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Viewing cable 92PHNOMPENH664, CAMBODIA: MEETING WITH HOR NAMHONG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
92PHNOMPENH664 1992-03-28 06:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
O 280652Z MAR 92
FM USMISSION PHNOM PENH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0943
INFO USMISSION NEW YORK 0178
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PHNOM PENH 0664 
 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS BEIJING, JAKARTA, TOKYO, SINGAPORE, PARIS, 
LONDON, MOSCOW, CANBERRA, KUALA LUMPUR 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL OADR 
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: MEETING WITH HOR NAMHONG 
 
1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
2.  SOLOMON, PIAK, AND GRIFFITHS THANKED SDC SNC MEMBER HOR 
NAMHONG FOR SOC COOPERATION OF THE POW/MIA ISSUE.  SOLOMON 
STRESSED TO HOR NAMHONG THE NEED FOR ALL THE FACTIONS TO ABIDE 
BY THE COMMITMENTS IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT TO ENSURE THE KHMER 
ROUGE HAD NO EXCUSES FOR NOT COOPERATING THEMSELVES.  SOLOMON 
EMPHASIZED THAT POLITICAL RIGHTS MUST BE RESPECTED AND THERE 
MUST BE AN END TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE.  SIV REINFORCES THIS 
POINT, UNDERLINING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS EXTEND BEYOND POLITICAL 
PRISONERS ISSUES TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, AMONG OTHERS.  HOR NAMHONG LISTED 
SOC CONCERNS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION AND PLEDGING FULL COOPERATION 
BY THE SOC.  HOWEVER, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HUMAN RIGHTS 
COULD BE "OVER-USED," RESULTING IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE.  WHILE 
SOLOMON PRESSED FOR 100 PERCENT DEMOBILIZATION OF FACTIONAL 
FORCES, HOR NAMHONG SUGGESTED REVISITING THE QUESTION AFTER 10 
PERCENT DEMOBILIZATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  A/S SOLOMON HELD A ONE-HOUR MEETING WITH SOC SNC MEMBER AND 
FOREIGN MINISTER HOR NAMHONG MARCH 9 IN PHNOM PENH.  DR. 
SOLOMON'S DELEGATION INCLUDED COM TWINING, WHITE SHOUSE SPECIAL 
ASSISTANT SICHAN SIV, DOD DAS ALAN PTAK, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF 
FAMILIES PRESIDENT ANNE MILLS GRIFFTHS, EAP/VLC DIRECTOR CHRIS 
LA FLEUR, AND OTHERS. 
 
4.  HOR NAMHONG THANKED DR. SOLOMON FOR THE VISIT AND 
ESPECIALLY FOR THE LIFTING OF THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST 
CAMBODIA.  RECALLING THE MEETING HE HAD HELD WITH DAS QUINN IN 
WASHINGTON, HE PROMISED THAT THE SOC WOULD CONTINUE FULL 
COOPERATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE, WHICH HE SAID THE SOC SEES AS 
A PURELY HUMANITARIAN QUESTION. 
 
GOC CONCERNS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCORD 
------ ------------ --------------- ------- 
 
5.  HOR NAMHONG PLEDGED FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS PEACE 
AGREEMENT BY THE SOC.  HE THEN ENUMERATED SOC CONCERNS.  FIRST, 
HE SAID THE 70 PERSENT DEMOBILIZATION OF FACTIONAL FORCES MUST 
BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE THE RAINY SEASON BOGS DOWN TRANSPORTATION 
IN THE COUNTRY.  SECOND, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOMETHING BE 
DONE TO FIND WORK FOR THE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIRES.  IF THEY WERE 
LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES, THEY MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED IN 
"MISCONDUCT."  THIRD, ON REPATRIATION, HOR NAMHONG CITED THE 
INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF DEMINED LAND FOR THE RETURNEES.  HE 
WORRIED THAT DELAY OF THE RETURN OF PEOPLE FROM THE BORDER 
COULD PROLONG THE TRANSITION PERIOD, WITH BAD CONSEQUENCES FOR 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORD.  FOURTH, THE SOC SNC MEMBER 
CITED POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH CORRUPTION AND VOTE BUYING IN THE 
ELECTIONS. 
 
"MUST NOT SEE AND OVER-USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS" 
-------- --------------- ---------- ------- 
 
6.  FIFTH, HOR NAMHONG ASSERTED THAT, WHILE ALL SIDES HAD 
COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO IMPLEMENTING PLURALISM AND LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY AND FREEING ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AT THE JANUARY 14 
SNC MEETING, ONLY THE SOC HAD DONE SO.  HOR NAMHONG WORRIED 
THAT, "FREEDOMS WILL BE EXPLOITED FOR POLITICAL REASONS.... WE 
MUST NOT SEE AN OVER-USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS." 
 
7.  THE SOC SNC MEMBER ALSO SAID IT REMAINED UNCLEAR THAT THE 
KR WILL VOLUNTARILY ABIDE BY THE ACCORDS.  HE POINTED TO THE 
SHOOTING OF THE UN HELICOPTER AND CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS IN 
KOMPONG THOM AS EVIDENCE THE KR MAY NOT COOPERATE.  FURTHER, 
HOR NAMHONG SPECULATED THE KR MIGHT NOT RESPECT THE RESULTS OF 
FUTURE ELECTIONS.  HE ARGUED, "FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
ACCORD WILL NOT MEAN THE END OF THE KR THREAT."  HE AVERRED 
THAT KR STRATEGY IS NOT TO WIN ELECTIONS NOW, BUT TO STRENGTHEN 
THEIR POSITION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR THE FUTURE. 
 
U.S. GRATITUDE ON POW.MIA ISSUE 
------------- ----------------- 
 
8.  A/S SOLOMON, RESPONDED BY THANKING HOR NAMHONG ESPECIALLY 
FOR THE COOPERATION THE U.S. HAS RECEIVED ON POW/MIA.  DAS PTAK 
AND MRS. GRIFFITHS ALSO EXPRESED GRATITUDE FOR SUPPORT ON 
POW/MIA, ESPECIALL PERMITTING THE USE OF HELICOPTERS IN 
CAMBODIA.  DR. SOLOMON CITED PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECH IN JANUARY 
IN SINGAPORE AND THE COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT BUSH TO MOVE 
TOWARD NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH ALL THE NATIONS OF INDOCHINA 
AS PROGRESS IS MADE ON POW/MIA.  THE MEETINGS IN HANOI, WITH 
THE AGREEMENT ON THE FIVE-POINT PLAN, IF IMPLEMENTED SINCERELY, 
WILL ADVANCE U.S. NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES 
OF INDOCHINA.  THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH LIFED THE U.S. 
EMBARGO ON CAMBODIA IS A SIGN OF U.S. SINCERITY, AS IS THE U.S. 
INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS 
PEACE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING FUNDING WHICH MAY REACH AS MUCH AS 
USD 600 MILLION FOR THE U.S. 
 
NEED FOR 100 PERCENT DEMOBILIZATION, RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
---------- --------- ------------ ----------- ------- ------ 
 
9.  DR. SOLOMON STRONGLY PRESSED FOR 100 PERCENT DEMOBILIZATION 
OF FACTIONAL FORCES.  THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE GREATEST SECURITY 
FOR CAMBODIA SINCE THE REMANANTS OF THE FACTIONS' ARMIES COULD 
RETURN TO FIGHTING.  PRINCE SIHANOUK AGREES WITH THIS APPROACH, 
HE SAID.  ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DR. SOLOMON STRESSED THAT, FOR 
CAMBODIA TO OVERCOME THE BURDEN OF ITS TRAGIC PAST, IT WOULD BE 
HARD TO OVER-EMPHASIZE HUMAN RIGHTS.  HE TOOK EXCEPTION WITH 
THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONCERN THAT HUMAN RIGHTS MIGHT SOMEHOW 
BE "OVERDONE."  HE STRESSED THAT THE UN WOULD HAVE THE 
AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA EVEN 
AFTER UNTAC HAD LEFT.  THIS WOULD BE IMPORTANT. 
 
CONCERN OVER KR NON-COOPERATION, MUST NOT GIVE KR EXCUSES 
------ ----------- ------------- ----------- ------------ 
 
10.  DR. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. CONSIDERS THE RESISTANCE OF THE 
KR TO COOPERATE WITH THE PEACE AGREEMENT A MATTER OF SERIOUS 
CONCERN.  THE KR HAVE SOUGHT ALL MEANS TO KEEP THE UN OUT OF 
ITS ZONE.  THE KR COMPLAINS THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE STILL 
PRESENT AND THAT, THEREFORE, THEY MUST CONTINUE TO FIGHT.  THE 
U.S. CANNOT JUDGE WHETHER SOME VIETNAMESE TROOPS REMAIN IN 
CAMBODIA, SOLOMON SAID.  IT IS UP TO UNTAC TO VERIFY THE 
WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.  SOLOMON CONCLUDED THAT THE POINT 
IS THAT, "ALL OTHER FACTIONS MUST ABIDE BY THE PEACE PLAN SO 
THE KR HAS NO EXCUSES FOR NON-COOPERATION."  THIS WOULD 
STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S HAND IN BRINGING 
PRESSURE ON THE KR.  THE SOC SHOULD FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THE 
RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS.  THIS WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON 
THE KR, WHO HAVE THUS FAR RELEASED NONE.  THE SOC AND OTHER 
FACTIONS SHOULD ALSO COOPERATE COMPLETELY WITH UNAMIC/UNTAC AND 
SHULD REFRAIN FROM ANY MILITARY OPEATION OR MOVEMENTS WHICH 
VIOLATE THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT.  THE FACTIONS MUST PROVIDE 
FULL ACCESS FOR THE UN TO THEIR ZONES. 
 
11.  SOLOMON SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL PLUARLISM IS 
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE IN 
DEALING WITH THE KR.  THE U.S. IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA, ESPECIALLY THE ASSASSINATION OF TEA BUN 
LONG, THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF OPPOSITION FIGURE DUNG 
PHAN, AND THE ATTACK ON KHIEU SAMPHAN.  THE ANGER OF PEOPLE AND 
DESIRE FOR REVENGE AGAINST THE KR IS UNDERSTANDABLE.  HE 
REMINDED HOR NAMHONG OF SECRETARY BAKER'S STATEMENT IN PARIS 
THAT THE U.S. WOULD FAVOR EFFORTS TO BRING THOSE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE GENOCIDAL POLICIES OF POL POT TO JUSTICE. 
NEVERTHELESS, ALL PARTIES MUST CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT OR 
THERE WOULD BE UNENDING VIOLENCE,  DR. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. IS 
AWARE THAT SOME IN THE SOC REGIME ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT NEW 
POLITICAL PARTIES BEING FOUNDED.  BUT POLITICAL OPENNESS IS 
ESSENTIAL TO FIGHTING THE KR.  MOREOVER, IN THE U.S. THERE ARE 
MANY PEOPLE BORN IN CAMBODIA WHO WOULD LIKE TO CONTRIBUTE 
TOWARD CAMBODIA'S DEVELOPMENT.  THEY MUST FEEL SECURE OR THEY 
WILL NOT BE WILLING TO RETURN AND PARTICIPATE. 
 
 
FACTIONS MUST SHOW SETTLEMENT WORKING TO MAINTAIN U.S. SUPPORT 
--------- ----------- ------------ -------------- ------------ 
 
12.  A/S SOLOMON WARNED THAT IF THE UN SETTLEMENT IS NOT SEEN 
TO BE WORKING, SOME IN THE U.S. SHOULD PAY HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS 
OF DOLLARS FOR THE PEACE PLAN.  WHEN SOC PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN 
TRAVELS TO WASHINGTON, HE WILL FACE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FULL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS. 
 
13.  HOR NAMHONG RESPONDED TO A.S SOLOMON'S POINTS BY SAYING WE 
MUST NOW WORK TO ACHIEVE 70 PERCENT DEMOBILIZATION FIRST AND 
PLEDGED THAT THE SOC WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL IT HAD RELEASED ALL 
POLITICAL PRISONERS.  THERE WILL BE ANOTHER RELEASE ON MARCH 
23-24 OF PRISONERS FROM ODDAR MEANCHEY PROVINCE.  WHEN THE 
PRINCE TRAVELS TO KOMPONG SOM, ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS HELD 
HERE WILL ALSO BE RELEASED.  FINALLY, HE PROMISED THE SOC 
AUTHORITIES WOULD INVESTIGATE THEIR OWN SYSTEM TO ENSURE THERE 
ARE NO MORE POLITICAL PRISONERS HELD.  HOR NAMHONG WENT FURTHER 
TO SAY THAT "WE ARE INTERVENING WITH THE INTERIOR MINISTRY' TO 
IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR ALL OTHER PRISONERS.  THE SOC HAS ASKED 
ICRC FOR HELP WITH MEDICINES AND FOOD TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS IN 
THE PRISONS. 
 
14.  THE SOC FOREIGN MINISTER PLEDGED THE SOC WOULD FULLY 
COOPERATE WITH UNAMIC AND UNTAC ON MILITARY MATTERS.  HE SAID 
THE SOC HAS NO NEED TO ENLARGE ITS ZONES AND SAID KARIM HAD 
EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH SOC COOPERATION 
MILITARILY.  THE SOC HAS FOUGHT BACK ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE.  HE 
CONCLUDED THAT, FOR CAMBODIA, "THERE IS NO CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT 
THE PARIS AGREEMENT.  WE SEE IT AS THE BEST CHOICE TO END THE 
WAR." 
 
HOR NAMHONG WORRIES FREEDOM WILL BE USED FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
---------- ---------- ------------ ----------- -------- ------ 
 
15.  REGARDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE, HOR NAMHONG SAID THIS WAS 
WHAT HE MEANT WHEN HE SAID "OVER-USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS."  HE 
SAID, "IT IS EASY TO USE VIOLENCE AND THEN ACCUSE THE PHNOM 
PENH GOVERNMENT."  IT WAS OTHERS WHO PROFIT FROM THESE CRIMES, 
HE ALLEGED.  HE SAID THE VIOLENCE DOES NOT AFFECT JUST PEOPLE 
LIKE TEA RUN LONG AND DUNG PHAN.  HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN 
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINSTG BOTH HIM AND HUN SEN AND THAT 
THERE HAD BEEN AN ATTACK ON HIS SON.  HOR NAMHONG CONCLUDED, 
"WE NEED TO DIVIDE THE POLITICIANS FROM THOSE WHO WOULD USE 
FORCE."  WHILE THERE WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULTIES, WE MUST BE 
PATIENT, HE SAID. 
 
16.  SICHAN SIV INTERJECTED TO SUPPORT A/S SOLOMON'S POINTS. 
HUMAN RIGHTS IS ONE OF THE AREAS FOR WHICH HE IS RESPONSIBILE 
IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND IS A CORNERSTONE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
SIV EMPHASIZED THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS GOES WELL BEYOND 
SIMPLY FREEING POLITICAL PRISONERS.  IT INCLUDES FREEDOMS OF 
PRESS, RELIGION, AND ASSOCIATION, AMONG OTHERS. 
 
17.  HOR NAMHONG RESPONDED THAT,  "WE HAVE THE SAME 
UNDERSTANDING (OF HUMAN RIGHTS), THAT IT IS NOT JUST RELEASING 
PRISONERS."  HE CITED THE SIDE RANGE OF AGREEMENTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AT THE JANUARY 14 MEETING IN PHNOM PENH AND THE 
PROTECTIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REVISED SOC CONSTITUTION. 
"WE ASK OTHERS TO IMPLEMENT THESE RIGHTS 100 PERCENT." 
JOURNALIST WHO CAN TRAVEL IN THE GOC-CONTROLLED AREAS MUST ALSO 
BE ABLE TO PASS THROUGH THE OTHER ZONES, FOR INSTANCE. 
 
SOLOMON WARNS CORRUPTION COULD PLAY INTO HANDS OF KR 
-------------- -------------- ---------- ----------- 
 
18.  SOLOMON CONCLUDED BY SAYING THE U.S. HOPES THE SOC WILL 
GET CONTROL OF THE CORRUPTION.  CORRUPTION AMONG SOC OFFICIALS 
"WILL ERECT A BARRIER AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE KR."  NOR 
NAMHONG EXPRESSED HIS AGREEMENT AND SAID THE SOC HAS TAKEN 
MEASURES AGAINST CORRUPTION, INCLUDING DISMISSING SOME 
MINISTERS.  HOR NAMHONG SAID HE HAD PROPOSED THAT THE MINISTERS 
BE SENTENCED PUBLICLY. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
19.  THE MEETING PROVIDED A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR GIVE AND TAKE 
ON THE ISSUES AND FOR THE U.S. TO STRESS THE NEED TO RESPECT 
THE ACCORDS TO ENSURE THE KR HAS NO EXCUSES FOR 
NON-COOPERATION.  IT IS CLEAR THE SOC IS NOW OPPOSED TO MOVING 
TO 100 PERCENT DEMOBILIZATION.  THE MOST WORRISOME COMMENT BY 
THE SOC FOREIGN MINISTER WAS HIS CONCERN THAT HUMAN RIGHTS 
WOULD BE USED AS PRETEXT FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE.  END COMMENT. 
 
20.  A/S SOLOMON CLEARED THIS MESSAGE. 
 
 
TWINING