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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 000228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2030 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING 
 
REF: SECDEF DTG 292154ZJAN10 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt; reasons 1.4 (b 
/d) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  Initiatives for the Security Treaty,s 50th 
anniversary, updates on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Host Nation Support (HNS), 
Realignment/Futenma Replacement Facility, possible new 
bilateral exchanges and F-X procurement were the main 
Alliance issues discussed during the February 2 Security 
Sub-Committee (SSC) meeting, led by EAP A/S Campbell and ASD 
Gregson on the U.S. side, and MOFA DG for North America 
Umemoto and MOD DG for Defense Policy Takamizawa on the 
Japanese side.  Regarding the 50th anniversary, both sides 
raised the possibility of a new security declaration, a 2 2 
(SecState, SecDef, and GOJ counterparts) meeting, and 
trilateral engagement with India in 2010.  DG Umemoto, 
however, relayed Foreign Minister Okada,s decision not to 
form an eminent persons panel to shepherd anniversary 
activities.  In terms of new exchanges, DG Umemoto called for 
the start of formal bilateral dialogues on regional security 
(focusing initially on China), extended deterrence, and 
cyber-security. 
 
¶2. SUMMARY cont'd: The Japanese side expressed support for 
beginning HNS discussions at an early point with a view to 
presenting a more efficient support package to the Japanese 
public.  ASD Gregson pressed for green energy technologies as 
a possible component of a successor HNS agreement, and A/S 
Campbell noted the political sensitivities of the HNS issue 
during a time of FRF-related Alliance challenges.  On the 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, A/S Campbell urged the 
Japanese side to refrain from going public with FRF 
alternative proposals before consulting with the USG.  ASD 
Gregson expressed concern that politicization of FRF 
decisions are bleeding into other realignment projects, 
particularly Iwakuni.  DG Takamiza provided an update on F-X 
procurement, noting that MOD has started a process to brief 
the Defense Minister on the candidate aircraft, threat 
assessment and procurement and delivery issues.  DG 
Takamizawa expressed concerns about barriers to F-35 
information, Japanese industrial to participation in F-35 
production, and rumors of delivery delays.  End summary. 
 
¶3. (U) The United States and Japan held a Security 
Sub-Committee (SSC) meeting on February 2 hosted by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.  Assistant Secretary of 
State Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Wallace ""Chip"" Gregson chaired the U.S. side, with Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Northern American Affairs Bureau Director 
General Kazuyoshi Umemoto and Ministry of Defense Bureau of 
Defense Policy Nobushige Takamizawa chairing for Japan. 
Representatives from Embassy Tokyo, Pacific Command and U.S. 
Forces, Japan joined the U.S. chairs, with representatives 
from the Japan Joint Staff filling out the Japan side.  A 
full list of participants is at the end of the cable. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Quadrennial and Ballistic Missile Defense Reviews 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) OSD Director for Japan Basalla drew on talking points 
in Ref A to provide an overview of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) and Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). 
ASD Gregson emphasized that the United States is not reducing 
its presence in Northeast Asia, but rather expanding 
throughout the Pacific the presence of its existing 
alliances.  The United States encourages the increase in 
Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) presence and operations 
around Guam and Asia.  This will help protect sea lanes of 
communication from non-traditional and conventional threats. 
The USG seeks the expanded use of Guam for U.S. 
military-Japan Self Defense Force training.  This joint 
 
TOKYO 00000228  002 OF 007 
 
 
training, combined with Japan's increased experience with 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR),such as 
with the JSDF deployment to Haiti, will demonstrate to the 
region Japan's ability to react to humanitarian aid 
situations and improve its national image.  A permanent JSDF 
presence on Guam to support the training would be 
appropriate, ASD Gregson noted. 
 
¶5. (C) JSDF Joint Staff Director for Plans and Policy MG 
Koichi Isobe offered that the HA/DR missions match JSDF 
capabilities and experience and are supported by the public 
and politics in Japan, as evidenced by the quick Cabinet 
decision on the Haiti dispatch.  MOD Defense Policy DG 
Takamizawa noted that a critical factor for Japan's HA/DR 
operations will be having sufficient quick lift capability. 
 
---------------------- 
Nuclear Posture Review 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Basalla provided an update on the Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) using interagency-cleared talking points, noting 
its release has been delayed until March 1 as a result of 
serious and sustained U.S. leadership attention on the 
contents.  A key theme will be the U.S. commitment to reduce 
the number of nuclear weapons and at the same time strengthen 
deterrence and extended deterrence to reduce the potential 
for conflict that would threaten the United States, as well 
as its allies and partners.  The United States is looking to 
strengthen regional deterrence architectures and deepen 
security cooperation, including with Japan.  A key 
recommendation in the NPR will be to retire the 
nuclear-armed, submarine-launched Tomahawk Land Attack 
Missile (TLAM-N), as it has been deemed redundant and would 
require a costly replacement program.  The United States has 
sufficient other means to project nuclear power and the NPR 
will indicate investments into the U.S. strategic deterrent 
force.  Non-nuclear strike capabilities and BMD also play 
critical roles in regional deterrence and the United States 
seeks continued and additional cooperation with Japan in 
these areas.  The United States is aware of Japan's interest 
in these issues, as indicated by Foreign Minister Kazuya 
Okada's letter to Secretaries Clinton and Gates, and is 
looking forward to continued dialogue with Japan, Basalla 
stated. 
 
---------------------------- 
Extended Deterrence Dialogue 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) ASD Gregson added that the United States has been 
consistent and strong in its public messages, such as Deputy 
Secretary of State Steinberg's statement following North 
Korea's missile and nuclear activities in the spring of 2009, 
that the United Stated would take every action possible to 
reassure and defend its allies.  The United States seeks to 
expand the dialogue with Japan on extended deterrence issues. 
 This should include a GOJ visit to U.S. Strategic Command to 
ensure Japan understands, to the extent possible, U.S. 
deterrence plans and concepts, and to allow Strategic Command 
to hear Japan's interests and concerns, ASD Gregson stated. 
 
¶8. (S) MOFA DG Umemoto informed the U.S. side that Foreign 
Minister Okada, who was not interested in the strategic 
issues associated with extended deterrence when first taking 
office, is now eager to start a bilateral dialogue on the 
issue.  MOFA would like to send a team to the United States 
during the week of February 15 to begin formal discussions. 
A/S Campbell stressed that there are three distinct issue 
sets that must be managed: 1. extended deterrence, 2. nuclear 
history (known as the ""secret agreements"" in Japan), and 3. 
the ability of U.S. aircraft and ships to call at Japanese 
ports without needing to confirm or deny the presence of 
nuclear weapons. 
 
TOKYO 00000228  003 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶9. (S) DG Umemoto said nuclear propulsion is not much of a 
concern in Japan, especially following the USS George 
Washington's deployment, but nuclear weapons are very much 
tied to the ""secret agreement"" issue.  Japan does not want to 
end up like New Zealand and needs to find a path forward that 
allows U.S. operations and port visits to continue while also 
responding to questions from the Japanese public.  He also 
noted that the Japanese public has high expectations 
following President Obama's Prague speech, and so it will be 
necessary to reconcile the contradiction between working to 
reduce nuclear weapons and strengthening deterrence.  The 
public also needs to understand that reducing reliance on 
U.S. nuclear weapons for Japan's security will mean an 
increased reliance on U.S. and Japanese conventional forces, 
DG Umemoto said.  Both sides agreed on the need to draw up a 
terms of reference and begin the extended deterrence dialogue 
as soon as possible. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
50th Anniversary: Regional Security Assessment 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (C) DG Umemoto proposed that a key bilateral activity 
associated with the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security Treaty should be a Deputy Director 
General/Deputy Assistant Secretary-led assessment of the 
security environment in East Asia, with a specific initial 
focus on China.  The work should kick-off in March.  Both 
sides agreed on the benefit of including experts, which 
should come from the interagency policy community, including 
the National Security Council and the White House, as well as 
the armed forces and intelligence community.  A/S Campbell 
recommended State and MOFA lead this assessment.  MOD DG 
Takamizawa offered that the assessment should incorporate 
previous dialogues, such as the bilateral airpower dialogue. 
The results could lead to renewed discussions on Alliance 
roles, missions and capabilities, and also inform Japan's 
revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and 
drafting of the next 5-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, DG 
Takamizawa said. 
 
¶11. (C) A/S Campbell stated that, given North Korea's 
activities, China's growing military, and increased 
non-traditional threats, including extremism, piracy and 
climate change, the United States and Japan face the most 
challenging security environment in the history of the 
Alliance.  However, the messages to the public regarding 
bilateral dialogues often gloss over this reality.  DG 
Umemoto agreed with A/S Campbell's statement that this needs 
to change with an  assessment of the regional security 
picture so that the public better understands threats to 
Japan.  He also said FM Okada wants to discuss the security 
environment with his counterparts as well and suggested this 
topic could be part of a future 2 2 meeting. 
 
-------------------------------- 
50th Anniversary: Cyber-security 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) DG Umemoto said cooperation on cyber-security would 
be another activity to kick off during the 50th Anniversary 
year. He expressed appreciation for the U.S. offer to 
continue discussions on cyber-security issues, including 
those related to China.  ASD Gregson noted the importance of 
getting real experts together, given the highly technical 
nature of the subject.  DG Umemoto suggested having a joint 
cyber exercise at some point.  ASD Gregson agreed, noting 
that the United States was setting up a military command to 
defend and combat threats to networks.  DG Takamizawa said 
Japan was not as far along as the United States and has had a 
hard time assigning responsibility to the right agency, which 
has hindered Japan's approach to the issue.  A/S Campbell 
replied that USG coordination on cyber security was not as 
 
TOKYO 00000228  004 OF 007 
 
 
developed as was believed.  He suggested, and all agreed, 
that the best path forward for progress would be a 
DOD-MOD-led dialogue.  DG Umemoto said Japan is also ready to 
""upgrade"" the until now classified Bilateral Information 
Security Task Force (BISTF) into a public working group on 
information security that would build on BISTF's work to date. 
 
------------------------ 
Wisemen's Group/Mini-SSC 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) A/S Campbell reiterated the USG,s interest in 
forming a bilateral &wisemen,s group8 for shepherding 
events related to the 50th anniversary of the security 
treaty, an idea originally suggested by the Japanese Embassy 
in Washington.  DG Umemoto pointed out that FM Okada remains 
firmly opposed to creating a formal group.  As a practical 
matter, the DPJ government is not able to identify sufficient 
numbers of security experts outside the government with no 
ties to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  Although MOFA 
had supported the idea at one point, the change in government 
and the current political environment have rendered it 
unfeasible, DG Umemoto said. 
 
¶14. (C) DG Umemoto also called for discussions at the 
upcoming mini-SSC on bilateral planning and each of the 
sub-elements.  While both sides have achieved considerable 
progress in moving forward on individual sub-elements, senior 
Japanese political leaders could not connect them together 
well in the overall bilateral planning construct, Umemoto 
noted.  ASD Gregson responded that he supports discussing 
bilateral planning at the mini-SSC, and suggested that both 
sides explore and discuss further some of the key takeaways 
from the recent Keen Edge bilateral exercise.  OSD Director 
for Japan Basalla suggested discussing bilateral training in 
the mini-SSC, emphasizing that training is an issue that 
crosses over both strategic and operational issues. 
 
¶15. (C) A/S Campbell suggested that both sides try to 
schedule another SSC in March, either in Washington or in 
Hawaii, with perhaps a half-day set aside for a trilateral 
meeting with India.  DG Umemoto expressed support for the 
idea, noting that the GOJ has been seeking trilateral 
discussions with India and bilateral discussions with China. 
A/S Campbell noted difficulties in pursuing a bilateral 
summit between the President and Prime Minister Hatoyama in 
April, adding, however, that considerable interest exists for 
a Security Consultative Committee (SCC) &2 28 meeting. 
Scheduling an SCC meeting sometime after the GOJ,s decision 
on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) in May would be a 
good opportunity to announce the direction to be taken by the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance, as well as to celebrate the hard work of 
both sides on FRF.  An SCC prior to a resolution on FRF, 
however, could be difficult.  DGs Umemoto and Takamizawa 
noted difficulties in following such a timeline, as the Diet 
would be in session in June and Defense Minister Kitazawa 
would also need to focus on campaigning in the July Upper 
House election. 
 
--------------------------- 
50th Anniversary: End State 
--------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) A/S Campbell asked, given the proposed bilateral 
activities that include the extended deterrence dialogue, 
regional security assessment and cyber-security cooperation, 
what the GOJ sees as the end state for the 50th anniversary 
of the Security Treaty.  DG Umemoto said FM Okada sees the 
process starting with the current discussions on planning for 
the 50th anniversary commemoration, followed by the 
abovementioned dialogues, and culminating in a joint 
declaration that would articulate the Alliance in the 21st 
Century.  A/S Campbell noted that a joint declaration could 
be possible, if the Futenma Replacement Facility issue is 
 
TOKYO 00000228  005 OF 007 
 
 
solved in a timely fashion.  FM Okada has the same view, DG 
Umemoto responded.  A/S Campbell noted that President Obama 
will stop in Guam in March on his way to Australia and 
Indonesia.  The stop should signal to Japan the importance of 
Guam to Alliance transformation and the realignment of U.S. 
forces, particularly the FRF plan.  A/S Campbell also noted 
the need to begin laying the ground work for President 
Obama's trip to Japan in November. 
 
------------------- 
Host Nation Support 
------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) DG Umemoto called for both sides to begin the formal 
process for conducting a comprehensive review of Host Nation 
Support (HNS) as agreed in the current Special Measures 
Agreement (SMA) on Host Nation Support (HNS) for U.S. forces. 
 He stressed that, from the GOJ,s perspective, comprehensive 
review does not necessarily equate to drastic reductions in 
HNS, but rather, managing HNS funds more efficiently by 
examining all areas of use to demonstrate to the Japanese 
public that HNS contributes to the defense of Japan.  The 
focus, DG Umemoto stated, should be on more efficient use of 
HNS or on slight reductions with greater results.  ASD 
Gregson cautioned against portraying the comprehensive review 
as &slight reductions,8 as some Washington observers could 
misinterpret Japanese calls for &slight reductions8 as 
calls for &less defense.8  He also stressed that the goal 
for both governments should be to attain the greatest value 
out of HNS, not to minimize cost. 
 
¶18. (C) A/S Campbell sought DG Umemoto,s views on the idea 
of extending current levels of HNS by one year and delaying 
negotiations in order to avoid raising yet another 
contentious bilateral issue.  He pointed out that precedent 
for such extensions exist, as the two goverments had done so 
on two other occasions.  DG Umemoto rejected the idea, 
stressing that simple continuation of current levels of HNS 
would be toocontroversial.  He underscored that, precedent 
notwithstanding, the new government would not support a plan 
in which both sides did nothing to address perceived 
inefficiencies in HNS spending.  DG Umemoto noted, however, 
that immediate changes to current levels of HNS are not 
necessary, given both sides, respective budget cycles.  A 
five-year agreement, for example, that demonstrates changes 
either at the end of the five-year period or sometime earlier 
would allow for continuation of current HNS levels for a 
short period, DG Umemoto said. 
 
¶19. (C) A/S Campbell stressed that the contents of HNS 
discussions ought to be kept out of the public.  He also 
noted that USG would integrate Assistant Secretary for 
Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and his bureau more 
deeply in the HNS negotiations, a bureaucratic change in the 
USG,s approach to HNS.  The USG wants to pursue periodic 
senior-level talks led by the DOS Office of the Senior 
Advisor for Security Negotiations and Agreements to review 
progress made at the Director-level SMA negotiations in 
Tokyo, as well as to address broader, strategic issues.  ASD 
Gregson suggested including renewable energy in the HNS 
discussions, as utilities costs present a considerable 
portion of HNS.  He offered to send to Japan a DOD briefing 
team to engage in discreet information exchanges on some of 
the energy efficiency projects being pursued by DOD, 
including the Office of Naval Research. 
 
---------------------------- 
Futenma Replacement Facility 
---------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) DG Umemoto underscored that the &entire8 GOJ is 
committed to finding a solution on FRF by the end of May, as 
Prime Minister Hatoyama and other senior officials have 
commented publicly.  He noted that the ruling party,s 
 
TOKYO 00000228  006 OF 007 
 
 
consultations are progressing and stressed that the possible 
alternatives do not exclude the current plans.  He assured 
the U.S. delegation that any alternative put forth by the GOJ 
must meet U.S. military requirements and will, therefore, 
require prior consultation with the USG.  Referring to the 
results of the Nago City mayoral elections (won by an 
anti-FRF candidate), DG Umemoto pointed out that decisions on 
FRF will be made by the GOJ, not local communities.  He also 
asked that the USG support the proposed visit to Guam by 
members of the Coalition Working Group, with whatever 
conditions or restrictions it wants to impose on them.  The 
members want to examine the current conditions in Guam to 
inform their own deliberations.  While the GOJ understands 
U.S. concerns about possible ulterior motives of Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) and People,s New Party (PNP) members 
of the working group, MOFA would like the USG to agree to 
support a multiparty delegation in principle, DG Umemoto said. 
 
¶21. (C) A/S Campbell said the USG would agree to support the 
visit in principle.  He pointed out that the USG would 
continue to maintain that the current FRF plan remains the 
best approach, that the USG is prepared to engage on the 
issue with the GOJ, that it seeks expeditious results, and 
that any decisions on FRF must be made bilaterally.  A/S 
Campbell also noted that the U.S. side would respond strongly 
if the Japanese side were to go public with unilateral FRF 
alternative proposals before consulting with the USG.  DG 
Umemoto pointed out that the Realignment Roadmap is not 
limited to FRF and urged both sides to make progress on other 
areas of realignment.  ASD Gregson responded that while the 
Roadmap goes beyond Futenma, the politicization of FRF is 
bleeding into other realignment projects, particularly 
Iwakuni. 
 
--- 
F-X 
--- 
 
¶22. (S) DG Takamizawa reported that MOD had held the first of 
four internal meetings to bring the Defense Minister and Vice 
Ministers up to date on the F-X (Japan's next fighter 
aircraft) procurement.  The remaining meetings will focus on 
why the F-X is necessary, the security environment, candidate 
aircraft (F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, F/A-18E/F, F-15X and the 
Eurofighter) and procurement timelines for each aircraft. 
Meetings will be held every other week until end of March or 
early April.  MOD is planning to reach out to other countries 
that have the candidate aircraft to determine their rationale 
for procurement.  MOD will be looking at F-X procurement not 
just from the perspective of replacing the aging F-4 
squadrons, but also with a view to replacing Japan's F-15s 
and countering the growing multilayered China threat.  This 
could lead to fewer resources for the F-X and more for other 
assets, such as submarines for instance, depending on Japan's 
assessment of the threat.  Domestic industrial participation 
will also be a factor, as Japan's indigenous F-2 line will 
soon be shut down, leaving Japan with no domestic fighter 
production program.  MOD's assessment is that, if the F-35 is 
selected, there would be no room for Japanese industrial 
participation.  Moreover, MOD would also not be able to 
purchase indigenously produced missiles for the F-35.  DG 
Takamizawa assessed that MOD will request funding for the F-X 
in the JFY2011 budget, although perhaps without specifying a 
platform. 
 
¶23. (C) A/S Campbell affirmed that the United States is 
committed to providing as much information as possible so 
Japan can make the right decision.   DG Takamizawa said 
getting information has been a difficult and frustrating 
process, while noting the information security issues 
associated with the Joint Strike Fighter.  MOD has accepted 
that it will not be able to receive radar cross section (RCS) 
data on the F-35 and will try to determine why other 
countries decided to purchase the platform prior to receiving 
 
TOKYO 00000228  007 OF 007 
 
 
RCS data.  DG Takamizawa expressed concern about delivery 
timelines, indicating he had heard rumors that there were two 
to three-year delays.  ASD Gregson said it is important to 
dispel rumors and have people with accurate information 
provide Japan with an update on the current status. 
 
¶24. (U) Meeting participants: 
 
State Department 
---------------- 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Kurt Campbell 
Embassy DCM James Zumwalt 
Robert Luke, Embassy Political Minister Counselor 
Kevin Maher, EAP/J Director 
Joseph Young, Embassy Political-Military Unit Chief 
Nirav Patel, EAP Special Assistant 
Mark Tesone, EAP Special Assistant 
Simon Lee, Embassy Political Military Officer 
Dan Cintron, Embassy Political Military Officer 
 
Defense Department 
------------------ 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 
Affairs Wallace ""Chip"" Gregson 
Brig Gen William Uhle, PACOM Deputy J3 
Suzanne Basalla, OSD Director for Japan 
COL Jeffrey Wiltse, USFJ J5 
LCDR John Bradford, OSD Country Director for Japan 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--------------------------- 
North American Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto 
North American Deputy Director General Koji Tomita 
Embassy of Japan Minister Akiba 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director Funakoshi 
Senior Japan-U.S. Security Coordinator Arai 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Div. Dep. Director Okazaki 
 
Ministry of Defense 
------------------- 
Defense Policy Director General Nobushige Takamizawa 
Japan Joint Staff Policy and Plans Director MG Isobe 
Defense Policy Deputy Director General Tetsuro Kuroe 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Div. Director Serizawa 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Dep. Director Araki 
 
¶25. (U) A/S Campbell's and ASD Gregson's staff cleared this 
cable. 
ROOS