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Viewing cable 88LONDON16998, NORTHERN IRELAND - CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
88LONDON16998 1988-08-09 17:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy London
R 091735Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8426
INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
NATO COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
DIRFBI WASHDC
USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF/SPACOS//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/J5//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF//
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH)
AMCONSUL EDINBURGH POUCH)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 16998 
 
TERREP 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: KPRP PTER PGOV MARR MCAP UK EI
SUBJECT:  NORTHERN IRELAND - CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE 
 
REF:  A) LONDON 16351  B) LONDON 5653 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY:  THE RECENT ESCALATION OF IRA ATTACKS, 
WHICH HAVE INCLUDED NOT ONLY MORE KILLINGS IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND BUT ALSO BOMBINGS AT UK MILITARY BASES IN 
CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST BOMBING IN BRITAIN 
ITSELF SINCE 1984, HAVE CAUSED HMG TO REEXAMINE ITS 
EFFORTS TO CONTROL IRA TERRORISM.  THE INITIAL PROGNOSIS 
BY OFFICIALS IN LONDON IS THAT THERE IS NOT A GREAT DEAL 
MORE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE SHORT TERM OTHER THAN TO 
INCREASE ALERT LEVELS AND OTHER PRECAUTIONS AGAINST 
TERRORIST ATTACKS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, KEY 
GOVERNMENT OFFICES, AND OTHER LIKELY IRA TARGETS. 
 
THE IRA MIGHT BE PLANNING ATTACKS DIRECTLY AGAINST OR TO 
COINCIDE WITH CERTAIN UPCOMING EVENTS, INCLUDING THE 
BEGINNING OF THE CORONER'S INQUEST IN GIBRLATAR INTO THE 
KILLING THERE OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS LAST JANUARY, AND 
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE AT BRIGHTON IN OCTOBER. 
 
THE ATTACKS HAVE NOT WEAKENED THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE 
TO CONTINUE WITH ITS CURRENT POLICIES, WHICH INCLUDE 
TRYING TO RECTIFY CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND.  THERE HAVE BEEN NEW DEMANDS TO INCREASE UK 
MILITARY FORCES IN ULSTER AND TO REINTRODUCE THE 
PREVENTIVE INTERNMENT OF KNOWN IRA ACTIVISTS; THE 
GOVERNMENT HOPES THESE STEPS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY AND 
FOR NOW HAS NO SUCH PLANS. 
 
UK OFFICIALS ARE PLEASED WITH PROGRESS IN GAINING THE 
COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST THE IRA, BUT ALSO ARE CONVINCED THAT THE IRISH 
REPUBLIC COULD DO MORE TO HELP.  PERHAPS THE SHOCK OF 
THE CURRENT WAVE OF ATTACKS, SAYS HMG, WILL ACCELERATE 
THE IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO 
GOVERNMENTS.  LONDON HOPES THAT IMPROVED INTRA-EUROPEAN 
COOPERATION IN COMBATTING TERRORISM WILL HELP TO 
MINIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRA ATTACKS ON BRITISH 
MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
THE IRA PLAYS TO THE NEWS AND CHALLENGES LONDON TO REACT 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
3.  THE RECENT ESCALATION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE 
IRA, INCLUDING BOMBINGS OF UK MILITARY TARGETS IN 
CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST IRA BOMBING IN BRITAIN 
ITSELF IN FOUR YEARS, HAS REFOCUSED ATTENTIONS IN 
WHITEHALL ON THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING IRA TERRORISM. 
WHAT THE KILLINGS BY THE IRA HAVE NOT DONE IS UNDERMINE 
EITHER THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO STICK TO ITS 
POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE CONSERVATIVE 
POLITICAL CONSENSUS BEHIND THOSE POLICIES. 
 
4.  THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE AND HMG POLICE OFFICIALS 
CALCULATE THAT THE IRA PLANS ITS ATTACKS MAINLY FOR NEWS 
VALUE.  SPOKESMEN FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL WING, 
SINN FEIN, HAVE CONFIRMED THIS IN RECENT INTERVIEWS WITH 
JOURNALISTS.  THE IRA WANTS ITS ATTACKS TO SHOCK THE 
PUBLIC IN BRITAIN AND WEAR DOWN BRITISH DETERMINATION TO 
STAY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.  THE UK SUNDAY NEWSPAPER "THE 
OBSERVER" REPORTED ON AUGUST 7 THAT IRA SOURCES TOLD ITS 
REPORTERS THE AUGUST 1 BOMBING OF AN ARMY DEPOT IN 
LONDON (REFTEL A) WAS UNDERTAKEN ON THE BORDER OF PRIME 
MINISTER THATCHER'S OWN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY WITH 
THE HOPES THAT IT WOULD KILL MANY SOLDIERS (ONE DIED IN 
THE BLAST) AND FORCE MRS. THATCHER TO RETURN EARLY FROM 
HER AUSTRALIA VISIT. 
 
5.  THE BOMBINGS HAVE EMBARASSED THE GOVERNMENT BUT NOT 
NEARLY SO MUCH AS THE IRA APPARENTLY WOULD LIKE.  SO 
FAR, IT HAS STIFFENED RATHER THAN WEAKENED LONDON'S 
RESOLVE.  AND, WHILE THE KILLINGS HAVE SCORED INTENSIVE 
NEWS COVERAGE, THEY PROBABLY HAVE NOT INCREASED 
SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBERS OF BRITONS WHO AGREE WITH THE 
"TIME TO GO" MOVEMENT FOR A BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM 
ULSTER.  THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT MANY ORDINARY 
CITIZENS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 
AND OTHER POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS CANNOT BE 
PROTECTED BETTER.  IN UK TELEVISION INTERVIEWS, SEVERAL 
PEOPLE WHO LIVE NEAR THE NORTH LONDON ARMY BASE ATTACKED 
ON AUGUST 1 SAID THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN AMAZED THAT 
SECURITY WAS SO LAX AT THE BASE.  BUT MANY OTHER 
BRITONS, EVEN WHILE THEY WINCE AT EACH DAY'S TALLY OF 
BOMBING VICTIMS, DO NOT EXPECT THEIR GOVERNMENT TO BE 
ABLE TO FEND OFF TERRORISTS EVERY TIME.  THEY APPEAR TO 
UNDERSTAND, AS EX-PRIME MINISTER STANLEY BALDWIN TOLD 
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1932, THAT DESPITE ANY 
PRECAUTIONS "THE BOMBER WILL ALWAYS GET THROUGH." 
 
THE ESCALATION WAS EXPECTED 
--------------------------- 
6.  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TOM KING 
DECLARED IN LATE JULY THAT THE IRA WAS BECOMING 
INCREASINGLY "INCOMPETENT," AS EVIDENCED BY A SERIES OF 
BUNGLED ATTACKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH INNOCENT 
BYSTANDERS WERE KILLED OR INJURED INSTEAD OF MEMBERS OF 
THE SECURITY FORCES.  THE RECENT ESCALATION OF KILLINGS 
CAME SO FAST AFTER KING'S STATEMENT AS TO SEEM PROMPTED 
BY IT.  THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) TOLD US THAT 
KING'S PRONOUNCEMENT WAS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND WAS NOT 
REFLECTED IN ANY RELAXATION OF VIGILANCE BY THE POLICE 
AND MILITARY FORCES.  SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE KNOWN THE 
IRA WAS MERELY PAUSING AND WAS OVERDUE FOR A COME-BACK. 
 
7.  NIO OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE UK SECURITY 
FORCES REVEALED THEIR PENETRATION OF IRA COMMUNICATIONS 
WHEN THEY KILLED EIGHT IRA TERRORISTS IN MAY 1987 AT 
LOUGHGALL, NORTHERN IRELAND, THE IRA HAS BEEN HOLDING 
BACK WHILE IT CHANGED ITS METHODS.  THE TERRORISTS HAVE 
AMASSED TONS OF ARMAMENTS, CHIEFLY FROM LIBYA, BUT HAVE 
BEEN FEELING THEIR WAY WITH NEW PROCEDURES FOR MAKING 
AND COMMUNICATING DECISIONS.  THE KILLING OF CIVILIAN 
BYSTANDERS AT ENNISKILLEN IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR AND 
IN SEVERAL OTHER APPARENTLY BUNGLED IRA ATTACKS SINCE 
THEN PROBABLY WAS DUE IN PART TO A DECENTRALIZATION OF 
IRA DECISION-MAKING.  TO AVOID LEAKS AND INTERCEPTS, 
LOCAL IRA UNITS WERE TOLD TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY.  SAS 
AND POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH UNITS HAVE EXCELLENT 
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WHICH THE IRA CORRECTLY ASSUMES 
INCLUDE "MOLES" IN ITS OWN RANKS.  THE SAFETY WARNING 
FOR THE IRA, AND THE BOAST OF UK AUTHORITIES, IS THAT IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND "EVERY TREE HAS ITS SPECIAL BRANCH." 
 
8.  AFTER MORE THAN HALF A YEAR OF PREPARATIONS, UK 
OFFICIALS TOLD US, THE IRA PLANNED A SERIES OF ATTACKS 
WHICH WAS TO INCLUDE THE GIBRALTAR BOMBING IN JANUARY. 
THE FAILURE OF THAT ATTACK (REFTEL B) AND THE REVELATION 
THAT ONCE AGAIN UK SECURITY OFFICIALS WERE AWARE OF ITS 
PLANS PROBABLY CAUSED THE IRA TO DELAY OR DEFER OTHER 
ATTACKS.  IT WENT AHEAD WITH BOMBINGS DIRECTED AGAINST 
UK MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, 
APPARENTLY SECURE IN THE BELIEF THAT AT LEAST ONE 
"ACTIVE SERVICE UNIT" EMPLACED TO OPERATE IN GERMANY AND 
THE NETHERLANDS HAD NOT BEEN DETECTED BY EITHER UK OR 
LOCAL SECURITY OFFICIALS.  WHATEVER ATTACKS HAD BEEN 
PLANNED IN BRITAIN ITSELF PROBABLY WERE JUDGED TO BE 
MORE RISKY AND WERE DELAYED AGAIN, BUT UK AUTHORITIES 
WERE CONVINCED THEY WOULD OCCUR EVENTUALLY. 
 
9.  UK SECURITY OFFICIALS KNEW OF MANY IRA MEMBERS AND 
SYMPATHIZERS IN BRITAIN AND WATCHED THEM AS CLOSELY AS 
POSSIBLE.  BUT WHEN THE ATTACK CAME IN NORTH LONDON ON 
AUGUST 1 IT WAS BY A "SLEEPER," AN INDIVIDUAL OR A UNIT 
OF THE IRA NOT KNOWN BY SPECIAL BRANCH TO BE IN ENGLAND 
AND READY FOR AN ATTACK HERE.  THERE MIGHT BE, OF 
COURSE, OTHER TERRORISTS IN BRITAIN PREPARING FOR 
ADDITIONAL ATTACKS.  MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONTACTS TOLD 
US THAT A GREAT MANY DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS HERE ARE 
"SOFT TARGETS" SUCH AS RECRUITING OFFICES AND URBAN 
DEPOTS WHERE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO INCREASE SECURITY 
PRECAUTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY.  IF A WELL-TRAINED IRA UNIT 
IS POISED AND EQUIPPED FOR ANOTHER ATTACK, SAID THE MOD, 
IT COULD WELL FIND ITS MARK. 
 
INTERNMENT FOR THE IRA IN ULSTER? 
--------------------------------- 
10.  WHILE THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH MORE BY WAY OF 
PRECAUTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN IN BRITAIN, THE SITUATION 
IS DIFFERENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.  SOME BACKBENCH 
CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT HAVE REACTED TO THE 
RECENT ATTACKS HERE AND IN ULSTER BY DEMANDING THE 
REINTRODUCTION OF INTERNMENT, THE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT 
TRIAL OR FORMAL CHARGES IN COURT OF KNOWN MEMBERS OF THE 
IRA AND OTHER VIOLENT GROUPS, BOTH CATHOLIC AND 
PROTESTANT. 
 
11.  INTERNMENT WAS ADOPTED IN AUGUST 1971 WHEN 450 
MEMBERS OF THE IRA WERE ROUNDED UP BY THE ARMY AND 
POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN "OPERATION DEMETRIUS." 
100 OF THOSE ARRESTED HAD TO BE RELEASED BECAUSE OF 
INSUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE TO BE CERTAIN OF THE CHARGES 
AGAINST THEM, SO THAT THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE IRA 
APPARENTLY WAS LEFT INTACT.  OPPONENTS OF INTERNMENT NOW 
CONCEDE THAT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS SO MUCH BETTER THAT 
A NEW ROUND-UP PROBABLY WOULD SUCCEED IN GREATLY 
DISRUPTING IRA PLANS.  TOM KING SAID RECENTLY THAT THE 
OPTION OF INTERNMENT REMAINS "UNDER REVIEW," BUT OUR 
CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT TOLD US THAT IRA ATTACKS WOULD 
HAVE TO BE FAR MORE SERIOUS FOR THE OPTION TO BE 
CHOSEN.  HMG KNOWS THAT ADOPTING INTERNMENT WOULD BE A 
PROPAGANDA VICTORY AND A RECRUITMENT BOON FOR THE IRA. 
ALSO, INTERNMENT VERY LIKELY WOULD NOT WORK UNLESS IT 
WAS ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND, 
WHICH UK OFFICIALS REGARD AS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. 
 
THE UK WANTS MORE HELP FROM IRELAND 
----------------------------------- 
12.  UK OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT ONE KEY TO SUCCESS IN THE 
WAR AGAINST IRA TERRORISM IS IMPROVED SECURITY 
COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.  THEY THINK 
THAT DUBLIN HAS NOT YET FELT COMPELLED TO PUT ITS WEIGHT 
FULLY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN PART BECAUSE THE IRA, 
EVEN THOUGH IT DECLARES THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT IS 
"ILLEGAL" AND THAT THE IRISH POLICE AND MILITARY ARE 
LEGITIMATE TARGETS FOR ATTACK, HAS WISELY REFRAINED FROM 
ENDANGERING ITS SANCTUARY ON THE IRISH SIDE OF THE 
BORDER BY ATTACKING THE REPUBLIC'S OFFICIALS AND ARMED 
FORCES THERE. 
 
13.  THERE WERE EVENTS IN 1987 WHICH EMBARRASSED THE 
DUBLIN GOVERNMENT INTO GREATER ACTION, SAY UK OFFICIALS, 
SUCH AS THE CAPTURE OF THE ARMS SHIP EKSUND AND THE 
REVELATION THEREFROM THAT THE IRA HAD BEEN IMPORTING 
LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS FROM LIBYA INTO IRELAND TO BE 
USED AGAINST FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND.  THE SUBSEQUENT 
FAILURE OF THE INTENSIVE EFFORT OF IRISH FORCES IN 
"OPERATION MALLARD" TO FIND MANY OF THOSE ARMAMENTS, AND 
THE PROLONGED INABILITY OF THE IRISH POLICE IN LATE 1987 
TO CAPTURE THE RENEGADE EX-IRA MEMBER AND RAMPANT 
CRIMINAL DESI O'HARE, THE POPULARLY STYLED "BORDER FOX," 
EMBARRASSED IRELAND AND ITS SECURITY FORCES STILL MORE. 
NIO OFFICIALS TOLD US THEY BELIEVE IT IS MORE USEFUL NOW 
TO USE EACH ADDITIONAL IRA ATTACK, AND THE PRESUMPTION 
THAT THE IRA TRAVELS RELATIVELY FREELY IN THE REPUBLIC 
AND HAS MUNITIONS STORED THERE, AS ARGUMENTS TO PROD 
DUBLIN INTO MORE COOPERATION. 
 
14.  AT A RECENT EC MEETING IN HANOVER MRS. THATCHER 
ONCE AGAIN CONFRONTED IRISH PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY OVER 
THE NEED FOR DUBLIN TO BE MORE HELPFUL.  ACCORDING TO 
CABINET SOURCES HERE, HAUGHEY CONCEDED THAT IRELAND'S 
POLICE AND MILITARY DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO 
COOPERATE FULLY WITH BRITISH FORCES IN STOPPING THE 
IRA.  IN RESPONSE TO THATCHER'S OFFER TO EITHER EXTEND 
BRITISH ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT 
OR TO ARRANGE SUCH ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IF 
NECESSARY, HAUGHEY PROMISED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD 
REASSESS THE NEED FOR TRAINING AND OTHER SECURITY 
IMPROVEMENTS. 
 
NO END IN SIGHT 
--------------- 
15.  HMG OFFICIALS REGARD THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM 
AS A PERENNIAL IRRITANT WHICH WILL NOT GO AWAY IN THE 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.  NO ONE WILL FIND A SOLOMONIC WAY TO 
SATISFY THE CONTRADICTORY DEMANDS OF UNIONISTS AND 
REPUBLICANS.  THE PERCEIVED GRIEVANCES OF BOTH SIDES 
WILL CONTINUE TO GENERATE CONFLICT.  WITH NO NEAR-TERM 
SOLUTION IN SIGHT, THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF GOVERNMENT ARE 
TO KEEP VIOLENCE DOWN TO TOLERABLE LEVELS IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND, STOP THE SPREAD OF IRA ATTACKS TO BRITAIN AND 
ELSEWHERE, AND RECTIFY THOSE OF THE GRIEVANCES 
UNDERLYING THE CONFLICT WHICH ARE LEGITIMATE. 
 
16.  THE GOVERNMENT IN LONDON BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED 
IRA TERRORISM IS INEVITABLE.  THEY LIKE TO POINT OUT, 
HOWEVER, THAT THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, EVEN 
WITH THE RECENT ESCALATION, IS VERY MUCH LESS THAN IN 
THE PEAK YEAR 1972 AND IN MOST INTERVENING YEARS.  UK 
OFFICIALS ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN KEEP THE KILLINGS IN 
ULSTER TO NOT MUCH MORE THAN CURRENT LEVELS WITHOUT ANY 
INCREASE IN SECURITY FORCES THERE.  IRA ATTACKS IN 
BRITAIN ITSELF AND IN EUROPE ARE A DIFFERENT MATTER. 
COUNTER-TERRORISM TIES AND COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES HAS IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND 
THE UK IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE IRA CAN BE HELD 
IN CHECK OUTSIDE OF NORTHERN IRELAND EVEN THOUGH ATTACKS 
WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR. 
 
17.  THERE ARE MANY EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH 
MIGHT BRING IRA ATTACKS, SUCH AS THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE MAZE PRISON ESCAPES ON SEPTEMBER 25 AND SEVERAL 
DIFFERENT DAYS WHEN CATHOLIC OR PROTESTANT ORGANIZATIONS 
WILL BE HAVING PUBLIC MARCHES.  IN ADDITION, THERE ARE 
SEVERAL UPCOMING EVENTS AND ANNIVERSARIES WHICH COULD BE 
CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE PERIODS OF INCREASED THREAT OF 
IRA TERRORIST ATTACK IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE.  PROMINENT 
AMONG THEM ARE: 
 
-- THE BEGINNING, NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 6, OF THE 
INQUEST BY THE GIBRALTAR CORONER INTO THE KILLING OF 
THREE IRA TERRORISTS THERE LAST JANUARY. 
 
-- THE ANNUAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 
11-14.  THE CONFERENCE WILL BE AT BRIGHTON THIS YEAR, 
THE SAME PLACE WHERE AN IRA BOMB CAME CLOSE TO KILLING 
MARGARET THATCHER AND A MAJOR PART OF HER CABINET DURING 
THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN 1984. 
 
-- 1989 WILL MARK THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF BOTH THE 
INTRODUCTION OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO NORTHERN IRELAND AND 
THE CREATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA.  1989 COULD BE A 
BAD YEAR FOR COMMEMORATIVE TERRORISM. 
 
PRICE