R 311106Z MAY 90
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4337
DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
DIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 05759 
 
LAGOS FOR ROSE 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV PINR KPRP SU
SUBJECT:  SUDAN'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT:  MORE IN CHECK 
          THAN IN CHARGE 
 
¶1.  SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY:  IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 30, 
1989, WHEN ELEMENTS OF SUDAN'S ARMORED AND AIRBORNE 
FORCES SEIZED POWER FROM PRIME MINISTER SADIQ AL MAHDI, 
IT WAS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE LONG-AWAITED TAKEOVER BY 
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAD FINALLY TAKEN PLACE. 
HOWEVER, IT QUICKLY BECAME CLEAR THAT THE COUP HAD BEEN 
ORGANIZED AND CARRIED OUT BY A SELECT FEW, PERHAPS EVEN 
LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED OFFICERS AND MEN, NOT EVEN FULLY 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TWO UNITS PRIMARILY INVOLVED.  THE 
JUNTA QUICKLY ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY 
COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) COMPOSED OF FIFTEEN MILITARY 
OFFICERS RANGING IN RANK FROM BRIGADIER TO MAJOR.  SOME 
OFFICERS SENIOR TO THE RCC MEMBERS WERE RETIRED.  DESPITE 
THE RETIREMENTS AND TRANSFERS, IT APPEARED THAT SUDAN'S 
MILITARY WAS FIRMLY IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT.  MANY 
RETIRED OFFICERS WERE CALLED BACK TO ACTIVE DUTY AND 
ASSIGNED CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION POSTS SUCH AS REGIONAL 
GOVERNOR.  OTHERS WHO HAD REMAINED ON ACTIVE DUTY WERE 
PROMOTED.  MOST OF THE NEW "LEADERS" HAD SIGNIFICANT 
COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN THE SOUTH AND ALL APPEARED TO 
SUPPORT GENERAL OMAR AL BASHIR AND THE RCC. 
 
¶3.  TEN MONTHS AFTER THE COUP, THE MILITARY 
ESTABLISHMENT, AS HAVE OTHERS, HAS BEEN FORCED TO 
REEVALUATE ITS POSITION REGARDING THE GOS.  AS MANY AS 
ONE THOUSAND OFFICERS (TWENTY TO TWENTY FIVE PERCENT OF 
THE CORPS) HAVE BEEN SACKED AND THOSE REMAINING ARE 
DISILLUSIONED BY THE DISTINCT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST HUE 
OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RECENT UNITY DECLARATION WITH 
LIBYA.  THEY ARE ALSO UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S 
FAILURE TO MOVE DECISIVELY TO END THE WAR IN THE SOUTH. 
NEARLY ONE HUNDRED ACTIVE AND RETIRED OFFICERS ARE IN 
PRISON FOR TWO SEPARATE COUP PLOTS AND TWENTY EIGHT HAVE 
ALREADY BEEN EXECUTED.  RUMORS OF CONTINUING PLOTTING 
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ABOUND, BUT THE RCC AND ITS 
SECURITY APPARATUS HAVE REPORTEDLY INFILTRATED UNITS FROM 
THE HIGHEST TO THE LOWEST LEVELS, EFFECTIVELY PREEMPTING 
ANY POTENTIALLY DECISIVE ACTION.  FROM APPARENT POWER TO 
OBVIOUS EMASCULATION, SUDAN'S MILITARY IS NOW MORE IN 
CHECK THAN IN CHARGE AND FACES AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
A SMALL GROUP IN CHARGE 
 
¶4.  IN FEBRUARY 1989 WHEN SUDAN'S MILITARY LEADERS GAVE 
PRIME MINISTER SADIQ AL MAHDI AN ULTIMATUM REGARDING THE 
WAR IN THE SOUTH, IT WAS CLEAR TO MANY OBSERVERS THAT 
SADIQ'S DAYS WERE NUMBERED.  THE MILITARY HAD BECOME 
INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF 
DECISIVENESS AND PETTY PARTISAN BICKERING, THE CONTINUING 
EROSION OF THE ECONOMY, AND THE GENERAL MALAISE AFFECTING 
VIRTUALLY ALL SECTORS OF SUDANESE SOCIETY.  THUS, ON JUNE 
30, 1989 WHEN RADIO OMDURMAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE MILITARY 
HAD DEPOSED SADIQ, MOST SUDANESE WERE ACTUALLY RELIEVED. 
WIDELY REGARDED AS THE MOST RATIONAL, MOST OBJECTIVE, AND 
ONLY TRULY NATIONALIST GROUP IN SUDAN, THE MILITARY, IT 
WAS BELIEVED, WOULD END THE WAR IN THE SOUTH AND GET THE 
COUNTRY MOVING. 
 
¶5.  IT SOON BECAME CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE MILITARY HIGH 
COMMAND HAD NO ROLE IN THE COUP.  THE COUP HAD BEEN 
CARRIED OUT BY A FEW BRIGADIERS AND COLONELS WITH PERHAPS 
LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED SOLDIERS.  A FORMER PARATROOP 
COMMANDER, BRIG OMAR AL BASHIR EMERGED AS THE LEADER OF 
THE REVOLUTION.  ALTHOUGH HE QUICKLY NAMED HIMSELF AND 
FOURTEEN OTHER OFFICERS TO A REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL 
(RCC) TO RULE THE COUNTRY, CONFLICT WITH THE HIGH COMMAND 
WAS IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT.  MOST OF THE RCC MEMBERS HAD 
LITTLE COMMAND OR COMBAT EXPERIENCE.  THEY WERE PRIMARILY 
STAFF AND SUPPORT OFFICERS AND NOT ONE, INCLUDING OMAR 
HIMSELF, WAS WELL KNOWN WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
CONFLICT WITHIN THE MILITARY 
 
¶6.  RUMORS SPREAD QUICKLY OF A POSSIBLE COUNTERCOUP.  THE 
FACT THAT OMAR AND HIS GROUP SUCCEEDED BY DECEIVING UNIT 
COMMANDERS, PLAYING THEM OFF AGAINST EACH OTHER AND 
LEADING THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE ACTING WITH THE 
APPROVAL AND SUPPORT OF THE HIGH COMMAND, UNDERMINED THE 
REVOLUTION'S LEGITIMACY.  MANY BELIEVED THEN, AS THEY DO 
NOW, THAT OMAR, AIDED AND ABETTED BY THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC 
FRONT (NIF), MADE HIS MOVE WHEN AND HOW HE DID TO THWART 
OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS FROM CARRYING OUT THEIR OWN COUP. 
THEY ALSO ALLEGE THAT THE COUP WAS DESIGNED TO THWART THE 
PEACE PROCESS WHICH LOOKED PROMISING AND WHICH THE NIF 
OPPOSED.  WHETHER THE NIF WAS INVOLVED OR NOT IS STILL 
QUESTIONABLE, BUT THE PREEMPTION SCENARIO HELPS EXPLAIN 
WHY THERE WAS NO OPPOSITION TO THE COUP--NO ONE REALLY 
KNEW WHO WAS IN CHARGE AND VIRTUALLY EVERYONE SUPPORTED 
ONE COUP PLOTTER OR ANOTHER. 
 
¶7.  THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE 
MILITARY REPORTEDLY WAS THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION 
COMMANDER, MAJOR GENERAL MIRGHANI YASIN BABIKIR, A WELL 
RESPECTED OFFICER WHO MANY BELIEVED HAD HIS OWN PLANS. 
HE TOO HAD BEEN DUPED BY OMAR AND HAD IN FACT MADE OMAR'S 
SUCCESS POSSIBLE BY COMMITTING HIS DUTY OFFICER, MAJOR 
IBRAHIM SHAMS EL DIN, TO BRING FIFTEEN TANKS INTO THE 
CITY FROM THEIR BASE AT AL SHAGARA.  LITTLE DID GENERAL 
BABIKIR KNOW THAT SHAMS EL DIN WAS IN LEAGUE WITH OMAR. 
WITHOUT THE TANKS TO COMMAND KEY POINTS IN AND AROUND THE 
CITY, THE COUP PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FAILED.  THE ISOLATION 
AND SUBSEQUENT SWIFT ARREST OF THE SPAF HIGH COMMAND ALSO 
PREVENTED THE ISSUANCE OF ORDERS TO SUPPRESS BASHIR'S 
COHORTS. 
 
¶8.  OMAR REASSURED GENERAL BABIKIR AND OTHER SENIOR 
OFFICERS OF HIS NATIONALISM AND UNSELFISH COMMITMENT TO 
SUDAN.  HE ALSO ASSURED THEM HE WOULD NOT POLITICIZE THE 
MILITARY AND THAT HE WOULD KEEP IT ABOVE THE SECTARIAN 
SQUABBLES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES.  PROFESSIONAL 
OFFICERS ADOPTED A "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE. 
 
SENIOR OFFICERS OUT 
 
¶9.  WHILE REASSURING THE MILITARY ON ONE HAND, THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO DISCHARGE OFFICERS SENIOR 
TO THE RCC MEMBERS.  VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE COMMAND 
STRUCTURE WAS PENSIONED OFF ALONG WITH APPROXIMATELY 
THREE HUNDRED OTHER OFFICERS TO INCLUDE MAJOR GENERALS, 
BRIGADIERS, AND A FEW COLONELS.  SEVERAL OFFICERS 
SYMPATHETIC TO THE REVOLUTION WERE PROMOTED AND A FEW WHO 
HAD BEEN RETIRED WERE RECALLED TO SERVE AS REGIONAL 
GOVERNORS AND IN OTHER ROLES IN THE GOVERNMENT.  THE NEW 
COMMAND STRUCTURE JUSTIFIED THE RCC'S ACTIONS IN MILITARY 
TERMS, INDICATING THAT OFFICERS SENIOR TO THE MEMBERS OF 
THE RCC COULD NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM THEM.  RETIRED 
OFFICERS IN SUDAN RECEIVE NINETY PERCENT PAY SO THERE WAS 
LITTLE IMPACT ON THEIR FINANCIAL WELL-BEING.  IN MAY 
1990, HOWEVER, RETIRED OFFICERS LOST SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS 
INCLUDING ACCESS TO MILITARY COMMISSARIES AND FUEL 
SUPPLIES FOR PERSONAL VEHICLES. 
 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RCC AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 
 
¶10.  PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, AROSE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BETWEEN 
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE RCC.  THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT, IN ATTEMPTING TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY AND DEAL 
WITH THE MANY NON-MILITARY PROBLEMS FACING IT, PAID LESS 
AND LESS ATTENTION TO THE CONCERNS OF THE MILITARY 
ESTABLISHMENT.  RUMORS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONTROLLED 
OR HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (NIF) 
FURTHER UNDERMINED THE RCC.  THE MILITARY, FOR THE FIRST 
TIME, BEGAN TO FEEL THE THREAT OF POLITICIZATION. 
HOWEVER, THEY CONTINUED TO "WAIT AND SEE," THOUGH SEVERAL 
OFFICERS CLAIM THEY URGED GENERAL OMAR TO PURGE OR 
OTHERWISE CONTROL THE NIF INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. 
 
¶11.  DUE TO A GENUINE DESIRE FOR PEACE, AND PARTLY IN AN 
EFFORT TO APPEASE THE MILITARY, THE RCC ANNOUNCED A 
CONTINUATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE WITH THE SPLA/M AND 
ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE CIVIL WAR IN THE 
SOUTH.  AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEW GOVERNMENT BEGAN 
REINFORCING GARRISONS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH WITH ARMS 
PURCHASED FROM CHINA BY THE SADIQ GOVERNMENT.  ADDITIONAL 
SHIPMENTS OF SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION WERE ARRANGED WITH 
LIBYA AND IRAQ WHICH BEGAN TO MAKE DELIVERIES DIRECTLY 
INTO JUBA AS WELL AS KHARTOUM.  NEGOTIATING FROM A 
POSITION OF STRENGTH WAS THE WATCHWORD AND THE MILITARY 
ESTABLISHMENT APPEARED SATISFIED, CONVINCED OF THE RCC'S 
SINCERITY. 
 
THE WAR IN THE SOUTH 
 
¶12.  NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SPLA/M DID NOT GO WELL AND IN 
LATE OCTOBER GARANG'S FORCES ATTACKED AND TOOK THE BORDER 
TOWN OF KURMUK.  THE GOS RESPONDED BY BOMBING SEVERAL 
SOUTHERN TOWNS AND THE CEASE-FIRE EFFECTIVELY ENDED.  GOS 
FORCES RETOOK KURMUK IN LATE NOVEMBER, AFTER THE SPLA 
WITHDREW, BUT REBEL FORCES LAUNCHED SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON 
GOVERNMENT GARRISONS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH.  ADDITIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AND THE SPLA 
BESIEGED YEI IN AN EFFORT TO TAKE ALL OF EASTERN 
EQUATORIA AND ISOLATE JUBA.  THEY ALSO BEGAN 
INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING OF JUBA.  REINFORCED BY TROOPS 
FROM JUBA, YEI HELD AND THE SPLA CAMPAIGN CAME TO A 
HALT.  ALTHOUGH FIGHTING CONTINUES THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH, 
AND BOTH THE SPAF AND THE SPLA APPEAR TO BE MASSING 
TROOPS FOR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION IN UPPER NILE REGION, 
BOTH SIDES ARE AGAIN STALEMATED, ALTHOUGH SOME MIGHT 
ARGUE THAT THE SPLA NOW HAS THE UPPER HAND. 
 
PEOPLE'S ARMY OR BUDDING ISLAMIC LEGION? 
 
¶13.  AS NIF INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT INCREASED, SO DID 
DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE MILITARY.  TO PROTECT ITSELF 
FROM DISAFFECTED OFFICERS THE RCC INFILTRATED VIRTUALLY 
EVERY MILITARY UNIT WITH LOYALISTS, MANY WITH STRONG NIF 
SYMPATHIES.  AT THE SAME TIME, NIF SYMPATHIZERS WERE 
ADMITTED IN INCREASING NUMBERS TO OFFICER TRAINING 
SCHOOL.  BY EARLY APRIL 1990 SENIOR NIF MEMBERS TOLD 
EMBOFFS THAT AS MANY AS FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE OFFICER 
CORPS WERE NIF, UP FROM AN ESTIMATED LESS THAN FIVE 
PERCENT DURING THE SADIQ ERA.  FOLLOWING THE MARCH AND 
APRIL COUP ATTEMPTS, ANOTHER THREE TO FOUR HUNDRED 
OFFICERS WERE PURGED FROM THE MILITARY, INCREASING NIF 
AND OTHER LOYALIST CONTROL OF UNITS. 
 
¶14.  OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF MOST ARMY UNITS ARE STAFFED BY 
SOLDIERS AND NCOS FROM THE SOUTH.  MOST HAVE LITTLE 
COMMITMENT OR DEDICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT--THEY JOINED 
FOR THE SUGAR AND OTHER RATIONS GIVEN TO SOLDIERS, AS 
WELL AS THE SALARY.  ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE OFTEN ACQUITTED 
THEMSELVES WELL IN BATTLE, GENERALLY SURRENDERING ONLY 
WHEN THEIR FOOD AND AMMUNITION WERE DEPLETED, THEY HAVE 
LITTLE STOMACH FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.  AS WITH MORE 
OBVIOUS MERCENARIES, THEIR LOYALTY IS A FUNCTION OF THEIR 
PAY AND ALLOWANCES.  OFFICERS IN THE SOUTH ARE ALSO KNOWN 
FOR THEIR CORRUPTION WHICH NOT ONLY EARNS THEM THE ENMITY 
OF THE LOCAL POPULATION BUT ALSO FURTHER DIVIDES THEM 
FROM THEIR TROOPS.  NORTHERN, ARAB OFFICERS ARE 
REPORTEDLY LESS THAN COMFORTABLE WITH THEIR SUBORDINATES 
AND THIS FEELING OF UNEASE IS INCREASING AS THE OFFICER 
CORPS BECOME MORE AND MORE POLITICIZED. 
 
¶15.  OFFICERS ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT HIGH 
COMMAND LACKS THE PERSONALITIES AND CLOUT TO TAKE ON THE 
RCC OVER ISSUES CONCERNING THE WELFARE OF THE OFFICER 
CORPS.  THIS IS A MARKED DEPARTURE FROM THE TRADITIONAL 
POLITICO-MILITARY EQUATION IN SUDAN.  THE MILITARY HAS 
ALSO NOT BEEN IMMUNE TO RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT.  MILITARY 
OFFICERS ARE REQUIRED TO OBSERVE CURFEW HOURS AND 
CURRENCY AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.  ALTHOUGH FEW OFFICERS 
HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED BY THE REGIME, (EXCEPT THOSE 
IMPLICATED IN COUP PLOTS OR ATTEMPTS), SEVERAL, INCLUDING 
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, HAVE RELATIVES WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED 
OR ROUGHED UP BY SECURITY OFFICIALS.  IN ALMOST ALL 
CASES, THE OFFICER'S STATUS HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT TO 
PROTECT THE RELATIVE. 
 
¶16.  TO AUGMENT THE ARMY, THE GOS IN LATE 1989 PASSED THE 
POPULAR DEFENSE ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LOCAL ESTABLISHMENT 
OF POPULAR DEFENSE FORCES (PDF) AND THE ARMING OF TRIBAL 
MILITIAS.  ALTHOUGH MILITIAS ARE NOW BETTER ARMED THAN 
EVER BEFORE, THE GOS EXERTS LITTLE CONTROL OVER THEM. 
POPULAR DEFENSE FORCES HAVE BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY TAKEN 
OVER BY NIF ELEMENTS.  AS SUCH, ALTHOUGH NOMINALLY UNDER 
A MILITARY COMMANDER, THEY REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT 
COUNTERFORCE TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.  AS MANY AS 
TWO THOUSAND KHARTOUM RESIDENTS, MOSTLY NIF SYMPATHIZERS 
AND INCLUDING MANY UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WERE RECRUITED 
AND TRAINED IN THE PDF.  SEVERAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT 
MILITARY UNITS MAY EVENTUALLY BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE 
KHARTOUM AREA WHOSE SECURITY WILL BE PROVIDED FOR BY PDF 
FORCES ACTING AS A PALACE GUARD.  SUCH A CHANGE WOULD 
FURTHER REDUCE TRADITIONAL MILITARY INFLUENCE IN SUDAN. 
SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE NIF HAS ONLY BEEN MARGINALLY 
SUCCESSFUL IN THE PDF.  THERE IS LITTLE EMPATHY BETWEEN 
THEM AND THEIR TRAINERS AND MANY NIF RECRUITS HAVE 
ALREADY DESERTED DUE TO THE SPARTAN AND DISCIPLINED 
CONDITIONS IN PDF CAMPS. 
 
BUDGET/CAPABILITIES 
 
¶17.  ACTUAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 1988-1989 UNDER THE SADIQ GOVERNMENT TOTALLED 1.5 
BILLION SUDANESE POUNDS (333 MILLION USDOLS AT THE LEGAL 
RATE OF EXCHANGE).  THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989-1990 
UNDER GENERAL OMAR ALLOCATES 3.6 BILLION SUDANESE POUNDS 
(800 MILLION USDOLS) FOR DEFENSE.  NEITHER OF THESE 
FIGURES INCLUDES THE APPROXIMATELY 1 MILLION USDOLS WHICH 
THE GOS SAYS THAT IT SPENDS PER DAY IN WAGING THE WAR IN 
THE SOUTH.  ALTHOUGH THE INCREASE OF OVER 100 PERCENT IN 
DEFENSE SPENDING IS IMPRESSIVE, PLANNED EXPENDITURES IN 
THE MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE AND ENERGY ALSO DOUBLED, 
AND THE IRRIGATION MINISTRY SHOWS A 300 PERCENT 
INCREASE.  DESPITE THEIR BACKGROUNDS, THE RCC HAS NOT 
FAVORED THE MILITARY OVER OTHER MINISTRIES.  IN ADDITION, 
ACCORDING TO RCC ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, COL. SALAH 
EL DIN KARRAR, THERE WILL BE NO PROMOTIONS OR PAY RAISES 
IN THE MILITARY FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS. 
 
¶18.  SHORTLY AFTER ASSUMING POWER, GENERAL OMAR'S 
GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO RECEIVE TANKS, ARMORED CARS, AND AIR 
DEFENSE AND FIELD ARTILLERY FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA.  ALTHOUGH CONTRIBUTING SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE 
CAPABILITIES OF THE SPAF, THIS EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN ORDERED 
BY SADIQ AND FINANCED BY SAUDI ARABIA (THROUGH A THIRD 
COUNTRY) PRIOR TO JUNE 30.  SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION AND 
AIR TRANSPORTS WERE PROVIDED BY BOTH LIBYA AND IRAQ AT 
OMAR'S REQUEST.  OTHERWISE, THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS DONE 
LITTLE TO ENHANCE OR STRENGTHEN THE MILITARY. 
RECRUITMENT INTO MILITARY UNITS, AFTER AN INITIAL SURGE, 
HAS NOW TAPERED OFF IN FAVOR OF THE PDF. 
 
¶19.  SPAF STRENGTH HAS REMAINED CONSTANT WITH AN ESTIMATE 
OF APPROXIMATELY 4,000-6,000 OFFICERS AND 65,000-70,000 
ENLISTED MEN AND WOMEN.  THERE ARE 55,000-60,000 IN THE 
ARMY; 3,000 IN THE AIR FORCE; 3,000 IN THE AIR DEFENSE 
FORCE; AND 1,500 IN THE NAVY.  ORDER OF BATTLE INCLUDES 
FOUR INFANTRY DIVISIONS; ONE ARMORED DIVISION; ONE 
ENGINEER DIVISION; ONE AIRBORNE DIVISION CONSISTING OF 
ONE BRIGADE, SPECIAL FORCES AND RECONNAISANCE UNITS; 
FIELD AND AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS; AND A 
TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLY CORPS.  THE AIR FORCE HAS 
THIRTY-THREE OPERATIONAL SOVIET AND CHINESE MIG-21, 
MIG-23, F-5, AND  F-6 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT; SIX C-130 
TRANSPORTS (FIVE OPERATIONAL); THIRTY-FOUR U.S., FRENCH, 
AND SOVIET HELICOPTERS; AND FIVE OPERATIONAL SOVIET 
TRANSPORTS.  NAVAL EQUIPMENT INCLUDES EIGHTEEN COASTAL 
PATROL CRAFT, MOSTLY PROVIDED BY YUGOSLAVIA.  ALL SENIOR 
SUDANESE NAVAL OFFICERS WERE TRAINED IN YUGOSLAVIA, BUT 
NAVAL OPERATIONAL READINESS REMAINS VERY LOW. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶20.  WHILE SUDAN'S MILITARY APPEARS LITTLE CHANGED AS A 
RESULT OF THE JUNE 30, 1989 COUP, THE MILITARY 
ESTABLISHMENT IS RADICALLY DIFFERENT.  PREMATURE 
RETIREMENTS, PROMOTIONS WITHOUT REGARD TO SENIORITY, AND 
ASSIGNMENTS WITHOUT REGARD TO ABILITY HAVE SERIOUSLY 
UNDERMINED TRADITIONAL MILITARY VALUES.  TOGETHER WITH 
OBVIOUS POLITICIZATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS, THEY HAVE 
ERODED PROFESSIONALISM PERHAPS BEYOND REPAIR. 
 
¶21.  EXECUTIONS FOR THE APRIL 1990 COUP ATTEMPT FOLLOWING 
HASTILY ORGANIZED CLOSED TRIALS WITH NO REGARD TO DUE 
PROCESS HAVE FURTHER ISOLATED THE GOS FROM THE MILITARY. 
DISAFFECTION IN THE ARMED FORCES REMAINS HIGH AND IS 
LIKELY TO INCREASE.  COUP PLOTTING CONTINUES AND FUTURE 
ATTEMPTS TO DEPOSE GENERAL OMAR AND THE RCC ARE ALMOST 
CERTAIN. 
 
¶22.  WHILE THE CURRENT GOS IS CONTROLLED BY CAREER 
MILITARY OFFICERS AND NO EFFORT HAS BEEN SPARED TO 
PROVIDE THE SPAF WITH THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO 
PROSECUTE THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, SUDAN'S MILITARY IS FAR 
FROM IN CHARGE OF THE COUNTRY.  THE SPLA STILL CONTROLS 
THE MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH AND NIF INFLUENCE IN THE 
GOVERNMENT HAS DRIVEN A WEDGE BETWEEN THE RCC AND THEIR 
FORMER COMRADES IN ARMS.  SUDAN MAY HAVE A MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT, BUT FOR THE TIME BEING THE MILITARY ITSELF 
HAS BEEN CHECKED AND GENERAL OMAR APPEARS TO BE SETTING 
UP THE MATE. 
 
 
CHEEK