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Viewing cable 89STATE308460, U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
89STATE308460 1989-09-26 16:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
O 261609Z SEP 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
 SECDEF WASHDC 0000
 CIA WASHDC 0000
 NSC WASHDC 0000
NSA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 308460 
 
USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL CB US
SUBJECT:  U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY:  THIS CABLE PROVIDES POSTS WITH KEY THEMES 
TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE PRESS, AND OTHER 
INTERESTED PARTIES REGARDING OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 3) AND 
INFORMATION ON THE NEXT STEPS WE PLAN TO TAKE (SEE PARA 
4).  TALKING POINTS FOR SOME SPECIFIC COUNTRIES MAY BE 
FOUND IN PARA 5.  ALSO INCLUDED IS PRESS GUIDANCE 
REGARDING NEXT WEEK'S VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM 
CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 6).  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  KEY THEMES TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE 
PRESS, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN DISCUSSING 
CAMBODIA: 
 
GOALS FOR REGION 
---------------- 
THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO ENHANCE THE POLITICAL 
STABILITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.  A 
STABLE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA WILL SERVE 
 
THAT GOAL BY ENDING A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THAILAND AND 
REMOVING A SOURCE OF REGIONAL TENSION. 
 
SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF 
THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA INTO THE REGION, IN THE 
PROCESS REDUCING THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, 
AND WOULD IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. 
 
AFTER A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, THE CONTINUED STRONG 
ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE 
MAINTENANCE OF A STABILIZING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, 
WILL BE WELCOMED IN THE REGION AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A 
POSITIVE CLIMATE FOR U.S. INTERESTS. 
 
GOALS FOR A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT 
-------------------------------- 
THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING 
ACTIVELY THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL EFFORTS UNDERWAY 
TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN 
CONFLICT. 
 
THESE EFFORTS ARE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE DIPLOMATIC 
APPROACH WITH THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING A 
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT HAS THREE ASPECTS: 
 
1) A VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS; 
2) PREVENTION OF A RETURN TO DOMINANCE OF THE KHMER 
ROUGE; 
3) GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. 
 
PARIS CONFERENCE MOMENTUM 
------------------------- 
ALTHOUGH THE PARIS CONFERENCE DID NOT ACHIEVE ANY 
BREAKTHROUGHS, MANY SETTLEMENT DETAILS WERE RESOLVED 
AND A GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.  THE 
CONFERENCE: 
 
A) CONFIRMED THE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT.  A PARTIAL SOLUTION WAS SEEN AS A RECIPE 
FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE. 
 
B) ACHIEVED A VIRTUAL CONSENSUS THAT THE UN MUST PLAY 
THE CENTRAL ROLE IN ANY SETTLEMENT PROCESS. 
 
C) ACCOMPLISHED A GOOD DEAL OF VALUABLE WORK ON THE 
SPECIFIC ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING, GUARANTEES, 
AND REHABILITATION AND REPATRIATION. 
 
THE CONFERENCE DID NOT, HOWEVER, RESOLVE THE CENTRAL 
PHNOM PENH REGIME DID NOT ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION 
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT 
UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO 
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. 
 
ABSENT A VIABLE POLITICAL PROCESS, THE CAMBODIAN 
FACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO TURN INCREASINGLY TO MILITARY 
MEANS TO RESOLVE THEIR CONFLICT, A RESULT WHICH WILL 
BENEFIT NO ONE EXCEPT PERHAPS THE KHMER ROUGE. 
 
THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO LOSE THE VALUABLE MOMENTUM 
WHICH THE CONFERENCE HAS GENERATED.  WE MUST 
EXPEDITIOUSLY CONSIDER HOW TO OVERCOME VIETNAMESE 
INTRANSIGENCE AND SUSTAIN THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS.  THE 
CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES A NEW INSTITUTIONAL TOOL 
WE CAN USE IN WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. 
 
IN THEIR FINAL STATEMENT, THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS 
AGREED THAT THE CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA, 
WILL CONTINUE TO FACILITATE THE EFFORTS OF ALL PARTIES 
TO WORK TOWARD THE GOAL OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT.  IN ADDITION, THE CO-PRESIDENTS HAVE AGREED 
TO CONSULT WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS WITHIN SIX MONTHS 
REGARDING THE RECONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS 
ONLY SUSPENDED. 
 
UNGA RESOLUTION 
--------------- 
AT THIS UNGA, WE WILL WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA; WE BELIEVE 
THAT THIS RESOLUTION ANNUALLY HAS REFLECTED THE OPINION 
OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY REGARDING 
THE CAMBODIA SITUATION. 
 
VIETNAM'S WITHDRAWAL 
-------------------- 
WE NOTE THAT HANOI HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO 
WITHDRAW ITS REMAINING FORCES FROM CAMBODIA LATER THIS 
MONTH.           THIS WOULD BE WELCOME SINCE VIETNAM'S 
WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE 
THE VIETNAMESE INVASION MORE THAN TEN YEARS AGO. 
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
WILL ONLY ACCEPT VIETNAM'S CLAIM OF A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL 
IF THIS WITHDRAWAL OCCURS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A 
CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM, AND WE 
BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THIS MUST BE UNDER UNITED NATIONS 
AUSPICES--AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. 
 
VIETNAM HAS ANNOUNCED A TOTAL OF SEVEN WITHDRAWALS 
DURING THE PAST DECADE, WHICH IN MANY CASES TURNED OUT 
TO BE TROOP ROTATIONS. 
 
PHNOM PENH HAS ANNOUNCED THAT 24,000 VIETNAMESE CADRES 
AND TROOPS HAVE ALREADY LEFT CAMBODIA DURING JUNE AND 
JULY 1989; THIS HAS PROVEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIRM. 
 
THIS MONTH'S WITHDRAWAL WILL APPARENTLY BE VIEWED BY 
MANY JOURNALISTS AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF 
GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO VIETNAM; THERE HAVE BEEN PUBLIC 
REPORTS, AND WE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY, THAT A NUMBER 
OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS AUSTRALIA, HAVE DECLINED 
TO PARTICIPATE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CONCLUDE A 
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IN PARIS.  THIS HARDLY MEETS 
THE CRITERIA OF CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF 
THE WITHDRAWAL.  ONLY AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
MECHANISM, PREFERABLY UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND WITH 
SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND UNRESTRICTED ABILITY TO VISIT 
ALL AREAS OF CAMBODIA WOULD BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE 
ABSENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES. 
 
WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM CAN ONLY OCCUR 
AFTER A COMPLETE AND VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE 
TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA IN THE CONTEXT RPT IN THE CONTEXT 
OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE CAMBODIAN 
CONFLICT.  THE VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A 
PRACTICAL REALITY, THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE 
NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THEIR 
CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND 
OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS. 
 
IF TROOPS ARE INDEED WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA, WE HOPE 
THAT THEY WILL BE DEMOBILIZED IN VIETNAM. 
 
POSITIONING MAJOR TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE 
VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN BORDER OR IN LAOS WILL ONLY RAISE 
FEARS OF VIETNAM'S REINTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA--DESPITE 
SRV FOREIGN MINISTER THACH'S CLAIMS THAT VIETNAM WOULD 
NEVER RETURN ITS TROOPS TO CAMBODIA. 
 
THACH'S CLAIMS MAY BE CALLED INTO QUESTION BY HUN SEN'S 
RECENT COMMENTS THAT "IT IS THE LEGITIMATE R1GHT OF THE 
CAMBODIAN PEOPLE" TO CALL FOR OUTSIDE HELP IF THERE IS 
OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 
 
POSITIONING VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTHERN LAOS WOULD 
ALSO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT HANOI'S RESPECT IN 
GENERAL FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS. 
 
UNALTERABLE OPPOSITION TO A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A 
RETURN TO POWER OF THE MURDEROUS KHMER ROUGE. 
 
A DURABLE SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT MUST BE BASED ON A 
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH INCORPORATES A SERIES OF 
EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE KHMER ROUGE WILL BE 
CONTAINED. 
 
IN THIS REGARD, WE REGULARLY PRESS ALL THOSE INVOLVED 
TO CUT BACK THEIR AID TO THE KHMER ROUGE AND OTHERWISE 
HELP CONTROL THE KR IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
CAMBODIAN SOLUTION. 
 
OUR STRONG PREFERENCE IS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE NOT 
PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENTS; HOWEVER, 
ASEAN AND PRINCE SIHANOUK HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT 
THE BEST APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE KHMER ROUGE IS 
THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A STAKE IN A POLITICAL 
PROCESS, ONE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS AGAINST 
THEIR RETURN TO DOMINANCE.  NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE MADE 
CLEAR THAT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT ANY CAMBODIAN 
GOVERNMENT IS DIRECTLY AND INVERSELY RELATED TO THE 
DEGREE OF KHMER ROUGE PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN IT. 
 
NON-ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL PHNOM PENH REGIME CONTROL 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEADERS OF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME 
SHARE THIS UNACCEPTABLE BACKGROUND; MANY ARE FORMER 
KHMER ROUGE OFFICIALS FROM THE EASTERN MILITARY ZONE OF 
CAMBODIA--INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN, COMMUNIST 
PARTY LEADER HENG SAMRIN, AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LEADER 
CHEA SIM. 
 
HUN SEN HAS PROVED HIMSELF TO BE AN ABLE POLITICAL 
TACTICIAN AND COMPETENT MANIPULATOR OF THE NEWS MEDIA; 
HOWEVER, WE CAN ASSUME THAT AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND 
REGIMENTAL DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR HIS MILITARY REGION 
BEFORE DEFECTING FROM THE KHMER ROUGE TO VIETNAM IN 
1977, HUN SEN PARTICIPATED AT A RESPONSIBLE LEVEL IN 
THE KIND OF MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE MADE THE 
KHMER ROUGE NAME A BYWORD FOR INFAMY. 
 
THESE FORMER KR OFFICIALS ALSO REPRESENT AN 
ILLEGITIMATE REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED FOR THE PAST 
DECADE BY FOREIGN FORCE OF ARMS; THE PHNOM PENH REGIME 
IS ALSO ACQUIRING A SIGNIFICANT REPUTATION FOR 
CORRUPTION. 
 
ONLY A COMPROMISE ON POWER-SHARING BASED ON NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRINCE 
SIHANOUK--THE SYMBOL OF TRUE CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM--CAN 
ESTABLISH AN AUTHORITY WITH LEGITIMACY FOR THE INTERIM 
PERIOD UNTIL ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD. 
 
U.S. SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK 
-------------------------------- 
THE GOAL OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN 
HELPING TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. 
 
WHILE THE CORE OF OUR APPROACH IS A SUSTAINED 
DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, WE BELIEVE THAT STRENGTHENING OUR 
PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE 
CAMBODIAN NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE (NCR) WILL ALLOW THE 
NCR TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN A SETTLEMENT WHICH SERVES THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND PREVENTS A 
KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER. 
 
WE ARE NOT ALONE IN SUPPORTING THE NCR; THE 
NON-COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ASSISTANCE IN A 
VARIETY OF FORMS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES.  OUR 
EFFORTS ARE IN SUPPORT OF AND AT THE REQUEST OF THE 
NON-COMMUNISTS AND THESE COUNTRIES. 
 
U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST 
RESISTANCE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE NON-LETHAL.  WE 
CANNOT OFFER SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE SUPPORT WE AND 
THE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ARE PROVIDING; BECAUSE 
THIS ASSISTANCE GOES TO GUERRILLA FORCES OPERATING 
INSIDE CAMBODIA, ANY DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF THESE 
PROGRAMS COULD BE OF POTENTIAL UTILITY TO THE 
ADVERSARIES OF THE NCR. 
 
MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PHNOM PENH REGIME 
-------------------------------------------- 
NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR 
THE NON-COMMUNISTS IS MINOR IN COMPARISON TO THE 
MASSIVE QUANTITY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO 
PHNOM PENH BY THE SOVIET UNION, EITHER DIRECTLY OR VIA 
VIETNAM--AN AMOUNT ESTIMATED AT $1.1 BILLION BETWEEN 
1984 AND 1988. 
 
THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS THAT THIS SOVIET 
ASSISTANCE--A MASSIVE AMOUNT FOR A COUNTRY OF ONLY 
SEVEN MILLION PEOPLE--HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY THIS 
YEAR AND IS NOW ESTIMATED TO BE WELL OVER TEN TIMES THE 
QUANTITY THE CHINESE CURRENTLY PROVIDE THE KHMER ROUGE. 
 
THESE RECENTLY REPORTED INCREASED TRANSFERS OF 
EQUIPMENT TO THE PHNOM PENH REGIME SUGGEST THAT THE PRK 
IS MOVING AWAY FROM DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO ACHIEVE A 
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN PREPARATION FOR A RETURN TO THE 
BATTLEFIELD. 
 
NOT TIME FOR NORMALIZATION WITH VIETNAM 
--------------------------------------- 
IN LIGHT OF ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING 
VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE IN PARIS, THE CURRENT 
STALEMATE REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, AND 
APPARENT MOVEMENT BACKWARDS TOWARD A MILITARY OPTION, 
NORMALIZATION OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM WOULD BE 
PREMATURE. 
 
IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, WE BELIEVE THAT OTHER 
COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND 
ECONOMIC/AID RELATIONSHIPS WITH VIETNAM. 
 
4.  NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. (THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE 
FROM A SPEECH BY EAP ASSISTANCE SECRETARY RICHARD 
SOLOMON IN LOS ANGELES EARLIER THIS MONTH): 
 
THREE PROPOSITIONS 
------------------ 
THREE PROPOSITIONS UNDERLIE THIS ADMINISTRATION'S 
APPROACH TO THIS CONTINUING TRAGEDY: 
 
--  FIRST, CAMBODIA IS A CHALLENGE TO THE CONSCIENCE 
AND CONCERN OF THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  THE 
CAMBODIAN PEOPLE DESERVE THEIR OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, POLITICAL 
RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT -- AND WE WANT TO ENSURE 
THAT THERE ARE NO MORE CAMBODIAN KILLING FIELDS.  THE 
UNITED STATES WILL PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSUIT OF 
THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT WE 
HAVE NEITHER THE POLITICAL POSITION NOR THE RESOURCES 
TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES ON OUR OWN. 
 
--  SECOND, OUR PRIMARY SECURITY OBLIGATION IN THIS 
REGION IS TO THAILAND, TO WHICH WE ARE LEGALLY BOUND BY 
THE MANILA PACT OF 1954.  AS WELL, WE HAVE A MAJOR 
INTEREST IN THE CONTINUING INTEGRITY AND VITALITY OF 
ASEAN. 
 
--  AND THIRD, WE HAVE A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IN SEEING 
INDOCHINA FREED OF THE RIVALRIES OF THE GREAT POWERS -- 
AN OBJECTIVE MOST LIKELY REALIZED IF CAMBODIAN AND 
VIETNAM ARE AT PEACE WITHIN THEMSELVES AND WITH THEIR 
NEIGHBORS. 
 
THREE ACTIVITIES 
---------------- 
GIVEN THESE PROPOSITIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL 
PURSUE THREE LEVELS OF ACTIVITY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, 
ALL DESIGNED TO BUILD ON THE DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM OF 
PARIS: 
 
--  WE WILL SUSTAIN ACTIVE CONTACTS WITH THE FIVE 
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.  FRANCE, 
CHINA, AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE MAJOR POWERS WITH 
THE MOST DIRECT INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS IN CAMBODIA AND 
VIETNAM. 
 
THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE PRIMARY SUPPORTER OF VIETNAM 
AND HUN SEN, MUST RESTRICT ITS INCREASING FLOW OF ARMS 
INTO CAMBODIA, AND BRING HANOI TO SEE THAT ITS OWN 
INTERESTS WILL NOT BE SERVED BY ANOTHER CYCLE OF 
WARFARE IN INDOCHINA -- WHICH CERTAINLY WILL BE THE 
CASE IF IT SEEKS FULL POWER FOR HUN SEN IN THE ABSENCE 
OF A PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. 
 
IN RETURN, HANOI AND HUN SEN -- AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY -- HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT CHINA TO EQUALLY 
RESTRICT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE. 
INDEED, BEIJING HAS AN OBLIGATION TO TAKE ACTIVE 
MEASURES THAT WILL PREVENT THE KHMER ROUGE FROM AGAIN 
IMPOSING A MURDEROUS RULE ON THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. 
 
FRANCE, FOR ITS PART, IS DUE CREDIT FOR TAKING THE 
DIPLOMATIC RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRYING TO HELP THE 
CAMBODIAN FACTIONS BRIDGE THEIR DIFFERENCES.  WE SHOULD 
POINT OUT THAT THE PARIS CONFERENCE WAS ONLY SUSPENDED, 
NOT ADJOURNED -- SO THAT FRANCE AND CONFERENCE 
CO-CHAIRMAN INDONESIA HAVE A CONTINUING MANDATE TO WORK 
FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. 
 
--  AT A SECOND LEVEL, THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO WORK 
CLOSELY WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR 
POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT.  THEIR 
SECURITY INTERESTS ARE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE 
SEARCH FOR PEACE IN INDOCHINA; AND WE WILL SUPPORT 
THEIR EFFORTS -- MOST IMMEDIATELY AT THE UPCOMING 
SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 
 
--  AND FINALLY, WE WILL SUSTAIN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE 
NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND PRINCE SIHANOUK AS THE 
POLITICAL CENTER OF A PROCESS OF NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION. 
 
SOME NOW ARGUE THAT THE THREAT OF A KHMER ROUGE 
RESURGENCE IS SUCH THAT THE U.S. MUST RELY ON HUN SEN 
RATHER THAN PRESS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT.  THIS APPROACH IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED ON 
SEVERAL COUNTS. 
 
FIRST, A REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED BY FOREIGN FORCE 
OF ARMS LACKS LEGITIMACY.  VIOLATING THIS FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLE WOULD PUT AT RISK THE INTEGRITY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND BE TO OUR PERIL IN MANY OTHER 
PARTS OF THE WORLD.  SECOND, THERE IS AT PRESENT LITTLE 
BASIS FOR ASSUMING THAT HUN SEN'S UNPROVEN FORCES, 
ABSENT THEIR VIETNAMESE PROTECTORS, CAN ELIMINATE THE 
KHMER ROUGE, A GOAL THAT ELUDED HANOI'S VAUNTED ARMY 
FOR THE PAST DECADE.  AND LASTLY, IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SUPPORTED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK, SUCH 
A MOVE WOULD PIT THE U.S. AGAINST CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM 
-- A POLICY HARDLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. 
 
AS DEMOCRATS (WITH A SMALL "D"), OUR COMMITMENT MUST BE 
TO A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT PERMITS NATIONAL 
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.  WE SEE 
PRESS REPORTS OF HUN SEN'S POPULARITY, OF REFORMIST 
POLICIES PROMOTED BY PHNOM PENH THAT ARE RESTORING 
BUDDHISM AND ALLOWING PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE MARKET 
ACTIVITY.  IF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IS AS POPULAR AS 
ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN PORTRAYS IT TO BE, IT CAN 
ONLY BENEFIT BY TAKING ITS CASE TO THE PEOPLE IN FREE 
AND FAIR ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE UN. 
 
THE U.S. REMAINS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF SUCH 
A CREDIBLE TEST OF CAMBODIAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND TO 
WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN SUPPORTING A 
PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA THAT 
CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO 
DOMINANCE. 
 
THUS, THE ISSUE COMES BACK TO WHETHER THE CAMBODIAN 
FACTIONS, ENCOURAGED BY THEIR FOREIGN SUPPORTERS, CAN 
JOIN TOGETHER IN A POLITICAL PROCESS OF NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION.  THE U.S. WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE TO 
MOVE EVENTS IN THIS DIRECTION.  CHINA AND THE SOVIET 
UNION MUST DO THE SAME.  MOSCOW, IN PARTICULAR, MUST 
ACCEPT AND ACT ON THE REALITY THAT WITHOUT SOME 
WILLINGNESS BY VIETNAM AND HUN SEN TO COMPROMISE ON 
POWER-SHARING, THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, 
NO RESPITE FROM ARMED CONFLICT. 
 
5.  FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS FOR SELECTED 
HOST GOVERNMENTS: 
 
AUSTRALIA 
--------- 
WE APPRECIATE THE WAY WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON THIS 
ISSUE, MOST RECENTLY AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE. 
 
WE BOTH AGREE THAT EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER 
ROUGE RETURN TO POWER ARE VITAL.  HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE 
THAT THE KEY TO CONTROLLING THE KHMER ROUGE IS A 
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BUILT AROUND THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK. 
 
THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC AND 
ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH 
REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART. 
 
WE APPRECIATED YOUR INFORMING THE VIETNAMESE AT THE END 
OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE THAT FAILURE TO REACH A 
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN THAT AUSTRALIA WILL 
CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF NOT PROVIDING OFFICIAL AID TO 
THE SRV. 
 
WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO 
IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS 
EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF. 
 
WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION 
OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A 
COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS 
TO THE FUND. 
 
BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND 
---------------------------------------- 
WE WANT TO AGAIN THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE 
CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION THAT OUR DELEGATIONS 
ENJOYED THROUGHOUT THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. 
 
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK 
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD 
UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING 
DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE 
DELIBERATIONS. 
 
THE CONFERENCE AGAIN CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY TO ANY 
SETTLEMENT IS THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING:  HOW TO 
CONSTRUCT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK 
WHICH WOULD GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. 
THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, OF COURSE, WAS THE 
TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE WHICH HANOI AND THE PHNOM 
PENH REGIME ADOPTED ON THIS ISSUE.  THIS UNCOMPROMISING 
STANCE WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE MANNER IN WHICH 
PRINCE SIHANOUK APPROACHED THE PROBLEM. 
 
AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING 
ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE OUTLINE 
FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN STATES 
PRODUCED AT THE VERY END OF THE CONFERENCE.  ALTHOUGH WE 
REALIZE THAT THIS PROBLEM BASICALLY MUST BE RESOLVED BY 
THE CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES, EFFORTS BY OTHERS CAN BE 
HELPFUL IN PROVIDING USEFUL NEW APPROACHES. 
 
IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI 
AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS 
ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST 
RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH 
TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM.  IT IS VITAL FOR ASEAN TO 
CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN 
PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN 
CAMBODIA.  ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S. 
WORKING RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN 
DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING 
THE DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN 
RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 
 
WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN AT THIS 
YEAR'S UNGA TO ENSURE STRONG SUPPORT FOR YOUR CAMBODIA 
RESOLUTION. 
 
WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL 
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE 
PHNOM PENH REGIME. 
 
CANADA 
------ 
WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY AGAIN TO THANK 
YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE 
COOPERATION OUR TWO DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE 
PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. 
 
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK 
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD 
 
UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING 
DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE 
DELIBERATIONS. 
 
IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI 
AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS 
ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST 
RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH 
TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM.  WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS 
IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC 
INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME. 
 
CHINA 
----- 
WE WANT TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE CLOSE 
COOPERATION THAT EXISTED IN PARIS BETWEEN OUR TWO 
DELEGATIONS. 
 
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK 
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD 
UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE.  THE ALTERNATIVE TO 
ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT QUICKLY, WE FEAR, WILL BE A 
PERIOD OF CIVIL WARFARE.  SHOULD THE KHMER ROUGE BEGIN 
TO DEMONSTRATE MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THIS WILL RISK 
SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE OUR 
SUPPORT FOR THE TWO NON-COMMUNIST FACTIONS WITH WHICH 
THE KHMER ROUGE IS AFFILIATED. 
 
YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE KHMER 
ROUGE AND THE NEED FOR CONTROLS TO ASSURE THAT THEY DO 
NOT RETURN TO POWER IN CAMBODIA.  WE WERE VERY 
INTERESTED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY 
YOUR DELEGATION IN PARIS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE'S ROLE IN 
AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT COULD BE LESS THAN THE OTHER 
FACTIONS. 
 
WE ARE CONTINUING TO URGE THE SOVIETS TO PUSH THE 
VIETNAMESE AND HUN SEN TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY ON 
THE TRANSITIONAL POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS. 
 
TO AVERT AN ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA, WE ARE 
ASKING THE SOVIETS TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF ARMS TO ITS 
CAMBODIAN ALLY.  SIMILARLY, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD 
ALSO RESTRICT THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE. 
 
THE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA OF SENIOR KHMER 
ROUGE LEADERS LIKE POL POT, IENG SARY AND TA MOK IS 
PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME.  IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO 
EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT, IF YOUR 
GOVERNMENT WOULD STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THESE UNACCEPTABLE 
KHMER ROUGE LEADERS TO RELOCATE TO CHINA. 
 
FRANCE 
------ 
WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR ALL OF THE HARD 
WORK THAT YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STAFF, 
ESPECIALLY CLAUDE MARTIN, DEVOTED TOWARD MAKING THE 
PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA A SUCCESS. 
 
ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE A COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A 
GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. 
 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, IT IS 
IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND 
ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH 
REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART. 
 
IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
SHOULD CONTINUE TO IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL 
ASSISTANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE 
RESOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH 
AS THE IMF. 
 
WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND 
TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO 
HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND. 
 
WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD UPON THE 
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ACHIEVED AT THE CONFERENCE. 
 
INDONESIA 
--------- 
WE WOULD LIKE AGAIN TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES 
FOR YOUR IMPRESSIVE EFFORTS, ALONG WITH THOSE OF OUR 
FRENCH FRIENDS, TO ORGANIZE AND GUIDE THE MONTH-LONG 
PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.  WE ADMIRE THE DEDICATION 
AND COURAGE YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT 
DISPLAYED IN UNDERTAKING--DESPITE DAUNTING ODDS--THIS 
IMPORTANT INITIATIVE TO EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE TRAGIC 
CAMBODIAN CONFLICT. 
 
WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK 
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. 
 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD 
UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE AND 
ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT 
INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE DELIBERATIONS. 
 
AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING 
ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE 
OUTLINE FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN 
DELEGATIONS WERE DISCUSSING AT THE VERY END OF THE 
CONFERENCE.  IT MAY CONTAIN ELEMENTS YOU WOULD FIND 
USEFUL IN ATTEMPTING, UNDER YOUR MANDATE FROM THE 
CONFERENCE, TO REVIVE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE CAMBODIANS 
AND OTHER INVOLVED STATES ON THIS KEY ISSUE. 
 
IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI 
AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS 
ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST 
RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH 
TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM.  OF COURSE, CONTINUED ASEAN 
LEADERSHIP IN PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT IS VITAL.  WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE 
TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION 
WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME. 
 
JAPAN 
----- 
WE APPRECIATE THE SOLIDARITY THAT JAPAN HAS SHOWN WITH 
US ON THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE AND THE CLOSE COOPERATION 
BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE. 
 
THE CHIEF IMPASSE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE WAS 
THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ON 
THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO REAL INTEREST ON 
THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER 
PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO 
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. 
 
THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE 
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE 
PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON 
THEIR PART, A POSITION EACH OF US SHARES. 
 
WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO 
IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS 
EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF. 
 
WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND 
TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO 
 
HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND.  WE 
APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S STEADFAST SUPPORT ON THIS 
ISSUE. 
 
WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A 
COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT.  AT THIS UNGA, WE 
ALSO NEED TO WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT 
OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA. 
 
MALAYSIA 
-------- 
WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE 
COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR 
DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON 
CAMBODIA.  WE ADMIRED THE ACTIVE ROLE YOUR COUNTRY 
PLAYED AT THE MEETING, PARTICULARLY IN THE TAXING JOB 
OF CO-CHAIRING THE COMMITTEE ON GUARANTEES. 
 
AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE 
CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM 
PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO 
REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM 
GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE 
THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. 
 
IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC 
AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH 
REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART. 
 
IT IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL FOR ASEAN TO CONTINUE TO SPEAK 
WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN PROMOTING A 
COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA.  ASEAN'S 
LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S. WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN DEALING 
WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING THE 
DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN RESOLUTION 
ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
----------- 
WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED A 
WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL TO A 
UN-ADMINISTERED INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
MECHANISM/PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.  HOPEFULLY, FURTHER 
NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WILL MAKE THIS A REALITY. 
 
PHILIPPINES 
----------- 
(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND) 
 
SINGAPORE 
--------- 
(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND) 
 
SOVIET UNION 
------------ 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TO CONTINUE THE POSITIVE 
MOMENTUM GENERATED BY THE PARIS CONFERENCE.  WE EXPECT 
THAT IN KEEPING WITH THE CLOSING STATEMENT, CONFERENCE 
CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA, WILL SOON BEGIN 
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES WITH A VIEW 
TOWARD REENERGIZING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CORE 
POWER-SHARING ISSUE. 
 
TO BE FRANK, HOWEVER, UNLESS HANOI AND PHNOM PENH 
CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AND BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD 
FAITH, WE ARE AFRAID THAT ESCALATING VIOLENCE WILL SOON 
ADD TO THE MISFORTUNES OF THE LONG-SUFFERING CAMBODIAN 
PEOPLE. 
 
INCREASING INSTABILITY IN CAMBODIA WILL ALSO HAVE 
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS.  IT WILL 
REFLECT BADLY ON OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO RESOLVE 
REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INEVITABLY PROMOTE STRAINS IN 
OUR BILATERAL TIES. 
 
WE PLAN TO WORK WITH OUR CAMBODIAN FRIENDS AND OTHER 
ALLIES IN THE REGION TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED IN A 
COSTLY MILITARY TEST OF STRENGTH AND TO ENCOURAGE A 
QUICK RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. 
 
WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN REDOUBLED EFFORTS TO 
ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION 
TO THIS PROLONGED REGIONAL CONFLICT.  IT IS 
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES TAKE 
CONCRETE STEPS TO CURTAIL AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE THE 
FLOW OF ARMS INTO CAMBODIA. 
 
TO MOVE THIS POLITICAL PROCESS FORWARD, WE WOULD EXPECT 
YOU TO USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH BOTH HANOI 
AND PHNOM PENH TO CONVINCE THEM THAT A COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT BASED ON AN INTERIM CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT LED 
BY PRINCE SIHANOUK AND INCLUDING EQUITABLE 
REPRESENTATION FOR THE NON-COMMUNISTS AS WELL AS THE 
HUN SEN FACTION IS ESSENTIAL.  IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO 
AVERT A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND TO 
FORESTALL THE LOOMING SPECTER OF A KHMER ROUGE RETURN 
TO POWER. 
 
AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A KR RETURN 
TO POWER IN CAMBODIA AND STRONGLY PREFER THAT THEY HAVE 
NO ROLE IN ANY CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT BEIJING DID NOT 
SUPPORT AN EQUAL ROLE FOR THE KHMER ROUGE IN AN INTERIM 
GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVE THAT THIS OPENING SHOULD BE 
EXPLOITED TO MINIMIZE ANY ROLE FOR THE KR.  WE HOPE 
THAT YOU CAN PERSUADE HANOI AND PHNOM PENH TO PURSUE 
THIS OPPORTUNITY. 
 
SWEDEN 
------ 
YOUR EMBASSY HAS INFORMED US IN WASHINGTON THAT YOU 
HAVE DECLINED THE SRV AND PRK INVITATION TO MONITOR THE 
VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL, STATING THAT YOU WOULD ONLY 
PARTICIPATE IF ALL PARTIES WERE AGREED AND IF THERE 
WERE A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE. 
 
WE APPRECIATE THE POSITION OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON 
THIS ISSUE. 
 
THAILAND 
-------- 
(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND) 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
-------------- 
WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE 
COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR TWO 
DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON 
CAMBODIA.  ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE THE 
COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT WHICH WE BOTH 
SOUGHT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A 
GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. 
 
AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE 
CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM 
PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO 
REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM 
GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE 
THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. 
 
IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL 
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE 
PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ECOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON 
THEIR PARTS. 
 
6.  THE FOLLOWING EAP PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE VIETNAMESE 
WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA WAS PREPARED SEPTEMBER 21, 
1989: 
 
Q:  THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOW WITHDRAWN THEIR TROOPS FROM 
CAMBODIA.  WHAT'S OUR REACTION? 
 
A:  WHILE WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN 
INTERNATIONALLY-VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL, PREFERABLY UNDER 
THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND IN THE CONTEXT OF A 
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT, WE 
WELCOME HANOI'S APPARENT PULL-OUT AS AN END TO ITS 
TEN-YEAR OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA.  WE NOTE THAT THIS HAS 
BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE THE VIETNAMESE 
INVASION.  NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT VIETNAM CANNOT 
EVADE ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP ACHIEVE IN CAMBODIA A 
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION. 
 
Q:  WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, WILL THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL 
HAVE ON OUR CAMBODIAN POLICY? 
 
A:   THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA, UNFORTUNATELY, 
DID NOT ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE OF FINALIZING A 
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TO THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT.  TO A 
LARGE EXTENT, IT WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE 
PHNOM PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING WHICH 
PRECLUDED A COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT THE 
CONFERENCE'S INITIAL SESSION. 
 
WE BELIEVE THAT THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT MUST BE RESOLVED 
POLITICALLY AND NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD.  WE, THEREFORE, 
WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE CONFERENCE CO-PRESIDENTS 
AND PARTICIPANTS IN BUILDING UPON THE PROGRESS ALREADY 
MADE TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TOWARD A RESOLUTION. 
 
Q:  NOW THAT VIETNAM HAS PULLED ITS TROOPS OUT OF 
CAMBODIA AS WE DEMANDED, ARE WE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH 
RELATIONS WITH HANOI AS WE AGREED? 
 
A.  WE AGREED TO JOIN THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA 
WITH THE HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD ACHIEVE A 
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRAGIC CAMBODIAN 
CONFLICT INCLUDING A VERIFIED TOTAL VIETNAMESE 
WITHDRAWAL, ASSURANCES AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE KHMER 
ROUGE, AND A PROCESS LEADING TO REAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. 
 
IF THE CONFERENCE HAD ACHIEVED THAT OBJECTIVE, WE WERE 
PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS 
WITH HANOI, AS WE HAVE STATED MANY TIMES.  THE 
VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A PRACTICAL REALITY, 
THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE 
AFFECTED BY THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE 
POW/MIA ISSUE AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS. 
 
UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONFERENCE REACHED AN IMPASSE ON THE 
ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING -- TO A LARGE EXTENT DUE TO THE 
INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.  THEY 
REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE FOR A INTERIM COALITION GOVERNMENT 
UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK, WHICH WOULD LEAD THE COUNTRY TO 
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.  THEY CLEARLY INTEND THAT THE PRK 
SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF POWER UNTIL ELECTIONS. 
WE, AND MOST OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT THE 
CONFERENCE, ARE CONVINCED THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 
ARE NOT POSSIBLE UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. 
 
WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT SIGNS OF INCREASING 
DELIVERIES OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE PHNOM PENH 
REGIME AND THE IMPLICATIONS THAT MAY HAVE FOR AN 
ESCALATION OF THE VIOLENCE. 
 
IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE 
NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH HANOI WOULD BE 
PREMATURE.  WE WOULD HOPE THAT IF THE OTHER 
PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND 
ECONOMIC TIES WITH VIETNAM, HANOI CAN BE CONVINCED TO 
ADOPT A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH TOWARD SEEKING A 
COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN 
CONFLICT. 
 
 
EAGLEBURGER