O 171741Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4365
INFO RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK
AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY MBABANE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0647
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMCONSUL DURBAN
NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 20502 
 
 
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR FENDRICK 
NSC FOR ROBERT FRASURE 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SF
SUBJECT:  THE SAG-ANC RELATIONSHIP: A YEAR END PERSPECTIVE 
 
¶1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
------------------------ 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  A NEW MOOD OF UNCERTAINTY HAS SETTLED OVER SOUTH 
AFRICA FOLLOWING A YEAR OF UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL 
CHANGE.  AFTER A PROMISING START, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC HAVE BOGGED DOWN.  DISTRUST 
HAS DEEPENED, FUELED BY ANC SUSPICIONS THAT THE SAG IS 
TRYING TO PROFIT FROM ESCALATING TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE. 
FOR ITS PART, THE SAG BLAMES THE LACK OF MOVEMENT 
TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ANC'S LACK 
OF ORGANIZATION AND ON DIVISIONS INSIDE THE MOVEMENT. 
 
¶3.  THESE PROBLEMS ARE MANAGEABLE PROVIDED THE TWO 
SIDES DEVELOP A RENEWED SENSE OF URGENCY AND COMMON 
PURPOSE EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR.  THAT IMPERATIVE IS 
UNDERSTOOD AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE ANC AND THE 
SAG, WE BELIEVE.  AT LOWER LEVELS THE PERSPECTIVE IS 
LESS CLEAR.  MANY ANC MILITANTS BELIEVE THEY HAVE 
CONCEDED A GREAT DEAL, ESPECIALLY IN AGREEING TO 
SUSPEND THE ARMED STRUGGLE, AND OBTAINED LITTLE FROM 
GOVERNMENT IN THE TALKS THUS FAR:  E.G., THE PRISONERS 
ARE STILL NOT FREE, THE EXILES NOT YET HOME, AND 
UNPRECEDENTED LARGESCALE VIOLENCE IS CONTINUING. 
THE "COMRADES" ARE DEMANDING A MORE AGGRESSIVE ANC 
STANCE IN THE YEAR AHEAD.  IN THE SAG THERE ARE 
ELEMENTS EAGER TO EXPLOIT SUPPOSED SCHISMS IN THE 
ANC-SACP-COSATU ALLIANCE.  OTHERS APPEAR READY TO CAST 
ABOUT FOR DIFFERENT BLACK INTERLOCUTORS AND NEGOTIATE 
A NEW CONSTITUTION WITH THEM REGARDLESS OF THE ANC. 
 
¶4.  BOTH SIDES CAN TAKE SOME SMALL COMFORT PERHAPS IN 
THAT EXTREMIST CHALLENGES FAILED TO MATERIALIZE IN 
¶1990.  TO THE RIGHT, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IS LOSING 
GROUND.  THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC) DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO BE PULLING MILITANTS AWAY FROM THE ANC AS 
MANY PREDICTED IT WOULD.  WHILE THERE IS PROMISE FOR 
PROGRESS IN 1991, THE YEAR IS ENDING ON A LESS 
OPTIMISTIC NOTE THAN THE EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 1990 MIGHT 
HAVE LED ONE TO EXPECT.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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DE KLERK'S THREE-PRONGED OFFENSIVE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  THREE DISTINCT PROCESSES WERE EITHER INITIATED OR 
INTENSIFIED BY DE KLERK IN 1990: 
 
-- POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION.  THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC 
AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF 
EMERGENCY, THE REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL 
ACTIVITY, AND THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA AND MANY 
POLITICAL DETAINEES COMPLETELY CHANGED THE NATURE OF 
SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS.  DE KLERK HAS, IN EFFECT, 
GIVEN THE ANC, THE SACP, THE PAC AND OTHERS 
UNPRECEDENTED ROOM TO MANUEVER -- AND TO COMMIT 
MISTAKES -- WHILE REAPING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION 
FOR HIS BOLD REFORMISM.  CONTROL OF THE LIBERALIZATION 
AGENDA, AND THE CONTENT AND TIMING OF REFORMS, HAS 
REMAINED ENTIRELY IN GOVERNMENT'S HANDS. 
 
-- THE SCRAPPING OF APARTHEID.  HERE TOO DE KLERK HAS 
DICTATED THE PACE OF REFORM.  IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT 
BY MID-1991 ALL THE MAIN PILLARS OF APARTHEID, 
POSSIBLY EVEN THE POPULATION REGISTRATION ACT, WILL 
HAVE BEEN LEGISLATED OUT OF EXISTENCE.  WHITES HAVE 
ADJUSTED BETTER THAN EXPECTED (SO FAR, AT LEAST) TO 
THE REMOVAL OF RACIAL BARRIERS, ALTHOUGH 1991 IS 
LIKELY TO SEE EFFORTS TOWARD LOCAL AND INFORMAL FORMS 
OF DISCRIMINATION. 
 
-- NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION.  AT THE 
PRETORIA SUMMIT AUGUST 6, THE SAG AND ANC DELEGATIONS 
DECLARED THAT THE WAY WAS OPEN FOR THE START OF 
SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS.  ALMOST IMMEDIATELY 
THEREAFTER, THE SAG-ANC DIALOGUE BOGGED DOWN, AND FOR 
THE PAST FOUR MONTHS THE SAG HAS VACILLATED BETWEEN 
DIALOGUE WITH THE ANC AND MEASURES TO WEAKEN THE ANC. 
DE KLERK CAN PRESS FORWARD ON REFORM AND LIBERALIZE 
UNILATERALLY IN 1991, BUT HE WILL AT SOME POINT COME 
UNDER PRESSURE TO BEGIN SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS, 
EVEN WITHOUT ANC PARTICIPATION (WHICH IN OUR VIEW 
WOULD BE A GRAVE ERROR).  THE ANC WILL CLAIM 
NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BEGIN UNTIL PRE-CONDITIONS AND 
"STUMBLING BLOCKS" HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND, IN THIS 
RESPECT, HAS GIVEN THE SAG UNTIL APRIL 30 TO REMOVE 
THEM.  IF THEY ARE NOT REMOVED, THE ANC HAS SAID IT 
WILL RECONSIDER ITS COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS AND THE 
SUSPENSION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE. 
 
------------------------ 
NEGOTIATIONS BOGGED DOWN 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  IT IS THE STALLED NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS WHICH MOST 
WORRIES OBSERVERS.  BEHIND IT LIES AN EROSION OF TRUST 
BETWEEN SAG AND ANC NEGOTIATORS AND, TO A LESSER 
EXTENT PERHAPS, BETWEEN MANDELA AND DE KLERK 
PERSONALLY.  THIS EROSION BEGAN IN AUGUST AND IS 
CONTINUING.  IT IS LINKED TO THE TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE, 
WHICH MOST ANC LEADERS FIRMLY BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT 
IS EXPLOITING FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL ENDS.  MANDELA NOW 
CLAIMS THERE IS A SAG "DOUBLE AGENDA" -- NEGOTIATIONS 
TO PLACATE PUBLIC OPINION COUPLED WITH A CONSPIRACY TO 
DIVIDE AND WEAKEN THE ANC.  FROM A SAG PERSPECTIVE, 
THE PROBLEM IS THE ANC'S DISORGANIZATION, ITS 
INABILITY TO CONTROL ITS FOLLOWERS AND, ULTIMATELY, 
ITS RELUCTANCE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND STICK WITH THEM. 
RESTORING A MEASURE OF COMMON PURPOSE AND INSTILLING A 
NEW SENSE OF URGENCY WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN THE EARLY 
MONTHS OF 1991 IF THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS IS TO BE 
KEPT ON TRACK. 
 
¶7.  MODERATES ON BOTH SIDES REALIZE THAT THERE IS NO 
LONG-RUN ALTERNATIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT 
POWER-SHARING.  THERE IS NO "RETURN TO THE LAAGER" 
OPTION FOR WHITE SOUTH AFRICA.  THERE IS NO REAL ARMED 
STRUGGLE OPTION FOR THE ANC.  IN THAT SENSE, POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS TRULY IRREVERSIBLE. 
 
¶8.  WHAT HAS BECOME LESS CLEAR IN THE FINAL MONTHS OF 
1990 IS WHETHER THE SOUTH AFRICA'S TWO MAIN PLAYERS 
WILL RE-ENGAGE PROMPTLY IN EARLY 1991 OR WHETHER THE 
NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON HOLD.  FOR 
THE ANC, RIDDLED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL, FINANCIAL AND 
CONSTITUENT PROBLEMS, THERE WILL BE A STRONG EFFORT TO 
REFOCUS ITS RESOURCES ON REBUILDING ITS NEGLECTED TIES 
TO GRASSROOTS SUPPORTERS AND PROMOTING BLACK UNITY, 
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE WEEKEND'S CONSULTATIVE 
CONFERENCE.  "MASS ACTION" PROTEST WILL FIGURE 
PROMINENTLY IN SUCH A STRATEGY.  MANY IN THE ANC, AND 
MORE ESPECIALLY IN THE SACP, APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT 
SUCH MUSCLE-FLEXING IS ESSENTIAL IF THE ANC IS TO HAVE 
ANY CLOUT AT ALL AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.  THE SAG, 
FOR ITS PART, WILL DEMAND THAT THE ANC DISTANCE ITSELF 
FROM BOYCOTTS, STRIKES AND STAYAWAYS WHICH HAVE 
VIOLENT POTENTIAL.  IF A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION CAN BE 
ENGENDERED, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ANC ACTION COULD BE 
CHANNELED THOUGHTFULLY INTO PEACEFUL MASS 
DEMONSTRATIONS, ALLOWING THE ANC TO FLEX ITS MUSCLE 
AND PLACE PRESSURE ON THE SAG, WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE 
PROCESS.  BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE ENORMOUS RESTRAINT ON 
BOTH SIDES. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
NO REAL CHALLENGE TO THE NATS AND THE ANC 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  DESPITE THESE UNCERTAINTIES, BOTH THE ANC AND SAG 
HAVE AT LEAST ONE IMPORTANT SUCCESS TO CELEBRATE AS 
THE YEAR DRAWS TO A CLOSE.  POLITICAL THREATS FROM 
BOTH THE FAR RIGHT AND FROM THE FAR LEFT PROVED MUCH 
LESS FORMIDABLE THAN ORIGINALLY FEARED.  THIS VICTORY, 
UNFORTUNATELY, IS PARTLY OFFSET BY UNPRECEDENTED 
VIOLENCE. 
 
¶10.  A SERIOUS CONSERVATIVE PARTY CHALLENGE TO DE 
KLERK HAS YET TO MATERIALIZE.  CP LEADERS HAVE FAILED 
TO COME UP WITH PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO DE KLERK'S 
REFORMS.  OCTOBER POLLS SHOW THE CP SLIPPING BACK TO 
ONLY 25 PERCENT OF THE WHITE VOTE WHILE THE NATIONAL 
PARTY SUPPORT ROSE TO SLIGHTLY OVER 50 PERCENT.  IN A 
PINCH, DE KLERK COULD PROBABLY COUNT ON THE BACKING OF 
ALMOST ALL THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY VOTES.  HIS 
POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE WHITE ELECTORATE, AND WITHIN 
THE NATIONAL PARTY, IS STRONGER THAN EVER. 
 
¶11.  SIMILARLY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS 
THAT THE ANC IS LOSING SUPPORT TO MORE MILITANT BLACK 
ORGANIZATIONS ON THE LEFT SUCH AS THE PAC.  WHILE THE 
ANC HAS DOUBTLESS LOST SOME SUPPORT (RECENT 
INDEPENDENT AND GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED POLLS BOTH 
INDICATE THAT BLACK SUPPORT FOR THE ANC HAS SOFTENED 
CONSIDERABLY), THESE APPEAR TO BE LOSSES TO APATHY OR 
INDIFFERENCE, NOT DEFECTIONS TO THE PAC.  DESPITE 
THESE SETBACKS, THE ANC'S PRE-EMINENCE AMONG 
OPPOSITION GROUPS REMAINS UNQUESTIONED.  MOREOVER, ANC 
LOSSES CAN BE MADE UP QUICKLY.  OPTIMAL FROM MANDELA'S 
POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE A STRATEGY WHICH TRANSFORMS 
PEACEFUL MASS ACTION INTO INCREASED LEVERAGE AT THE 
NEGOTIATING TABLE. 
 
---------------------------- 
SAG SCORES IN WORLD CAPITALS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12.  IN ONE CRITICAL AREA IN 1990, SAG GAINS WERE ANC 
LOSSES.  FOR MANY YEARS THE DIPLOMATIC QUARANTINE OF 
SOUTH AFRICA BY MOST OF THE THE THIRD WORLD AND 
COMMUNIST BLOC WAS A KEY INGREDIENT IN 
ANC-ORCHESTRATED PRESSURE ON PRETORIA.  IN 1990 THE 
QUARANTINE CRUMBLED.  THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS CLAIMS IT IS UNABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE MANY 
CONTACT OPPORTUNITIES ON OFFER.  THE LOSS OF ITS VETO 
OVER MANY FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTACT WITH PRETORIA 
IS A BLOW TO THE ANC.  THE LIFTING OF AT LEAST SOME 
SANCTIONS BY WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IS AN INEVITABLE NEXT 
STEP IN 1991, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE WEEKEND'S EC 
DECISION TO LIFT THE BAN ON INVESTMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA.  THE ANC HAS NOT MOVED DECISIVELY TO SET NEW 
TERMS UNDER WHICH IT WOULD APPROVE A LIFTING OF 
SANCTIONS, AN OMISSION WHICH FURTHER REDUCES ITS 
LEVERAGE WITH THE SAG.  (OLIVER TAMBO WAS OBVIOUSLY 
AWARE OF THIS WHEN HE ASKED THE ANC CONSULTATIVE 
CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE SANCTIONS ISSUE, BUT 
THE MILITANT ASSEMBLY, WEARLY OF TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE AND 
DISTRUSTFUL OF THE SAG, REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION OF 
LIFTING SANCTIONS.) 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  NO ONE EXPECTED THE SAG AND ANC TO BE ON A QUICK 
AND STRAIGHT COURSE TOWARDS POWER-SHARING NEGOTIATIONS 
BY THE END OF 1990.  THE LOSS OF BOTH MOMENTUM AND A 
CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION IS NEVERTHELESS A 
DISAPPOINTMENT.  IF THIS DEADLOCK PERSISTS BEYOND 
MID-1991, THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT THAT THIS UNEASY 
PARTNERSHIP WILL TURN OPENLY CONFRONTATIONAL.  THE 
MAIN REASON FOR OPTIMISM IS THAT NEITHER THE SAG NOR 
THE ANC HAS ANY PLAUSIBLE LONG-TERM OPTION OTHER THAN 
NEGOTIATIONS.  WE STILL BELIEVE THEY WILL SEIZE THIS 
OPTION, BUT THE WAY AHEAD WILL BE ROUGH.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
SWING.