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Viewing cable 92RANGOON2310, NEW BURMESE LEADERSHIP PROMISES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
92RANGOON2310 1992-04-25 07:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rangoon
O 250742Z APR 92
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0239
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8224
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
HQSDEA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 02310 
 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/TB, HA, INR/B AND INM/AMB BORG 
CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA WILKINSON 
USIA FOR EA AND BVF 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BM
SUBJECT:  NEW BURMESE LEADERSHIP PROMISES 
          POLITICAL PROGRESS 
 
REFS: (A) RANGOON 2308, 
-     (B) FBIS BANGKOK 241348Z APR 92 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
- 
2.  SUMMARY:  ON APRIL 24, BURMA'S RULING MILITARY 
COUNCIL ISSUED ITS MOST DRAMATIC POLITICAL STATEMENT 
IN MORE THAN A YEAR.  IT PLEDGED TO RELEASE AN 
UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF POLITICAL DETAINEES "PROMPTLY", 
TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH OPPOSITION POLITICIANS WITHIN 
TWO MONTHS, AND TO CONVENE A "NATIONAL CONVENTION" SIX 
MONTHS LATER.  THE ANNOUNCEMENT BREAKS SIGNIFICANT NEW 
GROUND BY ACKNOWLEDGING THE EXISTENCE OF POLITICAL 
PRISONERS AND BY SETTING TIME FRAMES FOR INITIAL MOVES 
TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL RULE.  COMING ONE DAY AFTER 
GENERAL THAN SHWE REPLACED SAW MAUNG AS HEAD OF STATE, 
IT REINFORCES EARLIER SPECULATION THAT THE FORMER 
LEADER MAY HAVE BEEN THE PRINCIPAL ROADBLOCK TO 
ADOPTION OF A MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACH ON POLITICAL AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. 
 
3.  NEVERTHELESS, THE MILITARY RETAINS TIGHT CONTROL 
AND IS STILL FOLLOWING THE BASIC SCENARIO OUTLINED IN 
ITS DECLARATION 1/90, A COMPLEX MULTI-STAGED PROCESS 
UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT BEFORE 1994 
AT THE EARLIEST.  AS THE PLEDGE TO RELEASE POLITICAL 
DETAINEES CONTAINS A GAPING LOOPHOLE -- THE EXCLUSION 
OF THOSE WHO "ENDANGER STATE SECURITY" -- IT IS ALSO 
UNCLEAR WHETHER AUNG SAN SUU KYI OR ANY OTHER MAJOR 
OPPOSITION FIGURES WILL BE FREED.  STILL, IT IS A 
LONG-AWAITED STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND HAS BEEN 
GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED BY BURMESE OF ALL STRIPES.  WE 
THUS RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDER ISSUING A 
CAREFULLY NUANCED STATEMENT CHARACTERIZING THE BURMESE 
ANNOUNCEMENT AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND STRESSING 
THAT WE WILL BE WATCHING ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND 
BROADENING WITH KEEN INTEREST.  (SEE PARA 11.)  END 
SUMMARY. 
- 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
UNEXPECTED ANNOUNCEMENT REVIVES BURMESE POLITICAL HOPES 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4.  ON APRIL 24, ONE DAY AFTER GENERAL THAN SHWE 
REPLACED SAW MAUNG AS CHIEF OF STATE (REF A), BURMA'S 
RULING STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) 
MADE A SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT.  IT PLEDGED: 
 
-- TO RELEASE AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF POLITICAL 
DETAINEES "PROMPTLY"; 
 
-- TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH ELECTED PARLIAMENTARIANS 
AND THE REMAINING POLITICAL PARTIES WITHIN TWO MONTHS; 
AND 
 
-- TO CONVENE A "NATIONAL CONVENTION" SIX MONTHS 
LATER. 
 
THE ANNOUNCEMENT, SIGNED BY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND 
SLORC SECRETARY-1 KHIN NYUNT, HAD THE INSTANT EFFECT 
OF REVIVING POLITICAL HOPES AMONG THE BURMESE POPULACE 
AND RAISING EXPECTATIONS THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD A 
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS FINALLY IN THE REALM OF THE 
POSSIBLE. 
 
5.  OUR OWN INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND THAT OF SEVERAL 
SOLID BURMESE SOURCES IS THAT THIS REPRESENTS A 
SIGNIFICANT BREAK WITH THE PAST.  THE MOST STRIKING 
ASPECT OF THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT IS ITS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT BURMA HAS DETAINED PEOPLE FOR 
POLITICAL REASONS, A 180-DEGREE REVERSAL FROM PREVIOUS 
ASSERTIONS THAT ALL DETAINEES HAD "VIOLATED EXISTING 
LAW."  HOWEVER, HOW THE GOB WILL IMPLEMENT ITS 
COMMITMENT TO RELEASE THESE PEOPLE REMAINS AN OPEN 
QUESTION:  THE ANNOUNCEMENT CONTAINS A LOOPHOLE IN 
EXCLUDING THOSE WHO "ENDANGER STATE SECURITY" AND DOES 
NOT MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER THE RELEASES WILL INCLUDE 
PERSONS ALREADY CONVICTED OF "CRIMINAL" OFFENSES -- AS 
OPPOSED TO THOSE MERELY "ARRESTED AND DETAINED" FOR 
POLITICAL REASONS. 
 
6.  IN AN OPTIMISTIC VEIN, ONE FORMER POLITICIAN 
SPECULATED TO US THAT THE "SECURITY" EXCLUSION IS 
LARGELY A FACE-SAVING PHRASE AND THAT UP TO 90 PERCENT 
OF POLITICAL PRISONERS COULD BE ON THE STREETS 
SHORTLY.  HOWEVER, A MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS ASSESSMENT WAS 
PROVIDED BY TWO SEASONED BURMESE JOURNALISTS (PROTECT) 
WHO DO NOT EXPECT THE IMMINENT RELEASE OF AUNG SAN SUU 
KYI OR ANY OTHER ACTIVE OPPOSITION FIGURES LIKE NLD 
LEADERS KYI MAUNG AND FORMER GENERAL TIN 00.  MOST 
SOURCES AGREE THAT THE AUTHORITIES WILL PROBABLY LIFT 
THE HOUSE ARREST OF U NU, SINCE THE ELDERLY AND 
ENFEEBLED FORMER PRIME MINISTER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED 
OF ANY CRIME AND HARDLY REPRESENTS A SECURITY THREAT 
AT THIS POINT. 
 
------------------------------------- 
POLITICAL "DIALOGUE" FINALLY IN SIGHT 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  THE COMMITMENTS TO MEET WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AND 
TO CONVENE A NATIONAL CONVENTION ARE NOT NEW, AND MUST 
BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SLORC'S "DECLARATION 
1/90" -- A CONVOLUTED ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVELY NEGATING 
THE RESULTS OF THE 1990 ELECTIONS.  ACCORDING TO THAT 
DECLARATION, THE SOLE FUNCTION OF THE NATIONAL 
CONVENTION WILL BE TO DRAFT A CONSTITUTION WHICH WILL 
STILL BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY SLORC AND POSSIBLY A 
NATIONAL REFERENDUM.  ONLY AFTER ADOPTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION WOULD NEW ELECTIONS BE HELD AND POWER 
TRANSFERRED TO A (LIKELY COSMETIC) CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
8.  NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE GOB HAS 
PROVIDED ANY TIME FRAME FOR EVEN THESE INITIAL STEPS 
TOWARD DRAFTING A CONSTITUTION.  IN FACT, FORMER 
CHIEF OF STATE SAW MAUNG EXPLICITLY TOLD OUR CHARGE IN 
JANUARY THAT THERE IS "NO TIME FRAME" FOR MOVES TOWARD 
CONSTITUTIONAL RULE.  INTELLIGENCE CHIEF KHIN NYUNT 
AND OTHERS HAD ALSO INDICATED EARLIER THAT THE 
POLITICAL PARTIES THEMSELVES WOULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE 
THE INITIATIVE FOR CONVENING A NATIONAL CONVENTION -- 
AN INVITATION TO "SUICIDE" GIVEN THE GOB PENCHANT FOR 
PICKING OFF THOSE WHO SHOW POLITICAL INITIATIVE.  NOW, 
THE GOVERNMENT HAS PLEDGED TO START TALKS WITHIN TWO 
MONTHS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE "POLITICAL PARTIES 
EXISTING LAWFULLY" AND "INDIVIDUAL" MP'S.  HOW THEY 
WILL IMPLEMENT THIS AND WHETHER POLITICIANS WILL BE 
FREE TO TAKE INDEPENDENT POSITIONS REMAINS TO BE 
SEEN. 
 
-------------------------------- 
BUT PARTICIPATION MAY BE LIMITED 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  BASED ON THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S STATEMENT, THE GOB NOW 
APPEARS WILLING TO SIT DOWN WITH SOME BUT NOT ALL OF 
THOSE ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN THE MAY 1990 
ELECTIONS:  ACCORDING TO THE LATEST OFFICIAL 
ANNOUNCEMENTS, 98 OF THE 485 ELECTED MP'S HAVE EITHER 
BEEN DISQUALIFIED (68), RESIGNED (12), OR DIED (8) 
OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.  AN ADDITIONAL 20 OR SO ARE 
BELIEVED TO BE IN DETENTION, EITHER CONVICTED OR 
AWAITING TRIAL BUT NOT YET FORMALLY DEREGISTERED BY 
THE ELECTIONS COMMISSION.  OF THE ORIGINAL 235 PARTIES 
FORMED IN 1989 AND THE 93 THAT CONTESTED THE 1990 
ELECTIONS, ONLY TEN REMAIN LEGAL.  AMONG THESE ARE THE 
NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD), THE SHAN NLD, AND 
THE PROGOVERNMENT NATIONAL UNITY PARTY, WHICH TOGETHER 
ACCOUNTED FOR 423 OF THE ORIGINAL PARLIAMENTARIANS. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S REFERENCE TO "INDIVIDUAL" MPS 
APPARENTLY INCLUDES TWO GROUPS:  THOSE ELECTED FROM 
PARTIES WHICH HAVE SINCE BEEN ABOLISHED, AND A HANDFUL 
OF NLD MPS WHO HAVE EITHER RESIGNED OR BEEN EXPELLED 
FROM THE PARTY. 
-------------------------- 
COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION 
-------------------------- 
 
10.  THOUGH THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES AND CAVEATS 
IN THE SLORC'S SHORT STATEMENT, IT SEEMINGLY 
REPRESENTS THE FIRST PROMISE OF A BREAK-UP OF BURMA'S 
POLITICAL LOGJAM.  WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON THE 
FACTORS LEADING UP TO THIS ANNOUNCEMENT BUT IT NOW 
APPEARS SAW MAUNG -- DESPITE HIS LACK OF DAY-TO-DAY 
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS 
-- MAY HAVE BEEN THE KEY IMPEDIMENT TO ANY POLITICAL 
OPENING.  WHATEVER THE CASE, HIS DEPARTURE HAS 
PROVIDED A CONVENIENT EXCUSE FOR THAN SHWE, PRESUMABLY 
ACTING ON THE ADVICE OF KHIN NYUNT (AND POSSIBLY NE 
WIN) TO MOVE FORWARD -- AT LEAST ON PAPER.  WHILE 
DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS WERE PROBABLY KEY, WE ALSO 
ASSUME THAT MOUNTING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE -- 
INCLUDING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
SOME QUIET ENCOURAGEMENT FROM CHINA -- MAY HAVE PUSHED 
THE MILITARY IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
 
11.  WHILE ANY U.S. REACTION SHOULD UNDERSCORE THE 
NEED FOR DEEDS RATHER THAN MERE WORDS, EMBASSY 
BELIEVES IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR DEPARTMENT TO 
NOTE THE LATEST GOB COMMITMENTS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD 
GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
RULE.  ALONG THESE LINES, A NUANCED STATEMENT SHOULD 
STRESS THAT WE WILL BE OBSERVING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
(AND BROADENING) OF THIS PROGRAM WITH GREAT INTEREST. 
 
 
HUDDLE