOPHER 
FOR THE SECRETARIAT, THEN LATER AS A COURIER.  AS A 
TEEN-AGER, JIMENEZ SERVED AS A "STAFF ASSISTANT" TO THE 
SECRETARIAT.  HE GREW UP WITH THE SECRETARIAT, AT 
TIROFIJO'S SIDE. 
 
¶32.  WHILE MARULANDA HAS MANY SONS IN THE FARC, NONE HAVE 
SPENT AS MUCH TIME WITH HIM OR ARE AS CLOSE TO HIM AS 
JIMENEZ, HIS CHOSEN PROTEGE.  THERE IS LIKELY NO ONE THE 
PARANOID TIROFIJO TRUSTS MORE.  JIMENEZ IS THE ONE MEMBER 
OF THE SECRETARIAT WHO IS NEVER SEPARATED FROM TIROFI)O. 
¶33.  JIMENEZ IS A REPLICA OF MARULANDA.  LIKE HIS MENTOR, 
JIMENEZ IS AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO; A MILITARY LEADER (AND 
A NOTED ONE) NOT A POLITICAL ONE.  LIKE TIROFIJO, JIMENEZ 
HAS NO FORMAL MILITARY TRAINING, AND HAS NEVER TRAVELED TO 
CUBA OR THE EAST BLOC. 
 
¶34.  WHILE FAR FROM BRILLIANT, JIMENEZ IS SMART ENOUGH TO 
KNOW WHAT SIDE HIS BREAD IS BUTTERED ON.  HE ALWAYS AGREES 
WITH TIROFIJO.  MARULANDA BELIEVES IN CONTINUING THE ARMED 
STRUGGLE, THEREFORE SO DOES JIMENEZ. 
 
¶35.  WHILE JIMENEZ IS ABOUT THE SAME AGE AS FELLOW 
SECRETARIAT MEMBERS CANO, REYES AND MARQUEZ, HE REPRESENTS 
A DIFFERENT CURRENT OF GUERRILLA LEADER.  WHILE THEY 
JOINED THE FARC AFTER UNIVERSITY STUDIES AND CIVIL 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM, JIMENEZ AND OTHERS OF HIS ILK ARE 
CAMPESINOS WHO GREW UP IN THE INSURGENCY. 
 

IVAN MARQUEZ:  "MORE AMBITION THAN BRAINS" 
----------------------------------------- 
¶36.  WHEN FARC HEAD JACOBO ARENAS DIED IN AUGUST 1990, AND THE 
REMAINING FOUR FARC GENERAL SECRETARIAT MEMBERS ALL MOVED 
UP A NOTCH (WITH SECOND-IN-COMMANDER MARULANDA REPLACING 
ARENAS), IVAN MARQUEZ WAS ELEVATED TO THE GENERAL 
SECRETARIAT'S FIFTH AND LOWEST POSITION. 
 
¶37.  THE SECRETARIAT'S NEWEST MEMBER IS UNIQUE IN HAVING 
BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAPABILITY.  MARQUEZ IS A 
PROVEN MILITARY LEADER WITH POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, HAVING 
SERVED BOTH AS A PATRIOTIC UNION (UP) CONGRESSMAN AND A 
CGSB/FARC NEGOTIATOR IN BOTH THE CARACAS AND TLAXCALA 
ROUNDS OF THE PEACE TALKS.  AS HEAD OF THE FARC'S SOUTHERN 
BLOC IN HIS NATIVE CAQUETA DEPARTMENT BEFORE JOINING THE 
SECRETARIAT, MARQUEZ EARNED RESPECT FOR HIS MILITARY 
LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES, HAVING ONCE WIPED OUT A 
PARAMILITARY GROUP IN PUTUMAYO DEPARTMENT LINKED TO 
MEDELLIN CARTEL CAPO GONZALO RODRIQUEZ GACHA. 
 
¶38.  MARQUEZ ALSO IS THE SECRETARIAT'S MOST ENIGMATIC 
MEMBER.  SOURCES HAVE DIFFERED OVER WHETHER HE IS A 
HARDLINER.  AMONG THOSE DENYING MARQUEZ IS A WARMONGER IS 
FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST ROBERTO SAENZ, BROTHER OF 
MARQUEZ' NEGOTIATING PARTNER, ALFONSO CANO.  PRESIDENTIAL 
PEACE ADVISER GONZALO DE FRANCISCO HAS DESCRIBED MARQUEZ 
AS "A HARDLINER THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO BUSINESS WITH." 
 
¶39.  THE TRUTH MAY BE, AS ACADEMIC GUERRILLA EXPERT AND 
EX-COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVIST EDUARDO PIZARRO HAS 
REPORTED, THAT MARQUEZ "IS NOT A MAN TO LET HIS HEART GET 
IN THE WAY OF HIS AMBITION."  PEACE PROCESS PUSHER MORITZ 
AKERMAN, WHO KNOWS MARQUEZ, HAS CHARACTERIZED HIM AS FIRST 
AND FOREMOST AN AMBITIOUS OPPORTUNIST WHO "BLOWS WITH THE 
PREVAILING WIND."  PIZARRO THINKS THAT MARQUEZ SHARES 
CANO'S BELIEF THAT THE INSURGENCY IS A DEAD-END, BUT THE 
PREVAILING WIND HAPPENS TO COME FROM THE DIRECTION OF 
DOMINANT FARC/PCC HARDLINERS, AND THUS SO BLOWS MARQUEZ. 
 
¶40.  MARQUEZ HAS VARIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED TO BE IN ACCORD 
WITH CANO, HIS FELLOW FARC NEGOTIATOR, AND AT ODDS WITH 
HIM, WHETHER OUT OF CONVICTION OR BECAUSE OF COMPETING 
AMBITIONS.  MARQUEZ REPORTEDLY SHARES CANO'S DREAM OF A 
POST-INSURGENCY, POLITICAL CAREER; HOWEVER, WHILE CANO IS 
INTELLECTUALLY BRILLIANT, MARQUEZ IS MEDIOCRE.  ALTHOUGH 
NOT AN UNEDUCATED CAMPESINO LIKE MARULANDA, MARQUEZ LACKS 
CANO'S INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.  AKERMAN HAS DESCRIBED 
MARQUEZ AS HAVING "MORE AMBITION THAN BRAINS.'' 
 
¶41.  MARQUEZ REPORTEDLY WAS NAMED TO THE FARC NEGOTIATING 
TEAM (A) BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE, (B) BECAUSE 
HE WANTED THE CHANCE IN THE LIMELIGHT, AND (C) TO KEEP AN 
EYE ON CHIEF FARC NEGOTIATOR CANO, WHO'S TOO MODERATE TO 
HAVE THE FULL CONFIDENCE OF HIS FELLOW SECRETARIAT MEMBERS 
AND THE PCC.  WHEN AFTER THE CARACAS TALKS CANO WAS 
VILIFIED AND TEMPORARILY YANKED AS THE FARC NEGOTIATOR FOR 
BEING TOO SOFT, MARQUEZ WAS NAMED TO HEAD THE NEW HARDLINE 
FARC DELEGATION. 
 
¶42.  MARQUEZ' AMBITIONS ARE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY; HE 
WANTS TO BE THE NEXT ANTONIO NAVARRO WOLFF, NOT REPLACE 
TIROFIJO.  IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT HE VIEWS CANO 
(RATHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, TIMOLEON JIMENEZ) AS HIS RIVAL, 
EVEN IF THEY MAY BE IN IDEOLOGICAL ACCORD. 
 
¶43.  MARQUEZ, WHO RECENTLY TOLD AKERMAN HE RECEIVED 
TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION,  REPORTEDLY HARBORS DEEP 
HATRED FOR COLOMBIA'S SECURITY FORCES, WHO TORTURED AND 
KILLED A NON-GUERRILLA BROTHER OF HIS IN CAQUETA. 
 
 
CONCLUSION:  NONE OF THE DWARFS CAN REPLACE SNOW WHITE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶44.  DURING HIS LATE JUNE TRIP TO TLAXCALA, MEXICO, 
AKERMAN FOR THE FIRST TIME HEARD FARC GUERRILLAS TALKING 
ABOUT SUCCESSION TO MARULANDA.  OVER A MEAL, FARC 
NEGOTIATORS PABLO CATATUMBO AND TOMAS LINCE -- BOTH CANO 
SUPPORTERS -- SAID THE PERSON MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED 
MARULANDA WAS TIMOLEON JIMENEZ.  JIMENEZ WAS SAID TO ENJOY 
THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING MARULANDA'S MOST TRUSTED 
CONFIDANT, AND OF HAVING THE SUPPORT OF JORGE BRICENO 
SUAREZ ("MONO JOJOY"), HEAD OF THE ESTADO MAYOR DEL BLOQUE 
ORIENTAL (EMBO), THE FIVE FARC FRONTS WHOSE PRINCIPAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IS TO PROTECT THE FARC GENERAL SECRETARIAT. 
 
¶45.  CATATUMBO AND LINCE NAMED MONO JOJOY AS THE SECOND 
MOST LIKELY TO REPLACE MARULANDA (AFTER JIMENEZ).  MONO 
JOJOY REPORTEDLY IS THE SECRETARIAT'S FIRST ALTERNATE, 
MEANING HE'S NEXT IN LINE TO ASCEND TO THE FIVE-MEMBER 
BODY.  JIMENEZ AND MONO JOJOY ARE THE FARC'S SECOND AND 
THIRD RANKING MILITARY LEADERS BEHIND MARULANDA.  THE 
FARC'S ESTADO MAYOR (SECOND-TIER LEADERSHIP BODY) AND 
CAMPESINO RANK AND FILE APPEAR TO HAVE A BIAS IN FAVOR OF 
CAMPESINO/MILITARY LEADERS OVER INTELLECTUAL/POLITICAL 
ONES (LIKE CANO AND REYES). 
 
¶46.  THERE IS A MARKED DIFFERENCE IN STATUTE INSIDE THE 
FARC, HOWEVER, BETWEEN MARULANDA AND THE OTHER FOUR 
SECRETARIAT MEMBERS.  AKERMAN HAS REFERRED TO THE 
SECRETARIAT AS "SNOW WHITE AND THE FOUR DWARFS" TO 
ILLUSTRATE THAT DIFFERENCE. 
 
¶47.  THE FARC FACES A LONG-TERM PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION FOR 
WHICH THERE APPEARS TO BE NO SOLUTION.  MARULANDA, AS 
RESPECTED AS HE IS INSIDE THE FARC, IS INCAPABLE OF FULLY 
REPLACING ARENAS, WHO WAS A MILITARY, POLITICAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL GIANT.  THERE IS NO ONE, HOWEVER, TO REPLACE 
MARULANDA.  CANO OR REYES, AS INTELLECTUALS IN A CAMPESINO 
ARMY, NEVER WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE RANK AND FILE. 
JIMENEZ, WHILE CUT FROM THE SAME MOLD AS MARULANDA, LACKS 
TIROFIJO'S SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE.  IT IS THE HISTORICAL 
FIGURE OF MARULANDA THAT HAS HELD THE FARC TOGETHER SINCE 
ARENAS' DEATH.  IN AN ARMY WITH ONE GENERAL AND SEVERAL 
COLONELS, THE COLONELS WILL PROBABLY GO THEIR SEPARATE 
WAYS ONCE THE GENERAL HAS DEPARTED THE SCENE. 
 
 
BUSBY