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Viewing cable 10PRETORIA290, PRETORIA INPUTS TO THE 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10PRETORIA290 2010-02-11 12:54 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXRO1658
RR RUEHDU RUEHJO
DE RUEHSA #0290/01 0421254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111254Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1192
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0009
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0543
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1071
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0010
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 6246
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1067
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 7560
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 1624
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9913
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 PRETORIA 000290 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/S, AF/RSA; G/TIP FOR STEPHANIE KRONENBURG; 
G-LAURA PENA, INL, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SF KTIP KCRM PHUM KWMN SMIG KFRD
ASEC, PREF, ELAB, KMCA 
SUBJECT: PRETORIA INPUTS TO THE 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
(TIP) REPORT -- PART 2 OF 3 
 
REF: A. STATE 02094 
     B. PRETORIA 1551 
     C. PRETORIA 2016 
     D. PRETORIA 2229 
     E. PRETORIA 2567 
     F. PRETORIA 2671 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  001.2 OF 009 
 
 
 
(Text of paragraph 9 continues from the "Part 1" cable.) 
 
In December, private security officers at a gold mine in 
Barberton rounded up and handed over to police 260 illegal 
diggers, mainly undocumented Zimbabwean and Mozambicans 
working for organized criminal syndicates.  About a third 
were young teen minors, who were mostly paid laborers but who 
in some cases were brutally coerced to work as mine robbers. 
The under-age victims were held at a police station pending a 
court hearing, but the mining company welcomed IOM assistance 
to ensure proper intervention in future by social workers and 
ILO assistance to prevent further cases of child labor. 
 
Prosecutions listed in last year's report were continuing at 
year-end 2009.  In the high profile case of accused 
Mozambican Aldina dos Santos (aka "Diana"), IOM sources 
report that the prosecution had completed its arguments, and 
witnesses had been given leave to return home. 
 
Past examples of convictions of both recruiters and employers 
of TIP victims include recruiter Amien Andrews, sentenced to 
17 years in 1996, and still in jail; and brothel boss 
Elizabeth Maswanganye, who lured women and exploited them, 
sentenced to 5 years in 2006, and still in jail. 
 
-- F.  On behalf of NPA/SOCA, the IOM and other experts from 
the academic and NGO communities continued to provide 
extensive specialized counter-trafficking training to 
officials from an array of government agencies, from law 
enforcement to immigration officers to social workers, plus 
representatives of NGOs, advocacy organizations, and the 
media.  Training material encompassed the definition of 
trafficking, as distinct from smuggling; identification 
criteria; legal frameworks; and roles of various government 
departments and community actors.  The table below summarizes 
the over 800 SAG attendees of EC-funded IOM anti-TIP 
workshops during the calendar year 2009: 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
IOM Counter-Trafficking Training Attendees 
January - December 2009 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
- Dept. of Social Development and NGOs: 175 
- South African Police Service (SAPS): 146 
- Dept. of Home Affairs / border officers: 144 
- Department of Labor: 120 
- National Prosecuting Authority: 90 
- Judicial officials: 50 
- Department of Health: 36 
- Dept. of Education: 20 
- Other various departments: 31 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Total: 812 SAG employees trained against TIP 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
These SAG attendees are in addition to 398 members of mixed 
groups of NGOs, faith-based organizations, field workers, and 
even 30 visitors from Swaziland's intersectoral task force. 
 
IOM/SAG workshops will continue through 2010, emphasizing 
coordinated responses across government agencies, NGOs, and 
Qcoordinated responses across government agencies, NGOs, and 
the public.  After an intensive five-day IOM course, 78 
representatives of SAPS (26), DSD (26), DoH (14), DHA (5) and 
other government agencies (7) were certified as TIP trainers 
by conducting onward two-day courses in their agencies. 
Advanced training was provided to 52 practitioners from SAPS 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  002.2 OF 009 
 
 
(14), DHA (8), SADOL (8), DoH (7), NGOs (6), NPA (5), DSD 
(3), and DoJ (1). IOM's curriculum is being reviewed for SAG 
accreditation in 2010 and institutionalized roll-out across 
the SAG thereafter. 
 
Susan Kreston, children's rights advocate and guest lecturer 
at the University of the Free State, gave anti-TIP training 
at USG/State-funded workshops in May and September-October, 
to about 700 attendees in seven major cities.  There were 
about 250 participants at the May annual meeting of the South 
African Professional Society on the Abuse of Children 
(SAPSAC), where TIP was the primary theme of the 2009 
conference (and will be again in 2010).  The keynote speaker 
at the SAPSAC event was author and journalist Ben Skinner, 
who visited South Africa at the same time as the G/TIP 
Ambassador during the reporting period and wrote a Time 
magazine feature about TIP in South Africa. 
 
-- G.  There was little, if any, cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation on TIP between the SAG and neighboring countries, 
although DSD and IOM did assist in victims' repatriation.  As 
noted above, initiation of regional joint efforts against TIP 
was a goal of the NPA's Inter-Sectoral Task Team, and EC 
funding was applied to enable cross-border data sharing for 
TIP monitoring.  The SAPS noted a particular focus on 
cooperation with authorities of Mozambique, the land border 
experiencing the highest traffic in contraband goods as well 
as TIP. 
 
-- H.  Neither Post nor the SAPS trafficking desk is aware of 
any extraditions by South Africa to other countries to face 
TIP charges, nor of any requests by other nations for such 
extraditions. 
 
-- I.  Post has no evidence of official SAG involvement in 
TIP or institutional tolerance of TIP.  Some individuals in 
immigration or other law enforcement areas may have corrupt 
dealings with traffickers, however, as detailed below. 
 
-- J.  Until 2009 no SAG officials were known to have been 
prosecuted for involvement in TIP.  This year, however, press 
reports indicated that DHA officials had been arrested (month 
not specified) in the 2006 "After Dark" case in Durban for 
facilitating the movement of Thai victims into South Africa. 
In two ongoing cases (one in Durban, and the other in 
Rustenberg) police officers were said to be implicated as 
complicit with trafficking consortia.  IOM reported receiving 
tip-offs from trafficking insiders who would not trust local 
police, whom they believed were collaborators with criminals. 
 Interlocutors often commented anecdotally that police 
commonly patronized brothels and were inclined to look the 
other way on TIP, while border officials were widely 
considered to accept bribes as a matter of routine. 
 
A multinational anti-TIP team at Johannesburg International 
Airport expressed frustration that corruption did occur among 
DHA immigration officials apparently bribed by traffickers to 
overlook TIP.  Given long delays in investigations and low 
likelihood of successful prosecution, punishment was limited 
Qlikelihood of successful prosecution, punishment was limited 
to dismissal of suspected employees.  Further, strong trade 
unions blocked the permanent barring of such employees from 
future airport work, raising the prospect of recycling of 
offenders. 
 
-- K.  The South African Defense Forces provided troops to 
peacekeeping units deployed abroad, primarily on the African 
continent.  While our interviewees were aware of crimes 
committed by these troops, none were TIP-related. 
 
-- L.  South Africa did have a problem of child sex tourism, 
particularly in its most popular destination of Cape Town. 
While post had no hard data on offenders, anecdotally we were 
told that client perpetrators are largely from Europe (e.g. 
UK, Germany, Holland) and even the U.S., with exploitative 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  003.2 OF 009 
 
 
activities occuring primarily in rented holiday apartments. 
The amended SOA expressly provided for the exercise of South 
Africa's laws outside its territories (extraterritoriality). 
No one to date had been prosecuted under these 
extraterritorial provisions. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Victim Protection and Assistance 
-------------------------------- 
 
10.  (Responses to paragraph 28 of Ref A.) 
 
-- A.  Recent legislation provided specific protections to 
TIP victims.  The amended SOA stipulated that TIP victims 
were not to be charged with crimes -- such as immigration 
violations or prostitution -- which were the direct result of 
their having been trafficked.  Following extensive awareness 
and sensitivity training conducted by the UNODC, IOM, and 
others, police action toward TIP victims was said to be 
gradually more in line with this policy. 
 
Both the SOA and the amended Children's Act of 2007 (yet to 
be fully implemented), committed the SAG to victims' 
assistance in terms of places of safety, medical aid, and 
legal support.  In practice, the SAG did abide by these 
commitments, although provision of these services was uneven, 
and lacking most in rural areas.  The Children's Act would 
give extra legal protection to vulnerable children, 
especially those living and working on the street, children 
with disabilities, and children affected by the HIV pandemic. 
 This Act further included a requirement for planning at 
national and provincial levels and uniform roll-out of 
services. 
 
South Africa was a strong participant in the "Towards the 
Elimination of Child Labor" (TECL) project funded by the U.S. 
Department of Labor and implemented by the IOL.  Under TECL's 
auspices, the SAG drafted a Child Labor Plan of Action (CLPA) 
comprising hundreds of measures to combat and prevent child 
labor, including in its worst forms like trafficking.  The 
TECL grant was moving forward in South Africa, but ILO would 
not know the extent of its effectiveness until a (planned) 
government report on the status of child labor provisions was 
released.  SADOL remained the lead agency and noted that many 
of the measures had been incorporated into SAG departments' 
planning.  TECL and SADOL created a second "CLPA-II" for 
2008-12 that was adopted by Cabinet in February 2009.  The 
CLPA-II was to be used as a monitoring tool whereby each SAG 
department would track its progress on a bi-monthly basis. 
SADOL was expected to compile a final report and submit it to 
Parliament at the end of March 2010. 
 
-- B.  South Africa had a wide array of care shelters for 
victims of domestic abuse, gender-based violence, rape, and 
sexual assault.  Although there were no specialized 
facilities specifically targeted to TIP victims, trafficked 
persons could access any of those other shelters.  Due to the 
extremely high prevalence of those crimes (e.g. a rape rate 
higher than any other country not at war), assistance and 
care services were well established, albeit at insufficient 
Qcare services were well established, albeit at insufficient 
capacity.  Facilities were mainly run by NGOs, faith-based 
organizations (FBOs) and community charities, in coordination 
with the Department of Social Development (DSD).  As the only 
body formally authorized by judicial authorities to refer 
crime victims to private shelters, the DSD was required 
always to be involved in each case, even though it contracted 
with private entities to furnish shelter and care.  The DSD's 
Victim Empowerment Directorate conducted a five-year review 
of its 2004 'shelter strategy,' updating accreditation 
procedures, promoting more uniform standards of care, and 
boosting direct funding to its network of service providers. 
This review is anticipated to be complete in March 2010. 
 
Foreign victims had equal access to these shelters, with 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  004.2 OF 009 
 
 
South Africans.  Shelters segregated women from men, for whom 
few facilities exist since men comprise a small fraction of 
victims.  Children under 16 years of age, who were thought to 
make up over half of TIP victims, were cared for in dedicated 
and specialized facilities, with stringent requirements on 
accompaniment and monitoring by social workers. 
 
In a 2007 State/DRL-funded project to prompt awareness and 
collaboration among care providers to TIP victims in the 
inner city of Johannesburg, local NGO Khulisa found that many 
shelters had assisted TIP victims without identifying them as 
such, i.e. addressing and healing abuse without recognizing 
signs of trafficking.  In more developed provinces like 
Gauteng and Western Cape, Khulisa found (after probing) that 
about two thirds of organizations surveyed did in fact deal 
with victims of human trafficking; this figure was 57 percent 
in Mpumalanga province bordering Mozambique and 40 percent in 
Limpopo bordering Zimbabwe. 
 
In addition to DSD's networks of affiliated private shelters, 
the SAG had established a network of Thuthuzela Care Centers 
(TCCs), essentially crisis centers to assist victims of rape 
and sexual violence.  The TCC model was an integrated 
"one-stop shop" addressing victims' medical, legal, and 
social needs, and coordinating the services of SAG 
Departments of Health, Justice, and Social Development.  TCCs 
were not shelters -- they were not designed for victims to 
stay overnight, although they could refer victims to NGOs 
that did offer shelter.  Under the leadership of NPA/SOCA, 52 
centers were due for completion by 2011 -- 23 of them funded 
by an $11.7 million contract awarded by USAID under the 
Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative, and the other 12 
by UNICEF.  The ultimate goal was a total of 80 TCCs 
nationwide.  USAID estimated in 2008 that the TCCs already 
served approximately 20 percent of all victims of rape and 
sexual offences.  Further, UNODC funding of $18 million had 
been committed to the DSD's Victim Empowerment Unit to build 
a national network of victim drop-in centers. 
 
Because TIP victims were assisted through the same channels 
as victims of other types of violence and abuse, and in many 
cases not necessarily identified as TIP victims per se, the 
SAG did not have figures for amounts spent specifically 
assisting TIP victims.  DSD officials did share their concern 
that 2009 budgets were woefully inadequate to meet the 
standards of victim assistance stipulated by the Children's 
Act and TIP Bill.  In the case of TCCs, which were 
collaborative efforts across multiple SAG departments, each 
of the partners bore the costs for the services it 
contributed -- Department of Health for medical care, 
Department of Justice for legal aid, and DSD for counseling. 
 
-- C.  As noted, the SAG did provide TIP victims with legal, 
medical, and counseling services.  All TCCs, for instance, 
were staffed by doctors, forensic nurses, social workers, and 
Qwere staffed by doctors, forensic nurses, social workers, and 
satellite NGOs providing psycho-social help.  Subcontracted 
services, such as for overnight shelter, were funded by DSD, 
albeit at tiny levels of subsidy.  (The Saartjie Baartman 
Centre said it received funding in 2008 equivalent to $100 a 
month for every child in its care, and $300 a month per adult 
woman.)  According to DSD, victims' assistance funding was 
allocated in a cascade fashion, parceled from national 
government to departments and then to provinces, where the 
funding was spent by a combination of provincial and local 
authorities.  Foreign victims often did not avail themselves 
of counseling or legal aid, instead preferring only critical 
medical services followed by repatriation at the earliest 
opportunity. 
 
-- D.  As noted, the SOA provided TIP victims with relief 
from criminal prosecution or deportation.  Foreign victims 
are allowed to remain in the country temporarily to receive 
assistance and to assist law enforcement investigations. 
 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  005.2 OF 009 
 
 
-- E.  The SAG did not provide long-term shelter or housing 
to TIP victims; its programs were meant to be emergency 
response and transitional towards reintegration to normal 
life.  An exception was the case of foreign victims who 
agreed to remain in South Africa in witness protection 
programs while awaiting the trial of their traffickers.  This 
was uncommon, since most victims wanted to return to their 
home countries as quickly as possible, and the trial wait 
could extend for several years in South Africa's very slow 
judicial process. 
 
-- F.  DSD, SAPS, and private shelters collaborated in 
attending to victims when TIP situations come to light.  A 
social worker could be approached by an escaped victim, or 
called by a church shelter; or police could rescue a victim 
in the course of a raid; or an alert call could come through 
the IOM TIP hotline.  In any of these cases, DSD and SAPS 
notified each other to enable rapid care as well as effective 
gathering of evidence and testimony.  DSD was the only agency 
then authorized to refer victims to registered private 
shelters, and to monitor their care, prepare them for court, 
and accompany them through trial and/or repatriation stages. 
DSD aimed to have social workers on call, nationwide, 24x7, 
to respond to new cases, but if a social worker could not be 
contacted the SAPS were also authorized to place victims in 
temporary overnight shelter care rather than housing them in 
police custody.  These protocols were developed by the 
NPA/SOCA-led interagency task team awaiting the enactment of 
the TIP law. 
 
-- G.  Until passage of the TIP law, TIP victims continued to 
be categorized with other victims of rape, domestic abuse, 
and gender based violence.  As a result, there were no 
available statistics of TIP victims assisted during the 
reporting period, as these numbers were subsumed within much 
larger headings.  Even after the law is passed, lack of 
recognition of trafficking victims, even among social 
workers, will contribute to the absence of statistics or even 
estimates of numbers of victims assisted. 
 
-- H.  NPA-contracted IOM training to police, immigration and 
border officials, and social workers included instruction in 
the identification of TIP victims among sex workers, 
laborers, travelers, and victims of abuse.  The Thai 
Embassy's TIP officer described how SAPS alerted the Embassy 
and IOM in advance of raiding a brothel holding suspected 
Thai victims.  With Embassy translation, IOM then conducted 
screening interviews with those persons found, in order to 
distinguish trafficking victims from voluntary prostitutes. 
 
-- I.  Historically, TIP victims were often charged with 
offenses like prostitution or immigration violations, and 
foreign victims were generally quickly deported without 
medical attention, legal assistance, or counseling care.  The 
SOA has since provided protections from prosecution of 
victims for crimes committed under TIP coercion.  Police were 
Qvictims for crimes committed under TIP coercion.  Police were 
also trained to protect rather than punish victims.  Although 
police action towards TIP victims was gradually more in line 
with this policy, IOM lamented this year that improvements 
were not uniform: arrests of victims still occurred, and in 
one case the victim was locked in the same cell with the 
alleged trafficker.  IOM's perception was that the SAPS' 
longstanding focus on deportation of undocumented migrants 
tended to overshadow attentiveness to potential TIP.  Until 
the TIP Bill became a formal law, TIP would continue to be 
seen by some as a somewhat theoretical crime. 
 
-- J.  Victims could seek legal action against traffickers, 
but despite SAG encouragement to TIP victims to do so the 
vast majority preferred to return home without pressing 
charges, according to the SAPS and NPA.  No statistic was 
available on the exact number of victims willing to testify, 
but the volume of new TIP cases opened was an indicator that 
the number was small.  Durban SAPS sources said seven victims 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  006.2 OF 009 
 
 
were in witness protection programs at year-end in Durban's 
province of Kwa Zulu Natal (KZN) alone.  South Africa's 
witness protection and child witness support programs were 
well developed and world class, but were seen as 
underutilized yet on TIP. 
 
For those victims who remained in South Africa, those who 
were citizens or otherwise entitled to work could naturally 
seek new employment while a court case was pending.  Some 
shelters offered basic trade skills training, and IOM 
provided small seed capital for repatriated adult victims to 
launch new legal livelihoods in their home countries.  In the 
case of child victims, IOM undertook the tracing of victims' 
families through its offices in countries of origin, a 
process that normally lasted a few months, while the children 
remained under DSD supervised shelter. 
 
-- K.  As noted earlier, the SAG conducted extensive 
interagency training on TIP, including procedures for victim 
identification and assistance.  IOM told TIP officer that DHA 
had requested supplemental training targeted to its consular 
officers going abroad, but Post is not aware of any cases in 
the reporting period of such assistance by South African 
diplomatic missions.  Typically repatriation of South African 
victims was mediated by the IOM in both countries. 
 
-- L.  Post was not aware of any requests for SAG assistance 
by repatriated South African victims, nor of any mechanism 
for its provision, other than through the mediation of IOM. 
 
-- M.  IOM was the main international organization assisting 
TIP victims in South Africa -- advising the SAG on policy, 
serving as a member of the NPA/SOCA's Inter-Sectoral Task 
Team on TIP, running a national TIP phone hotline, conducting 
screening interviews to identify TIP victims, directly 
facilitating the provision of shelter, and arranging returns 
of foreign nationals.  These areas of victim assistance were 
alongside the IOM's extensive training of SAG officials, 
research on TIP, development of a national curriculum, and 
production of informational materials and participation in 
awareness-raising campaigns.  IOM said its working 
relationship with NPA/SOCA, DSD, and other SAG officials was 
close, although capacity constraints within the NPA/SOCA's 
TIP unit had created a habit of dependency on outsiders (IOM, 
EC, UNODC, ILO, et al) and a frustratingly slow pace of 
progress. 
 
---------- 
Prevention 
---------- 
 
11.  (Responses to paragraph 29 of Ref A.) 
 
-- A.  The SAG, IOM, and NGOs continued national 
awareness-raising activities.  Countertrafficking posters and 
brochures in six languages were distributed in local towns 
during IOM's training workshops, publicizing the IOM's 
toll-free helpline.  The fourth annual Human Trafficking 
Awareness Week alerted the public to the TIP threat and 
promoted the IOM's TIP helpline.  Aside from community 
workshops, IOM ran a series of 'indaba' style traditional 
village counsels with tribal leaders, specifically targeting 
Qvillage counsels with tribal leaders, specifically targeting 
potential TIP victims in rural communities. 
 
Although IOM had the lead role in coordinating the SAG's 
EC-funded anti-TIP training and curriculum development, 
myriad private initiatives were also ongoing.  A Catholic 
nuns' group drafted a school curriculum.  In inner city areas 
of Johannesburg, local NGO Khulisa educated communities to 
detect trafficking and created "referral map" posters for 
citizens to contact authorities.  Khulisa also developed a 
child-friendly kit for elementary school teachers to use with 
their students.  The Alliance of Christians Against 
Trafficking (ACT) conducted scenario-based "Traffic Proof" 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  007.2 OF 009 
 
 
seminars in churches, schools, and community halls to 
sensitize audiences to signs of TIP, ending with mnemonic 
games to help the public memorize the TIP helpline number 
0800-555-9999.  World Hope South Africa taught 
train-the-trainers workshops to build outreach capacity of a 
network of NGOs. 
 
Looking ahead to South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup of football, much of the concern about potential 
TIP was focused on minors, whose schools would be closed on 
an extended holiday to reduce traffic congestion during the 
games, and who were expected to flock to game sites and 
public fan parks where they could be vulnerable to kidnap or 
exploitation.  The DSD's Victim Empowerment Directorate had 
drafted a national Child Protection Strategy, that it 
reported it had tested successfully during the 2009 
Confederations Cup (precursor to World Cup).  DSD then tasked 
each province that would host a World Cup match with writing 
its own local plan.  NGO sources said these provincial plans 
were beginning to emerge in early 2010. 
 
Civil society organizations were important partners in the 
2010 anti-TIP efforts.  In collaboration with FIFA, a 
consortium of civil society groups -- UNICEF, National 
Association of Child Care Workers (NACCW), Childline, Child 
Welfare, Nelson Mandela Children's Fund (NMCF), and others -- 
had formed to prepare plans for "child friendly spaces" 
during the soccer games.  Each of the soccer cities was 
assigned to an NGO as the lead agency to coordinate 
protection efforts (e.g. Polokwane to Childline, Soweto to 
World Vision, etc.).  Volunteers, from child care workers to 
girl guides (equivalent of U.S. girl scouts), would help to 
supervise. 
 
In December the NMCF launched the "Champions for Children 
Campaign: 2010 and Beyond" to raise awareness of risks to 
minors and promote child protection.  The publicity campaign 
would feature South Africans from all walks of life, from 
former first lady Graca Machel (Mandela's wife) to a school 
principal to a township grandmother.  Childline's 24-hour 
toll-free hotline for reporting child abuse would be 
advertised nationally before, during, and after the World Cup. 
 
In Pretoria, the Tshwane Leadership Foundation had formulated 
a plan to raise awareness throughout downtown areas, walking 
the city grid block by block to target caretakers of 
buildings, budget hotels, hair salons, taverns, and shopping 
centers.  The group was flagging suspicious activities (e.g. 
persons milling around entries to ostensibly unused 
buildings), had befriended street prostitutes for 
information, and had identified locations which could be 
dangerous for kids during the games.  In Cape Town, child 
protection NGO Molo Songololo had similarly mapped potential 
hotspots and planned to deploy social workers to watch out 
for kids.  In Durban, the YMCA and municipality planned to 
run "Y-zones" where youth could partake in sports, enroll in 
life skill classes, or get academic assistance. 
Qlife skill classes, or get academic assistance. 
 
The Salvation Army was planning to mount big-screen football 
broadcasts in churches, where teachers would also conduct 
classes over the extended school break during the games, and 
lay people were being trained to supervise kids' clubs and 
youth programs.  Having identified particular "party streets" 
where youth might fall prey to traffickers, volunteers would 
be present to keep a watchful eye, talk to youth, and try to 
keep girls and boys safe.  On January 27, the Salvation Army 
launched a new hotline number, 0800-RESCUE, to assist TIP 
victims and receive tip-offs on trafficking.  The line would 
be staffed by speakers of all 11 South African national 
languages.  Contact was possible visa phone, fax, mail, or 
mobile phone text messaging.  The number would be added to 
South African Police posters and materials. 
 
See paragraph 15 below for more detail on the plans of the 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  008.2 OF 009 
 
 
Alliance of Christians against Trafficking (ACT) to recruit 
several thousand volunteers from abroad to help protect 
children around game events. 
 
Cape Town Tourism, a SAG-funded destination marketing 
organization which also sits on a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) board for the protection of children in tourism, had 
proposed that Cape Town act as pilot site for the roll-out of 
"the Code" against child sex tourism  (detailed in paragraph 
14 below). 
 
-- B.  The SAG monitored physical flows of persons at ports 
of entry, screening for behavior patterns indicative of TIP. 
The multinational South African Immigration Liason (SAIL) 
Team at Johannesburg Airport, for example, observed and 
interviewed passengers leaving the country, alert to signs of 
TIP, such as adults traveling with children evidently not 
their own.  Other suspicious signs included one-way tickets, 
same-day ticket purchase, unaccompanied minors, ignorance of 
final destination, or travel rationales which did not appear 
to be bona fide.  TIP detection was mainly a matter of 
pattern identification over time -- e.g. a suspect traveling 
repeatedly in varied company for no clear reason in a short 
period of time.  Before boarding, flight data was mined for 
known suspects by comparing it against data bases of persons 
of concern.  Because sufficient evidence took a long time to 
collect, and prosecution of offenders was a slim prospect as 
they could switch modes of operation, the SAIL team's primary 
strategy was one of disruption of detected activity, by 
screening and offloading of suspects and their potential 
victims. 
 
-- C.  See paragraph 8B above for details of the NPA/SOCA-led 
Inter-sectoral Task Team on TIP. 
 
-- D.  The National Action Plan was a long-running effort 
that had gone through several iterations and start-overs. 
The process, (re)-launched in May, had identified need areas 
such as data collection into a central data base, improved 
border control, public awareness, national coordination, 
strategies for international events (like the World Cup), 
measures against corruption, witness protection, public 
education, and regional coordination.  In late 2009, a new 
draft was floated at a stakeholders' conference, but sources 
said it was problematic -- not grounded in or making any 
reference to provisions of the TIP Bill, not aligned to 
budget resources, and not yet syndicated to impacted 
government agencies whose support would be essential.  Member 
states of the regional South African Development Community 
(SADC) had all committed to have such plans by in place by 
2015. 
 
-- E.  Prostitution was illegal in South Africa, and so was 
the purchasing of commercial sex services.  As mentioned, 
enforcement was often lax, given the competing priorities 
generated by South Africa's exceptionally high rates of 
violent crime and overstretched policing resources.  The 
SAG's greatest deterrence effort was its continuing arrests 
and prosecutions of violators, albeit within an overburdened 
Qand prosecutions of violators, albeit within an overburdened 
and slow judicial system. 
 
-- F.  In March 2009 Cape Town Tourism held a small, focused, 
and closed-door workshop (attended by local conoff) among 
representatives of the tourism industry, government, and 
civil society, to find ways to combat sex tourism.  Further 
efforts to deter sex tourism are described in paragraph 14 
below.  Such initiatives should impact the activities of 
foreign tourists in South Africa, and also South Africans who 
might travel abroad in future. 
 
-- G.  The South African military prosecuted its own troops 
involved in sex crimes such as rape while deployed on 
peacekeeping missions abroad.  All troops involved in such 
missions received behavior and conduct training to avert 
 
PRETORIA 00000290  009.2 OF 009 
 
 
problems of sexual abuse. 
 
(Text continues with paragraph 12 in the "Part 3" cable.) 
 
GIPS