R 202334Z NOV 90
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0576
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
DIA WASHDC
DEA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 18530 
 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE FOR S/CT BREELAND 
 
E.O. 12356: N/A 
TAGS: PTER CO
SUBJECT:  COLOMBIA: 1990 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: (A) STATE 355397; (B) BOGOTA 5568; (C) BOGOTA 14054; 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶1.  COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IS CONFRONTED BY 
THREE LEFTIST GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS 
VIOLENT, WELL-FINANCED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING 
ORGANIZATIONS.  BOTH THE INSURGENTS AND THE TRAFFICKERS 
USE TERRORISM, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST DOMESTIC 
TARGETS.  GUERRILLA VIOLENCE CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED 
INTERNATIONAL TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES 
HAVE AT TIMES CROSSED COLOMBIA'S BORDER INTO VENEZUELA 
AND ECUADOR. 
 
------------ 
PROSECUTIONS 
------------ 
 
¶2.  THERE WERE NO PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM IN COLOMBIA IN 1990. 
 
-------------------------- 
SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  NUMEROUS ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM OCCURED IN 1990, 
SOME THE RESULT OF GUERRILLA INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGNS 
AGAINST RURAL POPULATIONS.  GUERRILLAS REGULARLY TORTURE 
AND MURDER PEASANTS AND OTHERS SUSPECTED OF ASSISTING 
GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES.  THE MOST SIGNIFICANT 
TERRORIST ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WERE COMMITTED BY THE LOOSE 
CONGLOMERATE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS KNOWN AS THE 
MEDELLIN CARTEL.  IN AUGUST 1989 THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED 
A CRACKDOWN AGAINST THE MEDELLIN CARTEL FOLLOWING A 
STRING OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE 
CARTEL.  THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS RESPONDED WITH A 
VIOLENT CAMPAIGN OF BOMBINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS OF 
POLITICAL FIGURES AND POLICEMEN THAT CONTINUED INTO 
¶1990.  THE BOMBINGS WERE INTENDED TO INDUCE THE PUBLIC 
INTO PRESSURING THE GOVERNMENT INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS 
TO THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.  THE ASSASSINATIONS WERE 
MEANT TO INTIMIDATE POLITICAL FIGURES OPPOSED TO THE 
TRAFFICKER'S INTERESTS AND DISRUPT COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRATIC 
ELECTIONS. 
 
¶4.  IN MARCH AND APRIL SUSPECTED NARCO-TERRORISTS 
ASSASSINATED THE TWO LEADING LEFTIST PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATES.  IN MAY NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS BEGAN A 
COP-KILLING CAMPAIGN IN MEDELLIN, CONTRIBUTING TO A 
RECORD HIGH 521 POLICEMEN KILLED IN ALL OF COLOMBIA AS 
OF OCTOBER 16.  RANDOM STREETCORNER MASSACRES IN 
MEDELLIN SOON FOLLOWED THE ATTACKS ON POLICEMEN, 
CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH-LEVEL OF TERRORISM IN 
MEDELLIN.  SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACTS MAY HAVE BEEN 
COMMITTED BY THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN RETALIATION 
FOR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS.  FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLICE KILLING 
OF ONE OF ESCOBAR'S TOP AIDES IN JUNE WAS FOLLOWED HOURS 
LATER BY THE EXPLOSION OF A CAR BOMB WHICH KILLED THREE 
PEOPLE. 
 
¶5.  FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT 
AUGUST 7, THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS CHANGED THEIR 
TACTICS.  DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THE GROUP OF 
TRAFFICKERS KNOWN AS "THE EXTRADITABLES" KIDNAPPED NINE 
PROMINENT COLOMBIANS, MOSTLY JOURNALISTS.  IT IS WIDELY 
BELIEVED THAT THE KIDNAPPERS' AIM IS TO INFLUENCE THE 
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, SCHEDULED TO MEET IN FEBRUARY TO 
REFORM THE CONSTITUTION.  AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE 
TRAFFICKERS WANT THE ASSEMBLY TO PROHIBIT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY THE EXTRADITION OF COLOMBIAN CITIZENS. 
 
-------------------- 
EXTRADITION REQUESTS 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA MADE NO REQUESTS FOR 
EXTRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN 1990. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION AND EXTRADITION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  REF B, PLUS PREVIOUS EMBASSY REPORTING, DESCRIBES 
THE PROFOUND PROBLEMS OF THE COLOMBIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 
WHICH IS OUTDATED, INEFFECTIVE, AND VULNERABLE TO 
CORRUPTION AND INTIMIDATION.  GOVERNMENT POLICY IS TO 
ARREST AND PROSECUTE THOSE WHO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS, 
BUT IN REALITY THOSE WHO COMMIT THESE CRIMES ARE RARELY 
CAUGHT.  THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION IS IMPLEMENTING A 
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IT HOPES WILL STRENGTHEN THE 
GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO ARREST AND PROSECUTE TERRORISTS. 
 
¶8.  THE GOC CURRENTLY HAS NO LEGAL MECHANISM FOR 
EXTRADITING A COLOMBIAN TO THE U.S. FOR CRIMES OTHER 
THAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.  IN AUGUST 1989 COLOMBIA 
RESUMED EXTRADITIONS BY EXECUTIVE DECREE, FOLLOWING 
SEVERAL YEARS DURING WHICH EXTRADITIONS WERE PROHIBITED 
BY A 1987 SUPREME COURT RULING.  THE 1989 DECREE ONLY 
PROVIDES FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THOSE ACCUSED OF 
NARCOTICS-RELATED CRIMES.  INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
CRIMES ARE NOT INCLUDED.  IN SEPTEMBER THE GOVERNMENT 
PROMULGATED A DECREE (REF C) GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM 
EXTRADITION TO THOSE WHO CONFESS NARCOTICS OR 
TERRORIST-RELATED CRIMES.  ONLY ONE TRAFFICKER HAS TAKEN 
ADVANTAGE OF THIS DECREE, HOWEVER, AND COLOMBIA 
CONTINUES TO EXTRADITE DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO THE U.S. 
 
¶9.  IN JUNE 1990 THE GOC ISSUED ARREST WARRANTS FOR FIVE 
BRITISH MERCENARIES ACCUSED OF TRAINING PARA-MILITARY 
GROUPS FOR COLOMBIA'S NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.  COLOMBIA 
HAS A VALID EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
BUT APPARENTLY HAS MADE NO REQUEST FOR THEIR EXTRADITION. 
 
-------------------------------- 
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REGULARLY CONDEMN 
TERRORIST ACTS, BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL.  THE 
GOC WAS THE PRIMARY INSTIGATOR OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO 
AN ANTIGUA-BROKERED ISRAELI ARMS SALE TO COLOMBIAN 
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.  IN JULY THE JUSTICE MINISTRY 
CONDUCTED A MAJOR SHAKEUP OF COLOMBIA'S PUBLIC ORDER 
COURTS, RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING TERRORISM CASES, IN AN 
EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE COURTS' PERFORMANCE. 
 
------------------------------ 
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  IN NOVEMBER THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED A MAJOR ATTACK 
ON THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT BASE OF COLOMBIA'S LARGEST 
GUERRILLA GROUP, DEALING A BLOW TO THAT GROUP'S ABILITY 
TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ACTS.  COLOMBIA AGGRESSIVELY 
CAMPAIGNS IN THE UN AND THE OAS FOR ADOPTION OF 
RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS 
TRADE.  COLOMBIA HAS ALSO CALLED FOR TIGHTER 
RESTRICTIONS IN LEGITIMATE ARMS TRANSFERS. 
 
----------------------------------- 
SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  COLOMBIA PROVIDES NO SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM OR TERRORIST GROUPS, NOR HAS THE GOVERNMENT 
MADE ANY STATEMENTS IN FAVOR OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING 
COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE.  IN 1980 COLOMBIA BROKE 
RELATIONS WITH CUBA BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S SUPPORT FOR 
COLOMBIAN GUERRILLAS. 
 
------------------------------ 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES SINCE 1989 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN COLOMBIA'S 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS TERRORISM.  THE GOC CONTINUES TO 
CONDEMN TERRORISM AND PROSECUTE TERRORISTS TO THE BEST 
OF ITS VERY LIMITED ABILITY. 
 
 
HOBBS