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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9130

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/16/10 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) The fiction of "non-introduction of nuclear weapons" (Sankei) 
(2) Government agonizing over Hague Convention concerning child 
custody after failed international marriages; Japan under growing 
pressure from U.S. and European countries to accede to convention 
(Nikkei) 
(3) Reasons for Ozawa's obsession about visit to U.S. (Nikkei) 
(4) Will Ozawa's leadership be undermined? Part 3: First-term 
lawmakers at a loss (Nikkei) 
(5) National Public Service Law draft amendment: Vice minister and 
department director general-class officials to be treated equally 
(Nikkei) 
(6) Publication of Gaiko Forum to be suspended (Yomiuri) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) The fiction of "non-introduction of nuclear weapons" 
 
SANKEI (Pages 1, 8) (Full) 
February 15, 2010 
 
Yoshihisa Komori in Washington 
 
The Japan-U.S. alliance is in flux. While the drifting of the new 
administration in Japan appears to be the cause, there has also been 
a subtle change in the U.S. position from past administrations. This 
year marks the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. 
security treaty, which is the basis of the bilateral alliance, or 
the signing of the treaty in its present form. Since alliances 
cannot remain unchanged forever, it is quite natural for changes and 
reviews to take place. Yet what benefits have the alliance brought 
to the two countries in the first place? It is impossible to project 
into the future without examining the past and the present. This 
reporter would like to review the Japan-U.S. alliance based on his 
long involvement with actual developments in the bilateral 
relationship. 
 
"I think it is now time for the Japanese people, as well as the 
Japanese government, to admit this fact frankly." 
 
Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer made the above 
statement emphatically several times when he revealed the fiction 
about the U.S.'s "non-introduction of nuclear weapons" into Japan. 
 
In May 1981, I interviewed Reischauer at his home in the suburbs of 
Boston. During the conversation on Japan-U.S. security that lasted 
for two hours, he clearly stated in response to my questions that 
despite the Japanese government's three non-nuclear principles of 
"not possessing, producing, or introducing" nuclear weapons, for 
many years, U.S. naval vessels with nuclear arms on board had 
actually passed through Japanese territorial sea and called on 
Japanese ports. 
 
I was then a Mainichi Shimbun reporter who was sent to the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace as a senior research fellow and 
was doing research on issues relating to the Japan-U.S. alliance. 
 
The Reischauer residence was the picture of serenity in the bright 
May sun. A black dog was running in the yard, and Mrs. Haru 
Reischauer was cradling a relative's baby in her arms in the living 
room. 
 
TOKYO 00000305  002 OF 008 
 
 
 
Reischauer, who had just retired from Harvard University, made 
serious statements in a soft tone in that cozy environment. 
 
He said: "The U.S. side's understanding was that the introduction of 
nuclear weapons, which the Japanese side translated as mochikomi, 
meant putting nuclear weapons ashore or installing them. Carrying 
them aboard ships was not included. However, the Japanese government 
adopted the interpretation that the passage of vessels with nuclear 
arms aboard through Japanese waters was also included and asserted 
that the U.S. forces' nuclear weapons had never passed through its 
territorial seas or been brought into its ports." 
 
The acceptance of this difference in interpretation became a secret 
agreement between the two countries, and Reischauer said that the 
Japanese government was fully aware of this. 
 
However, why did Reischauer, fully aware he could expect strong 
criticism from both governments, reveal this "secret" at that time? 
Looking back, I think the main reason was he was enraged and thought 
that "the lies should stop." For sure, Reischauer did not use such 
rude language, but he did say: "This would mean that the Japanese 
government is lying to its people." 
 
While Reischauer indicated his understanding of the Japanese 
people's rejection of nuclear weapons due to their experience with 
the atomic bombings, he also pointed out the fact that under the 
bilateral alliance, Japan relies on the U.S. nuclear deterrence 
through the "nuclear umbrella" for its security. He further asserted 
that accepting nuclear deterrence while maintaining the fiction of 
"non-introduction" of nuclear arms under the three non-nuclear 
principles was very self-contradictory and hypocritical. In the 
first place, unlike today, the Soviet Union was building up its 
nuclear capability in its confrontation with the U.S. and areas 
around Japan were saturated with Soviet nuclear arms at that time. 
 
However, Reischauer's prediction and hope that the Japanese people 
and government would drop the fiction and admit the fact never came 
to pass. Although a series of opinion polls showed that the majority 
of the people believed Reischauer's words, the government 
consistently said this was not true. Its position has remained 
unchanged for nearly 30 years. 
 
At present, under the new Hatoyama administration of the Democratic 
Party of Japan, an official process to reveal the truth about the 
Japan-U.S. "secret agreements," including the one disclosed by 
Reischauer, has been launched. This effort to rectify an abnormal 
situation in which national defense and security is built on lies 
seems to have come too late. For us, who have consistently advocated 
dropping the fiction ever since the Mainichi Shimbun prominently 
reported on Reischauer's statements, this is a very welcome 
development. 
 
However, what is the Hatoyama administration planning to do after 
disclosing the truth about the Japan-U.S. "secret agreements" and 
proving that Reischauer's statements were true? Will it maintain the 
position of previous Japanese governments on the "introduction" of 
nuclear weapons and ban U.S. military vessels carrying nuclear arms 
from passing through Japanese waters and calling on Japanese ports? 
Or will it accept the longstanding interpretation of the U.S. side, 
allow passage and port calls, and carry on with "2.5 non-nuclear 
principles"? 
 
TOKYO 00000305  003 OF 008 
 
 
 
U.S. forces have stopped carrying tactical nuclear weapons on 
aircraft carriers and cruisers as revealed by Reischauer after the 
communist regime collapsed in the USSR in 1991. Therefore, there is 
an opinion that the "introduction" of nuclear arms is no longer an 
issue. However, it is unpredictable how the nuclear situation in 
areas near Japan will change in the future. It is extremely 
self-contradictory for Japan to ban even the passage of nuclear 
weapons through its territorial waters as long as the U.S.'s nuclear 
deterrence is a component of Japan's national defense. 
 
(2) Government agonizing over Hague Convention concerning child 
custody after failed international marriages; Japan under growing 
pressure from U.S. and European countries to accede to convention 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 14, 2010 
 
The issue of parental child abductions after international marriages 
end in divorce is emerging as a new source of conflict between 
Japan, the United States, and European countries. The United States 
and European countries are urging Japan to swiftly accede to the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, which stipulates a set of rules for settling disputes. In 
reality, it is difficult for Japan to accede to the convention due 
to the need to take necessary legislative measures, the differences 
in views on families, and other factors. Japan is under growing 
pressure from other countries. The matter might escalate into a 
major diplomatic issue. 
 
International marriages have been on the rise in recent years, and 
there have been numerous cases in which children are taken to Japan 
after marriages end in divorce, making it extremely difficult for 
other parents to see their children. In many cases, victims have 
asked their governments for solutions and their governments in turn 
have pressed Tokyo to take adequate measures. 
 
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband had a telephone 
conversation with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on Feb. 10 during 
which Miliband asked for Japan's cooperation, saying: "We attach 
importance to the issue of parental child abduction. We ask for your 
continued cooperation for resolving this problem." Meanwhile, U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who visited Japan for 
talks on the Japan-U.S. alliance, said emphatically during a press 
conference on Feb. 2: "(The issue of child abduction) might escalate 
into a major concern between Japan and the United States." 
 
Eighty-one countries are signatories to the Hague Convention. The 
convention requires the country to which a child is taken to to 
return the child to the country of his or her habitual residence if 
such a request is received from the parent from whom the child has 
been taken. The United States and European countries are calling for 
the cooperation of the Japanese government in resolving child 
abduction cases, while pressuring it to swiftly accede to The Hague 
Convention, saying that if Japan remains outside the convention, 
similar cases will continue to occur. 
 
The government, led by the Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry, 
has been discussing measures to deal with this situation. The 
Foreign Ministry held a briefing on Feb 10 that brought together the 
representatives of 13 embassies in Tokyo, in addition to setting up 
forums for discussions with the U.S. and French embassies. 
 
TOKYO 00000305  004 OF 008 
 
 
Procedures for returning a child require legislative measures. Given 
the situation that child custody is normally awarded to mothers in 
Japan, there are major obstacles to acceding to the convention. 
 
"In English, the words used for the act (of removing a child) are 
'child abduction,'" a senior Foreign Ministry official said." "Japan 
is likely to come under greater pressure from the United States and 
European countries." 
 
(3) Reasons for Ozawa's obsession about visit to U.S. 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
February 14, 2010 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa will 
likely visit the U.S. during the Golden Week holidays from late 
April to meet influential U.S. government officials. Ozawa, who is 
critical of the foreign policy of the previous governments led by 
the Liberal Democratic Party as blindly following the U.S, has not 
visited Washington in recent years, although he has visited the U.S. 
for grass-roots exchanges. 
 
Why has Ozawa been obsessive about visiting the U.S.? When Assistant 
Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with Ozawa on Feb. 2, he asked 
him to visit the U.S. Initially, a meeting with Ozawa was not 
included in Campbell's itinerary, but the meeting was suddenly 
arranged as Ozawa agreed to meet him. 
 
This is not the first plan for Ozawa to visit the U.S. since the 
Obama administration was launched in January of last year. 
 
According to DPJ Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka, the 
party under the lead of Ozawa last spring made this request to the 
U.S. government: "The party will seize the reins of government 
without fail, so Mr. Ozawa will visit the U.S. to discuss future 
Japan-U.S. relations with U.S. government officials. We would like 
you to arrange an official meeting with Secretary of State Clinton 
and an unofficial meeting with President Obama." 
 
Yamaoka stated: "There was considerable progress in coordination 
work, but because a new strain of influenza began to rage throughout 
the U.S., the plan was not translated into action." Another informed 
source pointed out: "Since a meeting with President Obama was not 
arranged, Ozawa dropped the plan." 
 
At the end of last year, too, the government was about to look into 
a visit to the U.S. by Ozawa again, but no specifics were discussed 
at that time. 
 
There were such moves in the past, so it is not true to say that the 
plan of Ozawa's U.S. tour came out of the blue. The U.S. side must 
be aiming at significantly moving forward the relocation the U.S. 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station through Ozawa's visit to the U.S. 
 
Meanwhile, Ozawa has openly asserted regarding the presence of U.S. 
forces in the Far East region: "The U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet should be 
sufficient," and has called for an equal relationship between Japan 
and the U.S. This view might have been reflected in his reply to 
Campbell's invitation: "If I make the trip, I would be put out if 
President Obama doesn't take sufficient time (to meet with me)." 
Even so, Ozawa has said that he would not engage in the policymaking 
process, so it remains uncertain what Ozawa is willing to talk about 
 
TOKYO 00000305  005 OF 008 
 
 
with President Obama. 
 
Many lawmakers in the ruling and opposition camps take this view: 
"He might be aiming to demonstrate his extensive personnel ties with 
key figures in the U.S. government and regaining his grip on the 
party, which has weakened due to his fund-raising scandal." Ozawa 
probably judges that if he can prove himself a key person amid 
strained Obama-Hatoyama relations, he will find it easier to contain 
growing calls for him to step down as party secretary general. 
 
In addition, behind his eagerness for a meeting with President Obama 
might be his mixed feelings of love and hatred for the U.S. 
 
"In that case, relations with the U.S. will be ruined." In 1990, 
when the government was mulling a dispatch of Self-Defense Force 
personnel on the occasion of the Gulf crisis, Ozawa, who was 
secretary general of the LDP at that time, scolded Foreign Ministry 
officials who were not positive about dispatching SDF troops. Ozawa, 
however, gradually came to harbor wariness toward the U.S. 
 
Some point out that he began to be wary of the U.S. when he 
accompanied then Vice President Shin Kanemaru on his tour of America 
in 1992. Kanemaru visited North Korea in 1990, and this visit 
incurred the U.S.'s strong displeasure. The government managed to 
arrange a meeting between Kanemaru and then President George H. W. 
Bush (Bush senior), but Washington's treatment of him was cool. 
 
An informed person said: "He was received at an entrance that is not 
used for guests to the White House and was shown to a room for 
family members of the President. He was apparently given a cold 
reception." Some observers see Ozawa's eagerness to hold a meeting 
with President Obama as mirroring his mixed feelings toward the U.S. 
based on this past experience. 
 
The DPJ unofficially asked the U.S. last week to send a letter of 
invitation for an Ozawa-led delegation of DPJ lawmakers. This may 
seem a trifle, but for Ozawa, who still remembers Washington's 
inhospitality in 1992, it might be negotiating with the U.S. 
 
(4) Will Ozawa's leadership be undermined? Part 3: First-term 
lawmakers at a loss 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 7, 2010 
 
It has been said that the Democratic Party of Japan's structure is a 
uni-polar system led by Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa. However, the 
situation in the party has begun changing. 
 
Sensitive to local opinions 
 
On Feb. 3, when Ozawa's exemption from indictment by public 
prosecutors became certain, Masanao Shibahashi, a first-term 
lawmaker, was asked by one of his supporters at a Setsubun 
(traditional end of winter) festival held in Gifu City about the 
problem involving Secretary General Ozawa. "He has been giving 
explanations in such venues as press conferences," Shibahashi 
answered. "However, even we don't know what really happened." 
 
Shibahashi is one of the graduates of the Ichiro Ozawa Institute of 
Politics. However, he flatly said: "I have no intention of defending 
Mr. Ozawa over this issue. I think most first-term lawmakers are 
 
TOKYO 00000305  006 OF 008 
 
 
taking a neutral stance." 
 
Shibahashi's rival in this single-seat constituency is former Postal 
Minister Seiko Noda of the Liberal Democratic Party. If the next 
election is taken into consideration, all 143 first-term lawmakers 
have no other choice but to be sensitive to the trends in their 
local constituencies and in public opinion. Tsutomu Takamura, who 
was defeated by former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura in the 
Yamaguchi Constituency No. 1 but later secured a seat in the 
proportional representation segment, said: "I feel most embarrassed 
when I come to think that people may suspect we too might be 
falsifying our political fund reports (because of the incident this 
time)." 
 
In late January, at a Japanese-style pub near the Diet Building, 
about 10 first-term DPJ lawmakers, joined by customers, held a 
discussion. "Both Mr. Ozawa and Mr. (Naoto) Kan may not be in 
political circles in 10 years' or 20 year's time," said one of the 
lawmakers. "I must seriously consider whom I should follow." The 
fate of the so-called Koizumi children is not a matter of 
indifference to them (nearly all the freshman candidates elected in 
the 2005 postal election lost their seats in the Lower House 
election last year). 
 
The Ozawa leadership told the 143 first-term lawmakers: "Your job is 
to win the next election. The election takes priority over 
policies"; "There is no need for you to be in Tokyo"; and, "Group 
activities are prohibited." Their obedience to those orders has now 
been undermined. They are now beginning to act on their own or hold 
meetings. 
 
Five first-term lawmakers, who previously worked with investment 
banks or securities houses, met in a room in the Diet Members' 
Building. The lawmakers, who call themselves "finance boys," are 
aiming at proposing such policies as a review of the method of 
managing the pension reserves before the end of this fiscal year. 
 
Attachment to Ozawa leadership still strong 
 
There is also a group named "Retsu-no Kai." It is a group of 
first-term lawmakers who have their seats in the same row in the 
Lower House floor of a plenary session. They circulate a piece of 
paper during a plenary session to adjust their schedules for a 
meeting. The group is characterized by their holding meetings at any 
time without the involvement of secretaries. 
 
Even so, many first-term lawmakers are strongly attached to the 
Ozawa leadership, because they feel uneasy about their election 
base. The 143 first-term lawmakers, who occupy nearly half of the 
Lower House seats, are torn between whether they should go their own 
way or should follow Ozawa. 
 
(5) National Public Service Law draft amendment: Vice minister and 
department director general-class officials to be treated equally 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 16, 2010 
 
The government is set to submit a bill amending the National Public 
Service Law to the current session of the Diet. In this connection, 
it has decided to make changes to the original plan, which divided 
senior positions into two groups - vice ministers or bureau 
 
TOKYO 00000305  007 OF 008 
 
 
directors and department director general-class officials - and 
unify the two groups into one. As a result, it will become possible 
to handle the transferring of a vice minister to a department 
director general-class position not as a demotion, a personnel 
change regarded as a special exception, but as a regular transfer. 
Since a review of the government employees' remuneration law is to 
be postponed, even if such a transfer is treated as a regular 
transfer, the transferred official's salary would be cut 
substantially. As such, some take the view that it would be 
difficult to put the revised plan into practice. 
 
Referring to the revised bill, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on the 
15th stressed: "Transferring a vice minister to a department 
director general-class position is not a demotion. The revision is 
designed to enhance the freedom (of personnel changes)." The prime 
minister told this to the press corps at the Prime Minister's 
Official Residence (the Kantei). The government plans to adopt the 
revised bill at a cabinet meeting as early as the 19th. 
 
According to the existing amendment bill, two cross-sectional lists 
of candidates were to be drawn up and personnel changes for demotion 
were to be made within the two groups. Demoting vice ministers or 
bureau directors general to department director general-level 
positions is regarded as an exceptional case. To implement such 
demotions, conditions such as that the work performance of the 
official in question was substandard had to be met. 
 
The revised plan stipulates that the two lists are to be unified 
into one and positions of officials from vice ministers down to 
department director general-level officials are to be regarded as 
management positions with different grades. Officials in the unified 
list can be demoted or appointed flexibly. 
 
However, the remuneration law that states remunerations for senior 
public servants and the National Personnel Authority's regulations 
will not be reviewed this time. Even if the revised National Public 
Service Law stipulates that vice ministers and department director 
generals will be treated equally, their treatment under the 
remuneration law will be substantially different. If a vice minister 
is transferred to the position of a department director general, his 
or her annual income could be lowered by about 8 million yen from 
about 23 million yen to about 15 million yen. 
 
National government employees can register complaints with the 
National Personnel Authority if they are demoted against their will. 
Under the existing law, demotions are unlikely to be approved except 
for in cases in which their work performance is poor or they have a 
health problem. Their position is thus guaranteed. 
 
There is a strong possibility that depending on the specifics of the 
revised bill, even if national government employees file complaints 
against their transfer (within the same list), which is effectively 
a demotion, their complaints might not be addressed for the reason 
that their previous and new positions are both management positions. 
However, regarding the issue of a substantive drop in annual 
remunerations, some government officials have pointed out that it 
would be difficult to implement the revised bill, because it lacks 
specifics. Even if the revised bill is passed into law during the 
current Diet session, the government is bound to be pressed to look 
into amending the remuneration law in the process of drastically 
reforming the public servant system, including basic labor rights 
for government workers, slated to occur this fall. 
 
TOKYO 00000305  008 OF 008 
 
 
 
(6) Publication of Gaiko Forum to be suspended 
 
YOMIURI (Page 35) (Full) 
February 16, 2010 
 
It was learned yesterday that the publication of Gaiko Forum, a 
monthly journal on foreign affairs (Toshi Publishing Company), will 
be discontinued after the April issue, which will go on sale on 
March 8. Of a circulation of 30,000, about 9,000 copies are 
purchased by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). However, as a 
result of its budget screening, the Government Revitalization Unit 
decided to discontinue the purchase of the journal. As such, it has 
become difficult for the company to continue publishing the 
journal. 
 
Gaiko Forum was first published in 1988. It is the only Japanese 
monthly foreign policy journal in which Japanese and foreign 
academics and diplomats publish essays. MOFA has been distributing 
copies of the foreign policy journal to domestic and foreign experts 
and others. Following the government's decision to stop purchasing 
the journal, University of Tokyo Professor Shinichi Kitaoka and 
other experts on international affairs issued an emergency statement 
last December opposing the discontinuation. 
 
ROOS