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Viewing cable 10SEOUL152, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; FEBRUARY 4, 2010

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10SEOUL152 2010-02-04 08:23 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO5904
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #0152/01 0350823
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040823Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6918
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9669
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0749
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7234
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7300
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1742
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5584
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4510
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7716
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1978
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0062
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2350
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2967
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 000152 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; FEBRUARY 4, 2010 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Possibility of Engine Defects in Toyota Vehicles; 
U.S. Federal Safety Regulators to Investigate Electronic Throttle 
Control Systems in Toyotas 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Senior ROK Military Official: "N. Korea's Recent Artillery Firings 
Probably Due to Internal Power Struggle" 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union Allegedly Paid 
Membership Fees to Minor Opposition Democratic Labor Party through 
Illegal Bank Accounts 
 
Hankook Ilbo, All TVs 
Assistant Secretary Campbell: "(U.S.) Listening to Concerns from ROK 
Regarding Planned OPCON Transfer" 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Carcinogens Found in Deposits of Han and Youngsan Rivers 
 
Segye Ilbo 
Three Clinics Face Charges for Illegal Abortions 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
Foreign Minister Yu: "ROK in Discussions 
with Relevant Countries over Possible Inter-Korean Summit" 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
Visiting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Kurt Campbell said during a Feb. 3 press meeting that the 
U.S. has heard concerns raised by the ROK regarding the planned 
transfer of wartime operational control from the U.S. to the ROK and 
that it is taking them seriously. (All) 
 
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, in a Feb. 3 interview with YTN, said 
that the ROK is talking with the U.S., Japan, China and Russia over 
a possible inter-Korean summit, adding: "It is important to 
cooperate closely with these countries regarding the summit issue." 
(Hankook, Seoul) 
 
According to the Defense Ministry, North Korea has again designated 
two areas in the waters off the disputed maritime border in the 
Yellow Sea as "naval firing zones." The Defense Ministry raised the 
possibility of further provocations by the North, considering its 
recent behavior. (All) 
 
Responding to the Pentagon's latest Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR), which said that the ROK showed interest in participating in 
the U.S.'s Ballistic Missile Defense to prepare for missile attacks 
from North Korea, the ROK Military said yesterday that the QDR 
cannot be seen as Washington's official stance and that there has 
been no formal U.S. request regarding the issue. (Chosun, Dong-a, 
Hankook, Segye, Seoul) 
 
Lt. Gen. Benjamin R. Mixon, commander of the U.S. Army, Pacific, 
indicated yesterday that the U.S. is seeking to organize a 
trilateral military drill with the ROK and Japan. The ROK Defense 
Ministry, however, denied this, saying that it had no such 
discussions. (All) 
 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-A/S Campbell Visit to ROK 
 
SEOUL 00000152  002 OF 006 
 
 
-------------------------- 
All ROK media covered Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell's 
Feb. 3 press meeting in Seoul, during which he said: "We have heard 
some of the concerns mentioned by senior military and other 
officials in South Korea (regarding the planned transfer of wartime 
operational control from the U.S. to the ROK).  We take some of the 
concerns seriously."  He was further quoted as saying: "This is a 
matter for further high-level dialogue between our two countries. 
We will do nothing to undermine the security or confidence of our 
partners in South Korea." 
 
Regarding North Korea's demand for a peace treaty, Assistant 
Secretary Campbell was reported as saying: "What's most important 
right now, at the top of the list, no distractions, are the 
resumption of the Six-Party Talks and the return of North Korea to 
that framework."  He was also quoted about the possibility of an 
inter-Korean summit that (Washington) "welcomes efforts by the South 
Korean President to reach across the divide to North Korea," adding 
that the two allies are working closely together over the summit 
issue. 
 
In a related development, moderate Hankook Ilbo and Seoul Shinmun 
noted Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan's remarks during a Feb. 3 
interview with YTN, in which he said that the ROK is talking with 
the U.S., Japan, China and Russia over a possible inter-Korean 
summit, adding: "It is important to cooperate closely with these 
countries regarding the summit issue." 
 
Seoul commented that it is the first time that an ROKG official has 
confirmed that moves are underway to hold an inter-Korean summit. 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
Citing the Defense Ministry, all media reported that North Korea has 
again designated two areas in the waters off the disputed maritime 
border in the Yellow Sea as "naval firing zones."  According to 
media reports, the Defense Ministry said during a Feb. 3 meeting of 
ruling party and government officials that the two firing zones will 
be active for four days from Feb. 5-8 and that there is a 
possibility that the North may launch further provocations, 
considering its recent behavior. 
 
In a related development, right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo front-paged 
a report quoting a senior military official as saying yesterday that 
there is a strong possibility that the North's artillery fire late 
last month might have stemmed from a competition for loyalty to 
leader Kim Jong-il among military leaders.  The report went on to 
quote another military source as saying: "I believe that there is a 
serious power struggle underway in North Korea." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
OBAMA "BECKONING" ROK 
(Chosun Ilbo, February 4, Page 34: Excerpts) 
 
By Washington correspondent Lee Ha-won 
 
When high-ranking officials from the world's most powerful country 
(the U.S.) speak highly of the ROK, it seems to result from a 
strategic judgment. 
 
Amid the worsening situation in Northeast Asia, the U.S. is 
beckoning the ROK to seek help by making remarks favorable to the 
ROK.  The U.S. wants the ROK to play a helpful role in resolving the 
U.S.'s conflict with Japan and China and also in the North Korean 
issue.  In particular, (it seems that) the U.S.'s strategy is to use 
the U.S.-ROK relationship as leverage in dealing with Japan. 
 
From a broader perspective, President Obama is seeking a partner who 
will help tackle global issues.  This is why Obama in June last year 
agreed to the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance, which calls 
for global expansion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
 
SEOUL 00000152  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
This move by the U.S. provides a (good) opportunity for the ROK 
which will hold the G20 Summit in November 2010.  This will pave the 
way for the ROK to act as a "middle power" and play a bridging role 
between developed and developing countries.  This year should mark a 
turning point for the ROK to elevate its international status. 
 
 
LET'S LOOK AT U.S. MILITARY'S STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY CORRECTLY 
(Hankook Ilbo, February 4, Page 39) 
 
The Pentagon's latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which states 
the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK)'s strategic flexibility, made news 
in the ROK.  The QDR report touches on the U.S.'s mid- and long-term 
defense strategy and is submitted to the U.S. Congress.  Changing 
the USFK from forward-deployed to forward-stationed is the core of 
the U.S.'s defense reform which has been implemented since the Bush 
Administration.  The former ROK government made a basic agreement 
(with the U.S.) on this issue.  Highlighting (the USFK's strategic 
flexibility) by linking it with a transfer of wartime operational 
control (OPCON) appears to be a patriotic move.  However, this may 
lead us to disregard realistic challenges associated with strategic 
flexibility, jeopardizing our national interest. 
 
The essence of strategic flexibility is to change U.S. forces 
overseas from forward-deployed forces to available forces for global 
contingencies.  The main reason is to combat new threats from rogue 
countries and sponsors of terrorism.  However, realistic factors 
underlie (strategic flexibility.)  There is waning support at home 
and abroad for stationing U.S. forces overseas.  Moreover, the 
controversy has lingered over the USFK (in the ROK) regarding its 
status and environmental issues (related to USFK activities), 
sparking anti-U.S. sentiment.  In an effort to realign U.S. forces 
not only on the U.S. soil but also in the U.S.'s key allies such as 
Britain, Japan and the ROK, the U.S. decided to hand over wartime 
operational control to the ROK. 
 
Swamped by controversy over the transfer of wartime operational 
control, the ROK has put strategic flexibility on the back burner. 
The former ROK government championed the OPCON transfer, which 
resulted from the U.S.'s strategic change, as a move to achieve 
self-reliance.  Conservatives disregarded any potential security 
threat that may occur from strategic flexibility but only criticized 
the leftist government for imperiling security due to the OPCON 
transfer.  Leftists got the cold shoulder from the public because 
they resorted to radical slogans and violence. 
 
The USFK's strategic flexibility entails a risk that the ROK may be 
unexpectedly involved in (overseas conflicts) such as U.S.-China 
disputes over Taiwan.  Strategic flexibility also is related to the 
ROK's military sovereignty.  What we need to do is to draw a line 
between the U.S.'s role of defending the ROK and its role of serving 
as global forces.  We should not ignore challenges (associated with 
strategic flexibility) just by emphasizing the issue of OPCON 
transfer.  We should consider what is best for our national 
interest. 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: "WE TAKE THE ROK'S CONCERNS ABOUT 
OPCON TRANSFER SERIOUSLY" 
(JoongAng Ilbo, February 4, 2010, Page 4) 
 
By Reporter Kang Chan-ho 
 
As to the transfer of the wartime operational control to the ROK 
military (OPCON) in 2012, visiting U.S. Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said on February 3, "We have 
heard (some of )the concerns (mentioned by senior military and other 
officials) in South Korea.  We take (some of) the concerns 
seriously," adding, "This is a matter for (further) high-level 
dialogue between our two countries."  He said during a roundtable 
 
SEOUL 00000152  004 OF 006 
 
 
with reporters at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, "At this juncture, we 
think the most important steps will be to reassure (our partners of) 
the seriousness of our (defense) commitment to the ROK now and into 
the future." 
 
In this regard, some media outlets reported, "The ROKG conveyed 
concerns about the OPCON transfer (to the U.S.) through Assistant 
Secretary Campbell and sounded out the U.S. intention to renegotiate 
it."  However, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kim Young-sun denied 
it, saying, "The ROKG did not sound out the U.S. on the 
renegotiation of the OPCON transfer, nor did it deliver the concerns 
to Assistant Secretary Campbell.  Assistant Secretary Campbell made 
the remarks to the effect that as an ally, (the U.S.) was listening 
carefully to various opinions in Korea. " The U.S. Embassy also 
emphasized, "The position of Assistant Secretary Campbell and the 
USG is that the OPCON transfer should proceed as previously 
agreed." 
 
Assistant Secretary Campbell said, in reference to the ROK-U.S. 
coordination over an inter-Korean summit, "We could not have more 
confidence in the administration of President Lee Myung-bak," 
adding, "We have been closely consulted by the South Korean 
government on their proposals and prospects for high-level dialogue 
with the North Koreans, including the prospects and possibilities of 
a summit."  He also stressed, "We support the ROK's efforts toward a 
summit.  What is clear is that the essential next step is North 
Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks." 
 
Regarding the possibility that the Pentagon may pull some of its 
troops out of the Peninsula, he said, "Any modest flexibility would 
be, in an emergency like an earthquake elsewhere, the possibility 
for the ROK and the U.S. to deploy together outside of the Peninsula 
to be able to do those tasks together over a short period of time," 
and stressed, "This is in no way a reduction of our military 
capability on the Korean Peninsula." 
 
As to the lifting of sanctions against North Korea and the 
resumption of the Six-Party Talks after peace treaty talks, he said, 
"The American perspective is, as we say in English, 'first things 
first.'  Until North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks and 
recommits to the steps they took in 2005 (the September 19 Joint 
Statement) and 2007 (the February 13 agreement), the United States 
will not be prepared either to ease sanctions nor begin discussions 
on other issues, like an establishment of a peace regime." 
 
Asked about the impact of sanctions against North Korea, including 
those through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, he explained, 
"(The sanctions) have impeded North Korea's provocative behavior 
such as exports of weapons  and the like.  So we do think that these 
sanctions have begun to bite in North Korea." 
 
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: "WE WILL NOT DISCUSS A PEACE REGIME 
UNTIL NORTH KOREA RETURNS TO THE SIX-PARTY TALKS" 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, February 4, 2010, Page 2) 
 
By Reporter Kang Chan-ho 
 
As to the transfer of the wartime operational control to the ROK 
military (OPCON) in 2012, visiting U.S. Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said on February 3, "We have 
heard (some of )the concerns (mentioned by senior military and other 
officials) in South Korea.  We take (some of) the concerns 
seriously," adding, "This is a matter for (further) high-level 
dialogue between our two countries."  He said during a roundtable 
with reporters at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, "At this juncture, we 
think the most important steps will be to reassure (our partners of) 
the seriousness of our (defense) commitment to the ROK now and into 
the future." 
 
In this regard, some media outlets reported, "The ROKG conveyed 
concerns about the OPCON transfer (to the U.S.) through Assistant 
Secretary Campbell and sounded out the U.S. intention to renegotiate 
it."  However, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kim Young-sun denied 
 
SEOUL 00000152  005 OF 006 
 
 
it, saying, "The ROKG did not sound out the U.S. on the 
renegotiation of the OPCON transfer, nor did it deliver the concerns 
to Assistant Secretary Campbell.  Assistant Secretary Campbell made 
the remarks to the effect that as an ally, (the U.S.) was listening 
carefully to various opinions in Korea. " The U.S. Embassy also 
emphasized, "The position of Assistant Secretary Campbell and the 
USG is that the OPCON transfer should proceed as previously 
agreed." 
 
Assistant Secretary Campbell said, in reference to the ROK-U.S. 
coordination over an inter-Korean summit, "We could not have more 
confidence in the administration of President Lee Myung-bak," 
adding, "We have been closely consulted by the South Korean 
government on their proposals and prospects for high-level dialogue 
with the North Koreans, including the prospects and possibilities of 
a summit."  He also stressed, "We support the ROK's efforts toward a 
summit.  What is clear is that the essential next step is North 
Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks." 
 
Regarding the possibility that the Pentagon may pull some of its 
troops out of the Peninsula, he said, "Any modest flexibility would 
be, in an emergency like an earthquake elsewhere, the possibility 
for the ROK and the U.S. to deploy together outside of the Peninsula 
to be able to do those tasks together over a short period of time," 
and stressed, "This is in no way a reduction of our military 
capability on the Korean Peninsula." 
 
As to the lifting of sanctions against North Korea and the 
resumption of the Six-Party Talks after peace treaty talks, he said, 
"The American perspective is, as we say in English, 'first things 
first.'  Until North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks and 
recommits to the steps they took in 2005 (the September 19 Joint 
Statement) and 2007 (the February 13 agreement), the United States 
will not be prepared either to ease sanctions nor begin discussions 
on other issues, like an establishment of a peace regime." 
 
Asked about the impact of sanctions against North Korea, including 
those through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, he explained, 
"(The sanctions) have impeded North Korea's provocative behavior 
such as exports of weapons and the like.  So we do think that these 
sanctions have begun to bite in North Korea." 
 
 
CAMPBELL: "THE U.S. TAKES THE ROK'S CONCERNS ABOUT OPCON TRANSFER 
SERIOUSLY" 
(Chosun Ilbo, February 4, 2010, Page 3) 
 
By Editorial Writer Park Doo-sik 
 
As to the transfer of the wartime operational control from the U.S. 
military to the ROK military on April 17, 2012, U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell 
said on February 3, "We have heard (some of) the concerns (mentioned 
by senior military and other officials) in South Korea.  We take 
(some of) the concerns seriously."  Assistant Secretary Campbell, 
who arrived in Seoul on February 2, said during a roundtable with 
reporters at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul on the 3rd, "We will do 
nothing to undermine the security (or confidence of our partners 
here in) South Korea." 
 
He also noted, "Both of our military establishments have taken 
important steps on the path towards the OPCON transfer, and we have 
enormous confidence in the capabilities of the ROK military and the 
judgment of senior leaders here in South Korea," adding, "The most 
important steps will be to reassure our partners of the seriousness 
of our security commitment to the Korean Peninsula now and into the 
future."  In addition, he stated, "There is no desire on the part of 
the U.S. to walk away from (our commitments on) the Korean 
Peninsula."  If his remarks are put together, they mean that (the 
U.S.) will proceed with the OPCON transfer as scheduled but is 
considering various steps to reassure the ROK people that the OPCON 
transfer will not put the security of the Korean Peninsula in 
danger. 
 
 
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Regarding the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the 
Department of Defense on February 1 - in which the Pentagon said 
that the so-called "strategic flexibility" for rapid deployment of 
USFK abroad to conflict regions will be strengthened after the 
introduction of three-year, family accompanied tours by USFK in 
three or four years - Assistant Secretary Campbell said, "(Any) 
modest flexibility (that is created) has to be in the context of (a 
very secure and deep commitment on the part of the United States to) 
the security of the Korean Peninsula."  Asked about the examples of 
modest flexibility, he said, "I think the desire would be, in an 
emergency like an earthquake elsewhere, the possibility for the ROK 
and the U.S. to deploy together outside of the Peninsula to be able 
to do those tasks together over a short period of time." 
 
He said in reference to an inter-Korean summit, "We support the 
ROK's efforts toward an inter-Korean summit.  We are in close 
consultation." 
 
As to North Korea's call for peace treaty talks between the U.S. and 
North Korea, he noted, "What's most important right now, at the top 
of the list, no distractions, are the resumption of the Six-Party 
Talks and the return of North Korea to that framework,"" 
 
Assistant Secretary Campbell will meet with Foreign Minister Yu 
Myung-hwan and Unification Minister Hyun In-taek on February 4 to 
discuss the OPCON transfer, the resumption of the Six-Party Talks 
and an inter-Korean summit. 
 
 
ROKG SOUNDS OUT THE U.S. ON RENEGOTIATION OF OPCON TRANSFER 
(Kyunghyang Shinmun, February 4, Front page; Excerpts) 
 
By Reporters Park Seong-jin and Yu Shin-mo 
 
Assistant Secretary Campbell says the U.S. is taking (the ROK's 
concerns about the OPCON transfer) seriously and further high-level 
dialogue between the U.S. and the ROK is needed. 
 
The ROKG has reportedly sounded out the U.S. on engaging in 
renegotiation to delay the transfer of wartime operational control 
(OPCON) to the ROK. 
 
Assistant Secretary Campbell said that the U.S. is taking those 
concerns seriously.  Now, attention is turning to whether 
renegotiation will be held on the timing of the transfer of wartime 
operational control (OPCON), which is scheduled for April 2012. 
 
A high-ranking government official said on October 3 that the ROKG 
conveyed concerns about the OPCON transfer to the USG, which have 
been raised by conservatives, the military and senior citizens, 
adding that the U.S. is taking these concerns seriously. 
 
The ROKG expressed this position to Assistant Secretary Campbell, 
who is visiting the ROK, and sounded out the U.S. on holding a 
renegotiation to postpone the timing of the transfer of wartime 
operational control. 
 
After a meeting with Campbell, Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Yong-joon 
said that they discussed security cooperation between the ROK and 
the U.S. including the USFK issue.  He said, "We consulted on OPCON 
transfer.  For now, both countries share the same thoughts and the 
same understanding on OPCON transfer.  We have no special 
differences in opinion." 
 
(Editor's Note: The same story was also carried by Kookmin Ilbo.) 
 
 
STEPHENS