VZCZCXRO9558
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0218/01 0401005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 091004Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0141
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA FWD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000218 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO MCAP EAID SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN DDR FACING OPERATIONAL FLAWS AND FUNDING SHORTFALLS 
 
REF: 09 KHARTOUM 1086; 09 KHARTOUM 1087 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Participants from the Government of National 
Unity (GoNU), the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), the UN, and 
international donors met on February 1 and 3 seeking to rectify 
shortcomings plaguing Sudan's disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  An independent assessment of 
the DDR program completed in November found numerous shortcomings, 
including candidates for DDR not being chosen in accordance with 
agreed criteria and inability to account for numerous weapons 
collected.  In addition, difficulty adequately defining Women 
Associated with Armed Forces (WAAF) and People's Defense Forces 
(PDF) leaves the DDR program open to being overwhelmed by potential 
candidates.  However, efforts to suspend the program until 
credibility can be re-established are constrained by the risk of 
violence by previously-identified candidates grown impatient with 
delays.  Meanwhile, DDR continues to receive inadequate operational 
funding from the GoNU and GoSS, and funding for program benefits is 
drying up as donors wait to see program deficiencies addressed. 
Despite setbacks to DDR, donors remain willing to participate if 
current difficulties can be remedied.  DDR is the proverbial goose 
that laid the golden egg; and, given its value to the governments 
in both the north and the south, there is good reason to believe 
that they will at least make superficial efforts to assure its 
survival.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
Damning Assessment of DDR Program 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) An independent assessment evaluating the DDR program, 
commissioned by the United Nations Integrated DDR (UNDDR) Unit, in 
consultation with other relevant stakeholders, was published on 
November 28.  The assessment found that the process for generating 
and certifying a list of DDR candidates is deficient, and further, 
that these candidate lists were often abandoned in favor of those 
established by local commanders on a daily or weekly basis.  The 
assessment notes that this lack of a reliable listing of candidates 
facilitated the corruption of the DDR process through the entry of 
ineligible candidates into the program. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The assessment also found the National Strategic Plan, the 
guiding document of the DDR program, is insufficient to guide a 
credible program.  Among other weaknesses, the assessment found 
that this strategy document does not adequately define Women 
Associated with Armed Forces (WAAF) and People's Defense Forces 
(PFD), two amorphous groups eligible for DDR, making it impossible 
to establish solid criteria for candidature in either group.  The 
assessment also noted the lack of an agreed upon mechanism for 
monitoring the collection and management of ex-combatant's weapons 
by the SAF and the SPLA.  Finally, the assessment noted minimal 
understanding of the DDR program among participants and affected 
communities, resulting from the absence of any substantial 
information program.  Based on these concerns, in December the UN 
and donor community suspended DDR activities in order to evaluate 
DDR and implement solutions to restore credibility. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
Efforts Made to Regain Control of DDR 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) On February 1, Poloff attended a meeting of the 
newly-formed ad hoc DDR working group, tasked with developing 
weapons and candidate verification procedures.  Representatives for 
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed 
Forces (SAF) each offered to provide a revised candidate master 
list for a new DDR intake location thirty days prior to the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000218  002 OF 004 
 
 
commencement of DDR activities at that location.  The revised 
candidate master list will include candidates' name, mother's name, 
date of birth, gender, year mobilized, years of service, current 
residence, and for SAF forces only, military ID type and number. 
Verification of SPLA candidates will be conducted by cross-checking 
candidate names against payroll data.  The group also agreed that 
the SPLA and SAF would produce a weapons verification plan based on 
steps already outlined in the National Strategic Plan. 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Donors at the ad hoc meeting pressed SPLA and SAF 
representatives on the need to establish acceptable operating 
procedures for the joint military teams (JMT) charged with 
conducting candidate intake and verification.  The representative 
for the SPLA stated that it is the only party entitled to accept or 
reject a candidate for DDR.  This approach was accepted by the UN 
and donors, though it appears to limit the JMTs to a role of 
monitoring whether a candidate appears on the master list.  In a 
February 2 conversation, Sarah Douglas, DDR Officer in the UNDDR 
Unit, told Poloff that this approach is manageable because the 
master list is relatively trustworthy.  Douglas stated that the 
primary concern described by the DDR assessment is one in which 
local commanders discard the master list, substituting their own 
lists of candidates. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
Risk of Violence Limits UN's Ability to Pause Program 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite flaws in the program and a general freeze on 
current DDR activities, Douglas said the UN decided to continue 
processing approximately 8,000 candidates in Kadugli where the risk 
of violence from a suspension of DDR is especially acute.  (Note: 
In Kadugli DDR is being conducted on a unit by unit basis, and 
units are typically formed on an ethnic basis.  Jealousy and ethnic 
tensions are likely to flare if one ethnic group is perceived to 
have received preferential treatment.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Douglas said that in Rumbek the program was frozen upon 
release of the assessment, but plans exist to restart the program 
on February 15.  (Note: The population in the Rumbek area is 
overwhelmingly Agar Dinka, lessening the risk of ethnic violence. 
End Note.)  Douglas said that the need to restart the program in 
Rumbek is pressing because candidates for DDR have already been 
informed of their eligibility and could become violent if they are 
now delayed or excluded.  Rumbek will act as a pilot program for 
the new procedures developed in accordance with the assessment. 
The existing master list will be used, but candidates on that list 
will be cross-checked against SPLA payroll records. 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) In a similar vein, Douglas noted that the 18,000 
candidates who underwent disarmament and demobilization prior to 
the assessment will also receive the reintegration package despite 
corruption concerns.  Douglas noted that the reintegration program 
started recently in Blue Nile and will begin soon in Southern 
Kordofan, Lakes, and Western, Eastern and Central Equatoria. 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
Funding Concerns Continue 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Douglas stated that inadequate funding by the GoSS for the 
operational costs of the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) 
remains a major challenge, severely limiting the effectiveness and 
capacity of the SSDDRC to process candidates.  On the positive 
side, Douglas noted that, despite a general hiring freeze in the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000218  003 OF 004 
 
 
GoSS, the SSDDRC was given a waiver to hire several badly-needed 
additional staff.  In addition, though in contravention of existing 
agreements and the original intent of the donor community (Ref A), 
Canada has provided equipment to the SSDDRC, while the UN has 
provided a number of vehicles.  (Note: Pursuant to agreements 
governing DDR entered into by the GoSS, the GoNU and the UN, the 
GoSS and the GoNU is each obligated to pay the operational costs of 
the SSDDRC and Northern DDR Commission (NDDRC) respectively, while 
the UN and donors fund the program benefits received by DDR 
participants.  End Note.)  Douglas said that funding by the GoNU 
for the operational costs of the NDDRC often suffers significant 
delay, but is comparatively problem-free. 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) A rising concern is donor funding.  On February 3, Poloff 
attend a meeting of the High Level DDR Committee, in which Basil 
Massey, DDR Program Manager for the United Nations Development 
Fund, stated that currently the DDR program has only US$29 million 
remaining to provide reintegration program benefits to program 
beneficiaries.  Massey stated that without new funding, the program 
will run out of money  by the end of March.  Donors, in turn, 
stated that the program must show concrete improvement before they 
can provide additional funding. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
WAAF: Too Many, Too Confusing 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) WAAF were discussed at both the ad hoc meeting and high 
level meeting with no consensus reached on whether and how WAAF 
should be addressed by the DDR program.  At the high level meeting, 
Ambrose Kambaya, representing the SSDDRC, stated that the number of 
WAAF eligible for DDR is difficult to support, threatening to 
overwhelm the program.  He noted that he is not opposed to 
including WAAF in the program, but that the concept needs to be 
refined.  The chairman of the meeting, General Bakri Hassan Saleh, 
noted that the root of the problem in Southern Sudan is that all 
women in the south were associated with armed forces during the 
war.  There is no list or record of which woman did what.  Bakri 
noted that providing DDR benefits to some women is unfortunately 
going to disenfranchise and anger a vast number of other women who 
were equally involved.  He suggested that perhaps another approach 
or program for women is appropriate. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Processing 180,000 Candidates Not Possible 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Looking forward, Douglas stated that the agreed goal of 
processing 180,000 candidates before the end of the CPA's interim 
period is not feasible.  She stated that even working though the 
end of 2011, processing the 64,000 candidates currently submitted 
by the two parties will be a "massive accomplishment."  (Note: 
Currently 18,000 candidates have undergone disarmament and 
demobilization.  Some of these candidates have entered 
reintegration, but to date no DDR candidate has completed the 
process. End Note.) 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment: The findings of corruption and mismanagement in 
the strategic assessment represent a significant setback to DDR. 
It appears, however, that DDR donors have not given up on the idea 
of DDR, but are instead looking to address shortcomings in the 
process through increased monitoring and transparency.  Whether the 
GoNU and GoSS, and their appointed commissions, are capable of 
reigning in a process rife with possibilities for corruption 
remains to be seen.  However, with the SPLA attempting to downsize 
for budgetary reasons, and the SAF seeking to placate former 
PDF-allies, DDR is the proverbial goose that laid the golden egg, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000218  004 OF 004 
 
 
of great benefit to governments in both the north and the south. 
It therefore seems likely that they will make at least superficial 
efforts to assure its survival.  End Comment. 
WHITEHEAD