P 161741Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1344
INFO DIA WASHDC
DEA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 19513 
 
STATE FOR S/CT WHARTON 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1 
 
E.O. 12356: N/A 
TAGS: KPRP PTER CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 1989 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 363024; B. 88 BOGOTA 19003 
     ¶C. BOGOTA 18301 
 
 
¶1.  COLOMBIA HAS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WHICH IS UNDER 
ATTACK BY THREE SUBNATIONAL GUERRILLA GROUPS AND BY 
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.  THE COUNTRY IS THE VICTIM OF 
SUSTAINED TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE FOE OF BOTH 
GUERRILLA AND NARCOTICS-RELATED TERRORISM.  THE 
GOVERNMENT OF VIRGILIO BARCO EMERGED IN 1989 AS THE 
STANDARDBEARER IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST THE 
CRIMINAL POWER OF NARCOTERRORISTS. 
 
¶2.  THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONS ARE THREATENED THROUGH 
FREQUENT ATTACKS BY INSURGENTS ON RELATIVELY SMALL RURAL 
TOWNS AND POLICE STATIONS.  IN 1989 THE MILITARY'S 
INCREASED AGGRESSIVENESS SCORED MORE FREQUENT SUCCESSES 
AGAINST SUBVERSIVES.  AS A RESULT, THE RELATIVE BALANCE 
OF FORCES BETWEEN THE GUERRILLAS AND THE MILITARY HAS 
MOVED IN THE GOVERNMENT'S FAVOR, CULMINATING IN A 
NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE THAT RESULTED IN THE HIGHEST NUMBER 
OF GUERRILLA FATALITIES ON RECORD FOR SIMILAR ACTIONS. 
THIS IS MOSTLY DUE TO PRESIDENT BARCO, WHO HAS 
IMPLEMENTED CHANGES THAT HAVE ENHANCED SUBSTANTIALLY THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMED FORCES.  WE EXPECT THESE 
IMPROVEMENTS TO CONTINUE.  IN 1989, THE BARCO 
ADMINISTRATION ENGAGED A FOURTH SUBNATIONAL GUERRILLA 
GROUP IN PEACE TALKS, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PEACE 
INITIATIVE PROMULGATED BY THE GOC IN SEPTEMBER 1988. 
THESE PEACE TALKS APPEARED CLOSE TO FRUITION IN NOVEMBER 
1989, AS THIS GUERRILLA GROUP AGREED TO DEMOBILIZE, 
DISARM AND BECOME A LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY. 
 
¶3.  INSURGENT VIOLENCE CAN BE CONSIDERED INTERNATIONAL 
ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES HAVE AT 
TIMES CROSSED COLOMBIA'S BORDER INTO VENEZUELA, TO CARRY 
OUT KIDNAPPING AND EXTORTION SCHEMES, AND TO THE EXTENT 
THAT THE GROUPS RECEIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING 
TRAINING.  CUBA PROVIDES TRAINING TO ALL MAJOR COLOMBIAN 
GUERRILLA GROUP AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF COLOMBIANS 
TRAVEL THERE EACH YEAR, WHERE THEY TRAIN WITH 
SUBVERSIVES FROM OTHER NATIONS. 
 
¶4.  ANOTHER SOURCE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE EMANATES FROM 
THE NARCOTRAFFICKERS.  WHILE POLITICS IN NOT THE MAIN 
MOTIVE, VIOLENCE INSTIGATED BY NARCOS DELIVERS A 
POLITICAL IMPACT, CHARACTERIZED BY INTIMIDATION OF 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (ESPECIALLY THE JUDICIARY), 
INSTITUTIONS AND SUCH OPINION MAKERS AS THE MEDIA. 
NARCOTERRORISM DOES HAVE AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER 
SINCE THE TRAFFICKERS USE VIOLENCE TO EXTEND THEIR 
NETWORK AND INFLUENCE BEYOND COLOMBIA, INCLUDING THE 
UNITED STATES. 
 
¶5.  THE GOVERNMENT'S 1989 CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
NARCOTERRORISM CHANGED DRAMATICALLY THE SITUATION IN 
1988 WHEN THE GOC FAILED TO FIND A WAY TO REIMPOSE 
EXTRADITION.  MOST OFFICIALS CONSIDERED IT TOO DANGEROUS 
(SEE REFTEL C).  CONTINUED NARCO TERRORISM IN 1989, 
GALVANIZED GOVERNMENT RESOLVE AND PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST 
THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.  AFTER INCREASED VIOLENCE 
AGAINST JUDGES AND THE KILLING OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE 
AND GOVERNOR OF THE REGION AROUND MEDELLIN, THE BARCO 
ADMINISTRATION IMPLEMENTED UNPRECEDENTED MEASURES 
AGAINST NARCOS, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DECREE POWERS INVOKING COLOMBIA'S STATE OF SIEGE LAWS. 
ON AUGUST 18 JUST AS THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ADOPTING A 
NEW AND TOUGHER STANCE, THE NARCOS ESCALATED THE 
VIOLENCE FURTHER BY ASSASSINATING THE LEADING CANDIDATE 
FOR PRESIDENT.  THE PRESIDENT'S MEASURES ENHANCED AND 
STRENGTHENED THOSE ADOPTED BY THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION 
IN NOVEMBER 1988 (REFTEL B), WHICH INCLUDED THE 
IMPOSITION OF MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCES ON THOSE GUILTY 
OF KILLINGS IN THE COURSE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS.  THE 
TOUGH ANTI-NARCO DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE GOVERNMENT 
ON AUGUST 19, 1989 PROVIDED AMONG OTHER THINGS FOR 
EXTRADITION AND ASSETS FORFEITURE OF NARCOTRAFFICKERS. 
THERE FOLLOWED A SERIES OF MASSIVE RAIDS AGAINST LARGE 
NARCO PROPERTIES AND OF EXTRADITION OF A NUMBER OF 
INDIVIDUALS WANTED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 
NARCOTRAFFICKING AND/OR MONEY LAUNDERING. 
 
¶6.  NARCOTERRORISTS RETALIATED WITH BOMBINGS IN 
COLOMBIA'S MAJOR CITIES AND WITH THE SELECTIVE 
ASSASSINATION OF OPINION MAKERS (A CONGRESSMAN, THREE 
MAGISTRATES AND SEVERAL JOURNALISTS) WHO WERE IN FAVOR 
OF EXTRADITION AND OPPOSED TO THE "DIALOGUE" PROPOSED BY 
NARCOS.  IN SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER, THE SECURITY FORCES HAD 
INCREASING SUCCESS IN DEACTIVATING EXPLOSIVES, CAPTURING 
BOMBERS AND SEIZING A LARGE AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES. 
 
¶7.  BUT THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN BEGAN TO DISPLAY SIGNS 
THAT THE NARCOS WERE RECEIVING EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY AND 
TRAINING EITHER FROM THE GUERRILLA GROUPS OR FOREIGN 
ADVISORS.  IN MAY, A LARGE CHARGE WAS SET ALONG THE 
ROUTE TO WORK OF THE CHIEF OF THE COUNTRY'S 
INVESTIGATIVE POLICE (THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
SECURITY - DAS), GEN. MIGUEL MAZA MARQUEZ.  IT WAS 
COMMAND DETONATED AS HE DROVE BY BUT HE SURVIVED BECAUSE 
ANOTHER VEHICLE INTERVENED BETWEEN HIS ARMOURED CAR AND 
THE CAR BOMB.  ON DECEMBER 6, 1989, NARCOTERRORISTS 
DETONATED AN ELEVEN HUNDRED POUND EXPLOSION IN FRONT OF 
THE BOGOTA DAS HEADQUARTERS.  THE BOMB KILLED 62, 
INJURED HUNDREDS AND DEMOLISHED THE DAS HEADQUARTERS AND 
OTHER BUILDINGS.  IT WAS THE MOST DEVASTATING EXPLOSION 
IN COLOMBIA'S HISTORY.  PRECEDING THIS INCIDENT WAS THE 
MID-AIR EXPLOSION OF AN AVIANCA AIRLINER NEAR BOGOTA, 
WHICH IS BELIEVED BY EXPERTS TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN 
ON-BOARD EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.  WHILE THE AUTHORS OF THAT 
HORRIFIC ACT HAVE NOT YET BEEN IDENTIFIED, MANY ASSUME 
THAT THE TRAFFICKERS WERE RESPONSIBLE. 
 
¶7.  COLOMBIA HAS WORKED FOR ADOPTION IN THE UN AND THE 
OAS OF RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL 
ARMS TRADE, A PROPOSAL REVIVED BY PRESIDENT BARCO IN HIS 
1989 SPEECH BEFORE THE UN.  THESE EFFORTS ARE DESIGNED 
TO LIMIT THE AVAILABILITY OF SOPHISTICATED CONVENTIONAL 
ARMS TO WEALTHY TRAFFICKERS AND GUERRILLAS. 
 
¶8.  THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA HAS MADE NO PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
 
¶9.  THE PLO DOES NOT/NOT HAVE, NOR HAS IT HAD IN THE 
PAST, ANY OFFICIAL STATUS OR RECOGNITION IN COLOMBIA.  A 
PLO REPRESENTATIVE (MANDOUH GABER) WHO HAS REPORTEDLY 
VISITED COLOMBIA IN 1988-89, DOES NOT/NOT ENJOY ANY 
DIPLOMATIC OR QUASI OFFICIAL STATUS. 
 
¶10.  THERE WERE NO COURT PROSECUTIONS IN COLOMBIA IN 
1989 INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
 
 
MCLEAN