Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 87BOGOTA7890, THE GUERRILLA SITUATION: PREPARING FOR WAR?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #87BOGOTA7890.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
87BOGOTA7890 1987-06-09 22:18 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Bogota
P 092218Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7510
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY LIMA
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
id: 163
date: 6/9/1987 22:18
refid: 87BOGOTA7890
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: SECRET
destination: 87BOGOTA3997
header:
P 092218Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7510
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY LIMA
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC


----------------- header ends ----------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 07890 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: KPRP PINS MILI PTER CO
SUBJECT: THE GUERRILLA SITUATION: PREPARING FOR WAR? 
 
REF: BOGOTA 3997 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA WAR HAS BEEN 
QUIESCENT THE LAST FEW WEEKS.  THOUGH ARMED CONTACTS 
BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GUERRILLA GROUPS AND THE MILITARY 
CONTINUE, THE PACE OF MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS HAS 
SLACKENED.  THE MAIN ARENA OF CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN THE 
MEDIA, WHERE THE UNION PATRIOTICA (UP), POLITICAL FRONT 
OF THE COLOMBIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FARC), 
LEVELED CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST THE 
MILITARY.  COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA GROUPS ARE IN A 
RETRENCHMENT PHASE: REGROUPING, FORGING ALLIANCES, AND 
RETHINKING STRATEGIES.  THE GOC CONTINUES TO 
RESTRUCTURE ITS SECURITY APPARATUS AND TO AUGMENT THE 
ARMY'S STRENGTH THROUGH RECRUITMENT OF VOLUNTEER UNITS. 
THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE PREPARING FOR 
AN EVENTUAL BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE 
RESUMPTION OF FULL-SCALE CONFLICT.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
GUERRILLAS - THE PUBLIC PROFILE 
------------------------------- 
2. (S/NF) WAVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS BANNER:  THE FARC AND 
THE UNION PATRIOTICA ARE THE ONE COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA 
GROUPING POSSESSED OF A MEDIA SENSE.  IN RECENT WEEKS, 
THEY HAVE USED THE MEDIA TO MAKE THEIR CASE TO THE 
COLOMBIAN AND FOREIGN PUBLIC.  THE MAJOR THRUST BY THE 
UP WAS A MAY 8 PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH EX-PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE JAIME PARDO LEAL CHARGED OVER 100 MILITARY 
OFFICERS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST UP MEMBERS AND 
ACTIVISTS (SEE BOGOTA 6456).  THE UP'S CHARGES RESULTED 
IN A SWIFT DENIAL AND A NAME-BY-NAME REBUTTAL BY DEFENSE 
MINISTER SAMUDIO.  PARDO'S THRUST WAS COMPLEMENTED BY 
REPORTS OF A PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH UP 
CONGRESSMAN AND EX-FARC COMANDANTE BRAULIO HERRERA 
DECLARED THE UP AND THE PEACE PROCESS TO BE IN DANGER OF 
EXTINCTION FROM ASSAULTS BY THE MILITARY AND 
MILITARY-SUPPORTED PARA-MILITARY GROUPS (SEE BOGOTA 
7001).  HERRERA'S PARIS SOJOURN IS PROBABLY THE OPENING 
PHASE OF A LARGE SCALE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE 
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES.  SPECIAL 
REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
(PCC) IS COORDINATING SUCH A CAMPAIGN WITH LEFTIST 
GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE.  THE CAMPAIGN IS TO 
BE MODELED ON THOSE CONDUCTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENTS OF 
EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND ARGENTINA.  ANALOGY BETWEEN 
ARGENTINA'S "DIRTY WAR" AND CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA WILL 
BE THE KEY THEME.  THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO 
CONSTRAIN GOC ACTIONS AGAINST ANY GUERRILLA GROUP AND TO 
FRUSTRATE ATTEMPTS TO SECURE COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUPPORT 
FROM ABROAD. 
 
3. (U) PARDO ON THE PEACE PROCESS: FOLLOWING ON THE 
CHARGES OF MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, THE 
CONSERVATIVE WEEKLY "GUION" PUBLISHED AN INTERVIEW WITH 
PARDO IN ITS MAY 27 EDITION.  AFTER THE NOW-RITUAL 
DECLARATION OF THE UP'S INDEPENDENCE FROM THE FARC, 
PARDO WENT ON TO DENOUNCE THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION'S 
CONDUCT OF THE PEACE PROCESS.  HE DECLARED THE PROCESS 
TO BE IN CRISIS BECAUSE THE GOC LACKS THE WILL TO BUILD 
ON THE BASE CREATED BY THE BETANCUR ADMINISTRATION.  IN 
PARTICULAR, HE CITED THE GOC'S REFUSAL TO NAME AN 
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION COMMISSION AS PROOF OF A LACK 
OF INTEREST IN PEACE.  "THE GOVERNMENT," PARDO 
CONTINUED, "HAS NOT MOVED A SINGLE FINGER TO PUT AN END 
TO...ARMED CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE 
GUERRILLA MOVEMENT OBSERVING THE TRUCE."  HE ALSO 
CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT CONTENTION THAT THE ARMED 
FORCES MUST HAVE FREE ACCESS TO ANY PART OF THE 
COUNTRY.  CHALLENGED THAT THE TREATY DID NOT CONCEDE 
"INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS" TO THE FARC, PARDO COUNTERED 
THAT "THE FARC NEEDS A GEOGRAPHICAL SITE, A PIECE OF 
EARTH." 
 
4. (U)  A LETTER TO BARCO:  THE UP'S EFFORTS WERE 
COMPLEMENTED BY DESPATCH MAY 10 OF A LETTER FROM THE 
FARC COMANDANTES TO PRESIDENT BARCO.  REVEALING A NEW 
AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, THE FARC WARNED 
THAT THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS IN BARCO'S HANDS. 
SIGNIFICANTLY, THE FARC DECLARED THAT THEY DID NOT SIGN 
A TRUCE WITH "MILITARISM" AND ARE READY TO JOIN "OUR 
PEOPLE WHEN IT DECIDES TO RISE UP AGAINST MILITARISM." 
THE FARC'S LETTER CONTAINS AN IMPLICIT THREAT: SHOULD 
BARCO BECOME "MILITARISTIC" IN THE FARC'S EYES, THE 
GUERRILLAS WILL HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ABANDON THE 
PEACE PROCESS AND RESUME OPERATIONS. 
 
 
GUERRILLAS - BEHIND THE SCENES MANEUVERING 
------------------------------------------ 
5. (C/NF) FARC - STIRRING FROM THE NEST:  WHILE THE 
FARC'S PUBLIC ORGANS ARE ENGAGED IN TARRING THEIR 
GOC/MILITARY OPPONENTS, THE FARC AND COLOMBIA'S OTHER 
GUERRILLA ARMIES, SINGLY OR IN CONCERT, HAVE BUSIED 
THEMSELVES WITH REORGANIZATION, ALLIANCES, AND STRATEGIC 
RETHINKING.  AS THE LARGEST GUERRILLA ARMY, AND THE SOLE 
GROUP REMAINING WITHIN THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC'S 
ACTIVITIES COMMAND THE LION'S SHARE OF INTEREST.  RECENT 
REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS REDISTRIBUTING 
FORCES, POSSIBLY WITH AN EYE TO READINESS IN EVENT OF AN 
OPEN BREAK WITH THE GOC.  ONE MILITARY SOURCE REPORTS 
THAT FIVE ADDITIONAL FARC FRONTS ARE BEING FORMED.  IT 
IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS PROJECTED EXPANSION REFLECTS 
ADDITIONAL ARMED STRENGTH, A REDISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE 
STRENGTH TO COUNTER GOC INITIATIVES, OR A RESPONSE TO 
RIVAL GUERRILLA GROUPS.  HOWEVER, GIVEN THE GROWTH IN 
FARC STRENGTH SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS, 
IT FAIR TO ASSUME THAT THE NEW FRONTS REFLECT 
AUGMENTATION OF THE FARC'S ARMED STRENGTH.  BY CONTRAST, 
OTHER SPECIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS 
CONSOLIDATING FRONTS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE MARCH 1988 
ELECTIONS.  ANOTHER FACET OF THE SITUATION IS A JUNE 2 
REPORT IN "EL ESPECTADOR", BOGOTA'S LEADING DAILY, THAT 
THE FARC IS ABANDONING ITS MOUNTAIN HEADQUARTERS AT LA 
URIBE AND SHIFTING FORCES TO META AND GUAVIARE 
DEPARTMENTS.  THIS REPORT REMAINS UNCONFIRMED; GOC 
OFFICIALS PLED IGNORANCE WHEN PRESSED BY THE MEDIA FOR 
CONFIRMATION.  IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE FARC WOULD 
LEAVE INACCESSIBLE LA URIBE FOR NEW AND UNHARDENED 
QUARTERS.  ANY SHIFT OF PERSONNEL FROM LA URIBE MAY IN 
FACT BE TIED TO THE ACTIVATION OF NEW FRONTS. 
 
6. (S/NF) EXTENDING A HAND TO THE EPL: WHILE CONTINUING 
TO SPAR WITH THE GOC ON THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC HAS 
NOT ABANDONED ITS HOPES OF DOMINATING COLOMBIA'S 
GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.  A MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WAS 
THE APRIL 4 AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 
(EPL) WHICH CALLED FOR GUERRILLA UNITY, "DEMOCRATIC 
CONVERGENCE" AND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO COLOMBIA'S 
PROBLEMS.  CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT EACH 
SIDE SEES ADVANTAGES FLOWING FROM THE PACT.  THE FARC 
FORESEES A NOMINAL TRUCE BETWEEN THE GOC AND THE EPL 
WHICH WOULD ALLOW INCREASED EPL TO INCREASE POLITICAL 
ACTIVITY IN ITS CORDOBA DEPARTMENT STRONGHOLD -- AN 
ADVANTAGE FOR THE RADICAL LEFT.  THEY ALSO VIEW THE PACT 
AS AN INCENTIVE FOR OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS TO NEGOTIATE 
WITH THE FARC.  FOR ITS PART, THE EPL SEES THE AGREEMENT 
AS A MEANS OF LURING THE FARC OUT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. 
THUS, THE AGREEMENT COULD SUCCUMB TO THE DISTRUST AND 
IDEOLOGICAL SQUABBLING THAT HAVE KEPT COLOMBIA'S 
GUERRILLAS DIVIDED. 
 
7. (S/NF) EXTENDING A FIST TO THE ELN: DESPITE SUCCESS 
IN FORGING LINKS TO THE EPL, TENSIONS BETWEEN THE FARC 
AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN) HAVE ESCALATED. 
IN PARTICULAR, THE FARC HAS ACCUSED THE ELN OF MURDERING 
MEMBERS OF THE FARC'S UNION PATRIOTICA (UP) POLITICAL 
FRONT IN ARAUCA INTENDENCY.  THE SITUATION MIRRORS THE 
CONFLICTING AMBITIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS IN THAT AREA. 
WHILE THE FARC REMAINS INTENT ON MONOPOLIZING POLITICAL 
POWER IN ARAUCA, AND USING THE AREA AS A RECRUITING 
POOL, THE ELN SEEKS TO DOMINATE THE AREA THROUGH ATTACKS 
ON THE OIL PIPELINE.  CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING INDICATES 
THAT THE ELN DESIRES A MEETING TO RESOLVE THESE 
PROBLEMS.  IT IS UNKNOWN IF SUCH A MEETING OCCURRED, BUT 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE FARC AND THE ELN HAVE 
TEMPORARILY SHELVED THEIR DIFFERENCES. 
 
8. (C) ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE:  THE NEW DEVELOPMENT 
SUGGESTING A SUBSUMPTION OF FARC-ELN DIFFERENCES IS THE 
GENERAL STRIKE CALLED FOR JUNE 7-9.  THIS STRIKE, 
DESIGNED TO PARALYZE SEVEN DEPARTMENTS OF NORTHEASTERN 
COLOMBIA, WAS JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE FARC, THE 
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (EPL), THE M-19, THE NATIONAL 
LIBERATION ARMY (ELN), AND THE NEWLY-REACTIVATED RICARDO 
FRANCO FRONT (A DISSIDENT WING OF THE FARC). 
VICE-MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT FERNANDO BOTERO TOLD MISSION 
JUNE 9 THAT THE STRIKE HAS NOT ASSUMED THE DIMENSIONS 
ORIGINALLY FEARED.  URBAN WORKERS HAVE LARGELY IGNORED 
CALLS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS.  BOTERO ADDED THAT ABOUT 
18,000 CAMPESINOS HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED UNDER DURESS BY 
THE GUERRILLAS, THREATENED WITH A 20,000 PESO FINE OR 
DEATH FOR NON-COMPLIANCE.  WHILE SATISFIED THAT THE 
STRIKE'S IMMEDIATE IMPACT IS MINIMAL, BOTERO COMMENTED 
THAT THE EVIDENT GUERRILLA COOPERATION IN FOMENTING THE 
CAMPESINO MARCHES IS DISTURBING (COMMENT: WE SHARE 
BOTERO'S CONCERN; WHATEVER THE SUCCESS OF THE CIVIC 
STRIKE, ITS PLANNING POINTS TOWARD POSSIBLE GREATER 
COOPERATION AMONG THE GUERRILLAS.) 
 
9. (S/NF) M-19 -- THROWING THEIR HAT IN THE RING: THE 
FARC IS NOT ALONE IN RETHINKING ITS POSITION AND IN 
RESTRUCTURING ITS FORCES.  CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING 
INDICATES THAT THE LONG-UNHEARD-FROM M-19 HAS DECIDED TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE 1988 MAYORAL ELECTIONS.  THE GROUP 
INTENDS TO ACT THROUGH FRONT GROUPS AND TO SEEK 
ALLIANCES WITH MAINSTREAM POLITICIANS AND GROUPS SUCH AS 
THE FARC'S UNION PATRIOTICA.  THE FARC/EPL AGREEMENT 
CITED IN PARAGRAPH (6) IS A PRIME MOTIVATION FOR THE 
M-19'S ACTION.  IN ADDITION, THE M-19 INTENDS TO FORGE 
CLOSER LINKS WITH THE FARC.  AS WITH OTHER 
INTER-GUERRILLA AGREEMEMTS, SELF-INTEREST ASSUMES A 
COMMANDING POSITION; THE M-19 HOPES THAT CLOSER 
RELATIONS WITH THE FARC WILL FOSTER JOINT OPERATIONS 
SHOULD THE FARC-GOC TRUCE COLLAPSE.  IN OTHER 
DEVELOPMENTS, THE M-19 IS CREATING NEW URBAN TERRORIST 
UNITS IN COLOMBIA'S MAJOR CITIES, AND HAS BEGUN JOINT 
TRAINING WITH THE EPL TO REBUILD ITS DEPLETED STRENGTH 
ALONG THE CARIBBEAN COAST. 
 
10. (S/NF) ELN - PULSO FIRME Y MANO TENDIDA:  IN 
ADDITION, THE ELN IS NEARING COMPLETION OF A MAJOR 
REORGANIZATION OF ITS BOGOTA UNITS.  FORMERLY LARGELY 
AUTONOMOUS, THESE UNITS WILL NOW BE SUBJECT TO THE ELN'S 
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE.  GIVEN THE ELN'S REPUTATION FOR 
DISCIPLINE, FUTURE ELN ACTIONS IN BOGOTA MAY SEEK TO 
HAVE AN IMPACT SIMILAR TO THEIR PIPELINE ATTACKS IN 
ARAUCA.  REGARDING THE PIPELINE, ON JUNE 1, THE ELN 
PROPOSED TO THE GOC A CESSATION OF PIPELINE ATTACKS, 
PROVIDED THE GOC MET SEVERAL ELN DEMANDS REGARDING 
PETROLEUM EXTRACTION AND EXPORT (SEE BOGOTA 7451). 
THESE DEMANDS WERE ROUNDLY REJECTED BY RECONCILIATION 
ADVISOR CARLOS OSSA ESCOBAR, WHO DECLARED THAT THE GOC 
WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ITS ENERGY POLICY "WITH AN ARMED 
MINORITY INTENT ON ATTACKING THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY." 
 
 
THE GOVERNMENT - RESTRUCTURING FOR CONFLICT 
------------------------------------------- 
11. (C/NF) MILITARY GROWTH:  GUERRILLA EFFORTS AT 
RESTRUCTURING HAVE THEIR PARALLEL ON THE GOVERNMENT 
SIDE.  THOUGH PRESIDENT BARCO REITERATED TO VISITING 
GENERAL GALVIN (SEE BOGOTA 7463) HIS BELIEF THAT HIS 
REHABILITATION PLAN WILL SAP MUCH OF THE FARC'S 
STRENGTH, HE REMAINS INTENT ON EXPANDING THE SIZE, 
MOBILITY, AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE ARMED FORCES. 
BARCO BELIEVES (COMMENT: WE AGREE) THAT THE ARMED FORCES 
ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO TAKE ON A FULLY-ACTIVE 
FARC.  HOWEVER, HIS RECENT COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT 
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ARE BRAKING THE PACE OF ARMY 
EXPANSION.  IN A JUNE 2 SPEECH AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY, 
BARCO STATED THAT HIS GOVERMMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE 
"BASIC ELEMENTS" NEEDED BY THE ARMY, BUT ONLY "TO THE 
MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE."  WHATEVER THE REALITY OF 
BUDGET LIMITATIONS, THE COLOMBIANS HAVE DECIDED TO 
PURCHASE U.S.-MADE TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS AT A COST OF 
$36 MILLION, THOUGH DELIVERY OF THE FIRST UNIT WILL NOT 
TAKE PLACE UNTIL LATE 1987.  IN ADDITION, THE ARMY HAS 
BEEN RECRUITING SOME 2,000 DISCHARGED SOLDIERS FOR 
SERVICE IN SPECIAL VOLUNTEER COMPANIES.  THESE UNITS ARE 
HIGHLY RATED DUE TO THE MEN'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE, AND HAVE 
BEEN DEPLOYED IN CONTESTED AREAS SUCH AS CAQUETA 
DEPARTMENT.  RECRUITMENT OF ADDITIONAL VOLUNTEER UNITS 
IS EXPECTED. 
 
12. (U) SECURITY RESTRUCTURING:  AS A FURTHER STEP IN 
COMBATTING THE THREAT POSED BY THE GUERRILLAS AND THE 
EROSION OF PUBLIC ORDER, THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL 
INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANS HAVE BEGUN MAJOR 
REORGANIZATIONS.  THE NATIONAL POLICE ANNOUNCED JUNE 2 
THE ACTIVATION OF 30 INTELLIGENCE "BRIGADES" DESIGNED TO 
DETECT URBAN ACTIVITIES BY GUERRILLA GROUPS, BE THEY 
MILITARY OR POLITICAL IN NATURE.  FOR ITS PART, THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS - COLOMBIAN 
FBI) HAS CREATED THREE NEW COMMANDS DEDICATED TO 
SECURITY, EXPLOSIVES AND COUNTER-TERRORISM, AS WELL AS 
INTELLIGENCE CENTERS IN BOGOTA, CALI, MEDELLIN, AND 
CUCUTA.  ACCORDING TO DAS COMMANDER GENERAL MAZA, ALL 
UNITS ARE DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE WAVE OF CRIMINALITY, 
TERRORISM, AND ARMED SUBVERSION CONFRONTING COLOMBIA. 
 
 
PROGNOSIS 
--------- 
13. (C) AS INDICATED IN MISSION'S LAST ASSESSMENT OF 
COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA SITUATION (REFTEL), THE LEVEL OF 
CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA IS EXPECTED TO GROW DURING 1987. 
THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY BOTH THE GOC AND THE VARIOUS 
GUERRILLA GROUPS REFLECT THAT EXPECTATION.  THE ACTIVE 
GUERRILLA GROUPS APPEAR INTENT ON STRIKING THE GOC ANEW 
ONCE REDEPLOYMENT AND RETRAINING ARE ACCOMPLISHED. 
HOWEVER, THE MAJOR DANGER TO COLOMBIAN INSTITUTIONS AND 
U.S. INTERESTS HERE LIES IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE FARC. 
EVOLUTION OF EVENTS, OF COURSE, WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE 
FARC FORESEES PROSPECTS OF ITS UNION PATRIOTICA 
POLITICAL FRONT IN THE MARCH 1988 POPULAR ELECTIONS FOR 
MAYORS.  CURRENT PROJECTIONS SUGGEST THE UP WILL DO 
FAIRLY WELL IN SOME ISOLATED RURAL AREAS, AND MAY ELECT 
UP TO EIGHTY MAYORS (OUT OF OVER 1,000), ALL IN 
RELATIVELY SMALL TOWNS.  BASED ON THIS EXPECTATION, MOST 
OBSERVERS HERE THINK THE FARC WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO 
FORMALLY BREAK THE TRUCE BEFORE NEXT MARCH -- ALTHOUGH 
THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE MAY RISE WITHOUT ANY DECLARATION. 
BEFORE OR AFTER MARCH, THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE EVENTS IS 
WIDE: THE FARC IN OPEN WARFARE, OR STILL-NOMINAL 
ADHERENCE TO THE PEACE ACCORDS;  THE UP LEAVING THE 
CONGRESS, OR STAYING TO USE IT AS A PLATFORM TO DENOUNCE 
THE GOVERNMENT.  BUT IN OUR JUDGEMENT ALL THESE 
SCENARIOS WILL HAVE ONE COMMON FACTOR:  HEIGHTENED 
VIOLENCE AND INCREASED THREAT TO COLOMBIA'S INSTITUTIONS 
AND U.S. INTERESTS. 
 
 
GILLESPIE 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================