Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10TOKYO229, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/04/10

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10TOKYO229.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10TOKYO229 2010-02-04 23:09 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6718
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0229/01 0352309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 042309Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9212
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1026
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8685
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2501
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5726
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9181
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2957
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9638
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9005
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/04/10 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) U.S. assistant secretary of state meets with Ozawa to search for 
breakthrough in Futenma relocation issue (Sankei) 
 
(2) "Japan@the World" column: How to draw up a blueprint for a new 
alliance (Asahi) 
 
(3) Editorial: U.S. defense strategy calls for deepening Japan-U.S. 
alliance (Nikkei) 
 
(4) U.S. Ambassador Roos, Hokkaido governor participate in summit of 
female mayors (Hokkaido Shimbun) 
 
(5) Foreign Minister Okada to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 (Nikkei) 
 
 
(6) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) U.S. assistant secretary of state meets with Ozawa to search for 
breakthrough in Futenma relocation issue 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 3, 2010 
 
As if to coincide with the release of the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) by the U.S. Department of Defense, the governments of Japan 
and the U.S. have shifted into full gear in their effort to deepen 
the bilateral alliance. On Feb. 2, they held a Japan-U.S. Security 
Subcommittee (SSC) meeting of bureau director-level foreign affairs 
and defense officials. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell had a personal talk with 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa and 
tried to find ways to mend the strains caused by the U.S. Marine 
Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture) 
relocation issue. However, with the Hatoyama administration 
continuing to drift over its security policy, a breakthrough in the 
situation is nowhere in sight. 
 
On the afternoon of the 2nd after attending the SSC talks, Campbell 
told Ozawa in the DPJ secretary general's office in the Diet 
building, "We have reaffirmed our intentions to further strengthen 
the bilateral alliance. This alliance serves as the linchpin of the 
U.S. policy toward Asia." It is unusual for senior U.S. officials to 
visit the Diet. By doing so, Campbell, a leading Japan hand in the 
Obama administration, is apparently determined to save the face of 
Ozawa, the most influential figure in the Hatoyama administration. 
 
The meeting, which was held behind closed doors apart from the 
opening statements, lasted for an hour. A briefing after the talks 
was also cancelled at the request of Ozawa. Ozawa politely saw 
Campbell off at the Lower House entrance. Campbell told the press 
corps with a smile, "Nice talks." 
 
There is no doubt that the Futenma issue was brought up in the 
talks. The U.S. side is apparently unhappy about the inconsistency 
of Japanese ministers' views on the issue and believes that Ozawa is 
the only one who will be able to find a way out of the current 
situation. Campbell probably made the courtesy call on Ozawa with 
the aim of figuring out what he is up to. 
 
TOKYO 00000229  002 OF 009 
 
 
 
The QDR specifically mentions the need to implement the Japan-U.S. 
agreement, including the agreement on the relocation of the Futenma 
facilities to an area near the coast of Camp Schwab (in Henoko, Nago 
City, Okinawa Prefecture), calling on the Japanese government to 
steadily implement the existing plan. Campbell during the SSC 
conveyed the U.S. government's stance to the Japanese side and 
stressed to the press corps: "We have clearly conveyed our view that 
the existing plan is the best option. We would like to work closely 
so as to move forward on this issue." 
 
However, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has entirely relegated the 
effort to find a relocation site to the ruling parties' Okinawa base 
issue review committee to work out. The committee is also going 
astray with the three ruling parties failing to reach an agreement. 
 
The panel held a meeting on the evening of Feb. 2. Participants 
agreed to dispatch an inspection team consisting of government and 
ruling party officials to Guam, which the SDP insists is a candidate 
relocation site, in mid-February. However, the U.S. side is 
reluctant to allow the inspection team to make the visit. It is now 
certain that the submission of a proposal for a relocation site by 
each party slated for January will be delayed until late February or 
later. 
 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada mentioned the possibility of 
continuing to use Futenma Air Station, provoking a backlash from the 
SDP. This has also halted the talks on the issue. Following the 
SDP's opposition to the idea of continuing to use the current site, 
the prime minister on the evening of the 2nd told the press corps: 
"This whole issue originated from the idea of Futenma relocation. It 
will not be a solution if we go back to the beginning. The foreign 
minister understands that." However, the foreign minister at a press 
conference on the evening of the 2nd once again said, "If worst 
comes to the worst, Futenma Air Station will remain at the same 
site." The fire continues to smolder. 
 
The perceptions of cabinet ministers not only on the relocation 
issue but also on security issues are diverse. A senior Defense 
Ministry official said with a sigh: "In the present administration, 
there are no politicians who can map out a strategy that Japan 
should adopt based on the QDR." 
 
(2) "Japan@the World" column: How to draw up a blueprint for a new 
alliance 
 
ASAHI (Pages 1, 15) (Slightly abridged) 
February 4, 2010 
 
Yoichi Funabashi, chief editor 
 
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 
Japan-U.S. security treaty in 1960, the Japanese and U.S. 
governments have declared that they will "deepen" the Japan-U.S. 
alliance. They would like to come up with a blueprint for a new 
alliance by the time U.S. President Barack Obama visits Japan in 
November. 
 
However, the Hatoyama administration has scrapped the Futenma Air 
Station relocation plan agreed upon between the two governments in 
2006 and begun to consider an alternative plan. As a result, the 
Japan-U.S. relationship is in disarray. 
 
TOKYO 00000229  003 OF 009 
 
 
 
Opinion in the U.S. of the Hatoyama administration is harsh. An 
editorial in The New York Times on Jan. 28 expressed concern that 
"there are signs that many of the leaders of Japan's new 
administration and its postwar generation do not understand the 
irreplaceable value of the Japan-U.S. security partnership." 
 
However, on the other hand, there is a growing opinion that the U.S. 
should avoid forcing the Hatoyama administration into a corner. The 
same editorial counseled the Obama administration to be "patient," 
asserting that, "The Obama administration should look for a solution 
to the Futenma relocation and encourage the Hatoyama administration, 
so that it can declare with confidence that it is capable of 
conducting equal diplomacy with the U.S." It is important to deal 
with the base issues in the context of developing a blueprint for a 
new alliance. 
 
How, then, should the new alliance blueprint be drawn up? 
 
Stabilizing relations with a rapidly rising China will be the main 
issue. While China is not a threat right now, there is no guarantee 
that it will not be one in the future. China's peaceful rise so far 
owes much to its leaders' prudence and "patience." 
 
However, if China becomes more powerful economically and militarily, 
such "patience" may be weakened. The Western countries have begun to 
express their uneasiness and even alarm with China's recent 
"conceited" attitude in the areas of economics and finance, human 
rights, and global warming. 
 
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, who played a major 
role in the "redefinition" of the Japan-U.S. security alliance in 
the 1990s, argues strongly for "buying insurance by engaging China" 
when dealing with this country. The functions of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance will be most important in such a situation. Nye asserts 
that a real alliance consists of deterrence in peacetime and 
preparedness for contingencies. 
 
The main source of tension is China's naval buildup and the 
projection of such military power in Asia and the Pacific. Japan and 
the U.S. should consider creating a multilateral framework with the 
Asian neighbors, including China, for maritime stability in the 
South China Sea and East China Sea. This can start with cooperation 
among Japan, the U.S., Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
other countries in dealing with the threat posed by pirates in the 
South China Sea. 
 
The "redefinition" of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the 21st Century 
will consist of the "transformation" from an alliance "against" to 
an alliance "for." Japan should aim at consolidating its relations 
with China; realizing policy dialogues among Japan, the U.S., and 
China; and building "maritime peace" with the Japan-U.S.-China 
relationship as the axis. It is only through such "transformation" 
of the Japan-U.S. alliance that stability in China and Asia can be 
achieved. 
 
Along with the role of the alliance, the management of the alliance 
also needs to be "redefined." I would like to discuss here the 
following principles: mutual benefit, complementarity, and 
cooperation. 
 
The principle of mutual benefit means the "sharing of obligations" 
 
TOKYO 00000229  004 OF 009 
 
 
in responding to "common threats and issues." Here, the important 
thing is that the obligation and cost should be more or less 
proportionate on both sides. So far, the Japan-U.S. alliance has 
consisted mainly of the U.S.'s defense of Japan and Japan's 
provision of military bases. This structure can be sustained into 
the future by reducing the excessive burden on Okinawa. 
 
The principle of complementarity means that the two sides will 
combine their strengths in order for the alliance as a whole to 
realize its full potential. Japan is good at civilian power, while 
military power is the U.S.'s forte. Humanitarian aid and disaster 
relief, building and maintenance of peace, development for nation 
building, prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
disarmament, breaking away from dependence on oil, and environmental 
conservation and working toward a low carbon society are promising 
areas in which Japan can make contributions. To be sure, 
complementarity does not denote a complete division of labor. The 
alliance will remain a military alliance. Here, it will be important 
for Japan to maintain and develop its economic and technological 
power and its international competitiveness, which form the basis of 
its civilian power. 
 
The principle of cooperation means enhancing the reliability of the 
common tasks and operations of the two countries in support of the 
alliance and building broader-based human resources for the 
alliance. Intelligence sharing, joint flight exercises, and joint 
administration of military bases by the two countries should be 
considered. 
 
The Japan-U.S. alliance was built on the pledge by a victorious and 
a vanquished country in World War II not to go to war ever again and 
on "trust and reconciliation." The fact that these two countries 
with different languages and culture have been able to develop such 
a profound relationship of trust following the war is almost a 
miracle in contemporary history. 
 
It seems that the desire to be free from dependence on the U.S. and 
to seek moral solidarity with Asia is a latent force in the 
sentiments of the leaders of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and 
the Japanese people. However, security policy should not be affected 
by sentimentalism. The essence of security policymaking lies in 
conducting rational and strategic policy debate based on national 
interests while skillfully controlling nationalist sentiments in the 
process. The exercise of self-restraint on both sides to suppress 
nationalism is also a hidden function of an alliance. 
 
The Obama administration has proposed a security strategy for 
multilateral defense of the global commons, including navigation in 
international waters and cyber space. 
 
There are moves in the U.S. Department of Defense toward setting up 
a Pacific command for humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Prime 
Minister Hatoyama's "yuai boat" concept has elements in common with 
the multilateral medical assistance network promoted by the Obama 
administration. Now is the time for the DPJ to open up new frontiers 
in the Japan-U.S. alliance in a different way from the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP). If the DPJ and LDP are able to build 
consensus across party borders on Japan-U.S. security policy, the 
50th year of the security treaty will indeed be of great historic 
significance. 
 
(3) Editorial: U.S. defense strategy calls for deepening Japan-U.S. 
 
TOKYO 00000229  005 OF 009 
 
 
alliance 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 4, 2010 
 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has released its Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) for 2010, which sets the guidelines for DOD security 
policy for the next four years. The 2010 QDR focuses on the variety 
of new threats the nation faces and calls for its allies in the Asia 
Pacific region, including Japan and South Korea, to play an expanded 
role. The allies should study the contents of the threats and 
jointly address the threats as a matter of course. 
 
The hard battle in Afghanistan probably can be cited as the most 
influential factor that has caused the U.S. to alter its strategy 
over the past four years. Emerging countries have gathered strength, 
non-state forces have gained influence, and weapons of mass 
destruction have spread further throughout the world. There is also 
the danger of military action in cyberspace. 
 
It is necessary to deal effectively with such diversified threats; 
otherwise, security will be undermined on a global scale. Therefore, 
it is quite natural for the DOD to spotlight new threats in the 
QDR. 
 
Previous QDRs envisioned a strategy to deal with two large-scale 
conflicts in the Middle East and Asia simultaneously, but this 
two-front strategy was removed from the 2010 QDR. The U.S. probably 
judged that it would be appropriate to eliminate this strategy from 
a realistic point of view. However, this strategy had some deterrent 
effect on North Korea's moves, so its elimination is not desirable 
from the standpoint of Japan. 
 
Probably with the aim of making up for the removal of the two-front 
strategy, the QDR promised to enhance its deterrence capability with 
nuclear and conventional weapons for Japan, South Korea, and other 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of this is to 
strengthen relations with its allies. 
 
In the case of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the U.S. should have 
proposed in the QDR that defense cooperation between Japan and the 
U.S. should be strengthened by means of Japan taking measures to 
enable the Self-Defense Force to exercise the right to collective 
self-defense. But this idea is not practical in the current 
Japan-U.S. relationship under the Hatoyama administration. 
 
Almost at the same time as the release of the QDR, Japan and the 
U.S. held a high-level meeting of the Security Subcommittee composed 
of their senior foreign and defense officials in Tokyo. As a result 
of the Hatoyama administration's decision to put off making a 
decision on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air 
Station until the end of May, Japan and the U.S. remain unable to 
arrange a meeting between Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and 
President Barack Obama. Given this, strategic dialogue has been 
carried out by working-level officials of the two countries. 
 
Between Japan and the U.S., deliberations were carried out between 
working-level officials until 10 years ago. Although the Hatoyama 
administration has advocated shifting the decision-making 
responsibility to politicians, the Japan-U.S. alliance has returned 
to the so-called "working-level alliance" of 10 years ago. Foreign 
Minister Katsuya Okada has emphasized the importance of his talks 
 
TOKYO 00000229  006 OF 009 
 
 
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Hawaii, but the two sides 
have yet to establish a deep relationship of trust. 
 
If the U.S. proposal for an expanded role to be played by its allies 
is translated into action, it will inevitably become a major 
challenge for the Hatoyama administration. 
 
(4) U.S. Ambassador Roos, Hokkaido governor participate in summit of 
female mayors 
 
HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN ONLINE (Full) 
09:11, February 4, 2010 
 
The "national summit of female mayors" that opened in the town of 
Higashikagura in Kamikawa Subprefecture moved its venue to Sapporo 
City on Feb. 3. Seven female mayors, including Mayor Keiko Kawano of 
Higashikagura exchanged views with Governor Harumi Takahashi (of 
Hokkaido), Sapporo Mayor Fumio Ueda, and other officials. U.S. 
Ambassador to Japan John Roos, who was on an inspection tour to see 
the Sapporo Snow Festival and other sites, made an unscheduled 
appearance and livened up the atmosphere at the summit. 
 
In a speech, Governor Takahashi said: "There are only three female 
governors and seven female mayors in the country. This number is 
very small, but let us work together." During the informal meeting, 
Roos asked: "How is the female mayors' summit going?" He talked to 
each of the mayors, and the mayors all advertised their towns 
enthusiastically. 
 
The summit will close on Feb. 4 after adopting an appeal at a hotel 
in the town of Toyako in Iburi Subprefecture, which was the venue 
for the G-8 Hokkaido-Toyako Summit. 
 
(5) Foreign Minister Okada to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 4, 2010 
 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada yesterday started making arrangements 
to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 with an eye to holding talks with 
his Australian counterpart Stephen Smith. The purpose of his trip to 
Australia is to lay the groundwork for a meeting of the two 
countries' foreign and defense ministers (2-plus-2), which will be 
held as early as this summer. Okada and Smith are expected to 
confirm that the two countries will accelerate talks for the 
conclusion of an economic partnership agreement (EPA). They are also 
expected to exchange views on Japan's research whaling. 
 
(6) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 1, 2010 
 
Questions & Answers 
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) 
 
Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 50 (55) 53 48 
No 38 (34) 37 39 
Not interested 12 (12) 10 14 
 
TOKYO 00000229  007 OF 009 
 
 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 7 
(6) 6 8 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
2 (2) 2 3 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policies 
13 (9) 12 13 
Because the nature of politics is likely to change 78 (82) 80 76 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 3 
(5) 4 3 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
41 (42) 37 45 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policies 32 
(32) 35 29 
Because the nature of politics is unlikely to change 23 (20) 24 23 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
 T P M F 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 30 (35) 33 28 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 16 (16) 17 14 
New Komeito (NK) 4 (4) 2 6 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (2) 3 3 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1 (2) 2 0 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 1 (1) 1 0 
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 4 (4) 4 4 
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) -- (0) -- -- 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 0 0 
Other political parties 1 (1) 1 0 
None 39 (33) 35 43 
 
Q: What do you think DPJ Secretary General Ozawa should do if 
Tomohiro Ishikawa, one of his former secretaries and currently a DPJ 
lawmaker seated in the House of Representatives, is prosecuted over 
his fund management organization's unreported land purchase? Do you 
think he should resign from his party post to take responsibility? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 76  75 78 
No 18  22 15 
 
Q: Some lawmakers in the DPJ are criticizing the prosecutors' 
investigation over the case. Do you think the prosecutors' 
investigation is appropriate? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 71  71 71 
No 21  23 19 
 
Q: Concerning this case, Prime Minister Hatoyama told DPJ Secretary 
General Ozawa to "please fight" and also said he hoped Mr. Ishikawa 
would not be indicted. Do you think these Hatoyama remarks are 
problematic? 
 
 T P M F 
 
TOKYO 00000229  008 OF 009 
 
 
Yes 65  62 67 
No 29  35 25 
 
Q: Prime Minister Hatoyama's fund management organization is alleged 
to have falsified reports on political donations. In this case, a 
former state-funded secretary of Prime Minister Hatoyama has been 
prosecuted on the charge of violating the Political Funds Control 
Law. Do you think Prime Minister Hatoyama should resign to take 
responsibility for this case? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 33 (40) 34 33 
No 60 (54) 63 57 
 
Q: In this case, it is clear that a total of more than 1.2 billion 
yen was provided to Prime Minister Hatoyama by his mother for eight 
years. Prime Minister Hatoyama explained, "My former secretary 
handled that, and I didn't know anything about it." Do you believe 
this explanation? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 25  27 23 
No 68  69 68 
 
Q: The government's budget for next fiscal year incorporates its 
policy-based plans to provide child allowances and make high school 
education free of charge. Meanwhile, the government will issue 
deficit-covering bonds at a record-high level of 44 trillion yen. Do 
you approve of this budget? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 31  34 29 
No 61  61 60 
 
Q: The recent mayoral election in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, 
ended in the victory of a candidate opposed to relocating the U.S. 
military's Futenma airfield facility to the Henoko area of the city, 
and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano indicated that there is no need 
for the government to ask for local consent for its decision 
concerning where to relocate Futenma airfield. What do you think 
about this? 
 
 T P M F 
This is a problem 73  71 74 
This is not a problem 19  25 14 
 
Q: What do you think the Hatoyama government should do about the 
Futenma relocation issue. Pick the response that is closest to your 
opinion. 
 
 T P M F 
Relocate Futenma airfield out of Okinawa Prefecture or Japan 48 (51) 
47 50 
Look for another site in Okinawa Prefecture for Futenma relocation 
26 (15) 27 25 
Relocate Futenma airfield to Henoko 16 (25) 20 12 
 
Q: If an election for the House of Councillors were to be held now, 
which political party or which political party's candidate would you 
vote for in your proportional representation bloc? 
 
 T P M F 
 
TOKYO 00000229  009 OF 009 
 
 
DPJ 35  40 32 
LDP 20  21 19 
NK 5  3 7 
JCP 4  4 4 
SDP 2  3 2 
PNP 1  2 0 
YP 6  7 5 
RC 0  0 1 
Other political parties 15  14 15 
 
(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that 
the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "No answer" omitted. Figures in 
parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Dec. 
19-20. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Jan. 30-31 over the 
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit 
sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,662 households with one or more 
eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,050 
persons (63 PERCENT ). 
 
ROOS