R 161427Z MAY 91
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1271
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL KADUNA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAA/POLAD/ECJ2//
USDAO ABIDJAN IV
USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 04184 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RA, AF/WF, AND NEA/AFN 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PREL PINS PTER LY NG
SUBJECT:  COUNTERING LIBYAN INFLUENCE IN NIGER 
 
REF:  A.  STATE 146918 (NOTAL) 
-     B.  STATE 150492 (NOTAL) 
-     C.  BAMAKO 003325 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1.  SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2.  DESPITE NUMEROUS EFFORTS OVER THE YEARS BY THIS 
EMBASSY TO COUNTER QADDHAFI'S INFLUENCE IN NIGER, 
THE LIBYAN PRESENCE HAS STEADILY GROWN.  THE SAIBOU 
REGIME CLINGS DESPERATELY TO ITS "GOOD-NEIGHBOR" 
POLICY, AND FEARS ANTAGONIZING QADDHAFI.  ALSO THE 
NIGERIENS PERCEIVE TANGIBLE BENEFITS FROM THE LIBYAN 
PRESENCE--AND NO NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES.  THEY CANNOT 
FIND A LIBYAN HAND IN LOCAL DISTURBANCES 
 
¶3.  TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL APPROACH ON LIBYA, WE 
SHOULD LAY DOWN MARKERS WITH THE NEXT GOVERNMENT AND 
THE OTHER NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN NIGER, 
INCLUDING PARTIES AND UNIONS, ABOUT LIBYAN 
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA.  BRIEFERS SHOULD 
SPEND MORE TIME ON CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF LIBYAN 
SUBVERSION IN AND THROUGH AFRICAN STATES, THAN ON 
MARGINAL ISSUES IN NIGER SUCH AS CW AND PALESTINIAN 
TERRORISM.  END SUMMARY 
 
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LIBYAN INFLUENCE GROWS DESPITE US DEMARCHES 
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¶4.  COUNTERING LIBYAN INFLUENCE IN NIGER HAS BEEN 
AMONG THIS EMBASSY'S HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR YEARS. 
WHILE WE HAVE READY ACCESS TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT, AND HAVE MADE INNUMERABLE DEMARCHES ON 
LIBYA, BOTH GENERAL AND SPECIFIC, WE HAVE NOT BEEN 
ABLE TO ARREST THE INEXORABLE GROWTH OF THE LIBYAN 
PRESENCE IN THIS COUNTRY. 
 
¶5.  TWO FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO LIBYA'S 
SUCCESS.  FIRST, THE SAIBOU GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN MORE 
INCLINED THAN ITS PREDECESSOR TO PURSUE A 
"GOOD-NEIGHBOR" POLICY TOWARDS QADDHAFI.  THE 
REGIME'S REASONING IS THAT IT GAINS NOTHING BY 
ANTAGONIZING LIBYA, EXCEPT FOR A GREATER CERTITUDE 
THAT IT WILL ACT AGAINST NIGERIEN INTERESTS.  WITH 
QADDHAFI NEXT DOOR, AND A COMPLETELY OPEN EXPANSE OF 
DESERT FOR A BORDER, LIBYAN "DIRTY TRICKS" IN NIGER 
WOULD BE MERE CHILD'S PLAY. 
 
¶6.  SECOND, THE EXPANDED LIBYAN PRESENCE IN NIGER 
HAS NOT YET HAD ANY CONCRETE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES, 
AND IN FACT HAS PRODUCED A NUMBER OF POSITIVE ONES 
FROM THE NIGERIEN PERSPECTIVE.  FIRST, THE NIGERIENS 
OBSERVE MORE LIBYAN COMMERCIAL UNDERTAKINGS IN THEIR 
COUNTRY, WHICH THEY EQUATE WITH INCOME FOR NIGER, OR 
AT LEAST FOR SOME NIGERIENS. 
 
¶7.  THEY ALSO SEE LIBYAN ASSISTANCE FROM TIME TO 
TIME, WHICH, ALTHOUGH NOT MUCH, IS MORE THAN THEY 
GET FROM ANY OTHER MAGHREB STATE, AS ONE NIGERIEN 
OPPOSITION PARTY OFFICIAL HAS POINTED OUT. 
MOREOVER, THE SPREAD OF LIBYAN INFLUENCE IS ALMOST 
CERTAINLY NOT WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL BENEFIT 
FOR A NUMBER OF NIGERIEN INDIVIDUALS, THAT PERHAPS 
DOES NOT SHOW UP ON THEIR GROSS INCOME STATEMENTS. 
 
¶8.  FINALLY, DESPITE THE UNQUESTIONED PRESENCE OF 
NIGERIEN DISSIDENTS IN LIBYA OVER THE PAST TEN 
YEARS, ESPECIALLY AMONG TUAREGS, THE GON HAS BEEN 
UNABLE TO COME UP WITH ANY RECENT EVIDENCE OF DIRECT 
LIBYAN ASSISTANCE TO AY DISSIDENT GROUPS IN NIGER. 
 
¶9.  IN OUR VIEW, AS LONG AS THE NIGERIENS LACK 
CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF UNSAVORY LIBYAN ACTIVITIES 
WITHIN THEIR BORDERS, AND AS LONG AS THE LIBYANS 
CONTINUE TO ADD TO THE NATIONAL WEALTH, IT WILL BE 
DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE GON TO CLAMP DOWM ON THE 
LIBYAN PRESENCE.  MOREOVER, WE CANNOT COUNT ON THE 
PROLIFERATION OF PARTIES AND AN EVENTUAL CHANGE IN 
REGIME TO CREATE A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD LIBYA, SINCE 
QADDHAFI IS LIKELY TO BUY INTO RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
THE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES AND POWER CENTERS, IF HE 
HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO.  WE HAVE VERY LIMITED MEANS 
OF COUNTERING THAT KIND OF EFFORT. 
 
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NEED TO LAY DOWN MARKERS WITH GON, PARTIES, UNIONS 
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¶10.  THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH WE CAN TAKE TO 
MINIMIZE LIBYAN INFLUENCE IN NIGER IS TO CONTINUE TO 
LAY DOWN MARKERS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT AND NOW WITH OTHER POLITICAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (PARTIES, UNIONS, ETC.) ABOUT LIBYA'S 
DESTRUCTIVE POLICIES IN AFRICA.  WE SHOULD PROVIDE 
CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF LIBYAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, 
ESPECIALLY IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AS WE HAVE DONE 
HERE IN THE PAST REGARDING BURKINA FASO, CHAD, AND 
BENIN.  MALI IS ANOTHER COUNTRY IN WHICH THE 
POTENTIAL FOR GROWING LIBYAN INFLUENCE (AS EMBASSY 
BAMAKO HAS ARGUED) IS OF DIRECT SIGNIFICANCE, GIVEN 
THE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS IN MALI AND NIGER OF 
RESTIVE TUAREG POPULATIONS AMD POVERTY-STRICKEN, 
NASCENT DEMOCRACIES RIPE FOR LIBYAN EXPLOITATION. 
 
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COUNTERING THE "BENEFITS" OF THE LIBYAN PRESENCE 
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¶11.  TO COUNTER NIGERIEN PROPENSITY TO SEE THE 
BENEFITS OF THE LIBYAN PRESENCE, WE SHOULD MAKE AN 
EFFORT TO DRAW PARALLELS FOR THE NIGERIENS ABOUT HOW 
CERTAIN LIBYAN ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGER COULD 
POTENTIALLY WORK AGAINST NIGER'S INTERESTS, 
ESPECIALLY BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE IN OTHER AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES. 
 
¶12.  BRIEFERS FROM WASHINGTON COULD BE PARTICULARLY 
HELPFUL IN THESE TASKS, BUT WE SHOULD WAIT AT LEAST 
UNTIL A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE, IF WE 
EXPECT TO REACH POLICY MAKERS AND OPINION SETTERS.. 
MOREOVER, OUR BRIEFINGS SHOULD NOT DWELL AT LENGTH 
ON LIBYAN CW POLICY, SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN 
TERRORISM, OR OTHER ISSUES MARGINALLY RELEVANT TO 
NIGER'S CONCERNS.  WE SHOULD BE AS NIGER-SPECIFIC AS 
POSSIBLE, IF WE WAWT TO HAVE AN EVENTUAL IMPACT. 
 
CUNDIFF