R 301008Z MAY 91
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0933
INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 02104 
 
 
E.0.12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM PINR ECON EFIN SU
SUBJECT:  BASHIR AND THE RCC ON THE EVE OF THEIR SECOND 
          ANNIVERSARY 
 
¶1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY:  BESEIGED AND CRITICIZED FROM VIRTUALLY 
EVERY QUARTER, AS IT APPROACHES ITS SECOND ANNIVERSARY, 
GENERAL OMAR AL-BASHIR'S REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL 
NONETHELESS APPEARS FIRMLY IN CHARGE OF SUDAN.  THE 
RECENT CURRENCY CHANGE, ABOUT AS BADLY BOTCHED AS 
ANYTHING THE GOS HAS DONE, REVEALED A POPULATION 
TOTALLY COWED.  THE OPPOSITION REMAINS FRAGMENTED AND 
UNORGANIZED AND MOST POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP IS OUTSIDE 
TRY.  CONFLICT CONTINUES WITHIN THE RCC WITH 
SOME MEMBERS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN OTHERS, BUT BASHIR 
HIMSELF IS PROBABLY STILL FIRST AMONG EQUALS.  THE 
NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLS INTERNAL 
SECURITY, THE ECONOMY, AND THE MEDIA, HENCE 
CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL POWER, BUT NIF HEAD HASSAN AL 
TURABI AND BASHIR SHARE A COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS 
GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF PERVASIVE NIF INFLUENCE WHICH 
MAY NOT BE AS ABSOLUTE AS IT APPEARS.  UNLESS AND UNTIL 
THOSE INTERESTS DIVERGE IT WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT TO 
ASCERTAIN WHO WIELDS GREATER POWER.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  DESPITE INCREASING CRITICISM FROM EVERY QUARTER 
EXCEPT THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT, GENERAL OMAR AL 
BASHIR'S GOVERNMENT APPEARS STRONGER THEN EVER.  IN THE 
WAKE OF THE GULF WAR AND WITH A TOTALLY BANKRUPT 
ECONOMY, THE RCC SHOULD BE ON THE DEFENSIVE, BUT IT IS 
NOT.  ANY DOUBTS ABOUT THE REGIME'S RESILIENCE, HAVE 
BEEN DISPELLED BY THE RECENT CURRENCY CHANGE.  ALTHOUGH 
BADLY EXECUTED, THE GOS ACCOMPLISHED, AT LEAST FOR THE 
MOMENT, ITS STATED GOALS OF REDUCING LIQUIDITY, GAINING 
SOME CONTROL OVER THE MONEY SUPPLY, AND REDUCING 
INFLATION.  UNSTATED BUT OBVIOUS GOALS SUCH AS 
UNDERMINING THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE MAJOR 
OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE SPLA WERE ALSO SERVED. 
 
¶4.  AT THE SAME TIME, DUE TO A SERIES OF ERRORS AND 
MISCALCULATIONS, THE CURRENCY CHANGE BROUGHT THE 
ECONOMY TO A SCREECHING HALT AND ADVERSELY IMPACTED 
VIRTUALLY EVERY SUDANESE.  HOWEVER, AGAIN SHOWING THEIR 
TENDENCY TO SHRINK TO ANY OCCASION, THE SUDANESE LINED 
UP DAY AFTER DAY AT BANKS AROUND THE COUNTRY TO TURN IN 
THEIR CASH FOR PARTIAL PAYMENT AND PROMISES.  QUEUES 
WERE GENERALLY DISCIPLINED AND WITHOUT INCIDENT; IN 
SEVERAL CASES SOLDIERS ACTUALLY MARCHED THE CIVILIAN 
POPULATION IN MILITARY LIKE FORMATION TO THE BANKS. 
 
¶5.  OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT, WHILE WIDESPREAD AND 
INCREASINGLY VOCAL, REMAINS FRAGMENTED AND TOTALLY 
UNORGANIZED.  ALMOST ALL POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP IS 
OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.  THE FEW FORMER POLITICAL PARTY 
LEADERS STILL IN KHARTOUM ARE SO DISCREDITED THEY POSE 
LITTLE THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT.  TRADITIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS OF REGIME MAINTENANCE SUCH AS THE 
MILITARY, POLICE, AND BUREAUCRACY ARE UNDOUBTEDLY 
DISENCHANTED WITH THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY ARE SO 
THOROUGHLY INFILTRATED WITH LOYAL SECURITY PERSONNEL 
AND NIF INFORMANTS THAT THERE IS LITTLE POSSIBILITY 
THEY COULD MOUNT ANY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION. 
 
¶6.  ONLY THE NIF SUPPORTS THE REGIME AND THEY HAVE 
PROFITED HANDSOMELY FROM THEIR COLLUSION.  AS NIF 
OFFICIALS ARE QUICK TO POINT OUT, THEY WERE THE ONLY 
PARTY IN OPPOSITION WHEN BASHIR TOOK OVER IN JUNE 
¶1989.  CONSEQUENTLY THEY WERE THE LOGICAL CHOICE TO 
ASSIST THE NEW GOVERNMENT.  (FYI:  SEVERAL SUDANESE 
STILL CLAIM, WITHOUT EVIDENT PROOF, THAT THE COUP WAS 
ENGINEERED BY THE NIF TO THWART SADIQ AL MAHDI'S PEACE 
EFFORTS.  END FYI.) NIF MEMBERS OR SYMPATHIZERS NOW 
OCCUPY KEY POSITIONS IN THE BUREAUCRACY, MEDIA, LABOR, 
ACADEMIA, JUDICIARY, MILITARY, AND SECURITY 
ORGANIZATIONS.  BASHIR'S GOVERNMENT HAS ADOPTED ALMOST 
EVERY MAJOR NIP POLICY FROM FEDERALISM, AND 
ISLAMICIZATION OF EDUCATION TO THE RECENT ADOPTION OF 
OF A NEW PENAL CODE TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM TURABI'S 1988 
PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA.  LONG A POWERFUL 
FORCE IN BANKING AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THEY NOW 
CONTROL WHATEVER PROFITABLE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY TAKES 
PLACE IN SUDAN.  NIF MEMBERS WERE VIRTUALLY UNAFFECTED 
BY THE CURRENCY CHANGE; HAVING BEEN FOREWARNED, THEY 
TURNED THEIR CASH INTO GOLD, COMMODITIES, OR HARD 
CURRENCY PRIOR TO THE CHANGE.  THE NIP, HOWEVER, IS NOT 
A MONOLITH AND SOME MEMBERS EXERCISE GREATER INFLUENCE 
THAN OTHERS. 
 
¶7.  ONLY LIBYA JARS THE RCC-NIP EQUILIBRIUM.  QADHAFI 
HAS CRITICIZED BASHIR FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA 
AND THE MIXING OF RELIGION AND POLITCS, TWO KEY NIF 
POLICIES.  LIBYA HAS ALSO MOVED DECISIVELY AGAINST 
FUNDAMENTALISTS AT HOME, AND LIBYAN RECONCILIATION WITH 
EGYPT, OFTEN CITED B/ NIF MEMBERS AS THEIR ARCHENEMY, 
MITIGATE AGAINST NIP INFLUENCE.  MOST BELIEVE ONLY 
LIBYAN INFLUENCE KEEPS BASHIR FROM DECLARING SUDAN AN 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.  THE NIF SEEMS TO BE BANKING ON 
SUDAN'S EMERGING RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN TO COUNTER 
LIBYAN INFLUENCE, WHICH IS BASED PRIMARILY ON GOS 
DEPENDENCE FOR BOTH OIL AND ARMS.  ALTHOUGH THE 
IRANIANS ARE ASSERTING THEMSELVES IN CULTURAL, 
EDUCATIONAL, AND RELIGIOUS AREAS (ALL EXCLUSIVELY NIF 
SPHERES), THEY HAVE YET TO COMPETE WITH THE LIBYANS IN 
SUPPLYING OIL OR ARMS. 
 
¶8.  COMMENT:  CONFLICT CONTINUES WITHIN THE RCC BETWEEN 
THOSE MEMBERS WHO STRONGLY FAVOR NIP POLICIES AND THOSE 
WHO PREFER A MORE SECULAR STATE.  TWO RCC MEMBERS WERE 
RECENTLY DISMISSED (OR RESIGNED DEPENDING ON WHOM YOU 
CONSULT) FOR THEIR DISSENTING OPINIONS.  THE THREE 
SOUTHERNERS AND OTHER MODERATES APPEAR TO HAVE LITTLE 
IF ANY INFLUENCE, LEADING MOST OBSERVERS TO CONCLUDE 
THAT TURABI AND THE NIF, OPERATING IN A POLITICAL 
VACUUM, CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT COMPLETELY.  NIF 
INFLUENCE IS CERTAINLY GREAT, BUT BASHIR SEEMS STILL IN 
CONTROL.  BECAUSE HE IS A PROPONENT OF NIF POLICIES, IT 
IS UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT HE IS HIS OWN MAN, AS TINY 
ROWLAND SUGGESTS.  UNTIL HE AND TURABI COME INTO 
CONFLICT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH 
POWER TURABI ACTUALLY WIELDS.  HOWEVER, AS LONG AS 
BASHIR AND TURABI AGREE ON THE AGENDA FOR THE GOS, 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THEM OVER A MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE, POLICY 
ISSUE IS UNLIKELY. 
 
CHEEK