P 211136Z OCT 86
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6046
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ALGIERS 05347 
 
E.O. 12356:   DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PREL XF AG
SUBJECT:  ALGERIA AND THE ARAB WORLD:  MOVING FROM 
          RADICALISM TO MEDIATION 
 
REF:  KPRP-4 (FY-87) 
 
¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT 
 
¶2. SUMMARY:  UNLIKE ITS SELF-PERCEIVED LEADERSHIP 
ROLE IN AFRICA, ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO POSITION 
ITSELF IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A MEDIATOR/PEACEMAKER 
AT THE CENTER OF COMPETING FACTIONS AND INTERESTS. 
ALGERIA IS NO LONGER IN THE FOREFRONT OF RADICAL 
ARAB CAUSES, ALTHOUGH IT STILL TRADES ON THE 
FORMER ASSOCIATIONS IT ESTABLISHED UNDER BOUMEDIENE 
AND THUS RETAINS ACCESS TO VIRTUALLY ALL ARAB 
GROUPS.  REFLECTING PRESIDENT BENDJEDID'S OWN 
CONSENSUS-BUILDING DOMESTIC STYLE, ALGERIA HAS 
WORKED FOR THE CREATION OF A GREATER ARAB MAGHREB 
AS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION UNDER WHICH REGIONAL 
PROBLEMS MIGHT BE SOLVED AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO 
PROMOTE PLO UNITY AS A MEANS OF MOVING THE MIDDLE 
EAST PEACE PROCESS FORWARD (IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN LEBANON).  ALTHOUGH 
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FINDING A CONCILIATORY 
BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE GULF WAR, ALGERIA HAS 
PERSISTED IN SEEKING OPENINGS TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST 
A CEASEFIRE THERE.  RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST 
CONFRONTATION STATES OF SYRIA AND JORDAN HAVE 
WAXED AND WANED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, AS HAVE 
TIES WITH THE GULF STATES, PARTICULARLY SAUDI 
ARABIA.  ALGERIA REMAINS ACTIVE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE 
AND ITS VARIOUS SUB-ORGANIZATIONS, BUT IS SKEPTICAL 
ABOUT THE VITALITY OF THE LEAGUE AND ITS ABILITY 
TO UNITE, INSTEAD OF DIVIDE, ITS MEMBER STATES. 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES ARE BASED 
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PETROLEUM--ITS PRICE AND 
THE QUANTITIES MARKETED.  AS A PRICE "HARDLINER," 
ALGERIA OFTEN FINDS ITSELF AT ODDS WITH ITS 
FELLOW ARAB PRODUCERS WITHIN OPEC.  THE GOA 
LEADERSHIP ALSO DEVOTES CONSIDERABLE ENERGY TO 
ADVANCING ITS INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD, AT 
LEAST IN PART TO ENCOURAGE GREATER STABILITY AS 
A HEDGE AGAINST THE POTENTIAL ENCROACHMENT OF 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM INTO NORTH AFRICA. 
 
¶3. AS A CREDIBLE GO-BETWEEN WITH MOST ARAB GROUPS, 
ALGERIA HAS CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO THE ACHIEVE- 
MENT OF SOME U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES, FROM 
THE MEDIATION OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS IN 1980/81 
TO PRESENT GOA EFFORTS IN LEBANON, AS WELL AS 
ACTING AS A COUNTER TO LIBYAN INFLUENCE.  ALGERIA 
WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY 
WITH THE U.S. ON TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES 
TO RESOLVING NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED ISSUES, EVEN 
WHERE WE SHARE A COMMON GOAL.  HOWEVER, UNLIKE 
UNDER BOUMEDIENE, THE BENDJEDID REGIME IS PREPARED 
TO "REASON WITH US" AND EXPLORE POTENTIALLY WORKABLE 
SOLUTIONS FREE OF THE RHETORIC WHICH PREVIOUSLY 
CHARACTERIZED ALGERIAN POLICYMAKING.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------- 
THE MAGHREB 
----------- 
 
¶4. FOR ALGERIA, ITS POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD BEGINS 
WITH THE MAGHREB AND EFFORTS TO FOSTER REGIONAL 
STABILITY, PARTICULARLY ALONG ITS BORDERS.  TO 
FURTHER THIS GOAL THE GOA HAS PROMOTED A POLICY OF 
REGIONAL UNITY UNDER THE RUBRIC OF A "GREATER ARAB 
MAGHREB" AND HAS CONCLUDED A FRIENDSHIP AND CONCORD 
TREATY WITH TWO OF ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS, TUNISIA 
AND MAURITANIA.  WHILE A FUNCTIONING MAGHREB 
ORGANIZATION IS STILL IN THE DISTANCE, THE IDEA 
OFFERS ALGERIA A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO 
SEEK RESOLUTION OF SOME OF ITS MAJOR REGIONAL 
PREOCCUPATIONS.  THE GOA BELIEVES A MAGHREB ORGANIZA- 
TION COULD PROVIDE AN INSTITUTIONAL COVER FOR A 
WESTERN SAHARA SOLUTION AND ALSO RESOLVE ALGERIA'S 
OUTSTANDING BORDER PROBLEMS WITH MOROCCO AND LIBYA. 
IN ALGERIA'S VIEW IT WOULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR 
GREATLY EXPANDING ECONOMIC COOPERATION THROUGH 
COMPLEMENTARY ECONOMIES AND A POSSIBLE FREE TRADE 
ZONE PATTERNED AFTER THE COMMON MARKET.  THE GOA 
BELIEVES IMPROVED REGIONAL TIES WOULD ENHANCE 
POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR A 
PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN TUNISIA AFTER BOURGUIBA. 
FINALLY, THE GOA HOPES THAT THE POTENTIAL ADHERENCE 
BY LIBYA TO SUCH A REGIONAL GROUPING WOULD 
MODERATE QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR TO SOME EXTENT AND 
INCREASE HIS STAKE IN COOPERATION. 
 
¶5. DESPITE ALGERIA'S ASPIRATIONS FOR A GREATER 
MAGHREB AS A SOURCE OF REGIONAL UNITY AND STRENGTH, 
THE GOAL DOES NOT APPEAR ANY CLOSER TO REALIZATION 
NOW THAN PRIOR TO THE MOROCCAN-LIBYAN ACCORD OF 
AUGUST 1984.  ALGERIA'S BILATERAL STRAINS WITH 
MOROCCO AND THE CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS BY QADHAFI 
TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF 
ALGERIA'S AGREEMENT WITH TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA 
MILITATE AGAINST A UNITED MAGHREB.  IN ADDITION, 
THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT REMAINS A MAJOR COMPLI- 
CATING FACTOR BLOCKING GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION. 
 
¶6. GIVEN THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR A GREATER 
MAGHREB, THE GOA NEVERTHELESS DIRECTS ITS POLICIES 
TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS AS IF SUCH A SCHEME MIGHT 
BE ACHIEVABLE.  WITH TUNISIA THE GOA FOLLOWS AN 
ACTIVE POLICY OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC COOPERATION, 
PROVIDING ASSURANCES AND MATERIAL SUPPORT 
TO COUNTER LIBYAN PRESSURES AGAINST THE GOT, 
EXCHANGING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO COORDINATE SOME 
REGIONAL ACTIONS AND MAINTAINING AS CLOSE TIES 
AS POSSIBLE WITH A VIEW TOWARD A PEACEFUL, POST- 
BOURGUIBA TRANSITION.  ON LIBYA, GOA POLICY HAS 
MOVED AWAY FROM RADICAL SOLIDARITY AS A MEMBER OF 
THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" TO ONE OF SOMETIMES OPEN 
AND OTHER TIMES DISGUISED OPPOSITION TO THE 
QADHAFI REGIME.  ALGERIA OPENLY OPPOSES LIBYAN 
ACTIONS IN CHAD AND ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST 
ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE.  THE GOA ATTEMPTS 
TO COUNTER LIBYAN INFLUENCE IN WEST AFRICA, SUDAN, 
AND EVEN AMONG RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS.  DESPITE 
THESE POLICY DIFFERENCES, ALGERIA HAS, SINCE THE 
BEGINNING OF 1986, TRIED TO EASE BILATERAL TENSIONS 
THROUGH A MEASURED PUBLIC RAPPROCHEMENT WITH LIBYA. 
THIS POLICY HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED TO US BY 
BENDJEDID'S ADVISOR GENERAL BELKHEIR AS A MEANS 
OF FOLLOWING THE LIBYAN DOMESTIC SITUATION CLOSELY 
WHILE LOOKING FOR OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH WHICH 
IT CAN MODIFY QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR OR HIS POSITION 
WITHOUT RUINING FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A POST-QADHAFI 
LIBYA. 
 
¶7. CURIOUSLY, ALGERIANS FEEL THE CLOSEST AFFINITY 
WITH MOROCCANS EVEN THOUGH IN GEOPOLITICAL TERMS 
MOROCCO IS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH COULD LAY 
PLAUSIBLE CLAIM TO BEING A REGIONAL RIVAL.  FOR 
THE MOMENT, THAT RIVALRY IS FOCUSED ON THE WESTERN 
SAHARA CONFLICT, WHICH APPEARS STALEMATED BOTH 
MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY.  IT IS LIKELY THAT 
THE GOA WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO ISOLATE MOROCCO 
WITHIN THE REGION, IN THE ARA8 WORLD AND IN AFRICA, 
AS A MEANS OF INCREASING PRESSURE FOR A NEGOTIATED 
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT. 
HAVING SUPPORTED THE POLISARIO CAUSE FOR THE PAST 
TEN YEARS, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOLONIALIZATION 
FOR EVEN LONGER, THE GOA LEADERSHIP IS NOT LIKELY 
TO ABANDON THE POLISARIO AND CEDE SOVEREIGNTY TO 
MOROCCO WITHOUT A CREDIBLE POLITICAL PROCESS BEING 
ESTABLISHED TO SETTLE THE ISSUE.  UNTIL THEN, 
DESPITE THE VOICED BEST INTENTIONS OF THE TWO 
GOVERNMENTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL REMAIN COM- 
PETITIVE RATHER THAN COOPERATIVE, WITH THE RISK OF 
DIRECT CONFRONTATION BEING LOW.  ON THE MARGINS 
WILL BE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN MAURITANIA 
IN WHICH THE GOA COMPETES FOR INFLUENCE THROUGH 
ITS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GIRM. 
 
----- 
EGYPT 
----- 
¶8. EGYPT, AT THE EDGE OF THE MAGHREB, HAS HAD 
ALTERNATELY WARM AND COOL RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. 
DURING ALGERIA'S INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE NASSER'S 
EGYPT PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT MILITARY TRAINING AND 
ASSISTANCE.  MANY OF THE ALGERIAN SOLDIERS WHO 
SURVIVED ON THAT AID HAVE ATTAINED RANKING POSITIONS 
WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY AND ARE A 
SOURCE OF WARM PERSONAL CONTACTS FOR EGYPT. 
HOWEVER, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS OF 1978 PUSHED 
BOUMEDIENE'S ALGERIA INTO BECOMING AN ACTIVE MEMBER 
OF THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" TO MOBILIZE ARAB 
EFFORTS TO ISOLATE EGYPT.  BUT BENDJEDID BEGAN 
TO MOVE ALGERIA GRADUALLY BACK TOWARD EGYPT IN 
THE EARLY 1980'S.  THE PACE OF THIS RAPPROCHEMENT 
HAS ACCELERATED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, ESPECIALLY 
SINCE AUGUST 1984 WHEN, IN THE WAKE OF THE OUJDA 
ACCORD, ALGERIA SOUGHT TO BALANCE AN INCREASED 
THREAT IT PERCEIVED FROM LIBYA WITH GREATER 
COORDINATION ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH 
EGYPT ALONG LIBYA'S EASTERN AND WESTERN BORDERS. 
HIGH-LEVEL VISITS HAVE BECOME MORE FREQUENT AND 
VISIBLE, AS HAVE CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES. 
IN RECENT MONTHS, THE PACE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS 
HAS SLOWED, PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF IMPROVING 
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF A 
DIMINISHED LIBYAN "THREAT."  NEVERTHELESS, 
SUBSTANTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS CONTINUE, WITH 
THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF MONITORING AND INFLUENCING 
QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR.  IT IS NOT LIKELY THE GOA 
WILL RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH EGYPT ANYTIME 
SOON, BUT COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE AS 
EACH ATTEMPTS TO PURSUE ITS INTERESTS--ALGERIA 
TO FORESTALL ANOTHER SHIFT IN EGYPTIAN POLICY ON 
THE WESTERN SAHARA BACK TO FAVORING MOROCCO 
(EGYPT SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN POSITION IN THE 1985 
UNGA) AND EGYPT TO MAINTAINING SYMPATHETIC ACCESS 
TO ARAB "RADICAL" STATES AND GROUPS THROUGH 
ALGERIA WHEN NECESSARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. ALGERIA HAS ALWAYS PRIDED ITSELF AS BEING ONE 
OF THE STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF THE PALESTINIAN 
CAUSE AND OF ITS MAJOR POLITICAL/MILITARY ORGANIZA- 
TION, THE PLO.  ALGERIA'S OWN EXPERIENCE IN GAINING 
INDEPENDENCE HEAVILY INFLUENCES ITS VIEW OF THE 
PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ITS BELIEF THAT THE PALESTINIAN 
PEOPLE MUST HAVE THEIR OWN LAND IN WHICH THEY CAN 
EXPRESS THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER.  AS ALGERIA WAS 
ABLE TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE ONLY THROUGH THE 
UNITY THE FLN DEMONSTRATED IN THE FACE OF THE 
FRENCH "OCCUPATION," SO THE LOCAL CATECHISM GOES, 
THE PLO WILL BE ABLE TO REGAIN ITS HOMELAND ONLY 
THROUGH A SIMILAR POLICY OF UNITY.  THEREFORE, THE 
GOA BELIEVES PLO UNIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL IF THERE 
IS TO BE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR PEACE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST.  ALGERIA ACKNOWLEDGES THERE ARE 
SERIOUS IDEOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES 
WITHIN THE PLO, BUT HAS URGED THE PLO TO SUBMERGE 
THESE DIFFERENCES BEHIND A FACADE OF UNITY. 
ALGERIA'S OVERRIDING CONCERN WITH UNITY HAS 
TENDED TO MAKE ALGERIA A SUPPORTER OF PLO CHIEF 
ARAFAT WHO THE GOA BELIEVES IS THE ONLY PALESTINIAN 
LEADER WHO HAS THE STATURE AND BROAD FOLLOWING TO 
UNITE THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT.  NEVERTHELESS, THE 
GOA DIFFERS  WITH ARAFAT ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS, 
AS IT DID IN EARLY 1985 OVER THE HOLDING OF THE 
PNC IN JORDAN AND THE SUBSEQUENT AMMAN ACCORD. 
(THE GOA REFRAINED FROM PUBLIC DENUNCIATION BUT 
PRIVATELY EXPRESSED STRONG SKEPTICISM THAT THE 
AMMAN ACCORD COULD HAVE ANY POSITIVE EFFECT ON 
THE PEACE PROCESS.) 
 
¶10. SINCE MARCH 1986 THE GOA HAS ATTEMPTED TO GIVE 
SUBSTANCE TO ITS PRINCIPLES ON PLO UNITY.  FOLLOW- 
ING BENDJEDID'S MARCH 25-28 VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE 
LAUNCHED A MAJOR INITIATIVE TO HOLD A UNITY MEETING 
IN ALGIERS OF THE NINE PLO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
FACTIONS.  OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS THE GOA HAS 
SENT SPECIAL MISSIONS TO SYRIA, LIBYA, AND THE 
USSR, AS WELL AS RECEIVED MOST OF THE SIGNIFICANT 
PLO LEADERS IN ALGIERS.  THUS FAR, ALGERIAN EFFORTS 
HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY CONTINUING INTERNAL PLO 
DIFFERENCES, THE UNWILLINGNESS OF SYRIA TO CONTRIBUTE 
TO A PLO UNITED BEHIND ARAFAT, AND A LACK 
OF SUFFICIENT SOVIET LEVERAGE ON SYRIA TO FORCE 
SYRIAN COOPERATION.  DESPITE THESE SETBACKS, THE 
GOA WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR PLO UNITY, WHILE 
PROVIDING MODEST MILITARY TRAINING WITHIN ALGERIA, 
AS THE ONLY MEANS, IN THE GOA VIEW, OF OBTAINING 
A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 
 
¶11. CONCURRENTLY, THE GOA MAINTAINS SOME ACCESS TO 
THE MARGINAL "RADICAL" FACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST, INCLUDING ABU NIDAL, ABU MUSA, AND HIZBOLLAH. 
ALGERIA HAS SERVED AS A CONDUIT TO THESE GROUPS ON 
VARIOUS HOSTAGE ISSUES, BUT ALSO HAS ACQUIRED 
INTELLIGENCE ON THEIR LEADERSHIP AND STRUCTURES. 
IN SOME CASES, THE GOA HAS BEEN WILLING TO SHARE 
THIS INTELLIGENCE WITH NON-ARAB COUNTRIES.  UNLIKE 
THE BOUMEDIENE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESENT ALGERIAN 
REGIME APPARENTLY DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO THESE FACTIONS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CONFRONTATION STATES 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12. ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE 
IN LEBANON WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF CREATING 
A STABLE ARAB BASE FROM WHICH MORE EFFECTIVE 
CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL COULD BE ORGANIZED.  IN 
THE PROCESS THE GOA HOPES TO PRESERVE THE LIVES 
OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WHO ARE ENCAMPED IN LEBANON, 
END THE INTERNECINE KILLING AMONG ALGERIA'S ARAB 
BROTHERS, ENCOURAGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS, 
EXPEL ISRAELI TROOPS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND 
EVENTUALLY RE-ESTABLISH A VIABLE LEBANESE STATE-- 
ALL IN ALL A TALL ORDER.  THE GOA HAS MOVED 
CAUTIOUSLY TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON, 
USING ITS FORMER AMBASSADOR (ABDELKRIM GHERAIEB) 
TO OPEN CONTACTS WITH ALL LEBANESE GROUPS AND SEEK 
OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER TALKS AMONG 
THESE GROUPS.  ALGERIAN CONTACTS WITH NABIH BERRI'S 
AMAL WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL DURING THE JUNE 1985 
TWA HIJACKING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENS AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH U.S. 
HOSTAGES REMAINING IN LEBANON.  ALTHOUGH ALGERIA 
HAS SUSPENDED ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARAB 
LEAGUE'S SOLIDARITY FUND FOR LEBANON, IT REMAINS 
ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
EFFORTS, RECENTLY DISPATCHING A SPECIAL ENVOY 
(MINISTER OF CULTURE BOUALEM BESSAIEH) AND A 
RANKING FLN PARTY MEMBER (SADEK ZOUATEN) TO EXPLORE 
THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS.  ALGERIA DOES PROVIDE 
SOME BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF 200 
UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS ANNUALLY, BUT NOT MUCH 
FINANCIAL AID DESPITE GEMAYEL'S BEST EFFORTS. 
OVER THE NEXT YEAR, THE GOA IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN 
AN ACTIVELY NEUTRAL "WATCHING BRIEF" IN LEBANON 
RATHER THAN RISK ITS PRESTIGE IN A DRAMATIC POLICY 
INITIATIVE. 
 
¶13. RELATIONS WITH JORDAN HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY 
SINCE THE LATE 1970'S, INCLUDING AN EXCHANGE OF 
HIGH-RANKING MILITARY DELEGATIONS AND THE VISIT OF 
THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN 1985.  THE MILITARY 
EXCHANGES WERE USEFUL FOR THE GOA BECAUSE THEY 
PROVIDED FURTHER INSIGHTS ON HOW TO APPROACH AND 
DEAL WITH WESTERN ARMS SUPPLIERS, NOTABLY THE U.K. 
AND THE U.S., WITH WHOM ALGERIA HOPES TO DIVERSIFY 
ITS ARMS PURCHASES.  SECONDLY, THE GOA WAS EXPOSED 
TO WESTERN ARMS SYSTEMS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES. 
DESPITE CRITICISM FROM RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS AND 
STATES OF THE AMMAN ACCORD, ALGERIA RESERVED ITS 
JUDGMENT, THUS PRESERVING ITS ENTREE WITH THE 
JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.  OTHERWISE, BILATERAL 
RELATIONS ARE CORDIAL WITHOUT BEIMG PARTICULARLY 
PROFOUND.  WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY IS THAT ALGERIA NOW 
RECOGNIZES THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING CORDIAL TIES 
WITH ARAB "MODERATES" (EVEN MONARCHS), A 
RECOGNITION OF THE VALUE OF SUCH TIES THAT ONLY 
FAINTLY EXISTED IN THE PRE-BENDJEDID ERA. 
 
¶14. PERHAPS ALGERIA'S MOST FRUSTRATING POLITICAL 
RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE WITH SYRIA, A 
COUNTRY WITH WHICH ALGERIA USED TO SHARE AN 
IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY AND INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK. 
THE IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY HAS BEEN FADING RAPIDLY 
IN RECENT YEARS, AND ALGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE HAS BEGUN TO DIVERGE SIGNIFICANTLY 
FROM THAT OF SYRIA IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS.  ALGERIA 
NO LONGER FINDS ITSELF ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A 
REJECTIONIST FRONT MEETING AND IS RELUCTANT TO 
RECONSTITUTE SUCH A FRONT.  WHILE SYRIA SUPPORTS 
ALGERIA ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND COOPERATES WITH 
ALGERIA IN EFFORTS TO ISOLATE MOROCCO, IT REMAINS 
THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ALGERIA'S ATTEMPT TO UNIFY 
THE PLO. ALGERIA HAS ALSO BEEN CRITICAL OF SYRIA'S 
ROLE IN LEBANON (AS A COMPLICATING FACTOR 
PREVENTING RECONCILIATION) AND HAS BEEN UNHAPPY 
WITH SYRIA'S SUPPORT FOR HIZBOLLAHS "TERRORIST" 
ACTIVITIES.  NEVERTHELESS, THE TWO COUNTRIES 
MAINTAIN VERY ACTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS TO 
COORDINATE POLICIES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, WITH THE 
GOA HOPING FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ON PLO UNITY 
AND SYRIA HOPING TO EXCHANGE THIS FOR A NEW 
REJECTIONIST FRONT. 
 
------------ 
THE GULF WAR 
------------ 
 
¶15. THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, LIKE THEIR 
PREVIOUS DISPUTE IN THE 1970'S MEDIATED BY ALGERIA, 
IS AN ONGOING CONCERN FOR THE GOA.  IN DISCUSSING 
THE SITUATION, FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIMI IS ALWAYS 
QUICK TO POINT OUT HIS PREDECESSER LOST HIS LIFE 
TRYING TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE WAR.  PERHAPS 
BECAUSE OF THIS SETBACK, AND ALGERIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
OF THE CONTINUING INTRANSIGENCE OF BOTH PARTIES, THE 
GOA HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY NEW INITIATIVE 
ON THE WAR.  IN THE INTERIM ALGERIA HAS MAINTAINED 
ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN BY ABSTAINING ON ONE- 
SIDED ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS FAVORING IRAQ AND 
CONTINUING HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES.  THE GOA HAS USED 
THESE CONTACTS TO PROBE IRANIAN FLEXIBILITY, THUS 
FAR WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE RESULTS, ADDING TO THE 
PESSIMISM IBRAHIMI HAS EXPRESSED TO US.  RECENT 
IRANIAN GAINS AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY 
HAVE "TILTED" ALGERIAN POLICY TOWARD IRAQ.  HOWEVER, 
ALGERIA IS ONE OF THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH CAN 
APPROACH EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE 
THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. 
 
-------------------------------- 
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16. ALGERIAN RELATIONS IN THE GULF, AS FOR OTHER 
COUNTRIES, REVOLVE AROUND TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA. 
IN THIS REGARD, WHILE THE TENOR OF GOA-SAG RELATIONS 
HAS IMPROVED TO THE LEVEL OF A POLITE DIALOGUE, 
THERE ARE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES PREVENTING 
CLOSER COOPERATION.  SIMILAR TO THE SAUDIS, THE 
ALGERIANS ARE QUICK TO TAKE OFFENSE AT PERCEIVED 
SLIGHTS AND THEY ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE 
ETIQUETTE OF RELATIONS, GRANTING OR WITHDRAWING 
ACCESS FOR SAUDI EMISSARIES DEPENDING ON TREATMENT 
ACCORDED TO ALGERIANS.  BEYOND SUCH ATMOSPHERIC 
ISSUES, THE GOA HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF SAUDI SUPPORT 
FOR THE MOROCCAN WAR EFFORT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA, 
SAUDI STRATEGY WITHIN OPEC, AND SAUDI PARTICIPATION 
IN THE EXTRAORDINARY ARAB SUMMIT ORGANIZED IN 
CASABLANCA IN AUGUST 1985.  FM IBRAHIMI HAS ALSO 
VOICED IMPATIENCE OVER REPEATED SAUDI REQUESTS FOR 
ALGERIAN INTERVENTION WITH "RADICAL" ARABS WITHOUT 
RECEIVING RECIPROCAL SAUDI SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN 
SAHARA.  NEVERTHELESS, ALGERIA RECOGNIZES THE 
DEGREE OF SAUDI INFLUENCE WITHIN OPEC, THE ARAB 
LEAGUE AND WITH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT, AND 
HAS ATTEMPTED TO EMPLOY A QUIET DIPLOMACY IN THE 
PAST YEAR TO MODIFY SAUDI POLICIES.  THE GOA GIVES 
ITSELF CREDIT FOR SOME PROGRESS WITHIN OPEC AND 
IS MODESTLY OPTIMISTIC THAT SAUDI ARABIA WILL 
AGREE TO HOLD AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT IN DECEMBER 
TO "CLOSE ARAB RANKS."  (THIS WOULD BE THE LONG- 
DELAYED SUMMIT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 1984.) 
ON THE WESTERN SAHARA, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE. 
 
¶17. ALGERIA MAINTAINS CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT, 
THE UAE, AND OMAN.  THE GOA JUST ASSIGNED NEW 
RESIDENT AMBASSADORS TO BAHRAIN AND QATAR, AND THIS 
MAY PORTEND AN UPSURGE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF 
BILATERAL RELATIONS.  HOWEVER, RELATIONS 
ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS CHIEFLY ON OIL PRICING AND 
PERHAPS SECONDARILY ON KEEPING THE "WOLF" OF ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISM AWAY FROM THE GULF'S DOOR.  FURTHER 
SOUTHWEST, ALGERIA WAS DISTURBED BY THE OVERTHROW 
OF THE ALI NASIR MUHAMED REGIME IN SOUTH YEMEN AND 
THE SOVIET ROLE IN SUPPORTING HIS SUCCESSOR.  THE 
GOA LEADERSHIP DERIVED A CERTAIN LESSON FROM THESE 
EVENTS AND HAS INFUSED A COOLNESS INTO ITS 
FORMERLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH YEMEN. 
INFREQUENT CONTACTS PERSIST WITH ALI NASIR MUHAMED, 
ALTHOUGH THE ALGERIANS HAVE NOT ASSISTED ANY 
EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE ATTAS GOVERNMGNT.  ON 
THE CONTRARY, THERE HAS BEEN A RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE 
OF ATTAS, WHO IS EXPECTED TO VISIT ALGIERS 
LATER THIS YEAR OR IN EARLY 1987.  AS FOR NORTH 
YEMEN, THE YAR JUST APPOINTED A NEW AMBASSADOR 
TO ALGIERS WHO APPEARS WELL-CONNECTED WITHIN 
SANAA, POSSIBLY SIGNIFYING IMPROVING 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.  ALGERIA HAS 
COORDINATED TO A SMALL EXTENT ITS RESPONSES WITH 
NORTH YEMEN ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL OF 
ALI NASIR. 
 
--------------- 
THE ARAB LEAGUE 
--------------- 
¶18. FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS ALGERIA HAS VIEWED THE 
ARAB LEAGUE AS A NEARLY MORIBUND, INCREASINGLY 
IRRELEVANT ORGANIZATION, REFLECTIVE OF THE 
DISARRAY IN THE ARAB WORLD.  APPARENTLY,THOUGH, 
WITHIN THE PAST TWO MONTHS THE GOA HAS SEIZED UPON 
THE LEAGUE AS A POTENTIAL VEHICLE FOR RENEWING/ 
REVITALIZING ARAB UNITY.  TO THIS END THE GOA HAS 
SENT EMISSARIES TO DAMASCUS (MESSAADIA), SAUDI 
ARABIA (IBRAHIMI) AND BEIRUT (BESSAIH/ZOUATEN) 
TO LOBBY FOR THE NECESSITY OF A SUMMIT, OPTIMISTICALLY 
IN DECEMBER.  THE GOA HAS ALSO USED THE ARAB 
LEAGUE TO REINFORCE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN 
BY OPPOSING ANTI-IRANIAN RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF 
WAR.  HOWEVER, ALGERIA HAS BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL 
IN GAINING ARAB SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN SAHARA 
ISSUE, AND THIS HAS HINDERED ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO 
GAIN SDAR ADMISSION INTO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
(NAM).  FURTHERMORE, THE GOA HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LEAGUE AND HAS WORKED 
TO BOTH STREAMLINE AND IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS 
AT THE LEAGUE'S HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS. 
 
------------------ 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
------------------ 
¶19. OIL AND HYDROCARBON REVENUES ARE THE LIFEBLOOD 
OF THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY, AND THEREFORE DEVELOPMENTS 
AFFECTING OIL ARE CRITICAL TO ALGERIA'S WELFARE. 
ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN HIGH PRICES WHILE 
PRESSURING MAJOR PRODUCERS TO ACCEPT "REASONABLE" 
PRODUCTION LEVELS, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA.  THIS 
PRESSURE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH LIBYA AND IRAN 
PRINCIPALLY, BUT RECENTLY THE GOA HAS TRIED TO 
FORM AN ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN PRODUCERS FOR A 
SIMILAR OBJECTIVE.  AS PRICES HAVE STABILIZED 
SINCE AUGUST, ALGERIA HAS TAKEN SOME SATISFACTION 
FROM ITS EFFORTS, EVEN IF IN REALITY THEY HAD ONLY 
A MARGINAL IMPACT ON OPEC DECISIONS.  BESIDES OIL, 
THERE IS VERY LITTLE TRADE BY ALGERIA WITHIN THE 
ARAB MARKET, AND ONLY A BARELY MORE SIGNIFICANT 
MONETARY INTEREST BY ARAB BANKS AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE ARAB DEVELOPMENT BANK 
AND THE SAUDI DEVELOPMENT BANK.  WE BELIEVE LOANS 
FROM THESE SOURCES WERE LESS THAN $100 MILLION, 
REPRESENTING A DECLINE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR. 
THUS, AS THE OIL MARKET GOES, SO GO ALGERIA'S 
TRADE RELATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, HAVING SOME 
REPERCUSSIONS FOR ITS POLITICAL RELATIONS. 
 
---------------------- 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
---------------------- 
¶20. AS IN MOST ARAB COUNTRIES, ISLAM IS THE STATE 
RELIGION IN ALGERIA AND, AS SUCH, ENJOYS A 
PRIVILEGED POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER INSTITUTIONS. 
THE GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO CO-OPT ISLAMIC 
PRECEPTS AND VALUES BY INCORPORATING THEM INTO 
THE NATIONAL CHARTER AND BY ENCOURAGING MOSQUE 
CONSTRUCTION AND PAYING AND TRAINING THE IMAMS. 
THERE IS ALSO SUBSTANTIAL ANNUAL SUPPORT FOR ALGERIAN 
PILGRIMS TO PERFORM THE HAJJ TO MECCA. 
HOWEVER, WHEN EXTERNAL INFLUENCES HAVE ATTEMPTED 
TO INVADE THE GOA'S MONOPOLY ON ISLAM, IT REACTS 
VIGOROUSLY.  THE GOA WAS PARTICULARLY INCENSED 
BY LIBYAN EFFORTS IN 1983-84 TO FUND "PRIVATE" 
MOSQUES, WHICH THE GOA CORRECTLY VIEWED AS SOURCES 
OF FUNDAMENTALISM.  RUMORS OF SAUDI FINANCING TO 
ALGERIAN ISLAMISTS IN MID-1986 ALSO RAISED GOA 
SUSPICIONS ABOUT SAUDI INTENTIONS.  THE GOA CON- 
TINUES TO BE CONCERNED BY BEN BELLA'S EFFORTS TO 
USE ISLAM TO RECRUIT ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS.  TO 
COUNTER THESE ACTIVITIES, THE GOA HAS WORKED CLOSELY 
WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECRUIT 
TRADITIONALLY ORIENTED ISLAMIC SCHOLARS TO STAFF 
ALGERIA'S NEW UNIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC AND SCIENTIFIC 
STUDIES IN CONSTANTINE.  THE GOA ALSO TRIES TO 
CONTROL THE INFLOW OF ISLAMIC MATERIALS, SUCH AS 
RECORDED SERMONS AND LITERATURE, WITH ONLY 
MODERATE SUCCESS.  DESPITE RELATIVELY ACTIVE 
CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS 
OF FUNDAMENTALISM, THE GOA DOES NOT APPEAR TO 
COORDINATE ITS RESPONSES WITH ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS. 
FOR ALGERIA, FUNDAMENTALISM REMAINS MORE OF A LONG- 
TERM POTENTIAL PROBLEM RATHER THAN AN IMMEDIATE 
THREAT, AND AS SUCH IS USUALLY NOT ON ALGERIA'S 
AGENDA IN ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MOST 
ARAB COUNTRIES. 
 
------------------------- 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
------------------------- 
 
¶21. MUTUAL U.S.-ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR 
BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON 
ALGERIA'S APPROACH ON NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED 
ISSUES.  DESPITE OUR DISAGREEMENT OVER TACTICS, 
OUR SHARED DISTRUST OF QADHAFI HAS ALLOWED US TO 
MAINTAIN A USEFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE GOA ON LIBYA. 
SIMILARLY, ALGERIA HAS ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE, 
NON-AGGRESSIVE POSTURE TOWARD TUNISIA TO CONTRIBUTE 
TO A STABLE TRANSITION THERE.  ALGERIAN REACTIONS 
WERE RELATIVELY MUTED TO THE U.S. RAID ON 
TRIPOLI (APRIL 15), AND, AFTER A BRIEF PAUSE, 
THERE WAS AN UPSURGE IN BILATERAL COOPERATION 
ACROSS A BROAD SPECTRUM, INCLUDING MILITARY AND 
SECURITY INTERESTS.  FOREIGN MINISTRY SECGEN HAMDANI 
EXPLAINED TO US THAT ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO HAVE THE 
PLO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ARE INTENDED TO ENABLE 
THE PLO TO RESPOND TO PEACE INITIATIVES IN A MORE 
POSITIVE MANNER.  THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN 
COOPERATIVE EFFORTS MADE TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE 
OF U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON, AIDED BY ALGERIA'S 
ACCESS TO THOSE RADICAL GROUPS HOLDING THE AMERICANS. 
FINALLY, THE GOA HAS RECENTLY TAKEN STEPS TO 
COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. ON COUNTERING TERRORISM. 
 
 
¶22. THESE CONCRETE ACTIONS BY THE GOA TO WORK WITH 
THE U.S. ON ARAB-RELATED ISSUES THAT AFFECT OUR 
INTERESTS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED TOO IN ALGERIA'S 
RHETORICAL PUBLIC APPROACH, WITH A LOWERING OF 
DIRECT CRITICISM, EVEN WHILE VOTING AGAINST U.S. 
POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.  THE GOA LEADERSHIP 
HAS BEEN WILLING TO PAY A DOMESTIC PRICE FOR THIS 
POLICY, DEFLECTING CRITICISM BY INTERNAL HARDLINERS 
AND MOVING FORWARD, ALBEIT GRADUALLY, WITH A VARIETY 
OF BILATERAL PROGRAMS.  ACTIVE U.S. SUPPORT FOR 
ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT TOUCHES UPON NORTH 
AFRICA, AS IT DID IN THE OCTOBER 1985 ISRAELI 
BOMBING OF PLO HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS, WILL GIVE 
THE GOA SERIOUS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING 
TOWARD BROADLY DEEPER COOPERATION ON ARAB-RELATED 
ISSUES.  HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE A GROWING CAPACITY 
TO SEPARATE ISRAELI ACTIONS FROM U.S. POLICIES, 
AS APPEARS TO BE THE CASE WITH ALGERIAN ACCUSATIONS 
OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN MOROCCO.  IF THIS TREND 
CONTINUES, IT MIGHT BE A STRONG INDICATION 
THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS TAKEN ON AN 
IMPORTANCE WHICH COULD TRANSCEND PREVIOUS ALGERIAN 
CONVICTIONS THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ARAB SOLIDARITY 
WAS THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN ITS 
POLICY FORMULATION.  IN ANY CASE, IT IS CLEAR 
THAT ALGERIA NOW INCLUDES POTENTIAL U.S. 
REACTIONS AS PART OF ITS POLICY DELIBERATIONS AND 
FREQUENTLY GIVES THESE REACTIONS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT 
IN ITS DECISION-MAKING.  THIS WILL CONTINUE TO 
PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK 
CLOSELY WITH THE GOA TO ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN 
THE ARAB WORLD. 
 
 
JOHNSTONE