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Viewing cable 90PRETORIA17357, THABO MBEKI ON THE STATE OF PLAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
90PRETORIA17357 1990-10-24 14:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Pretoria
P 241418Z OCT 90
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3283
INFO RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL DURBAN
AMEMBASSY MBABANE
AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0561
USMISSION GENEVA 0133
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 17357 
 
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR FENDRICK 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PINS SF
SUBJECT:  THABO MBEKI ON THE STATE OF PLAY 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 340610             (B) PRETORIA 16918 
      (C) PRETORIA 17247 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  IN A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH DCM MCCALLIE, ANC 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR THABO MBEKI OUTLINED 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANC-INKATHA PEACE TALKS, CONTINUING SIGNS 
OF FOUL PLAY BY SECURITY FORCE ELEMENTS, AND THE STATUS OF 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SAG.  OF KEY IMPORTANCE, MBEKI SAID: 
 
  --  ANC AND INKATHA HAVE AGREED TO COOPERATE ON LOCAL 
PEACE TREATIES IN THE NATAL AREAS MOST AFFECTED BY 
VIOLENCE, LEADING TO A SUMMIT MEETING OF TOP OFFICIALS 
FROM EACH SIDE, INCLUDING MANDELA AND BUTHELEZI. 
 
  --  EVIDENCE, THOUGH NOT FIRM PROOF, CONTINUES TO 
SURFACE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ARE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR INCITING BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE; 
GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ACT AGAINST THESE ELEMENTS OR 
APPOINT A JUDICIAL ENQUIRY AGGRAVATES ANC MISTRUST. 
 
  --  THE ANC IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE CONSTITUTIONAL 
MATTERS WITH THE SAG IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP, BUT 
THE SAG HAS STALLED THESE DISCUSSIONS UNTIL VIOLENCE IS 
DOWN AND MORE PROGRESS IS REGISTERED IN THE ARMED-ACTIONS 
WORKING GROUP. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  DCM MCCALLIE AND POLOFF LUCAS CALLED ON ANC 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT CHIEF THABO MBEKI AND 
FELLOW NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC) MEMBER AZIZ 
PAHAD OCTOBER 21 AT THE LATTER'S TEMPORARY RESIDENCE IN 
MAYFAIR, JOHANNESBURG.  DURING THE TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION, 
THE DCM PRESENTED REF A DEMARCHE (WHICH HE INDICATED HAD 
ALSO BEEN DELIVERED TO BUTHELEZI - REF B) AND COVERED A 
RANGE OF OTHER TOPICS. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
NATAL PEACE:  WORKING FROM THE GROUND UP 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  IN RESPONSE TO OUR POINTS ON ENDING ANC-INKATHA 
CONFLICT, MBEKI EXPLAINED THAT THE JOINT ANC-INKATHA 
COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE HAD REACHED AGREEMENT TO PURSUE 
SERIATIM LOCAL PEACE TREATIES IN THE MOST VOLATILE AREAS 
OF NATAL AS A WAY OF LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A 
MANDELA-BUTHELEZI SUMMIT.  THE SIDES HAD AGREED, MBEKI 
CLAIMED, THAT A FAILED SUMMIT -- ONE WHICH DID NOTHING TO 
HALT THE VIOLENCE -- WOULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.  THE 
INKATHA DELEGATION, LED BY FRANK MDLALOSE, SEEMED 
GENUINELY COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND APPARENTLY 
HAD BUTHELEZI'S FULL BLESSING.  FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF 
THE EMPANGENI (OR NORTHERN NATL) ACCORD, LOCAL AGREEMENTS 
WERE CURRENTLY BEING DEVELOPED IN MPUMALANGA, NDWEDWE AND 
ELSEWHERE.  TYPICALLY, ANC AND INKATHA MEMBERS OF THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE WOULD TRAVEL TOGETHER TO THE AFFECTED 
AREAS, CALL TOGETHER LOCAL LEADERS FROM BOTH FACTIONS, AND 
HELP BROKER A PEACE TREATY. 
 
5.  MBEKI HOPED THIS PROCESS WOULD EVENTUALLY SUCCEED IN 
HALTING VIOLENCE, BUT WARNED THAT PROGRESS WAS SLOW AND 
INKATHA SHOWED SIGNS OF DIVISION.  SOME ELEMENTS WISHED TO 
DERAIL THE ADMITTEDLY DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS.  INKATHA 
JOINT COMMITTEE MEMBERS WERE SOMETIMES RELUCTANT TO DEFY 
THESE ELEMENTS OPENLY.  RUMORS HAD IT IN ONE CASE THAT 
BUTHELEZI HIMSELF INCITED LOCAL CHIEFS TO OPPOSE ANC PEACE 
INITIATIVES.  HARD WORK WOULD BE REQUIRED TO KEEP THE 
PROCESS ON TRACK AND SUSTAIN MOMENTUM, MBEKI SAID; BOTH 
SIDES NEEDED TO DESIGNATE OFFICIALS WHO COULD DEVOTE FULL 
TIME TO IT. 
 
6.  MBEKI SAID THIS PROGRESS ON THE GROUND WOULD HELP 
ENSURE A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT MEETING.  THE (##) EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE (NEC) AND INKATHA'S 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE.  THE INKATHA LEADERSHIP WAS NO LONGER 
INSISTING EXCLUSIVELY ON A ONE-ON-ONE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN 
MANDELA AND BUTHELEZI, NOR WAS MANDELA REFUSING TO MEET 
BUTHELEZI, MBEKI STATED.  DATES FOR THE AGREED GATHERING 
WOULD BE SET ONCE MANDELA RETURNS FROM ABROAD.  (NOTE: 
REF C REPORTS AN OCTOBER 22 ANC STATEMENT WHICH PROPOSES A 
MEETING OF TOP ANC AND INKATHA OFFICIALS, INCLUDING 
MANDELA AND BUTHELEZI, "WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE."  END 
NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
REEF VIOLENCE:  SECURITY FORCE ELEMENTS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7.  IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, MBEKI STOOD BY THE FAMILIAR 
ANC VIEW THAT "ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES" ARE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR INCITING VIOLENCE IN REEF TOWNSHIPS.  "WE 
ARE QUITE SURE THE VIOLENCE IS NOT SPONTANEOUS," HE SAID, 
BUT INSTIGATED IN ORDER TO "DISCREDIT THE MOVEMENT AND 
WEAKEN THE ANC."  EVIDENCE INCRIMINATING WHITE POLICE 
OFFICERS, FORMER RENAMO AGENTS, AND CCB-STYLE OPERATIVES 
CONTINUES TO MOUNT.  INKATHA ELEMENTS, PROBABLY RECRUITED 
DIRECTLY BY SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY SERVICES, ARE ALSO 
INVOLVED, MBEKI CLAIMED. 
 
8.  MBEKI ADMITTED THAT MOST LEADS IN ANC'S POSSESSION 
COULD NOT PASS FOR PROOF IN A COURT OF LAW.  HE ARGUED, 
HOWEVER, THAT THE ANC -- IN ITS CURRENT "UNDERSTAFFED, 
UNDERFINANCED" STATE -- CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP SUCH 
INFORMATION.  ONLY THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE RESOURCES TO DO 
SO.  THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NIS) CONCEDES THIS 
POINT, BUT LAW AND ORDER MINISTER VLOK AND HIS POLICE 
OFFICIALS STILL INSIST THAT THE ANC MUST PROVIDE MORE 
INFORMATION BEFORE THEY CAN ACT.  THIS ATTITUDE, TOGETHER 
WITH DE KLERK'S REFUSAL TO LAUNCH A JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION 
INTO THE CAUSES OF THE VIOLENCE, CREATES AN IMPRESSION IN 
ANC RANKS THAT PRETORIA HAS A HIDDEN AGENDA TO UNDERMINE 
ANC SUPPORT.  MBEKI WONDERED WHETHER THE SAG MIGHT ALSO 
FEAR REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE SECURITY FORCES IF STRONG 
ACTION IS TAKEN AGAINST ROGUE ELEMENTS.  HE LAMENTED THE 
FACT THAT ANC'S SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER HAD PREVENTED THE 
ORGANIZATION FROM THOROUGHLY CANVASSING BLACK TOWNSHIP 
POLICEMEN, MANY OF WHOM HAVE INFORMATION ON THE IMPROPER 
ACTIVITIES OF THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS. 
 
---------------------------- 
PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
9.  CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS WORKING GROUP.  ASKED WHEN THE 
ANC-SAG DIALOGUE WOULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE OTHER 
POLITICAL ACTORS, MBEKI EXPLAINED THAT MUCH WORK STILL 
NEEDED TO BE DONE BILATERALLY.  THE SAG AGREES THAT A 
WORKING GROUP SHOULD CONSIDER CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS, BUT 
VILJOEN HAS DECLINED TO PURSUE THESE MATTERS BEYOND A 
SINGLE MEETING (WITH THABO MBEKI) WHICH DID NO MORE THAN 
SET AN AGENDA FOR ANC-SAG EXPLORATORY TALKS.  ACCORDING TO 
MBEKI, CONSTITUTIONAL PLANNING MINISTER VILJOEN HAS PLACED 
TWO CONDITIONS ON FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DISCUSSIONS:  A 
DECREASE IN VIOLENCE COUNTRYWIDE AND MORE PROGRESS IN THE 
ARMED-ACTIONS WORKING GROUP. 
 
10.  "THE SAG HAS STALLED THE PROCESS," MBEKI ASSERTED, BY 
LINKING PROGRESS IN VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS.  THE ANC 
ARGUES THT THE DIFFERENT TRACKS SHOULD BE PURSUED 
SIMULTANEOUSLY, NOT SEQUENTIALLY.  THE ANC BELIEVES THE 
WORKING GROUP ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY 
TAKE UP CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND NEGOTIATION 
PROCESSES WITH A VIEW TO REPORTING AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND 
DISAGREEMENT TO THE NEXT ANC-SAG SUMMIT, "GROOTE SCHUUR 
III."  THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE 
SELECTED NEEDS TO BE THRASHED OUT BEFORE THE TALKS CAN BE 
BROADENED. 
 
11.  ARMED ACTIONS WORKING GROUP.  IN THIS FORUM, MBEKI 
COMPLAINED, THE SAG WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONVERT THE ANC'S 
COMMITMENT TO SUSPEND ARMED ACTIONS INTO AN ABANDONMENT OF 
THE ARMED STRUGGLE.  PRETORIA CHOOSES TO INTERPRET "ARMED 
ACTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES" (SEE THE PRETORIA MINUTE) 
VERY BROADLY TO INCLUDE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF MK 
SOLDIERS.  FOR THE ANC'S PART, IT IS WILLING TO END 
VIOLENT ACTS, INFILTRATION OF MEN AND ARMS, AND IN-COUNTRY 
TRAINING, BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A FIGHTING FORCE 
OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.  FURTHER, THE ANC FEELS IT HAS NO 
OBLIGATION TO TURN OVER WEAPONS ALREADY STOCKPILED IN 
SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
12.  POLITICAL OFFENSES WORKING GROUP.  MBEKI SAID 
PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL OFFENSES WORKING GROUP ARE 
MANAGEABLE.  THE GROUP'S FOLLOW-UP REPORT, DUE FOR RELEASE 
THIS WEEK, WOULD CLARIFY CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES, E.G., HOW TO 
APPLY FOR SUSPENSION OF POLITICAL TRIALS IN PROGRESS, AND 
WHO MUST COMPLETE THE EXILES' QUESTIONNAIRE.  THERE IS 
ANC-SAG AGREEMENT THAT THE BULK OF SECURITY PRISONERS 
WOULD BE FREE BY YEAR'S END; "THERE SHOULD BE NO ONE ON 
ROBBEN ISLAND BY JANUARY 1," MBEKI SAID.  COMPLICATED 
SECURITY CASES, AND THOSE INVOLVING PUBLIC VIOLENCE FOR 
POLITICAL REASONS, WOULD BE REVIEWED BY COMMITTEE BEFORE 
THE END OF APRIL, ACCORDING TO THE PRETORIA MINUTE. 
 
13.  ON A PHILOSOPHICAL NOTE, MBEKI IDENTIFIED THE SOURCE 
OF MUCH ANC-SAG DISAGREEMENT AS A DIFFERENCE IN 
MIND-SETS.  THE ANC ASSUMES THAT ACCORDS REACHED BETWEEN 
THE TWO PARTIES SHOULD OVERRIDE EXISTING LAW.  MEANWHILE, 
THE SAG SEEMS INCLINED TO SEEK CHANGES IN ANC-SAG 
AGREEMENTS IF THEY COME INTO CONFLICT WITH STANDING 
LEGISLATION.  THUS, THOUGH THE ARMED-ACTIONS WORKING GROUP 
HAS BEEN MANDATED TO DISCUSS THE DISPOSITION OF ANC 
WEAPONRY, SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE STILL INSIST ON THE 
ILLEGALITY OF ARMS CACHES.  SIMILAR CONFUSION HAS ARISEN 
BECAUSE THE LAW STIPULATES THAT APPLICATIONS FOR INDEMNITY 
MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE STATE PRESIDENT, YET THE 
POLITICAL OFFENSES WORKING GROUP AGREED TO INDEMNIFY WHOLE 
CLASSES OF EXILES EN MASSE.  FINALLY, THE SAG INSISTS ON 
USHERING IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION THROUGH EXISTING 
GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES, WHILE THE ANC THINKS A GENERAL 
REFERENDUM WOULD SERVE TO LAUNCH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. 
IN ANY CASE, MBEKI SAID, DE KLERK SEEMS CONFIDENT THAT HE 
CAN WIN APPROVAL FOR THE RESULTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS, AND PREVENT THE RIGHT WING FROM BLOCKING AN 
AGREEMENT. 
 
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COMMENT 
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14.  IN STARK CONTRAST TO BUTHELEZI'S DEFENSIVENESS (REF 
B), MBEKI'S RESPONSE TO OUR INTEREST IN ANC-INKATHA 
RAPPROCHEMENT WAS A DISPASSIONATE, UPBEAT EXPLANATION OF 
ONGOING EFFORTS, SPRINKLED WITH WARNINGS ABOUT THE 
DELICACY AND VULNERABILITY OF THE PROCESS.  WE AGREE THAT 
PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL WILL IMPROVE 
PROSPECTS FOR A FRUITFUL SUMMIT AND BELIEVE A CAREFULLY 
TIMED JOINT MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES, LED BY 
BUTHELEZI AND MANDELA, COULD BE PRODUCTIVE. 
 
15.  MBEKI'S SUGGESTION THAT THE SAG HAS INTRODUCED 
LINKAGE INTO THE WORKING GROUP EXERCISE MERITS 
INVESTIGATION.  IF TRUE, IT IS IRONIC THAT AS THE ANC 
MOVES AWAY FROM THE RIGID, SEQUENTIAL PROGRAM OUTLINED IN 
THE HARARE DECLARATION, THE SAG MAY HAVE BECOME LESS 
FLEXIBLE IN ITS APPROACH TO THE JOINT WORKING GROUPS. 
 
16.  CONSISTENT WITH ITS SELF-IMAGE AS THE PRIME 
OPPOSITION FORCE, THE ANC PROBABLY SEEKS TO ESTABLISH THE 
LARGEST POSSIBLE AREA OF AGREEMENT WITH THE SAG ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES BEFORE OTHER PARTIES JOIN THE 
DISCUSSION.  THE SAG, ON THE OTHER HAND, MIGHT NOW WISH TO 
LIMIT THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE UNTIL OTHER PARTIES 
CLOSER TO PRETORIA'S THINKING ARE BROUGHT ON BOARD.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
SWING.