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Viewing cable 89STATE308460, U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
89STATE308460 | 1989-09-26 16:09 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State |
O 261609Z SEP 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC 0000
CIA WASHDC 0000
NSC WASHDC 0000
NSA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 308460
USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL CB US
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS
¶1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT.
¶2. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES POSTS WITH KEY THEMES
TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE PRESS, AND OTHER
INTERESTED PARTIES REGARDING OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE
CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 3) AND
INFORMATION ON THE NEXT STEPS WE PLAN TO TAKE (SEE PARA
4). TALKING POINTS FOR SOME SPECIFIC COUNTRIES MAY BE
FOUND IN PARA 5. ALSO INCLUDED IS PRESS GUIDANCE
REGARDING NEXT WEEK'S VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM
CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 6). END SUMMARY.
¶3. KEY THEMES TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE
PRESS, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN DISCUSSING
CAMBODIA:
GOALS FOR REGION
----------------
THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO ENHANCE THE POLITICAL
STABILITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. A
STABLE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA WILL SERVE
THAT GOAL BY ENDING A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THAILAND AND
REMOVING A SOURCE OF REGIONAL TENSION.
SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF
THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA INTO THE REGION, IN THE
PROCESS REDUCING THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION,
AND WOULD IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
AFTER A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, THE CONTINUED STRONG
ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE
MAINTENANCE OF A STABILIZING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE,
WILL BE WELCOMED IN THE REGION AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A
POSITIVE CLIMATE FOR U.S. INTERESTS.
GOALS FOR A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT
--------------------------------
THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING
ACTIVELY THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL EFFORTS UNDERWAY
TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN
CONFLICT.
THESE EFFORTS ARE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE DIPLOMATIC
APPROACH WITH THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT HAS THREE ASPECTS:
1) A VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS;
2) PREVENTION OF A RETURN TO DOMINANCE OF THE KHMER
ROUGE;
3) GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.
PARIS CONFERENCE MOMENTUM
-------------------------
ALTHOUGH THE PARIS CONFERENCE DID NOT ACHIEVE ANY
BREAKTHROUGHS, MANY SETTLEMENT DETAILS WERE RESOLVED
AND A GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. THE
CONFERENCE:
A) CONFIRMED THE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT. A PARTIAL SOLUTION WAS SEEN AS A RECIPE
FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE.
B) ACHIEVED A VIRTUAL CONSENSUS THAT THE UN MUST PLAY
THE CENTRAL ROLE IN ANY SETTLEMENT PROCESS.
C) ACCOMPLISHED A GOOD DEAL OF VALUABLE WORK ON THE
SPECIFIC ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING, GUARANTEES,
AND REHABILITATION AND REPATRIATION.
THE CONFERENCE DID NOT, HOWEVER, RESOLVE THE CENTRAL
PHNOM PENH REGIME DID NOT ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT
UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.
ABSENT A VIABLE POLITICAL PROCESS, THE CAMBODIAN
FACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO TURN INCREASINGLY TO MILITARY
MEANS TO RESOLVE THEIR CONFLICT, A RESULT WHICH WILL
BENEFIT NO ONE EXCEPT PERHAPS THE KHMER ROUGE.
THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO LOSE THE VALUABLE MOMENTUM
WHICH THE CONFERENCE HAS GENERATED. WE MUST
EXPEDITIOUSLY CONSIDER HOW TO OVERCOME VIETNAMESE
INTRANSIGENCE AND SUSTAIN THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. THE
CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES A NEW INSTITUTIONAL TOOL
WE CAN USE IN WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
IN THEIR FINAL STATEMENT, THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
AGREED THAT THE CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA,
WILL CONTINUE TO FACILITATE THE EFFORTS OF ALL PARTIES
TO WORK TOWARD THE GOAL OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE CO-PRESIDENTS HAVE AGREED
TO CONSULT WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS WITHIN SIX MONTHS
REGARDING THE RECONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS
ONLY SUSPENDED.
UNGA RESOLUTION
---------------
AT THIS UNGA, WE WILL WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA; WE BELIEVE
THAT THIS RESOLUTION ANNUALLY HAS REFLECTED THE OPINION
OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY REGARDING
THE CAMBODIA SITUATION.
VIETNAM'S WITHDRAWAL
--------------------
WE NOTE THAT HANOI HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO
WITHDRAW ITS REMAINING FORCES FROM CAMBODIA LATER THIS
MONTH. THIS WOULD BE WELCOME SINCE VIETNAM'S
WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE
THE VIETNAMESE INVASION MORE THAN TEN YEARS AGO.
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
WILL ONLY ACCEPT VIETNAM'S CLAIM OF A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL
IF THIS WITHDRAWAL OCCURS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A
CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM, AND WE
BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THIS MUST BE UNDER UNITED NATIONS
AUSPICES--AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
VIETNAM HAS ANNOUNCED A TOTAL OF SEVEN WITHDRAWALS
DURING THE PAST DECADE, WHICH IN MANY CASES TURNED OUT
TO BE TROOP ROTATIONS.
PHNOM PENH HAS ANNOUNCED THAT 24,000 VIETNAMESE CADRES
AND TROOPS HAVE ALREADY LEFT CAMBODIA DURING JUNE AND
JULY 1989; THIS HAS PROVEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIRM.
THIS MONTH'S WITHDRAWAL WILL APPARENTLY BE VIEWED BY
MANY JOURNALISTS AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO VIETNAM; THERE HAVE BEEN PUBLIC
REPORTS, AND WE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY, THAT A NUMBER
OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS AUSTRALIA, HAVE DECLINED
TO PARTICIPATE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CONCLUDE A
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IN PARIS. THIS HARDLY MEETS
THE CRITERIA OF CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF
THE WITHDRAWAL. ONLY AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
MECHANISM, PREFERABLY UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND WITH
SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND UNRESTRICTED ABILITY TO VISIT
ALL AREAS OF CAMBODIA WOULD BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE
ABSENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES.
WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM CAN ONLY OCCUR
AFTER A COMPLETE AND VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE
TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA IN THE CONTEXT RPT IN THE CONTEXT
OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE CAMBODIAN
CONFLICT. THE VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A
PRACTICAL REALITY, THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE
NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THEIR
CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND
OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.
IF TROOPS ARE INDEED WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA, WE HOPE
THAT THEY WILL BE DEMOBILIZED IN VIETNAM.
POSITIONING MAJOR TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE
VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN BORDER OR IN LAOS WILL ONLY RAISE
FEARS OF VIETNAM'S REINTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA--DESPITE
SRV FOREIGN MINISTER THACH'S CLAIMS THAT VIETNAM WOULD
NEVER RETURN ITS TROOPS TO CAMBODIA.
THACH'S CLAIMS MAY BE CALLED INTO QUESTION BY HUN SEN'S
RECENT COMMENTS THAT "IT IS THE LEGITIMATE R1GHT OF THE
CAMBODIAN PEOPLE" TO CALL FOR OUTSIDE HELP IF THERE IS
OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
POSITIONING VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTHERN LAOS WOULD
ALSO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT HANOI'S RESPECT IN
GENERAL FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS.
UNALTERABLE OPPOSITION TO A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER
--------------------------------------------- ----------
THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A
RETURN TO POWER OF THE MURDEROUS KHMER ROUGE.
A DURABLE SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT MUST BE BASED ON A
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH INCORPORATES A SERIES OF
EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE KHMER ROUGE WILL BE
CONTAINED.
IN THIS REGARD, WE REGULARLY PRESS ALL THOSE INVOLVED
TO CUT BACK THEIR AID TO THE KHMER ROUGE AND OTHERWISE
HELP CONTROL THE KR IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE
CAMBODIAN SOLUTION.
OUR STRONG PREFERENCE IS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE NOT
PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENTS; HOWEVER,
ASEAN AND PRINCE SIHANOUK HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT
THE BEST APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE KHMER ROUGE IS
THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A STAKE IN A POLITICAL
PROCESS, ONE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS AGAINST
THEIR RETURN TO DOMINANCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE MADE
CLEAR THAT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT ANY CAMBODIAN
GOVERNMENT IS DIRECTLY AND INVERSELY RELATED TO THE
DEGREE OF KHMER ROUGE PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN IT.
NON-ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL PHNOM PENH REGIME CONTROL
--------------------------------------------- ---------
AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEADERS OF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME
SHARE THIS UNACCEPTABLE BACKGROUND; MANY ARE FORMER
KHMER ROUGE OFFICIALS FROM THE EASTERN MILITARY ZONE OF
CAMBODIA--INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN, COMMUNIST
PARTY LEADER HENG SAMRIN, AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LEADER
CHEA SIM.
HUN SEN HAS PROVED HIMSELF TO BE AN ABLE POLITICAL
TACTICIAN AND COMPETENT MANIPULATOR OF THE NEWS MEDIA;
HOWEVER, WE CAN ASSUME THAT AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND
REGIMENTAL DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR HIS MILITARY REGION
BEFORE DEFECTING FROM THE KHMER ROUGE TO VIETNAM IN
1977, HUN SEN PARTICIPATED AT A RESPONSIBLE LEVEL IN
THE KIND OF MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE MADE THE
KHMER ROUGE NAME A BYWORD FOR INFAMY.
THESE FORMER KR OFFICIALS ALSO REPRESENT AN
ILLEGITIMATE REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED FOR THE PAST
DECADE BY FOREIGN FORCE OF ARMS; THE PHNOM PENH REGIME
IS ALSO ACQUIRING A SIGNIFICANT REPUTATION FOR
CORRUPTION.
ONLY A COMPROMISE ON POWER-SHARING BASED ON NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRINCE
SIHANOUK--THE SYMBOL OF TRUE CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM--CAN
ESTABLISH AN AUTHORITY WITH LEGITIMACY FOR THE INTERIM
PERIOD UNTIL ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK
--------------------------------
THE GOAL OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN
HELPING TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.
WHILE THE CORE OF OUR APPROACH IS A SUSTAINED
DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, WE BELIEVE THAT STRENGTHENING OUR
PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE
CAMBODIAN NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE (NCR) WILL ALLOW THE
NCR TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN A SETTLEMENT WHICH SERVES THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND PREVENTS A
KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER.
WE ARE NOT ALONE IN SUPPORTING THE NCR; THE
NON-COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ASSISTANCE IN A
VARIETY OF FORMS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. OUR
EFFORTS ARE IN SUPPORT OF AND AT THE REQUEST OF THE
NON-COMMUNISTS AND THESE COUNTRIES.
U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST
RESISTANCE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE NON-LETHAL. WE
CANNOT OFFER SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE SUPPORT WE AND
THE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ARE PROVIDING; BECAUSE
THIS ASSISTANCE GOES TO GUERRILLA FORCES OPERATING
INSIDE CAMBODIA, ANY DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF THESE
PROGRAMS COULD BE OF POTENTIAL UTILITY TO THE
ADVERSARIES OF THE NCR.
MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PHNOM PENH REGIME
--------------------------------------------
NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR
THE NON-COMMUNISTS IS MINOR IN COMPARISON TO THE
MASSIVE QUANTITY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO
PHNOM PENH BY THE SOVIET UNION, EITHER DIRECTLY OR VIA
VIETNAM--AN AMOUNT ESTIMATED AT $1.1 BILLION BETWEEN
1984 AND 1988.
THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS THAT THIS SOVIET
ASSISTANCE--A MASSIVE AMOUNT FOR A COUNTRY OF ONLY
SEVEN MILLION PEOPLE--HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY THIS
YEAR AND IS NOW ESTIMATED TO BE WELL OVER TEN TIMES THE
QUANTITY THE CHINESE CURRENTLY PROVIDE THE KHMER ROUGE.
THESE RECENTLY REPORTED INCREASED TRANSFERS OF
EQUIPMENT TO THE PHNOM PENH REGIME SUGGEST THAT THE PRK
IS MOVING AWAY FROM DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO ACHIEVE A
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN PREPARATION FOR A RETURN TO THE
BATTLEFIELD.
NOT TIME FOR NORMALIZATION WITH VIETNAM
---------------------------------------
IN LIGHT OF ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING
VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE IN PARIS, THE CURRENT
STALEMATE REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, AND
APPARENT MOVEMENT BACKWARDS TOWARD A MILITARY OPTION,
NORMALIZATION OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM WOULD BE
PREMATURE.
IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, WE BELIEVE THAT OTHER
COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND
ECONOMIC/AID RELATIONSHIPS WITH VIETNAM.
¶4. NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. (THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE
FROM A SPEECH BY EAP ASSISTANCE SECRETARY RICHARD
SOLOMON IN LOS ANGELES EARLIER THIS MONTH):
THREE PROPOSITIONS
------------------
THREE PROPOSITIONS UNDERLIE THIS ADMINISTRATION'S
APPROACH TO THIS CONTINUING TRAGEDY:
-- FIRST, CAMBODIA IS A CHALLENGE TO THE CONSCIENCE
AND CONCERN OF THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE
CAMBODIAN PEOPLE DESERVE THEIR OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT -- AND WE WANT TO ENSURE
THAT THERE ARE NO MORE CAMBODIAN KILLING FIELDS. THE
UNITED STATES WILL PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSUIT OF
THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT WE
HAVE NEITHER THE POLITICAL POSITION NOR THE RESOURCES
TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES ON OUR OWN.
-- SECOND, OUR PRIMARY SECURITY OBLIGATION IN THIS
REGION IS TO THAILAND, TO WHICH WE ARE LEGALLY BOUND BY
THE MANILA PACT OF 1954. AS WELL, WE HAVE A MAJOR
INTEREST IN THE CONTINUING INTEGRITY AND VITALITY OF
ASEAN.
-- AND THIRD, WE HAVE A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IN SEEING
INDOCHINA FREED OF THE RIVALRIES OF THE GREAT POWERS --
AN OBJECTIVE MOST LIKELY REALIZED IF CAMBODIAN AND
VIETNAM ARE AT PEACE WITHIN THEMSELVES AND WITH THEIR
NEIGHBORS.
THREE ACTIVITIES
----------------
GIVEN THESE PROPOSITIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL
PURSUE THREE LEVELS OF ACTIVITY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD,
ALL DESIGNED TO BUILD ON THE DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM OF
PARIS:
-- WE WILL SUSTAIN ACTIVE CONTACTS WITH THE FIVE
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. FRANCE,
CHINA, AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE MAJOR POWERS WITH
THE MOST DIRECT INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS IN CAMBODIA AND
VIETNAM.
THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE PRIMARY SUPPORTER OF VIETNAM
AND HUN SEN, MUST RESTRICT ITS INCREASING FLOW OF ARMS
INTO CAMBODIA, AND BRING HANOI TO SEE THAT ITS OWN
INTERESTS WILL NOT BE SERVED BY ANOTHER CYCLE OF
WARFARE IN INDOCHINA -- WHICH CERTAINLY WILL BE THE
CASE IF IT SEEKS FULL POWER FOR HUN SEN IN THE ABSENCE
OF A PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.
IN RETURN, HANOI AND HUN SEN -- AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY -- HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT CHINA TO EQUALLY
RESTRICT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE.
INDEED, BEIJING HAS AN OBLIGATION TO TAKE ACTIVE
MEASURES THAT WILL PREVENT THE KHMER ROUGE FROM AGAIN
IMPOSING A MURDEROUS RULE ON THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.
FRANCE, FOR ITS PART, IS DUE CREDIT FOR TAKING THE
DIPLOMATIC RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRYING TO HELP THE
CAMBODIAN FACTIONS BRIDGE THEIR DIFFERENCES. WE SHOULD
POINT OUT THAT THE PARIS CONFERENCE WAS ONLY SUSPENDED,
NOT ADJOURNED -- SO THAT FRANCE AND CONFERENCE
CO-CHAIRMAN INDONESIA HAVE A CONTINUING MANDATE TO WORK
FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.
-- AT A SECOND LEVEL, THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO WORK
CLOSELY WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT. THEIR
SECURITY INTERESTS ARE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE IN INDOCHINA; AND WE WILL SUPPORT
THEIR EFFORTS -- MOST IMMEDIATELY AT THE UPCOMING
SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
-- AND FINALLY, WE WILL SUSTAIN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE
NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND PRINCE SIHANOUK AS THE
POLITICAL CENTER OF A PROCESS OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION.
SOME NOW ARGUE THAT THE THREAT OF A KHMER ROUGE
RESURGENCE IS SUCH THAT THE U.S. MUST RELY ON HUN SEN
RATHER THAN PRESS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT. THIS APPROACH IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED ON
SEVERAL COUNTS.
FIRST, A REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED BY FOREIGN FORCE
OF ARMS LACKS LEGITIMACY. VIOLATING THIS FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE WOULD PUT AT RISK THE INTEGRITY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND BE TO OUR PERIL IN MANY OTHER
PARTS OF THE WORLD. SECOND, THERE IS AT PRESENT LITTLE
BASIS FOR ASSUMING THAT HUN SEN'S UNPROVEN FORCES,
ABSENT THEIR VIETNAMESE PROTECTORS, CAN ELIMINATE THE
KHMER ROUGE, A GOAL THAT ELUDED HANOI'S VAUNTED ARMY
FOR THE PAST DECADE. AND LASTLY, IN THE ABSENCE OF A
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SUPPORTED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK, SUCH
A MOVE WOULD PIT THE U.S. AGAINST CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM
-- A POLICY HARDLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
AS DEMOCRATS (WITH A SMALL "D"), OUR COMMITMENT MUST BE
TO A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT PERMITS NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. WE SEE
PRESS REPORTS OF HUN SEN'S POPULARITY, OF REFORMIST
POLICIES PROMOTED BY PHNOM PENH THAT ARE RESTORING
BUDDHISM AND ALLOWING PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE MARKET
ACTIVITY. IF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IS AS POPULAR AS
ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN PORTRAYS IT TO BE, IT CAN
ONLY BENEFIT BY TAKING ITS CASE TO THE PEOPLE IN FREE
AND FAIR ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE UN.
THE U.S. REMAINS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF SUCH
A CREDIBLE TEST OF CAMBODIAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND TO
WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN SUPPORTING A
PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA THAT
CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO
DOMINANCE.
THUS, THE ISSUE COMES BACK TO WHETHER THE CAMBODIAN
FACTIONS, ENCOURAGED BY THEIR FOREIGN SUPPORTERS, CAN
JOIN TOGETHER IN A POLITICAL PROCESS OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION. THE U.S. WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE TO
MOVE EVENTS IN THIS DIRECTION. CHINA AND THE SOVIET
UNION MUST DO THE SAME. MOSCOW, IN PARTICULAR, MUST
ACCEPT AND ACT ON THE REALITY THAT WITHOUT SOME
WILLINGNESS BY VIETNAM AND HUN SEN TO COMPROMISE ON
POWER-SHARING, THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT,
NO RESPITE FROM ARMED CONFLICT.
¶5. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS FOR SELECTED
HOST GOVERNMENTS:
AUSTRALIA
---------
WE APPRECIATE THE WAY WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON THIS
ISSUE, MOST RECENTLY AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE.
WE BOTH AGREE THAT EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER
ROUGE RETURN TO POWER ARE VITAL. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE
THAT THE KEY TO CONTROLLING THE KHMER ROUGE IS A
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BUILT AROUND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK.
THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC AND
ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH
REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.
WE APPRECIATED YOUR INFORMING THE VIETNAMESE AT THE END
OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE THAT FAILURE TO REACH A
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN THAT AUSTRALIA WILL
CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF NOT PROVIDING OFFICIAL AID TO
THE SRV.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO
IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS
EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF.
WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION
OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A
COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS
TO THE FUND.
BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND
----------------------------------------
WE WANT TO AGAIN THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE
CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION THAT OUR DELEGATIONS
ENJOYED THROUGHOUT THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD
UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING
DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE
DELIBERATIONS.
THE CONFERENCE AGAIN CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY TO ANY
SETTLEMENT IS THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING: HOW TO
CONSTRUCT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK
WHICH WOULD GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.
THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, OF COURSE, WAS THE
TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE WHICH HANOI AND THE PHNOM
PENH REGIME ADOPTED ON THIS ISSUE. THIS UNCOMPROMISING
STANCE WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE MANNER IN WHICH
PRINCE SIHANOUK APPROACHED THE PROBLEM.
AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING
ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE OUTLINE
FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN STATES
PRODUCED AT THE VERY END OF THE CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH WE
REALIZE THAT THIS PROBLEM BASICALLY MUST BE RESOLVED BY
THE CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES, EFFORTS BY OTHERS CAN BE
HELPFUL IN PROVIDING USEFUL NEW APPROACHES.
IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI
AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST
RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH
TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. IT IS VITAL FOR ASEAN TO
CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN
PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN
CAMBODIA. ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S.
WORKING RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN
DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING
THE DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN
RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN AT THIS
YEAR'S UNGA TO ENSURE STRONG SUPPORT FOR YOUR CAMBODIA
RESOLUTION.
WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE
PHNOM PENH REGIME.
CANADA
------
WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY AGAIN TO THANK
YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE
COOPERATION OUR TWO DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE
PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD
UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING
DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE
DELIBERATIONS.
IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI
AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST
RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH
TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS
IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC
INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.
CHINA
-----
WE WANT TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE CLOSE
COOPERATION THAT EXISTED IN PARIS BETWEEN OUR TWO
DELEGATIONS.
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD
UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE. THE ALTERNATIVE TO
ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT QUICKLY, WE FEAR, WILL BE A
PERIOD OF CIVIL WARFARE. SHOULD THE KHMER ROUGE BEGIN
TO DEMONSTRATE MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THIS WILL RISK
SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE OUR
SUPPORT FOR THE TWO NON-COMMUNIST FACTIONS WITH WHICH
THE KHMER ROUGE IS AFFILIATED.
YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE KHMER
ROUGE AND THE NEED FOR CONTROLS TO ASSURE THAT THEY DO
NOT RETURN TO POWER IN CAMBODIA. WE WERE VERY
INTERESTED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY
YOUR DELEGATION IN PARIS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE'S ROLE IN
AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT COULD BE LESS THAN THE OTHER
FACTIONS.
WE ARE CONTINUING TO URGE THE SOVIETS TO PUSH THE
VIETNAMESE AND HUN SEN TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY ON
THE TRANSITIONAL POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.
TO AVERT AN ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA, WE ARE
ASKING THE SOVIETS TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF ARMS TO ITS
CAMBODIAN ALLY. SIMILARLY, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD
ALSO RESTRICT THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE.
THE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA OF SENIOR KHMER
ROUGE LEADERS LIKE POL POT, IENG SARY AND TA MOK IS
PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO
EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT, IF YOUR
GOVERNMENT WOULD STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THESE UNACCEPTABLE
KHMER ROUGE LEADERS TO RELOCATE TO CHINA.
FRANCE
------
WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR ALL OF THE HARD
WORK THAT YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STAFF,
ESPECIALLY CLAUDE MARTIN, DEVOTED TOWARD MAKING THE
PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA A SUCCESS.
ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE A COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A
GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.
IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND
ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH
REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.
IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY
SHOULD CONTINUE TO IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL
ASSISTANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE
RESOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH
AS THE IMF.
WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND
TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO
HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND.
WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD UPON THE
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ACHIEVED AT THE CONFERENCE.
INDONESIA
---------
WE WOULD LIKE AGAIN TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES
FOR YOUR IMPRESSIVE EFFORTS, ALONG WITH THOSE OF OUR
FRENCH FRIENDS, TO ORGANIZE AND GUIDE THE MONTH-LONG
PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. WE ADMIRE THE DEDICATION
AND COURAGE YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
DISPLAYED IN UNDERTAKING--DESPITE DAUNTING ODDS--THIS
IMPORTANT INITIATIVE TO EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE TRAGIC
CAMBODIAN CONFLICT.
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD
UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE AND
ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT
INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE DELIBERATIONS.
AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING
ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE
OUTLINE FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN
DELEGATIONS WERE DISCUSSING AT THE VERY END OF THE
CONFERENCE. IT MAY CONTAIN ELEMENTS YOU WOULD FIND
USEFUL IN ATTEMPTING, UNDER YOUR MANDATE FROM THE
CONFERENCE, TO REVIVE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE CAMBODIANS
AND OTHER INVOLVED STATES ON THIS KEY ISSUE.
IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI
AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST
RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH
TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. OF COURSE, CONTINUED ASEAN
LEADERSHIP IN PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT IS VITAL. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE
TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION
WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.
JAPAN
-----
WE APPRECIATE THE SOLIDARITY THAT JAPAN HAS SHOWN WITH
US ON THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE AND THE CLOSE COOPERATION
BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE.
THE CHIEF IMPASSE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE WAS
THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ON
THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO REAL INTEREST ON
THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER
PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.
THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE
PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON
THEIR PART, A POSITION EACH OF US SHARES.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO
IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS
EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF.
WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND
TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO
HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND. WE
APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S STEADFAST SUPPORT ON THIS
ISSUE.
WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A
COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT. AT THIS UNGA, WE
ALSO NEED TO WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT
OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA.
MALAYSIA
--------
WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE
COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR
DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON
CAMBODIA. WE ADMIRED THE ACTIVE ROLE YOUR COUNTRY
PLAYED AT THE MEETING, PARTICULARLY IN THE TAXING JOB
OF CO-CHAIRING THE COMMITTEE ON GUARANTEES.
AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE
CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM
PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO
REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM
GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE
THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.
IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC
AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH
REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.
IT IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL FOR ASEAN TO CONTINUE TO SPEAK
WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN PROMOTING A
COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA. ASEAN'S
LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S. WORKING
RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN DEALING
WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING THE
DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN RESOLUTION
ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
NEW ZEALAND
-----------
WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED A
WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL TO A
UN-ADMINISTERED INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
MECHANISM/PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. HOPEFULLY, FURTHER
NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WILL MAKE THIS A REALITY.
PHILIPPINES
-----------
(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)
SINGAPORE
---------
(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)
SOVIET UNION
------------
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TO CONTINUE THE POSITIVE
MOMENTUM GENERATED BY THE PARIS CONFERENCE. WE EXPECT
THAT IN KEEPING WITH THE CLOSING STATEMENT, CONFERENCE
CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA, WILL SOON BEGIN
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES WITH A VIEW
TOWARD REENERGIZING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CORE
POWER-SHARING ISSUE.
TO BE FRANK, HOWEVER, UNLESS HANOI AND PHNOM PENH
CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AND BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD
FAITH, WE ARE AFRAID THAT ESCALATING VIOLENCE WILL SOON
ADD TO THE MISFORTUNES OF THE LONG-SUFFERING CAMBODIAN
PEOPLE.
INCREASING INSTABILITY IN CAMBODIA WILL ALSO HAVE
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS. IT WILL
REFLECT BADLY ON OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO RESOLVE
REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INEVITABLY PROMOTE STRAINS IN
OUR BILATERAL TIES.
WE PLAN TO WORK WITH OUR CAMBODIAN FRIENDS AND OTHER
ALLIES IN THE REGION TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED IN A
COSTLY MILITARY TEST OF STRENGTH AND TO ENCOURAGE A
QUICK RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.
WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN REDOUBLED EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION
TO THIS PROLONGED REGIONAL CONFLICT. IT IS
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES TAKE
CONCRETE STEPS TO CURTAIL AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE THE
FLOW OF ARMS INTO CAMBODIA.
TO MOVE THIS POLITICAL PROCESS FORWARD, WE WOULD EXPECT
YOU TO USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH BOTH HANOI
AND PHNOM PENH TO CONVINCE THEM THAT A COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT BASED ON AN INTERIM CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT LED
BY PRINCE SIHANOUK AND INCLUDING EQUITABLE
REPRESENTATION FOR THE NON-COMMUNISTS AS WELL AS THE
HUN SEN FACTION IS ESSENTIAL. IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO
AVERT A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND TO
FORESTALL THE LOOMING SPECTER OF A KHMER ROUGE RETURN
TO POWER.
AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A KR RETURN
TO POWER IN CAMBODIA AND STRONGLY PREFER THAT THEY HAVE
NO ROLE IN ANY CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT.
WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT BEIJING DID NOT
SUPPORT AN EQUAL ROLE FOR THE KHMER ROUGE IN AN INTERIM
GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVE THAT THIS OPENING SHOULD BE
EXPLOITED TO MINIMIZE ANY ROLE FOR THE KR. WE HOPE
THAT YOU CAN PERSUADE HANOI AND PHNOM PENH TO PURSUE
THIS OPPORTUNITY.
SWEDEN
------
YOUR EMBASSY HAS INFORMED US IN WASHINGTON THAT YOU
HAVE DECLINED THE SRV AND PRK INVITATION TO MONITOR THE
VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL, STATING THAT YOU WOULD ONLY
PARTICIPATE IF ALL PARTIES WERE AGREED AND IF THERE
WERE A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE.
WE APPRECIATE THE POSITION OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON
THIS ISSUE.
THAILAND
--------
(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)
UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE
COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR TWO
DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON
CAMBODIA. ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE THE
COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT WHICH WE BOTH
SOUGHT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A
GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.
AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE
CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM
PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO
REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM
GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE
THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.
IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE
PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ECOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON
THEIR PARTS.
¶6. THE FOLLOWING EAP PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE VIETNAMESE
WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA WAS PREPARED SEPTEMBER 21,
1989:
Q: THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOW WITHDRAWN THEIR TROOPS FROM
CAMBODIA. WHAT'S OUR REACTION?
A: WHILE WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN
INTERNATIONALLY-VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL, PREFERABLY UNDER
THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND IN THE CONTEXT OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT, WE
WELCOME HANOI'S APPARENT PULL-OUT AS AN END TO ITS
TEN-YEAR OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. WE NOTE THAT THIS HAS
BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE THE VIETNAMESE
INVASION. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT VIETNAM CANNOT
EVADE ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP ACHIEVE IN CAMBODIA A
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION.
Q: WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, WILL THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL
HAVE ON OUR CAMBODIAN POLICY?
A: THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA, UNFORTUNATELY,
DID NOT ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE OF FINALIZING A
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TO THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT. TO A
LARGE EXTENT, IT WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE
PHNOM PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING WHICH
PRECLUDED A COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT THE
CONFERENCE'S INITIAL SESSION.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT MUST BE RESOLVED
POLITICALLY AND NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE, THEREFORE,
WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE CONFERENCE CO-PRESIDENTS
AND PARTICIPANTS IN BUILDING UPON THE PROGRESS ALREADY
MADE TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TOWARD A RESOLUTION.
Q: NOW THAT VIETNAM HAS PULLED ITS TROOPS OUT OF
CAMBODIA AS WE DEMANDED, ARE WE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH
RELATIONS WITH HANOI AS WE AGREED?
¶A. WE AGREED TO JOIN THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA
WITH THE HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD ACHIEVE A
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRAGIC CAMBODIAN
CONFLICT INCLUDING A VERIFIED TOTAL VIETNAMESE
WITHDRAWAL, ASSURANCES AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE KHMER
ROUGE, AND A PROCESS LEADING TO REAL SELF-DETERMINATION
FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.
IF THE CONFERENCE HAD ACHIEVED THAT OBJECTIVE, WE WERE
PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS
WITH HANOI, AS WE HAVE STATED MANY TIMES. THE
VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A PRACTICAL REALITY,
THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE
AFFECTED BY THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE
POW/MIA ISSUE AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONFERENCE REACHED AN IMPASSE ON THE
ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING -- TO A LARGE EXTENT DUE TO THE
INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME. THEY
REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE FOR A INTERIM COALITION GOVERNMENT
UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK, WHICH WOULD LEAD THE COUNTRY TO
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. THEY CLEARLY INTEND THAT THE PRK
SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF POWER UNTIL ELECTIONS.
WE, AND MOST OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT THE
CONFERENCE, ARE CONVINCED THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
ARE NOT POSSIBLE UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.
WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT SIGNS OF INCREASING
DELIVERIES OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE PHNOM PENH
REGIME AND THE IMPLICATIONS THAT MAY HAVE FOR AN
ESCALATION OF THE VIOLENCE.
IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE
NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH HANOI WOULD BE
PREMATURE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT IF THE OTHER
PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND
ECONOMIC TIES WITH VIETNAM, HANOI CAN BE CONVINCED TO
ADOPT A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH TOWARD SEEKING A
COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN
CONFLICT.
EAGLEBURGER