Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 87TUNIS11489, BEN ALI AS PRIME MINISTER: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #87TUNIS11489.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
87TUNIS11489 1987-10-09 13:47 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Tunis
O 091347Z OCT 87
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2603
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ROME
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TUNIS 11489 
 
E.O. 12356: 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TS
SUBJECT:  BEN ALI AS PRIME MINISTER:  WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
 
REF:  TUNIS 11130 
 
1.  SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  BOURGUIBA'S ABRUPT DISMISSAL OF SFAR AND 
ELEVATION OF INTERIOR MINISTER BEN ALI AGAIN 
DEMONSTRATES PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S PERSONAL CONTROL 
OF POWER IN TUNISIA.  BEN ALI'S APPOINTMENT PUTS A 
STRONG MAN IN THE PRIME MINISTRY AND A HEARTBEAT AWAY 
FROM THE PRESIDENCY.  IN GOVERNING, BEN ALI WILL HAVE 
SUPPORT FROM SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER BACCOUCHE, CHIEF 
OF STAFF BARKETT AND PRESIDENTIAL COMPANION SAIDA 
SASSI.  ON THE OTHER HAND, BEN ALI WILL PROBABLY BE 
AT ODDS WITH PSD DIRECTOR MAHJOUB BEN ALI.  BEN ALI'S 
RAPPORT WITH EDUCATION MINISTER SAYAH DESERVES 
PARTICULAR ATTENTION.  ADDITIONAL CABINET CHANGES ARE 
WIDELY RUMORED--THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES, JUSTICE, AND 
POSSIBLY DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  BEN ALI'S MOST 
DRAMATIC POLICY SIGNAL HAS BEEN A CALL FOR 
RESPONSIBLE DIALOGUE AND DIRECT CONTACT WHICH WAS 
FOLLOWED UP BY MEETINGS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS. 
U.S. INTERESTS ARE WELL SERVED BY BEN ALI'S 
APPOINTMENT SINCE IT WILL ENHANCE STABILITY IN THE 
NEAR AND LONGER TERM.  WHILE HE IS NOT "AMERICA'S 
MAN,"  HE CARRIES NO IDEOLOGICAL BAGGAGE WHICH WOULD 
IMPEDE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS.  U.S. INTERESTS ARE 
ALSO SERVED BY BEN ALI'S TENTATIVE OPENING TO CRITICS 
WHICH SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------- 
BOURGUIBA MAINTAINS CONTROL 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (NO FORN) - PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAS AGAIN 
DEMONSTRATED HIS PERSONAL CONTROL OF TUNISIAN 
POLITICS BY ABRUPTLY DISMISSING RACHID SFAR AND 
ELEVATING PRIME MINISTER BEN ALI (REFTEL) TO THE 
PRIME MINISTRY.  SFAR'S DISMISSAL WAS EXPLAINED LAST 
WEEK AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENTIAL DISSATISFACTION WITH 
THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER'S ATTEMPT TO DESIGNATE HIS 
CANDIDATE, ABDELMALEK AL 'ARIF, AS DIRECTOR OF THE 
RULING DESTOURIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSD).  THAT 
EXPLANATION HAS GAINED CREDIBILITY BY THE SUBSEQUENT 
REPORT IN A LEADING NEWSPAPER THAT BOURGUIBA AND SFAR 
FIRST CLASHED OVER APPOINTMENTS SEPT. 10 WHEN SFAR 
PROPOSED AL 'ARIF AS MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ONLY TO 
HAVE THE PRESIDENT OVERRULE HIM AND APPOINT 
ABDELWAHAB ABDULLAH TO THAT POST.  A SIRO SOURCE 
REPORTED THAT BOURGUIBA PROPOSED THE PRIME MINISTRY 
TO BEN ALI SEPT. 13 BUT THE LATTER RECOMMENDED THE 
CHANGE TAKE PLACE AFTER THE MTI TRIAL WHICH CONCLUDED 
SEPT. 27.  NEVERTHELESS, THE CHANGE ITSELF WAS 
HANDLED CLUMSILY WITH THE PRESIDENT PLACING HIMSELF 
IN THE EMBARRASSING POSITION OF APPROVING HIGH-LEVEL 
APPOINTMENTS ONE DAY--I.E PARTY CHIEF, MINISTER OF 
CULTURE ETC.--ONLY TO RETRACT THEM THE NEXT.  BY 
SEVERAL RELIABLE ACCOUNTS, THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO 
EXTRAORDINARILY ABUSIVE TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER 
SFAR, AT THE CABINET MEETING SEPT. 30, WHO PROTESTED 
ALL ALONG THAT HE HAD ACTED WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
APPROVAL.  HENCE, THE PRESIDENT HAS SIMULTANEOUSLY 
REASSERTED PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES WHILE RAISING 
QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS GRIP ON EVENTS. 
 
4.  LIKE HIS PREDECESSORS, BEN ALI'S RAPPORT WITH THE 
PRESIDENT WILL BE A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN HIS ABILITY TO 
GOVERN.  ON SECURITY ISSUES, HE HAS SHOWN A DEFT 
TOUCH -- E.G. OPPOSING THE CREATION OF MTI MARTYRS 
WITHOUT LOOSING CREDIBILITY.  BEN ALI'S FIRST 
OFFICIAL STATEMENT CAREFULLY ACKNOWLEDGED 
PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES AND CHARACTERIZED THE PRIME 
MINISTER AS FIRST AMONG EQUALS IN SERVING THE 
PRESIDENT. 
 
---------------------------- 
A STRONGMAN A HEARTBEAT AWAY 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  UNLIKE SFAR, BEN ALI IS NOT VIEWED AS A 
TRANSITIONAL FIGURE.  ANY PRIME MINISTER SERVES AT 
THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT AND BOURGUIBA HAS NEVER 
TOLERATED A TRULY POWERFUL PRIME MINISTER IN THE 
PAST.  NEVERTHELESS BEN ALI'S TENURE IS MORE SECURE 
THAN HIS PREDECESSOR'S BECAUSE HE IS A PILLAR OF 
TUNISIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT -- NOT 
IRREPLACEABLE, BUT NOT EASILY REPLACED.  WITH BEN 
ALI'S APPOINTMENT, THE ENTIRE SUCCESSION PICTURE HAS 
OBVIOUSLY CHANGED.  INSTEAD OF A WEAK PROSPECTIVE 
PRESIDENT WHO WOULD HAVE INVITED CHALLENGES FROM 
POLITICAL OPPONENTS, THERE IS A STRONG AND VIGOROUS 
SUCCESSOR.  WHATEVER ELSE HAPPENS, THE INTERNAL 
SECURITY SITUATION IS NOT LIKELY TO GET OUT OF HAND 
AS LONG AS THERE IS NO OPEN SPLIT IN THE RULING 
ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
------ 
ALLIES 
------ 
 
4. BEN ALI'S ALLIES IN THE GOVERNMENT ARE STRONG AND 
WELL PLACED.  FIRST AND FOREMOST IS SOCIAL AFFAIRS 
MINISTER BACCOUCHE WHO ALSO COMES FROM HAMMAM SOUSSE 
AND IS AN OLD PERSONAL FRIEND.  BACCOUCHE IS PRESUMED 
TO BE BEN ALI'S PRIMARY POLITICAL ADVISOR.  AN ADROIT 
POLITICIAN, BACCOUCHE WAS PSD DIRECTOR (1983-86) AND 
IS CURRENTLY MANAGING TUNISIA'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
LIBYA AND THEIR IMPACT ON HER RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA 
AND MOROCCO.  BACCOUCHE'S MAJOR LIABILITY IS THE 
PRESIDENT'S ANTIPATHY FOR HIM WHICH STEMS IN PART AT 
LEAST FROM BACCOUCHE'S INDEPENDENT ATTITUDE AS PARTY 
DIRECTOR.  SECOND, CHIEF OF STAFF BARKETT THINKS 
HIGHLY OF BEN ALI AND HAS MAINTAINED REGULAR 
CONTACT.  INDEED, BARKETT WAS THE ONLY SENIOR 
MILITARY FIGURE WHO FAILED TO ATTEND A DINNER AT THE 
FRENCH EMBASSY ON THE EVE OF THE GOVERNMENT CHANGE, 
WHICH HAS PRODUCED SPECULATION THAT HE ALONE IN THE 
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WAS INFORMED AND CONSULTED BY 
BEN ALI IN ADVANCE.  THIRD, PRESIDENTIAL COMPANION 
SAIDA SASSI WAS OBSERVED AS AN ALMOST DAILY VISITOR 
TO THE INTERIOR MINISTRY IN RECENT WEEKS.  SHE HAS 
EVEN PLACED PHONE CALLS FROM BEN ALI'S OFFICE.  BY 
SEVERAL ACCOUNTS, BEN ALI SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING 
SASSI TO COUNSEL MODERATION TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE 
MTI TRIAL.  THE BEN ALI-SASSI CONNECTION DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO BE DEEPLY ROOTED AND MAY NOT ENDURE. 
 
----------- 
ADVERSARIES 
----------- 
 
6. BEN ALI HAS GENERALLY NOT ENGENDERED PERSONAL 
ANTIMOSITY.  NEVERTHELESS, HE HAS POLITICAL RIVALS 
AND PERSONAL ANTIPATHIES. THE NEW PSD DIRECTOR 
MAHJOUB BEN ALI IS THOUGHT TO BE ON A TOTALLY 
DIFFERENT WAVELENGTH THAN THE PRIME MINISTER.  PRIME 
MINISTER BEN ALI IS MORE SUBTLE AND SEES THE NUANCES 
OF A SITUATION.  PSD DIRECTOR BEN ALI IS A BLUNT 
INSTRUMENT.  MOREOVER, THE PSD'S NEWLY RE-ACTIVATED 
MILITIA'S ARE HELD IN CONTEMPT BY THE PROFESSIONAL 
SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT AND THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN 
SEVERAL RELATIVELY MINOR CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE 
TWO GROUPS.  PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA PRESUMABLY 
RECOGNIZED THE INCOMPATIBILITY AND NAMED MAHJOUB IN 
PART AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE NEW PRIME MINISTER. 
PRIME MINISTER BEN ALI ALSO REPORTEDLY DISLIKES 
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT, HOUSING AND EQUIPMENT SKHIRI 
WHO HIMSELF ALMOST CERTAINLY ASPIRED TO HEAD THE 
GOVERNMENT.  SKHIRI HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH 
CORRUPTION IN THE PAST AND HAS REPORTEDLY MISMANAGED 
HIS MINISTRY SO HE IS NOT IN A PARTICULARLY STRONG 
POSITION.  EDUCATION MINISTER SAYAH WOULD BE A MUCH 
MORE FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY GIVEN HIS PERSONAL RAPPORT 
WITH THE PRESIDENT (HE IS BOURGUIBA'S BIOGRAPHER) AND 
DEEP AND WIDE PARTY CONNECTIONS.  BECAUSE OF HIS 
POLITICAL SKILLS, SAYAH WAS FOR MANY THE LEADING 
CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED SFAR AND EVENTUALLY THE 
PRESIDENT HIMSELF.  HE NOW FINDS A FORMIDABLE 
OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF THOSE AMBITIONS.  SAYAH'S ONLY 
HINT OF DISATISFACTION THUS FAR WAS A PUBLIC COMMENT 
PRIOR TO THE GOVERNMENT CHANGE TO THE EFFECT THAT 
TUNISIA HAS BEEN AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE LEAD BY 
CIVILIANS -- A POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO BEN ALI'S 
MILITARY BACKGROUND.  THE SAYAH-BEN ALI RELATIONSHIP 
BEARS WATCHING. 
 
--------------------- 
MORE CABINET CHANGES? 
--------------------- 
 
7.  SINCE BEN ALI'S APPOINTMENT, TUNIS' RUMOR MILLS 
HAVE BEEN WORKING OVERTIME AND FURTHER CABINET 
CHANGES ARE ALMOST UNIVERSALLY EXPECTED.  MUCH OF THE 
SPECULATIONS HAS FOCUSED ON THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES. 
THE PRESIDENT REPORTEDLY MADE A SLIGHTING REMARK IN 
THE SEPT. 30 CABINET MEETING ABOUT MINISTER OF PLAN 
KHELIL'S FREQUENT TRIPS TO THE U.S.  (HE HAS BEEN IN 
WASHINGTON FOR IMF MEETINGS.)  BEN ALI, WHOSE 
ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE IS NIL, IS ALSO PERCEIVED TO NEED 
HELP PARTICULARLY IN THIS DOMAIN.  JUSTICE MINISTER 
AYARI IS ALSO THOUGHT TO BE BURNT OUT.  MOREOVER, THE 
PRESIDENT WAS REPORTEDLY NOT PLEASED WITH THE COURSE 
OF THE MTI TRIAL.  THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S 
DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE PRESIDENT EARLIER THIS SUMMER 
AND TOTAL EXCLUSION FROM RECENT MAGHREB DIPLOMACY 
HAVE ALSO RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS STATUS.  DEFENSE 
MINISTER BALY'S NAME IS ALSO MENTIONED AS SOMEONE WHO 
MIGHT BE CHANGED TO BRING NEW BLOOD INTO THE GOT. 
ONE LEADING CANDIDATE FOR A MINISTRY IS TUNISIA'S 
AMBASSADOR TO BONN BEJI CAID ESSEBSI, A FORMER 
MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO HAD 
BEEN IN TUNIS THIS PAST WEEK AND IS EXPECTED BACK 
LATER THIS WEEK.  UN PERMREP MESTIRI HAS ALSO BEEN 
MENTIONED AS A CANDIDATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
POLICY CHANGES: DIALOGUE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
8. BEN ALI'S ONE CLEAR POLICY INITIATIVE HAS BEEN A 
SLIGHT OPENING TO THE REGIME'S CRITICS.  IN HIS 
INITIAL POLICY STATEMENT AS PRIME MINISTER, HE CALLED 
FOR "A REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY BASED ON 
BOURGUIBIAN PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT CONTACT, RESPONSIBLE 
DIALOGUE AND CONCORD TO SERVE TUNISIA'S HIGHER 
INTERESTS AND TO SAFEGUARD TUNISIA'S STABILITY AND 
INVULNERABILITY."  SUBSEQUENTLY, HE MET ON OCT. 6 IN 
SEPARATE AND HIGHLY-PUBLICIZED MEETINGS WITH THE 
LEADERS OF THE INDEPENDENT TUNISIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
LEAGUE AND GOT-CONTROLLED ASSOCIATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND PUBLIC LIBERTIES.  THESE GESTURES HAVE BEEN WELL 
RECEIVED.  OPPOSITION POLITICIANS WITH WHOM BEN ALI 
MAINTAINED CONTACTS AS INTERIOR MINISTER ARE NO DOUBT 
HOPING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTENTION WILL 
EVENTUALLY EXTEND TO THEM.  IF SO, IT WILL BE A 
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. INTERESTS 
-------------- 
 
9.  U.S. INTERESTS ARE WELL SERVED BY BEN ALI'S 
APPOINTMENT.  IN THE NEAR TERM, IT ENHANCES STABILITY 
AT A TIME WHEN THE MTI CHALLENGE HAS BEEN BLUNTED, 
BUT NOT RESOLVED AND WHEN TUNISIA IS MOVING TOWARD A 
MORE NORMAL AND OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA.  IN THE 
LONGER TERM, SHOULD ANYTHING HAPPEN TO THE PRESIDENT, 
BEN ALI WOULD BE ALMOST THE IDEAL PERSON TO MAINTAIN 
ORDER IN THE TRANSITION.  HE IS NOT "AMERICA'S MAN" 
-- A WIDELY HELD PERCEPTION IN TUNIS BASED ON BEN 
ALI'S REPUTATION FOR "LAW AND ORDER" AND HIS LIMITED 
STUDY AS A SOLDIER IN THE U.S.  RATHER HE IS 
DISTINCTLY NON-IDEOLOGICAL.  NEVERTHELESS, THE 
ABSENCE OF INTELLECTUAL BAGGAGE--I.E. MZALI'S 
AMBITION TO BRING TUNISIA CLOSER TO THE ARAB WORLD, 
FOREIGN MINISTER MABROUK'S FRANCOPHILIA, ETC. -- IS 
AN ADVANTAGE AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED.  ALSO IN 
U.S. INTERESTS IS BEN ALI'S TENTATIVE OPENING TO THE 
REGIME'S CRITICS.  AT A MINIMUM, HE HAS ENDORSED THE 
LEGITIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY IN TUNISIA. 
WHETHER HE PROCEEDS FARTHER TOWARD POLITICAL 
PLURALISM WILL DEPEND ON MANY FACTORS -- PRINCIPALLY 
THE PRESIDENT'S ACQUIESCENCE OR RESISTANCE.  IT IS A 
TENDENCY, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE. 
 
PELLETREAU##