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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 SEOUL 000175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; FEBRUARY 5, 2010 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
U.S. Proposes Joint Exercises with ROK in Preparation against 
Possible Emergency in North Korea 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
U.S. Already Aware of Toyota's Accelerator Defects 
Three Years Ago 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Half of Left-wing Teachers Union Leaders Summoned by Police due to 
Their Alleged Involvement 
in Democratic Labor Party Activity 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Segye Ilbo 
Obama to Get Tough with China Currency 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Grand National Party Split by Conflicts over Sejong City Project 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
11 Senior Officials 
from Seoul City's Education Organizations Resign 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
At a February 3 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that in case of an emergency 
situation in North Korea, the U.S. may not be able to get the 
required Army ground units into the ROK in time due to the U.S.'s 
heavy commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Chosun, JoongAng, Dong-a, 
Seoul, Segye) 
 
In a related development, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Michael Mullen said that the U.S., however, will be able to send 
extra ground troops to the ROK in time after the completion of the 
proposed drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq in 2011. (Chosun, Dong-a, 
Seoul, Segye) 
 
According to an ROK diplomatic source, in his February 4 meeting 
with Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell expressed his 
surprise that his remarks that the U.S. is taking the ROK's concern 
about the planned transfer of wartime operational control seriously 
were seen as a possible review of the wartime command transfer. 
(JoongAng, Hankyoreh)  The ROKG source said that Campbell meant to 
say merely that he listened carefully to Defense Minister Kim 
Tae-young who had expressed concern over the issue earlier. 
(JoongAng) 
 
After his February 4 meeting with Unification Minister Hyun In-taek, 
Assistant Secretary Campbell said that the ROK and the U.S. have 
agreed that they will have to coordinate opinions on a possible 
inter-Korean summit and the Six-Party Talks. He said that the U.S. 
position is to support the ROK's foreign policy framework. (Dong-a, 
Hankook, Hankyoreh) 
 
On February 3, Campbell said that the main goal is resuming the 
Six-Party Talks, leading to some speculation that Washington might 
not be in favor of an inter-Korean summit prior to the North's 
return to the multilateral dialogue. (Hankook, Hankyoreh) 
 
According to a February 4 report by Japan's Asahi Shimbun, the ROK 
and North Korea agreed to the timetable of the inter-Korean summit 
during their behind-the-scenes contact in Singapore last year but 
the summit did not occur due to their disagreements over the agenda 
of the summit. (JoongAng, Seoul) 
 
According to an ROKG source, North Korea on February 4 unilaterally 
 
SEOUL 00000175  002 OF 009 
 
 
designated five regions along the eastern and western maritime 
borders with the ROK as naval firing zones. (Hankook, Seoul) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
U.S. President Barack Obama said on February 3 that he will not 
re-list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.  (Chosun, 
Hankyoreh, Segye) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-Korea: A/S Campbell visit to region 
-------------------------------------- 
Most ROK media covered Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell's February 4 meetings with Foreign 
Minister Yu Myung-hwan and Unification Minister Hyun In-taek in 
Seoul.  Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo and Left-leaning Hankyoreh 
Shinmun commented that Assistant Secretary Campbell's February 3 
remarks that the U.S. is taking the ROK's concern about the planned 
transfer of wartime operational control created a stir in the ROK. 
The newspapers quoted an ROK official as saying that, in his 
February 4 meeting with Foreign Minister Yu, Campbell expressed his 
surprise at the media coverage of his words and meant to say merely 
that he was fully aware of various opinions on the issue.  According 
to media reports, after his meeting with Unification Minister Hyun 
In-taek, Assistant Secretary Campbell said that the ROK and the U.S. 
have agreed that they will have to coordinate opinions on a possible 
inter-Korean summit and the Six-Party Talks.  Hankyoreh Shinmun 
noted that Campbell's February 3 remark that the main goal is 
resuming the Six-Party Talks sparked some speculation that the U.S. 
might not be in favor of an inter-Korean summit prior to the North's 
return to the Six-Party Talks.  The newspaper went on to say that 
that some observers see this as indicating that the ROK and the U.S. 
are trying to gain the upper hand in negotiations on the North 
Korean issue. 
 
-North Korea 
------------ 
Most ROK media covered North Korea's announcement that it will 
release U.S. religious activist Robert Park, who reportedly entered 
the country illegally in an attempt to raise awareness about 
Pyongyang's human rights abuses. According to media reports, the 
state KCNA news agency said, "The relevant organ of the DPRK (North 
Korea) decided to leniently forgive and release him, taking his 
admission and sincere repentance of his wrong doings into 
consideration." 
 
Most ROK media widely quoted U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' 
as saying at a February 3 hearing of the House Armed Services 
Committee that in case of an emergency situation in North Korea, the 
U.S. may not be able to get additional U.S. ground forces into the 
ROK in time due to the U.S.'s heavy commitment in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
Dong-a Ilbo observed in an editorial: "North Korea is attempting to 
set up a development bank to attract foreign investment and improve 
relations with the U.S. in order to circumvent international 
sanctions against the North.  However, unless North Korea gives up 
its nuclear ambitions, its economic and social turmoil will worsen 
and international sanctions will not be lifted. 
 
... Whether through an inter-Korean summit or the Six-Party Talks, 
we should make North Korea realize that it can obtain international 
assistance and cooperation from the ROK only by renouncing its 
nuclear weapons program and becoming a normal country through 
reform. 
 
-China-US: currency dispute. 
--------------------------- 
All ROK media gave prominent attention to President Barack Obama's 
 
SEOUL 00000175  003 OF 009 
 
 
remarks that he will get much tougher with China on trade rules, 
including currency rates to ensure that the U.S. is not put at a 
huge competitive disadvantage.  According to media reports, China 
dismissed these as wrongful accusations and pressure that will not 
help to solve the trade issue between the two countries. 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. 
(Dong-a Ilbo, February 5, 2010, Page 31) 
 
North Korea is in turmoil stemming from its currency revaluation of 
Nov. 30 last year.  Before the measure, the price of rice was 20 
North Korean won per kilogram, but this has gone up to 400 to 600 
won.  The value of the North's new currency has fallen from 30 won 
per U.S. dollar to 500 won.  With the number of people dying from 
hunger increasing, brawls between police and residents and murder 
are taking place. 
 
The dire situation is apparently threatening the stability of the 
communist regime, with the North Korean people calling their leader 
Kim Jong-il without the honorific title "Dear Leader."  Pyongyang 
reportedly fired its top finance official Pak Nam-ki over the 
economic debacle caused by the currency revaluation.  Such a step is 
insufficient, however, to allay the anger of the North Korean 
people.  In this sense, South Korea should raise its guard against 
the possibility of a contingency caused by the North stemming from 
its crisis and military provocations against the South to distract 
North Koreans from their troubled economy.  More than anything, 
cooperation between Seoul and Washington is needed to immediately 
respond militarily and politically to a contingency in Pyongyang. 
North Korea has made reconciliatory gestures by receiving corn from 
South Korea and proposing bilateral dialogue, yet has (also) raised 
tension by shooting artillery shells near the western inter-Korean 
maritime border. 
 
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Wednesday that if an 
emergency erupts on the Korean Peninsula, deployment of U.S. ground 
forces to South Korea will be delayed because of Washington's 
commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq.  U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State Kurt Campbell said the U.S. is taking seriously South Korean 
concerns over the transfer of wartime operational command from 
Washington to Seoul in 2012.  Yet it is unknown how seriously the 
U.S. is reviewing this.  If a problem happens in the first 60 to 70 
days after a war breaks out, this could lead to dire consequences. 
 
The North is apparently trying to overcome its economic crisis by 
securing foreign currency through wage hikes for North Korean 
workers at the Kaesong industrial complex and the resumption of 
South Korean tours to Mount Kumgang and Kaesong.  North Korea is 
attempting to set up a development bank to attract foreign 
investment and improve relations with the U.S. in order to 
circumvent international sanctions against the North.  However, 
unless North Korea gives up its nuclear ambitions, its economic and 
social turmoil will worsen and international sanctions will not be 
lifted. 
 
In the event of an inter-Korean summit, the Lee Myung-bak 
Administration must not repeat the mistake of the previous Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments.  The first two summits helped 
North Korea avert crisis without giving up its nuclear program. 
Whether through an inter-Korean summit or the Six-Party Talks, we 
should make North Korea realize that it can obtain international 
assistance and cooperation from the ROK only by renouncing its 
nuclear weapons program and becoming a normal country through 
reform.  Close cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. is also 
crucial in this process. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
 
SEOUL 00000175  004 OF 009 
 
 
WE SHOULD NOT TRADE OPCON TRANSFER ISSUE FOR (OTHER) DEMANDS FROM 
THE U.S. 
(Segye Ilbo, February 5, Page 34: Excerpts) 
 
It seems desirable to delay the planned transfer of wartime 
operational control (OPCON).   We need to reconsider transferring 
wartime operational control from the U.S. to the ROK as scheduled in 
a situation where the North has been ramping up tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula by staging nuclear tests and missile launches.  If 
the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) are withdrawn from the ROK and 
additional U.S. ground forces could not be deployed in time in case 
of an emergency situation, it will pose a grave threat to the 
security of the Korean Peninsula. 
 
However, we may have to pay for it if we overly insist on postponing 
the timing of the transfer of OPCON.  The U.S. Department of Defense 
floated the idea of the ROK's participation in the Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) system.  U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said 
yesterday that additional U.S. ground troops may not be able to 
arrive in the ROK in time in case of an emergency on the Korean 
Peninsula.  In addition, the U.S. may demand that the ROK purchase 
expensive weapons from the country. 
 
The ROKG should comprehensively review the issue of OPCON transfer 
from the perspective of security and national interest.  We should 
not give an impression (to the U.S.) that we are in such a hurry to 
delay the timing of the transfer of OPCON because this may put us in 
the position (where we have) to accept other demands from the U.S. 
The Korean Peninsula should not be a "security market" for the U.S. 
 
 
 
THERE SHOULD BE NO GIVE AND TAKE ON OPCON TRANSFER 
(Seoul Shinmun, February 5, 2010, Page 31; Excerpts) 
 
USFK's overseas deployment, the ROK's participation in the Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD), and the transfer of wartime operational 
control to the ROK are all important issues that would significantly 
change the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula.  The fact 
that the U.S. administration is publicly mentioning these issues 
almost at the same time raises speculation that Washington may have 
completed its review of its security strategy toward the Korean 
Peninsula looking forward three or four years and is now sounding 
out the ROK's intention.  To put it more directly, there is a 
suspicion that the U.S. may draw on the ROK society's concerns over 
the OPCON transfer and USFK's possible overseas deployment to 
pressure the ROK to join the BMD.  U.S. Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy Michele Flournoy's mention of "appropriate burden-sharing 
with allies" also bolsters this suspicion. 
 
No matter what intention the U.S. administration may have, the ROK's 
participation in the BMD requires an enormous (outlay of) 8 to 10 
trillion won and would likely conflict with discussions on the 
dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs and the 
establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.  In the 
sense that the ROK's participation in the BMD could immediately 
provoke North Korea and China, it is not expected to bring practical 
benefits to ROK security.  We should also take a more cautious 
approach to USFK's overseas deployment because it will change the 
nature of USFK from "deterrence against North Korea" to a "U.S. 
military stronghold in Northeast Asia."  Participation in the BMD 
also runs counter to last year's agreement between the ROKG and the 
USG that USFK's overseas deployment is a long-term task which should 
be reviewed with the ROKG's consent. 
 
The OPCON transfer should be addressed in a way that minimizes a 
security vacuum in the ROK-U.S. combined military strength.  In 
order to live up to the 60-year-old history of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance, we hope that the U.S. administration focuses on dispelling 
security concerns in some parts of the ROK society, instead of 
trying to use them. 
 
 
CHANGING SECURITY SITUATION NEEDS URGENT ATTENTION 
 
SEOUL 00000175  005 OF 009 
 
 
(Chosun Ilbo, February 5, 2010, Page 31) 
 
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told the House Armed Services 
Committee on Wednesday that U.S. ground forces may not be able to 
arrive in South Korea in time in case of an emergency in North Korea 
because of America's heavy commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
"Certainly, initially, we would be especially dependent on the Navy 
and the Air Force," he said, but added, "That's not to say they 
(Army units) wouldn't get there." 
 
According to an operational plan for such contingencies, the U.S. is 
required to dispatch 160 naval vessels, including five air craft 
carrier squadrons, 2,500 fighter planes and 690,000 Army and Marine 
troops to the Korean Peninsula within 90 days after a North Korean 
provocation escalates into a full-fledged war.  The aim is to thwart 
North Korean aggression in the early stages through overwhelming 
power.  This strategy has so far served to deter aggression by North 
Korea, but the U.S. Defense Secretary publicly admits that it would 
be difficult to deploy the required numbers. 
 
Adm. Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff who 
also spoke before the House Armed Services Committee, said, "I would 
only add that, as you look at the time line that you just described 
- end of '11, Army's out of... Iraq - it's the beginning of reset, 
really, for the Army in terms of equipment and actually training." 
That means it would be difficult to deploy large numbers of ground 
forces to the Korean Peninsula for the next two years. 
 
Veteran South Korean soldiers including former defense ministers and 
chiefs of staff have pointed out that the dismantlement of the 
Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command following the transfer of full 
(operational) control of South Korean troops to Seoul in 2012 would 
make it difficult for Washington to deploy large numbers of soldiers 
to the peninsula in an emergency. 
 
North Korea has 100,000 Special Forces troops, and 70 percent of its 
1.17 million strong army has been deployed close to the border with 
South Korea.  Long-range North Korean artillery is stationed along 
the demilitarized zone, and the North has missiles and chemical and 
biological weapons capable of hitting targets in South Korea.  It 
has also conducted two nuclear tests. Even though the South may be 
ahead of the North in terms of fighting power and economic strength, 
such attributes may prove useless in a short but intense battle 
resulting from a sudden and unexpected attack by the North. 
 
The best defense against North Korean aggression is to thwart such a 
move from the start, and the second-best option is to gauge the 
North's moves and deal with it early on by forming a line of 
resistance.  Until now, the CFC has played that role, but everything 
changes if U.S. ground forces cannot be deployed on time. 
 
Is South Korea prepared to deal with these changes to its security 
situation?  Is the South Korean public ready to accept them and 
willing to live with the heightened anxiety?  Are politicians able 
to set aside their ideological differences and come up with the best 
option for the security of their country?  And is the South Korean 
government ready to inform the public of the reality and handle the 
matter as an issue of utmost priority?  It is time for the 
government, politicians and the public to take a close look at their 
country's security situation and engage in some frank discussions. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
"I NEVER GAVE UP HOPE AND OPPORTUNITIES CAME... I HOPE NORTH KOREAN 
PEOPLE WOULD KNOW THIS." 
(Dong-a Ibo, February 5, 2010, Page 27) 
 
Lee Ae-ran, the first North Korea female defector to have received a 
Ph.D., is to receive the Award for International Women of Courage 
 
SEOUL 00000175  006 OF 009 
 
 
from the U.S. State Department. 
 
By Yoon Wan-jun 
 
Around 1981, a 17 year-old North Korean girl who very much wanted to 
study was unable to enroll in university because her family came 
from a "bad class." With the sense of loss she felt, she tried to 
take her own life by drinking insecticide. 
 
During her congratulatory remarks at the 1st International Donor 
Conference on North Korea held at the Plaza Hotel on February 4, 
Kathleen Stephens, U.S. Ambassador to Korea, told this North Korean 
girl's story. 
 
"We have breaking news. Dr. Lee Ae-ran will receive the Award for 
International Women of Courage next month for helping North Korean 
woman defectors. The State Department gives this award every year to 
ten outstanding woman leaders around the world. Secretary Hillary 
Clinton will personally hand out the award. In East Asia, Dr. Lee 
has been selected." 
 
Dr. Lee Ae-ran (46) finally went to college majoring in food 
engineering in 1985 when the North Korean authorities opened the 
doors of science and engineering colleges to those from "bad 
classes." She left North Korea in 1997 with nine members of her 
family. At the time, her husband was unable to leave. She 
strenuously studied in South Korea and earned a master's degree. 
Last year, she was the first North Korean female defector to receive 
a Ph.D. from a local university (Department of Nutritional Science 
and Food Management at Ewha Womans University). Starting next month, 
she will teach in Kyungin Women's College as a professor in the 
Department of Food Nutrition and Culinary Art. 
 
For many years, Dr. Lee has been helping with the rehabilitation 
programs for North Korean women who were divorced or have autistic 
children. Last year, she organized "Hana Women's Group" to provide 
leadership training for North Korean female defectors. And now, she 
is busy with an effort to establish a social corporation for these 
female defectors. She has been supporting college students of 
defector families with scholarships. Last year, she created a fund 
of 30 million won to provide North Korean adolescents with 100,000 
won each month for their private tuition fees. She has been 
stressing to the students, "As long as you hope, you can live." 
 
In a telephone conversation with Donga Ilbo on February 4, she said, 
"I heard that I will receive the award on March 10. I am surprised 
and grateful that the U.S. State Department has taken an interest in 
North Korean female defectors." 
 
"I hope that the news that a North Korean female defector is 
receiving an award will spread throughout North Korea. I want them 
to know that anyone can have this kind of opportunity if one 
continues to hope and work hard in a free world. If North Korean 
people change, that will be helpful to the opening of North Korea." 
 
Dr. Lee said that she had heard that Ambassador Stephens had 
recommended her but did not know that she would actually receive it. 
Last year, Dr. Lee met Secretary Clinton during her lecture at Ewha 
Womans University. She also met Robert King, Special Envoy on North 
Korean Human Rights Issues, who visited Korea last month. 
 
Her doctoral thesis is a research on the changes in North Koreans' 
diet patterns around the year 1990. This March, she will begin 
teaching at Kyungin Women's College and is now researching ways to 
globalize Korean cuisine. 
 
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: "(THE ROK, THE U.S.) SHOULD COORDINATE 
ON INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT AND SIX-PARTY TALKS" 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, February 5, 2010, Page 6) 
 
By Reporter Lee Yong-in 
 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
 
SEOUL 00000175  007 OF 009 
 
 
Kurt Campbell said after a meeting with Unification Minister Hyun 
In-taek on February 4, "The ROK and the U.S. agree that an 
inter-Korean summit and the Six-Party Talks should be sought 
together.  The core of agreement is that both nations will surely 
have to coordinate with each other in every aspect related to an 
inter-Korean summit and the Six-Party framework." 
 
Regarding the remarks by Assistant Secretary Campbell that 
emphasized coordination between the ROK and the U.S., some observers 
speculate that both nations may engage in a subtle tug of war over 
the sequence of an inter-Korean summit and the Six-Party Talks. 
Assistant Secretary Campbell also said after meeting with Deputy 
Minister Lee Yong-joon on February 3, "We support the ROK's efforts 
toward an (inter-Korean) summit," adding, "However, what is clear is 
that the necessary next step is North Korea's return to the 
Six-Party Talks." 
 
It can be viewed that, through his remarks, Assistant Secretary 
Campbell indirectly sent the ROKG a message that, at this stage, the 
focus should be placed on the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. 
Indeed, the USG is concentrating its diplomatic efforts on the 
resumption of the Six-Party Talks while postponing the excavation of 
the remains of U.S. troops killed in the Korean War and the North 
Korean National Symphony Orchestra's visit to the U.S. until after 
the Six-Party Talks restarts. 
 
During a regular briefing on February 4, Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Kim Young-sun denied any difference between the ROK and 
the U.S., saying, "There is no difference in position between both 
sides."  However, another ROKG official said, "Even if an 
inter-Korean summit is held, it would be aimed at making progress on 
the North Korean nuclear issue.  Therefore, it does not matter which 
talks comes first."  This can be interpreted in some way as meaning 
that (Seoul) will keep open the possibility of an inter-Korean 
summit before the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.  Some observers 
say that a three-day visit to the White House by Kim Tae-hyo, a 
presidential aide on foreign affairs and strategies, also aims to 
coordinate differences between the ROK and the U.S. over an 
inter-Korean summit. 
 
There is also a view that Assistant Secretary Campbell's remarks 
reveal that a leadership struggle between the ROK and the U.S. has 
finally emerged to the surface.  A foreign policy and security 
expert said on condition of anonymity, "In Washington, there is a 
mood of displeasure with the fact that the ROKG first announced 
proposals for North Korea, such as a grand bargain (package deal), 
the five-party talks, and the excavation of the remains of ROK 
soldiers." 
 
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: "THE OPCON TRANSFER WILL PROCEED AS 
SCHEDULED" 
(JoongAng Ilbo, February 5, 2010, Page 6) 
 
By Reporter Kang Chan-ho 
 
Kurt Campbell, visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, set out on February 4 to calm controversy 
over his February 3 remark that "We have heard the concerns (in the 
ROK about the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK 
military), and we take the concerns seriously."  Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Kim Young-sun said that in a meeting with Foreign 
Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Assistant Secretary Campbell expressed his 
surprise at wide media coverage of his words. 
 
Assistant Secretary Campbell reportedly said something to the effect 
that, "I meant to say that I was well aware of some of the concerns 
in the ROK over the OPCON transfer set for April in 2012, but I was 
surprised that some media outlets reported that my words hinted at 
the possibility of a delay in the OPCON transfer." 
 
According to a diplomatic source, Assistant Secretary Campbell's 
remark was intended to show that he had listened carefully to 
Defense Minister Kim Tae-young, who recently expressed his concern 
 
SEOUL 00000175  008 OF 009 
 
 
over the OPCON transfer. 
 
Prior to his visit to Seoul, Assistant Secretary Campbell reportedly 
heard the news that, in last month's seminar hosted by JoongAng 
Ilbo, Minister Kim called the OPCON transfer in 2012 the "worst 
situation" and that the (ROK) President was also concerned about it. 
 In other words, with concerns rising in the ROK, a major U.S. ally, 
Assistant Secretary Campbell intended to send a message that, as a 
friend of the ROK, he kept his ears open and "listened carefully." 
 
However, the source stressed, "Separately from his remarks, the 
position of Assistant Secretary Campbell and the U.S. is that the 
OPCON transfer will proceed as previously agreed."  The Assistant 
Secretary also reportedly told ROKG officials at a February 3 
dinner, "I am sorry (to put you to the trouble of explaining my 
remarks.)"  It is reported that Assistant Secretary Campbell, a 
former scholar, was personally negative about the early transfer of 
wartime operational control but, after assuming his position, he 
made it clear that the previous agreement between the ROK and the 
U.S. should be honored.  An ROKG official also noted, "The ROK and 
the U.S. are in the same position that, at present, there is no 
situation that changes the timetable for the OPCON transfer." 
 
Assistant Secretary Campbell's remark on February 3 that "We support 
an inter-Korean summit, but what is clear is that the essential next 
step is North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks" also caused a 
delicate stir.  This is because it raised speculation that, while 
coordinating with the U.S. over an inter-Korean summit, the ROKG may 
be discussing a "way to hold an inter-Korean summit before the 
resumption of the Six-Party Talks."  Spokesperson Kim Young-sun 
emphasized, however, "(The ROKG) believes that (Assistant Secretary 
Campbell's remark) is a message to North Korea.  It is not 
appropriate to directly link a summit to the Six-Party Talks." 
 
 
U.S. URGES JOINT DRILL FOR EMERGENCY IN N. KOREA 
(Chosun Ilbo, February 5, 2010, Front Page) 
 
By Reporter Ahn Yong-hyun 
 
The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of 
the U.S. Forces Korea are proposing to Seoul a joint military 
exercise in preparation for the collapse of the North Korean 
regime. 
 
The South Korean and U.S. militaries have almost completed an 
operational plan for what is delicately called a "sudden change" in 
the North, but they have yet to carry out a joint exercise based on 
the plan. 
 
The Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing the 
plan cautiously for fear of further angering the North, which is 
already on edge amid international sanctions and a currency reform 
gone disastrously wrong. 
 
A government source on Thursday said that, since late last year, one 
U.S. military leader after another has proposed to the Defense 
Ministry and the JCS officially or unofficially that a joint 
military exercise be staged in preparation for the "sudden change." 
 
U.S. JCS Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen reportedly made the proposal 
to his South Korean counterpart Gen. Lee Sang-eui at the bilateral 
Military Committee Meeting in Seoul in October last year.  USFK 
Commander Gen. Walter Sharp repeated the proposal to senior South 
Korean military officers in a recent meeting, according to a 
source. 
 
The ministry and the JCS urged caution but agreed there is a need 
for such an exercise.  Military authorities are considering two 
options.  The first envisages staging the drill as inconspicuously 
as possible as part of one of the existing annual joint exercises. 
The other is a drill ostensibly for humanitarian relief in case of a 
massive natural disaster in a hypothetical neighboring state. 
 
 
SEOUL 00000175  009 OF 009 
 
 
The joint contingency plan, dubbed OPLAN 5029, envisages six 
scenarios, including civil war caused by a transition of power or a 
coup after North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's death; theft and sale 
abroad of so-called weapons of mass destruction by an insurgent 
army; mass defection; massive natural disaster; and the kidnapping 
of South Korean citizens in the North.  However, this has never been 
officially confirmed. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
 
STEPHENS