R 020937Z APR 87
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1381
INFO DIA WASHDC//AO-3//
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 02354 
 
CINCPAC FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL KPRP IN BG
SUBJECT:  BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS 
 
THIS TELEGRAM FULFILLS ONE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
POST REPORTING PLAN 
 
¶1.  (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT). 
 
-- 
¶2.  SUMMARY:  BANGLADESH HOPES THAT RAJIV GANDHI WOULD 
BE A POWERFUL FORCE IN IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS 
HAVE FADED OVER THE PAST YEAR.  BANGLADESH AND INDIA 
HAVE MADE LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON LONG-STANDING 
PROBLEMS UNDER RAJIV; MANY AGAIN APPEAR INTRACTABLE 
AND NEW PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN.  THE UPSURGE IN VIOLENCE 
IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS HAS BEEN A PARTICULARLY 
IMPORTANT SETBACK.  WHILE THE USG HAS NO INTEREST IN 
GETTING INVOLVED IN BANGLADESH-INDIA PROBLEMS AND SHOULD 
CONTINUE TO AVOID ANY POSITIONS ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE HELPFUL 
IN PROMOTING REGIONAL STABILITY, A LONG-TIME U.S. 
OBJECTIVE IN SOUTH ASIA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-- 
BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT PERCEPTIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  BANGLADESHI HOPES THAT INDIAN PRIME MINISTER RAJIV 
GANDHI WOULD BE A POWERFUL FORCE IN IMPROVING RELATIONS 
HAVE FADED OVER THE PAST YEAR. THERE IS A GROWING REAL- 
IZATION THAT RAJIV FACES A MYRIAD OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, 
AS WELL AS DIFFICULT RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND SRI 
LANKA, AND CAN DEVOTE LITTLE TIME TO BANGLADESH.  IN 
THE BDG VIEW, WHAT GOODWILL OR NOBLE INTENTIONS HE MAY 
HAVE TOWARDS IMPROVING RELATIONS HAVE BEEN STYMIED AT 
EVERY TURN BY THE INDIAN BUREAUCRACY AND BY LESS HELP- 
FUL POLITICAL FIGURES.  (WATER RESOURCES MINISTER 
¶B. SHANKARANAND REMAINS A FAVORITE BDG BLACK HAT.) 
MANY BANGLADESHIS CONSIDER THAT THE INDIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY BUREAUCRACY IS DOMINATED BY PEOPLE WITH AN 
IMPERIOUS  ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDIA'S NEIGHBORS.  THEY 
BELIEVE THAT WHILE ERSHAD AND RAJIV MAY PERSONALLY GET 
ALONG WELL AND WANT TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, 
INDIAN BUREAUCRATS ARE DETERMINED TO KEEP UP THE 
PRESSURE ON BANGLADESH.  REPORTS THAT RAJIV CANNOT 
MANAGE THESE BUREAUCRATS, AND GROWING PERCEPTIONS 
THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S POLITICAL POSITION IS 
WEAKENING, ONLY COMPOUND THE FEAR AMONG MANY IN 
BANGLADESH THAT RAJIV IS POWERLESS TO EFFECT CHANGE. 
 
-- 
¶4.  PRESIDENT ERSHAD'S STATE VISIT TO DELHI JULY 14-16, 
1986  LED TO AN OPEN AND POSITIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, 
BUT MANY IN BANGLADESH VIEWED IT AS A TEST OF RAJIV'S 
ABILITY TO HASTEN THE RESOLUTION OF BILATERAL PROBLEMS, 
IN PARTICULAR THE TIN BIGHA LAND CASE AND THE EASTERN 
WATERS PROBLEM.  BY JANUARY 1987, OPTIMISM THAT PROGRESS 
COULD BE MADE ON BILATERAL ISSUES HAD FADED.  FOREIGN 
MINISTER TIWARI FACED A LITANY OF BDG GRIEVANCES DURING 
HIS JANUARY 6-8 VISIT TO DHAKA.  BANGLADESH AND INDIA 
HAVE MADE LITTLE PROGRESS ON LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS 
UNDER RAJIV; MANY AGAIN APPEAR INTRACTABLE AND NEW 
PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN.  FOREIGN MINISTER CHOUDHURY, IN A 
MARCH 25 SPEECH BEFORE PARLIAMENT, DEVOTED NEARLY HALF 
OF HIS HOUR-LONG ADDRESS TO INDO-BANGLADESHI BILATERAL 
PROBLEMS.  CHOUDHURY'S FOCUS ON INDIA REFLECTED THE BDG 
INTEREST IN DEMONSTRATING THE CORRECTNESS OF A STRONG 
STAND ON BILATERAL ISSUES AT A TIME WHEN THE BDG IS 
BECOMING INCREASINGLY EMBARRASSED AND FRUSTRATED BY 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, SUCH AS THE 
CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS PROBLEM. 
 
-- 
BILATERAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  THE FOLLOWING BILATERAL ISSUES, THE MAJORITY OF 
WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED EXTENSIVELY FROM DHAKA, FOR 
THE MOST PART ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BESET 
BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS OVER THE PAST YEAR AND 
DIMINISHED HOPES THAT RELATIONS WOULD IMPROVE UNDER 
RAJIV.  LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN RECORDED ON LONG- 
STANDING POLITICAL ISSUES.  AND IN ONE INSTANCE, THE 
CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, THE UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE THERE 
HAS CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT SETBACK. 
 
-- 
POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  EASTERN WATERS.   ALTHOUGH THE BDG WAS PLEASED 
THAT INDIA AGREED TO A TRILATERAL APPROACH TO AUGMENTING 
THE FLOW OF GANGES RIVER WATER TO BANGLADESH, SENIOR BDG 
OFFICIALS RECOGNIZED THAT ANY EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE 
EASTERN WATERS ISSUE BY BUILDING A SERIES OF DAMS IN 
NEPAL WAS CERTAIN TO BE FRUITLESS.  IN A "SHARING" 
APPROACH, BANGLADESH IS NOW ASKING INDIA FOR A GUARAN- 
TEED FLOW OF 25,000 CUSECS FROM THE GANGES, LESS THAN 
THAT PROVIDED IN THE SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT NOW IN FORCE, 
BUT ABOUT EQUAL TO WHAT BANGLADESH RECEIVES IN THE 
LOWEST WATER MONTHS BECAUSE OF THE BURDEN-SHARING 
PROVISIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT.  BANGLADESH ALSO WANTS A 
GUARANTEED 75 PERCENT OF THE FLOW OF THE BRAHMAPUTRA 
AND 50 PERCENT OF THE FLOW OF THE OTHER BORDER RIVERS. 
IF INDIA AGREES TO GUARANTEE THESE QUANTITIES OF WATER 
FOR BANGLADESH, THE BANGLADESH IRRIGATION MINISTER 
CLAIMS THE BDG WILL DROP ITS PROPOSAL FOR STORAGE DAMS 
IN NEPAL AND INDIA COULD THEN ABANDON THE IDEA OF A 
LINK CANAL FROM THE BRAHMAPUTRA TO THE GANGES ACROSS 
BANGLADESH.  THE BDG BELIEVES THAT SUCH A SHARING 
AGREEMENT WITH INDIA IS POSSIBLE, BUT THE INDIAN 
BUREAUCRACY REMAINS OBSTRUCTIVE.  IN BANGLADESH 
POLITICS, THE GREAT DANGER IS BEING SEEN AS "PRO- 
INDIAN."  THUS, PRESIDENT ERSHAD IS CAUTIOUS IN DEALING 
WITH THE EASTERN WATERS ISSUE. 
 
-- 
¶7.  CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS.   BDG OFFICIALS CLAIM 
THAT INDIA HAS PROVIDED ARMS, REFUGE, AND FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT TO THE SHANTI BAHINI INSURGENTS IN THE 
CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, THUS FUELING AN INSURGENCY 
WHICH HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY VIOLENT.  INDIA, ON 
THE OTHER HAND, CLAIMS THAT BANGLADESH HAS GIVEN 
REFUGE TO MEMBERS OF AN INDIAN INSURGENT GROUP, THE 
TRIPURA NATIONAL VOLUNTEERS.  INDIA AND BANGLADESH 
RECENTLY REACHED AN AGREEMENT THAT BANGLADESH WOULD 
REPATRIATE OVER 24,000 CHAKMA REFUGEES WHO FLED FROM 
BANGLADESH IN THE WAKE OF SHANTI BAHINI VIOLENCE. 
THE REPATRIATION PROGRAM WAS TO HAVE BEGUN ON 
JANUARY 15, BUT SHANTI BAHINI ATTACKS STOPPED THE 
REPATRIATION BEFORE IT BEGAN.  INDIA AND BANGLADESH 
CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE CHARGES ABOUT WHICH COUNTRY IS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE.  FOREIGN MINISTER 
(#)UMAYUN RASHID CHOUDHURY IN A MARCH 25 SPEECH BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT SAID THAT BANGLADESH IS READY TO TAKE 
BACK THE REFUGEES, BUT THAT THE GOI HAS NOT RESPONDED 
TO BANGLADESH'S PROPOSAL TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN 
HOME SECRETARIES ON THE REPATRIATION PROGRAM.  THE 
CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS ISSUE IS A PARTICULARLY SENSI- 
TIVE ONE FOR BANGLADESH IN VIEW OF A SEPTEMBER 1986 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT CHARGING WIDESPREAD 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE HILL TRACTS BY BANGLADESH 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS. 
 
-- 
¶8.  TIN BIGHA.   THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT RULED IN 
SEPTEMBER 1986 THAT THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION MUST 
BE AMENDED BEFORE INDIA COULD LEASE THE TIN BIGHA 
CORRIDOR  TO BANGLADESH IN PERPETUITY.  THE BANGLA- 
DESHIS HAD ASKED FOR THE TERRITORY TO BE TURNED OVER 
TO THEM DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1987.  RAJIV 
PROMISED TO DELIVER QUICKLY ON TIN BIGHA, AND HAS 
THUS FAR FAILED TO KEEP THAT PROMISE.  THE BDG 
CLAIMS THE ISSUE IS A TEST OF INDIA'S SINCERITY IN 
IMPROVING RELATIONS OVERALL, BUT IN FACT APPEARS 
FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT INDIA'S SLOWNESS. 
 
-- 
¶9.  MARITIME BOUNDARY.   FOREIGN MINISTER CHOUDHURY 
IN HIS MARCH 25 SPEECH HAS SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO ALL 
AVAILABLE INFORMATION, SOUTH TALPATTY ISLAND BELONGS 
TO BANGLADESH.  INDIA, HOWEVER, HAS STAKED A CLAIM TO 
THE ISLAND.  THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT THE TWO 
GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO DETERMINE OWNERSHIP THROUGH 
A JOINT SURVEY. 
 
-- 
¶10.  IN THE MIDST OF THESE CONTENTIOUS BILATERAL 
ISSUES, SOME BRIGHT SPOTS EXIST.  FOR EXAMPLE: 
 
-- 
¶11.  TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE.   BANGLADESH'S 
ELECTION PERIOD AND TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE 
IN 1986  PASSED WITHOUT DAMAGE TO BANGLADESH-INDIA 
RELATIONS.  INDO-BANGLADESHI RELATIONS WERE NEVER 
A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE PARLIAMENTARY OR 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.  WHILE THE INDIANS 
MAY HAVE WANTED THE AWAMI LEAGUE TO EMERGE IN A 
STRONG POSITION IN PARLIAMENT, NEITHER EVIDENCE NOR 
ACCUSATIONS OF INDIAN INVOLVEMENT EXIST.  SIMILARLY, 
THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD OF THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW 
AND THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT ERSHAD, THERE WERE NO 
SERIOUS ACCUSATIONS OF EITHER INDIAN INTERVENTION IN 
BANGLADESH'S AFFAIRS OR PRO-INDIAN SENTIMENT ON THE 
PART OF BDG OFFICIALS.  AWAMI LEAGUE LEADER SHEIKH 
HASINA'S MEETING WITH RAJIV GANDHI IN NOVEMBER 1986 
CREATED A BRIEF FLURRY IN DHAKA, BUT APPEARS TO HAVE 
HAD NO LASTING IMPACT ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE. 
 
-- 
¶12.  SAARC.   ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION 
FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) HAS YET TO HAVE A 
SUBSTANTIVE ROLE IN THE REGION, INDIA HAS COOPERATED 
WITH ITS NEIGHBORS TO ESTABLISH SAARC.  RAJIV'S 
SUPPORT FOR ERSHAD'S PERSONAL ROLE IN SAARC'S ESTAB- 
LISHMENT, AND THEIR USE OF THE FORUM SAARC PROVIDED 
FOR THE DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ISSUES, HAVE BEEN 
POSITIVE FACTORS IN BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS DURING 
THE PAST YEAR. 
 
-- 
¶13.  ASSAM BORDER.   THE ASSAM INFILTRATION ISSUE 
APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSIDED, AND THE INDIANS SEEM TO 
HAVE DROPPED PLANS TO CONSTRUCT THEIR PROVOCATIVE 
BORDER FENCE AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE HERE.  BUT LIKE 
MANY  OTHER PROBLEMS IN INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS, 
THE ISSUE  OF ALLEGED BANGLADESHI INFILTRATION INTO 
LESS HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS OF NORTHEASTERN INDIA 
REMAINS ONE WHICH CAN SUDDENLY BE BROUGHT AGAIN TO 
PROMINENCE EITHER BY A STRAY EVENT OR AS A CONSEQUENCE 
OF PERCEIVED DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEEDS IN THE TWO 
COUNTRIES. 
 
-- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  TRADE.   BANGLADESH'S FRUSTRATIONS OVER THE 
GROWING TRADE DEFICIT WITH INDIA AND INDIA'S 
NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE BDG REQUEST FOR IMPORT 
FINANCING HAVE HEIGHTENED BANGLADESH'S DISAPPOINT- 
MENT AND PUBLIC SKEPTICISM ABOUT INDIAN INTENTIONS. 
BANGLADESH-INDIA ECONOMIC TALKS ON DECEMBER 1-2, 
1986 FOCUSED PRINCIPALLY ON THE TRADE IMBALANCE, 
WHICH GREW TO 57 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 1985.  IN 
THAT YEAR, BANGLADESHI EXPORTS WERE UNUSUALLY STRONG, 
BUT SUCCEEDED IN COVERING ONLY 39 PERCENT OF THE 
IMPORTS FROM INDIA.  BANGLADESHIS VOICED DISAPPOINT- 
MENT AT THE LACK OF CONCRETE DECISIONS COMING FROM 
THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.  PROTESTS SURROUNDING THE 
OPENING OF AN INDIAN TRADE EXHIBITION IN DHAKA IN 
NOVEMBER 1986 REFLECTED THE UNDERLYING TENSION IN 
BANGLADESH'S COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND THE 
SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE IN SOME POLITICAL QUARTERS. 
 
-- 
¶15.  ACCESS.   INDIAN REQUESTS FOR ACCESS THROUGH 
BANGLADESH TERRITORY HAVE MET WITH RESISTANCE FROM 
BDG AUTHORITIES.  ACCESS TO ASSAM VIA INLAND WATER 
TRANSPORT, RAIL, AND ROAD, AND ACCESS TO THE SEA 
(THROUGH CHITTAGONG) FOR MIZORAM HAVE BECOME CONTEN- 
TIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES.  ACCORDING TO THE MFA'S 
DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE 
BANGLADESH MILITARY FEAR BOTH THE SECURITY ASPECTS 
OF SUCH ACCESS AND THE "SMUGGLING" WHICH WOULD TAKE 
PLACE.  BANGLADESH BELIEVES THERE WOULD BE A TREMEN- 
DOUS, UNCONTROLLABLE LEAKAGE OF INDIAN GOODS INTO 
BANGLADESH FROM RAILWAY AND ROAD TRANSIT.  THE 
DIRECTOR ADDED THAT INDIA HAS THREATENED TO BUILD A 
ROAD THROUGH THE NARROW NECK OF LAND WHICH CONNECTS 
ASSAM TO THE REST OF INDIA.  THAT WOULD "CUT BANGLADESH 
OUT" OF THE "BENEFITS" (TAXING POWER, FOR EXAMPLE) 
WHICH WOULD COME FROM ALLOWING INDIA ACCESS TO ASSAM 
THROUGH BANGLADESH TERRITORY.  (THE DIRECTOR, HOWEVER, 
THINKS THE THREAT IS A BLUFF; THE ROAD WILL NEVER BE 
BUILT BECAUSE IT IS TOO EXPENSIVE.) MORE POSITIVELY, 
INDIA AND BANGLADESH AGREED TO IMPROVE LAND LINE 
TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATIONS TO PERMIT AUTOMATIC DIRECT 
DIALING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.  THE SERVICE TOOK 
EFFECT ON MARCH 26. 
 
-- 
¶16.  SMUGGLING.  LONG A PROBLEM BETWEEN INDIA AND 
BANGLADESH, SMUGGLING APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED 
DRAMATICALLY OVER THE PAST YEAR, ALTHOUGH NO 
RELIABLE STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE.  THIS FURTHER 
STRAINS ECONOMIC RELATIONS.  THE BDG HAS FORMED AN 
ANTI-SMUGGLING COMMITTEE, IN WHICH ERSHAD TAKES 
A PERSONAL INTEREST, TO CRACK DOWN ON ALL SMUGGLING, 
PARTICULARLY ACROSS THE POROUS INDIA-BANGLADESH BORDER. 
ON MARCH 23, 1987  THE PARLIAMENT PASSED AN AMENDMENT 
TO THE SPECIAL POWERS ACT ALLOWING THE DEATH PENALTY 
TO BE IMPOSED AGAINST SMUGGLERS.  THE PRESIDENT IS 
LIKELY TO SIGN THE LEGISLATION LATER THIS YEAR.  IN 
ADDITION TO TRADITIONAL SMUGGLED ITEMS SUCH AS COTTON 
TEXTILES, BANGLADESH OFFICIALS BELIEVE HEROIN AND OTHER 
ILLEGAL DRUGS ARE FINDING THEIR WAY INTO BANGLADESH 
FROM INDIA. 
 
-- 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶17.  THE USG HAS NO INTEREST IN GETTING INVOLVED IN 
BANGLADESH-INDIA PROBLEMS AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO 
AVOID ANY POSITIONS ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES.  AT THE 
SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT IMPROVEMENT OF BANGLADESH- 
INDIA RELATIONS WILL PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY, A 
LONG-TIME U.S. OBJECTIVE IN SOUTH ASIA.  OUR ROLE MUST 
BE TO ENCOURAGE EACH SIDE, IN A LOW-KEY WAY, TO 
CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE OTHER TO RESOLVE THE BILATERAL 
PROBLEMS.  AND ALL MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NO QUICK, 
EASY SOLUTION TO ANY OF THEM. 
 
 
SCHAFFER