P 062248Z MAR 89
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3740
INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 03471 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PTER PINS PGOV CO
SUBJECT: WHY HAS THE FARC DECLARED A UNILATERAL TRUCE? 
 
REF: BOGOTA 3191 AND PREVIOUS 
 
¶1.  CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY: THE FARC'S CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
FEBRUARY 28 (REFTEL) HIGHLIGHTED THAT GROUP'S ONGOING 
ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURE THE GOC INTO DECLARING ITS OWN 
CEASEFIRE AND FORCE IT INTO ENGAGING IN PEACE TALKS WITH 
ALL FOUR GUERRILLA GROUPS IN THE SIMON BOLIVAR GUERRILLA 
COORDINATOR (SBGC).  THE FARC STRATEGY STEMS FROM 
POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY IMPERATIVES.  THE GOC IS 
NOT BUYING IT.  END SUMMARY 
 
THE FARC PLOY; THE GOC RESPONSE 
------------------------------- 
¶2.  THE FARC WANTS THE GOC TO CALL OFF THE TROOPS AND 
ENGAGE IN PEACE TALKS WITH THE SIMON BOLIVAR GUERRILLA 
COORDINATOR (SBGC).  ITS DECISION TO DECLARE A 
UNILATERAL TRUCE FOLLOWING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE 
COMMISSION OF NOTABLES IS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE 
THAT GOAL, AS IS ITS LATEST TACTIC OF SENDING A LETTER 
TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE GROUP OF EIGHT IN HOPES OF 
ENLISTING THEIR SUPPORT TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON BARCO TO 
OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SBGC.  THE GOC HAS REFUSED TO 
BE PRESSURED. 
 
¶3.  THE GUERRILLA STRATEGY TO FORCE THE GOVERNMENT INTO 
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN EVIDENT SINCE AT LEAST MID 
1988, WHEN THE M-19 FORCED THE CREATION OF THE COMMITTEE 
FOR DEMOCRATIC COEXISTENCE AS THE PRICE FOR THE RELEASE 
OF ALVARO GOMEZ HURTADO.  THE GOC SUCCESSFULLY WITHSTOOD 
THE M-19 PLOY AND THEN BEGAN A MORE PLANNED APPROACH OF 
ITS OWN TO REGAIN POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE PEACE ISSUE. 
ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1988, THE GOC CODIFIED AND PUBLICLY 
ANNOUNCED THE POLICY IT HAD IN ESSENCE BEEN FOLLOWING 
SINCE BARCO CAME INTO OFFICE IN AUGUST 1986; TO WIT: WE 
WILL NOT TALK FOR THE SAKE OF TALK (IMPLICATION -- AS 
BETANCUR DID), BUT MUST DEMAND PROOF BY WORD AND DEED 
THAT THE GUERRILLAS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT WANTING PEACE. 
ONCE THAT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED WE WILL TALK. 
 
¶4.  THE GOC IS TALKING WITH THE M-19 BECAUSE THAT GROUP 
DECLARED ITS TRUCE OVER SIX MONTHS AGO.  THIS, COMBINED 
WITH THE GOC'S DESIRE TO SHOW THAT ITS PEACE PLAN WILL 
WORK, MOTIVATED THE GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATIONS 
WITH THE M-19.  THE GOC FEELS UNDER NO PRESSURE TO RUSH 
INTO TALKS WITH THE FARC AND CAN POINT TO ITS TRACK 
RECORD VIS A VIS THE M19 TO DEFEND ITS POSITION. 
RAFAEL PARDO TOLD THE PRESS IN MEXICO MARCH 4 THAT "THE 
GOVERNMENT AGREES WITH DIRECT PEACE TALKS WITH THE 
GUERRILLA.  IT INITIATED THEM IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR 
WITH THE M-19 BECAUSE THAT GROUP HAD DEMONSTRATED OVER 
THE PREVIOUS SIX MONTHS A SINCERE DESIRE FOR PEACE.  THE 
FARC DECLARED ITS TRUCE ONE WEEK AGO.  WE HAVE NOTHING 
AGAINST SUCH A DECLARATION, BUT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT 
GOING TO INITIATE ANY DIALOGUE WITH ANY GUERRILLA 
ORGANIZATION IF IT CONTINUES ITS TERRORISM, KIDNAPPINGS, 
AMBUSHES AND EXTORTION."  IN ESSENCE, THE GOVERNMENT CAN 
SIT BACK AND WAIT TO SEE IF THE FARC COMPLIES WITH ITS 
PROMISE TO END HOSTILITIES, INCLUDING EXTORTION. 
 
THE MILITARY MOTIVATION 
----------------------- 
¶5.  IT APPEARS THAT THE FARC DECLARATION OF A UNILATERAL 
CEASEFIRE HAD ROOTS IN MILITARY EVENTS AS WELL. 
MILITARY SOURCES SPECULATE THAT THE FARC WAS HURT WHEN 
IT LOST AN IMPORTANT ARMS SHIPMENT IN JANUARY (SEE 
BOGOTA 315) AND, IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS, HAS INCURRED 
MORE CASUALTIES THAN EXPECTED.  IN ADDITION, CAMPESINOS 
IN KEY AREAS HAVE BEGUN SUPPORTING THE ARMY AND ITS 
ANTI-SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS MORE THAN IN THE PAST -- AN 
ADDITIONAL SETBACK TO THE FARC. 
 
¶6.  DEFENSE ATTACHE CONTACTS IN THE ARMED FORCES BELIEVE 
THAT THE FARC'S CEASEFIRE AND ITS INSISTENCE ON DIALOGUE 
WITHOUT DISARMAMENT IS A POLITICAL PLOY TO GAIN "TIME 
AND SPACE" TO BUILD UP THEIR FORCES.  ACCORDING TO THEM, 
1989 IS A CRITICAL YEAR FOR THE FARC, ONE IN WHICH IT 
HOPES TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO 
"GENERAL INSURRECTION" IN 1990.  THESE SOURCES SHARE 
PRESIDENT BARCO'S SUSPICIONS (REFTEL, PARA. 4) THAT THE 
FARC IS USING THE TRUCE AND PEACE DIALOGUE AS PRETEXTS 
TO GAIN A BREATHING SPELL AND COME BACK STRONGER IN LATE 
¶1989. 
 
¶7.  IN CONCLUSION, THE ONUS IS ON THE FARC TO PROVE IT 
IS SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE.  FARC LEADERS WILL LIKELY FIND 
IT DIFFICULT TO CONTROL THEIR SPREAD OUT AND 
DECENTRALIZED FRONTS, ESPECIALLY PREVENTING THEM FROM 
CARRYING OUT THEIR NORMAL "TAX" COLLECTIONS.  IF THE 
FARC CAN MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE, PRESSURE WILL MOUNT ON 
THE GOVERNMENT TO OPEN TALKS.  IF IT CANNOT, THE 
GOVERNMENT WILL BE FREE TO PURSUE ITS CURRENT PEACE PLAN 
WHILE KEEPING THE MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE FARC. 
 
 
MCNAMARA