P 031705Z APR 91
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0714
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
CSCE COLLECTIVE
/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 01505 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR (RPM, SOV AND EEY) 
 
VIENNA FOR CSBM DEL 
 
USVIENNA FOR USDEF CFE 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS: NATO PREL UR XH
 
SUBJECT:  NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF END OF 
          THE WARSAW PACT AND NEW SOVIET RELATIONS WITH 
          EASTERN EUROPE 
 
REF:  MOSCOW 9594 
 
¶1.  CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY.  DURING TWO NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS 
MARCH 26 AND APRIL 2, ALLIES REVIEWED THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE END OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NEW SOVIET RELATIONS WITH 
EASTERN EUROPE.  THE DISCUSSION COVERED BOTH SOVIET AND 
VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THEIR NEW 
SECURITY RELATIONS.  MOST SAW THE SOVIETS AS SEEKING TO 
AVOID ISOLATION BUT AT THE SAME TIME AS FINDING IT 
DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME THE ANIMOSITY OF THE PAST FORTY 
YEARS.  ONE FOCUS OF DISCUSSION WAS THE NEW BILATERAL 
TREATIES WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE NEGOTIATING WITH FORMER WTO 
ALLIES.  THE FIRST SUCH TREATY WAS INITIALED WITH ROMANIA 
AND ACCORDING TO THE GERMANS CONTAINS CLAUSES ABOUT NOT 
JOINING ALLIANCES TO WHICH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY HAVE 
MADE CLEAR THEY ARE NOT GOING TO AGREE.  VARIOUS OTHER 
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS AMONG EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS 
A SUBSTITUTE FOR CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PACT WERE ALSO 
DISCUSSED AND THE IMS GAVE THEIR ANALYSIS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  IN TWO SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS, ALLIES 
DISCUSSED THE IMPACT OF THE END OF THE WARSAW PACT 
MILITARY STRUCTURES.  A NUMBER OF ALLIES FOUND THE FRENCH 
PAPER ON THE SUBJECT (FAXED TO EUR/RPM) TO BE A GOOD 
SUMMARY OF IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN 
RELATIONS IN GENERAL. 
 
SOVIET VIEWS 
------------ 
¶4.  THE FRENCH REP SAID THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DRAW 
ULTIMATE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE END OF THE 
WARSAW PACT.  IT WAS CLEAR FROM BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH 
THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHAT THEIR PREFERENCES WERE 
TO REPLACE THE PACT IN THEIR SECURITY POLICIES.  HOWEVER, 
IT WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND MOSCOW'S REACTION 
AS WELL.  THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE OF THE DETERIORATION OF 
THEIR BASIC RELATIONS WITH THEIR FORMER ALLIES.  BUT, THEY 
ARE LESS CONSCIOUS OF THE REASONS FOR THAT CHANGE AS THEY 
BELIEVED EASTERN EUROPE ACTUALLY SAW SOME SECURITY BENEFIT 
FROM THE PACT AND TIES TO THE SOVIET UNION.  IN ANY CASE, 
MOSCOW UNDERSTANDS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS FOR 
RELATIONS WHICH MEANS A REJECTION OF THE PAST. 
 
¶5.  THE ISSUE FOR THE SOVIETS IS HOW TO DEVELOP THOSE 
RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR OWN POLITICAL DISARRAY. 
THE SOVIET MILITARY IS INCREASINGLY HOSTILE TO THE BLATANT 
MANIFESTATIONS OF DISLIKE FROM THE FORMER WP ALLIES, 
PARTICULARLY AS IT MANIFESTS ITSELF IN TEARING DOWN WAR 
MONUMENTS AND OTHER REMINDERS OF SOVIET TROOP PRESENCE. 
AT THE SAME TIME, SOME IN MOSCOW ARE AWARE THAT THE VERY 
INSTABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TODAY IS PERCEIVED BY 
EASTERN EUROPE AS A THREAT. 
 
¶6.  THIS LEAVES THE SOVIETS WITH TWO CHOICES:  LEAVE 
EASTERN EUROPE TO THE WEST AN ACCEPT ISOLATION OR DEVELOP 
NEW RELATIONS ON A MORE EQUAL BASIS.  OBVIOUSLY, THE 
SOVIETS DESPITE THE ODDS, WILL GO FOR THE LATER SOLUTION. 
THIS MEANS THAT THEY WILL TRY TO TAKE SOME STEPS TO REDUCE 
EASTERN EUROPEAN FEAR OF THE SOVIET UNION.  AT THE SAME 
TIME, MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT NATO SHOULD ALSO 
DISAPPEAR AND, IN ANY CASE, EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD NOT 
DEVELOP TOO CLOSE RELATIONS WITH IT.  THUS, THE SOVIETS 
WILL SEEK BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH SOME NEGATIVE SECURITY 
GUARANTEES AND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, MAINTAIN SOME FORM OF 
POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITH EASTERN EUROPE EITHER AS A 
VESTIGE OF THE PACT OR MORE LIKELY UNDER SOME NEW FORMAT. 
THE SOVIET MODEL REMAINS, AS EXPRESSED BY BESSMERTNYKH AT 
THE MEETING OF THE PACT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WHICH ENDED 
THE MILITARY STRUCTURE, TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH EASTERN 
EUROPE AS NEUTRALS ALONG THE LINE OF AUSTRIA AND FINLAND. 
THE ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE FOR THE SOVIETS IS 
SELF-ISOLATION. 
 
EASTERN EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR NEW SECURITY RELATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7.  THE NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THE PERCEPTION AMONG EASTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF A SECURITY VACUUM WITH THE DEMISE OF 
THE PACT.  HE ARGUED THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR IMPACTS OF THE 
PACT'S END WILL BE EASTERN EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR NEW 
SECURITY STRUCTURES.  REVIEWING A DISCUSSION THE DUTCH 
EMBASSY IN WARSAW HAD WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY 
OFFICIAL TOWPIK, THE DUTCH REP SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE 
OPTIONS FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES:  JOINING NATO, 
NEUTRALITY, AND USING CSCE STRUCTURES.  IN HIS REVIEW OF 
THESE OPTIONS, TOWPIK INDICATED THAT FOR VARIOUS REASONS 
NONE WAS APPROPRIATE IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO 
THE SENSE OF VACUUM, THE POLES BELIEVED THEY SHARED WITH 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY.  NATO AND MORE IMPORTANTLY THE 
SOVIET UNION HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IMMEDIATE MEMBERSHIP IN 
THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE NOW.  THE THREE 
COUNTRIES REJECTED NEUTRALITY BECAUSE IT SUGGESTED A 
BUFFER ZONE OR "CORDON SANITAIRE," WHICH WAS NO GUARANTEE 
OF SECURITY, BUT RATHER A GREATER RISK.  FINALLY, CSCE 
INSTITUTIONS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE 
SECURITY. 
 
¶8.  IN THIS CONTEXT, THE POLES WOULD TRY TO DEVELOP 
BILATERAL TIES WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS INCLUDING GERMANY AND 
THE SOVIET UNION.  BUT TOWPIK HAD NOTED TO HIS DUTCH 
INTERLOCUTOR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY SEEKING 
CLAUSES IN ITS BILATERAL TREATY WHICH WOULD LIMIT POLISH 
INDEPENDENCE.  THE NETHERLANDS REP CLOSED HIS PRESENTATION 
BY NOTING THAT THE POLISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAD 
SUGGESTED THAT IN THE SHORT TERM POLAND WOULD HAVE TO 
PRACTICE ARMED NEUTRALITY. 
 
¶9.  IN DEVELOPING THEIR NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS, THE 
HUNGARIANS WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING GOOD 
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD TRY TO MEET SOME 
SOVIET CONCERNS IN THE BILATERAL TREATY, THE GERMAN REP 
ADDED.  AT THE SAME TIME, HUNGARY WOULD SEEK TIES BOTH 
WITH OVERALL WESTERN ORGANIZATIONS LIKE NATO AND THE EC AS 
WELL AS SMALLER REGIONAL GROUPS LIKE THE PENTAGONALE. 
WHILE THEY RECOGNIZED THAT, IN SOME CASES, THESE GROUPS 
DID NOT HAVE A SECURITY PURPOSE, HUNGARY DID BELIEVE 
MEMBERSHIP IN A NUMBER OF GROUPS WITH WESTERN TIES AIDED 
THEIR SECURITY.  THE HUNGARIANS, UNLIKE THE POLES, TRIED 
NOT LIKE TO USE THE TERM SECURITY VACUUM BECAUSE IT 
IMPLIED THAT THERE WERE DISADVANTAGES TO THE END OF THE 
WARSAW PACT, WHILE THE HUNGARIANS CLEARLY SAW THE END OF 
THE PACT AS A NET SECURITY BENEFIT.  HUNGARY ALSO WANTED 
TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN ANY PAN EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS. 
 
¶10.  THE UK REP NOTED THAT THE MORE THE EASTERN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES REDEFINED THEIR SECURITY THE MORE IT APPEARED TO 
ISOLATE THE SOVIET UNION.  ALLIES HAD RECOGNIZED THE 
DANGERS INHERENT IN THIS PROCESS, AND THE SOVIETS WOULD 
USE THESE WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT 
THEIR ISOLATION TO LIMIT THE WEST AND SPECIFICALLY NATO 
TIES TO EASTERN EUROPE.  THE POLES, DURING BRITISH FOREIGN 
OFFICE MINISTER HOGG'S TRIP TO WARSAW, WERE AWARE OF THE 
SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THEY REMAINED INTERESTED IN 
DEVELOPING TIES INCLUDING MILITARY LINKS TO NATO.  THEY 
RECOGNIZED THAT MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT POSSIBLE NOW BUT DID 
NOT WANT TO RULE IT OUT AS AN ULTIMATE EVENTUALITY, EITHER. 
 
BILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE SOVIETS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  THE GERMAN REP NOTED THAT AS PART OF LOOKING FOR NEW 
SECURITY RELATIONS, THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE 
WILLING TO SIGN NEW TREATIES WITH MOSCOW.  IN THAT 
CONTEXT, HE NOTED THAT DURING THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN 
MINISTER'S VISIT THERE, THE MINISTER HAD INITIALED THE 
TEXT OF THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN BILATERAL TREATY.  WHILE THE 
TEXT HAD NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC ITS CONTENTS WERE OF HIGH 
INTEREST BECAUSE IT WOULD BE THE MODEL FOR TREATIES WITH 
THE OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES.  IN FACT THE SOVIETS 
HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED THESE TREATIES, WHICH WERE 
TO REPLACE THE WP AND THE BILATERAL SECURITY TREATIES 
UNDER IT, TO BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME FOR ALL THE FORMER WP 
ALLIES. 
 
¶12.  THE GERMAN REP REPORTED THAT THEIR EMBASSIES IN 
MOSCOW AND BUCHAREST BOTH AGREED THAT THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN 
TREATY CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING SECURITY CLAUSES: 
 
--COMMITMENTS BY BOTH NOT TO JOIN ALLIANCES DIRECTED 
AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY; 
 
--COMMITMENTS NOT TO LET THEIR TERRITORIES BE USED TO WAGE 
WAR AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY; 
 
--COMMITMENTS NOT TO PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE OR OTHER 
SUPPORT TO STATES WAGING WAR AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY; 
 
--AGREEMENT TO BASE THEIR SECURITY ON THE COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER; 
 
--AGREEMENT TO INFORM EACH OTHER OF A PERCEIVED THREAT TO 
THEIR RESPECTIVE SECURITIES; 
 
--AGREEMENT ON IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS IN THE CASE OF 
AGGRESSION AGAINST EITHER PARTY. 
 
¶13.  THE GERMAN REP SAID THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN 
MINISTER KVITSINSKY HAD DEFENDED THE TREATY AS A SIGN OF 
GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS AND NOT AN ATTEMPT TO REVIVE THE 
PACT.  THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT THE ERA OF MILITARY 
PACTS WAS OVER AND CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT ITS EVENTUAL 
EVOLUTION WOULD BE THE END OF NATO AS WELL. 
 
¶14.  THE GERMAN REP ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE CLAUSES IN 
THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN TREATY WENT WELL BEYOND ANY WHICH BONN 
ANTICIPATED OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD 
ACCEPT.  HE NOTED THAT UNTIL THE INITIALING OF THE 
ROMANIAN TREATY, THE SOVIET/HUNGARIAN AGREEMENT WAS 
THOUGHT TO BE FARTHEST ADVANCED.  ANTALL WAS EXPECTED TO 
GO TO MOSCOW TO SIGN IT AT THE END OF APRIL.  HOWEVER, THE 
GERMAN REP INDICATED THAT HUNGARY WOULD AS SOON HAVE NO 
TREATY AS SIGN A TREATY WITH SUCH FAR REACHING CLAUSES. 
 
¶15.  THE U.S. REP SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY SURPRISED 
WITHTHE CONTENT OF THE SOVIET/ROMANIAN TREATY WHICH HIS 
GERMAN COLLEAGUEHAD DESCRIBED.  DRAWING ON REFTEL, HE 
AGREED THAT OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES WERE UNLIKELY TO 
BE WILLING TO GO AS FAR, AND NOTED THAT AS MUCH AS 25 
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET/HUNGARIAN TREATY REMAINED 
BRACKETED.  FROM REFTEL, HE DESCRIBED THE SOVIET INTEREST 
IN THIS NEW GENERATION OF TREATIES AND THE HOPE THAT THEY 
WOULD ALL BE SIMILAR AND WOULD BRING SOME OF THE FORMER 
WARSAW PACT GUARANTEES AND CONSULTATIONS INTO THE NEW 
RELATIONS. 
 
¶16.  THIS EXCHANGE LED TO A VIGOROUS DISCUSSION AS TO WHY 
THE ROMANIANS HAD ACCEPTED SUCH CLAUSES AND WHAT THE 
EFFECT WOULD BE ON OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.  THE 
SPANISH REP NOTED ROMANIA, BUT ALSO BULGARIA'S SHAKY 
ECONOMIES WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION.  THE 
DUTCH REP AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEW BILATERAL 
TREATIES AND SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD EFFECT THE ENTIRE 
PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION.  HE ALSO REMINDED THE 
COMMITTEE THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR AFANASSIEVSKY HAD 
PROPOSED TO THE SYG THAT NATO "ENDORSE" IN SOME WAY THESE 
"SECURITY" CLAUSES IN THE NEW BILATERAL TREATIES.  IF THEY 
WENT AS FAR AS THE ROMANIAN TREATY APPARENTLY DID, THAT 
WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE.  AND IN ANY CASE, NATO SHOULD NOT 
BE SEEN AS INTERFERING IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THESE TREATIES. 
 
¶17.  THE FRENCH REP SAID THAT SHE AGREED THESE NEW 
SECURITY TREATIES WERE AN IMPORTANT NEW FACTOR AND NATO 
SHOULD FOLLOW THEIR DEVELOPMENT CLOSELY.  IT WOULD, SHE 
SUGGESTED, BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO 
INCLUDE THE CONCEPTS IN THESE TREATIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. 
 
¶18.  PAPER CIRCULATED (COPY FAXED TO EUR/RPM). 
 
UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION 
 
    --VISIT TO POLAND BY MR. HOGG, MINISTER OF STATE AT 
THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 17-19 MARCH 1991. 
 
KORNBLUM