VZCZCXRO8890
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0636/01 0520659
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210659Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5731
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000636 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS AF
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN'S MATURING 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
REF: A. KABUL 501 
     ¶B. KABUL 596 
 
KABUL 00000636  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Afghanistan's long-moribund Office of the National 
Security Council (ONSC) has shown new vitality over the last 
three months by first reorganizing itself, and then by 
choreographing GIRoA's interagency response to the threat 
posed by Ammonium Nitrate-based explosives (reftel A).  Under 
the direction of a charismatic Deputy National Security 
Advisor, ONSC is asserting a role on a range of issues, 
including insurgent reintegration and drafting the National 
Threat Assessment.  These signs of life, coupled with U.K. 
and U.S. advocacy, have sparked international interest in 
support for the ONSC. Embassy Kabul and ISAF will need to 
manage this support carefully to ensure that it meets NSC's 
needs for basic technical and staff support at the 
organization's lower levels, while avoiding the sort of 
heavy-handed  mentoring that can retard organizational 
development. END SUMMARY 
 
SECRET OF ONSC'S SUCCESS: 
FINDING AND EXPLOITING BUREAUCRATIC NICHES 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  ONSC had traditionally been hampered by 
ministries' turf consciousness, poor leadership, and 
Presidential disinterest.  Second Deputy National Security 
Advisor Shaida Mohammad Abdali, a 2008 graduate of the 
National Defense University, has led the fight to make ONSC a 
more effective institution along American lines.  ONSC now 
uses a working-level &Security Operations Group8 (SOG) to 
tee up issues for a Deputies Committee (DC), which in turn 
makes decision recommendations for a ministerial-level 
Principals, Group.  The SOG and DC include international 
observers, while the Principals, Group is entirely Afghan ) 
thus, internationals are consulted while decision-making 
remains in Afghan hands. ONSC has identified and taken on 
issues that fall outside traditional ministerial lines, and 
leveraged them to create a role for itself: 
 
-- The issue of Ammonium Nitrate based explosives, for 
example, crossed bureaucratic lines between several 
ministries.  Therefore, early ISAF and U.S. Embassy attempts 
to encourage a single ministry to take the lead encountered 
difficulties. ONSC leadership, backed by international 
support, sensitized President Karzai to the threat posed by 
AN explosives, and drafted a ban the President signed (reftel 
A). 
 
-- The ONSC convened a Ministerial meeting on February 14 to 
begin drafting GIRoA,s implementation plan on insurgent 
reintegration. ONSC is well positioned to lead the Afghan 
interagency on an issue involving overlapping security, 
governance, and development equities. 
-- When ONSC drafted the National Threat Assessment, it 
included ISAF, NTM-A, UNAMA, and the U.S. and U.K embassies 
in the process.  Internationals provided helpful comments to 
the SOG and DC (inter alia, toning down 
anti-Pakistan/anti-ISI language) but otherwise stayed on the 
sidelines as Afghans managed the process. 
 
-- ONSC is now tackling a trickier bureaucratic issue ) the 
destruction of obsolete ammunition.  Afghan views differ, 
with some major players (including the Ministry of Defense) 
adamantly opposed to ammo destruction.  In this test case, 
ONSC will have to forge a bureaucratic consensus where none 
exists, and deal with a recalcitrant ministry that "owns" the 
issue in question. 
 
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND INTEREST GROW 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  These successes have prompted ISAF headquarters 
elements and NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) to 
contemplate support for ONSC, building on earlier efforts by 
the U.K Embassy and the Combined Security Transition Command, 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A).  The UK Embassy was an early advocate 
of greater donor support for the ONSC. In summer 2009, it 
proposed a project to assist the office in drafting 
Afghanistan's first National Security Strategy -- a capstone 
strategic planning document that will organize the efforts of 
Afghanistan,s security services.  The UK project will spend 
500,000 pounds over six months to provide senior ONSC 
officials with advising by UK-based security experts. 
 
KABUL 00000636  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU)  CSTC-A had supported the ONSC with four contract 
advisors since 2004.  However, in 2009 CSTC-A began to 
withdraw its support for the ONSC, reducing and eventually 
eliminating its mentoring program.  U.S. Forces 
Afghanistan,s Liaison Office to the U.S. Embassy (L/EMB), 
which managed this program on behalf of CSTC-A, advocated for 
continued support to ONSC, and led an ad hoc working group on 
ONSC support with representatives from ISAF, CSTC-A, the U.S. 
and U.K embassies.  Along with ONSC,s success in banning 
Ammonium Nitrate, the ad-hoc group catalyzed ISAF and U.S. 
Embassy interest in support for ONSC. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), 
CSTC-A,s successor organization, has taken a proactive 
approach to supporting the ONSC.  NTM-A is in the final 
stages of approving a $12 million National Security Command 
and Control Center for President Karzai, to be administered 
by ONSC and staffed by personnel from the Ministries of 
Defense and Interior and the National Directorate of 
Security.  The facility will provide President Karzai with 
real-time information on all Afghan security operations and 
crises (including natural disasters), better enabling him to 
fulfill his role as Commander-in-Chief. Partners are also 
considering additional support: 
 
-- NTM-A has assigned a military officer (LTC O-5) to support 
the ONSC and contemplates placing as many as 10 civilian 
contract advisors within the ONSC to provide a variety of 
technical assistance to staff. 
 
-- ISAF has created an O-6 (Colonel) billet for an ONSC 
advisor; this position will be staffed by a subsequent NATO 
"Flags to Post" exercise. 
 
-- NATO's office of the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) 
is considering a more active role in support to ONSC.  Though 
their efforts are undefined at present, the SCR office could 
well become the locus for ISAF support to ONSC and could draw 
on Afghanistan Cooperation Program (ACP) funds to support 
their effort. 
 
-- The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy 
(OSD(P)) may provide one or two civilian advisors to ONSC 
through its Pakistan-Afghanistan Rotation Cell (PARC), which 
plans to deploy a dozen OSD(P) civilians to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan later this year. 
 
-- Embassy Kabul has requested the creation of an FS-O1 or 
Senior Foreign Service position to advise the ONSC. The 
position will be filled by a candidate with extensive prior 
NSC experience. 
 
-- USAID is seeking continued authority to support the Office 
of the President with salary subsidies, workforce and systems 
development, and technical assistance for officials working 
within the ONSC (ref B).  This support has enabled ONSC to 
build and maintain a competent and experienced staff. 
 
REMAINING WEAKNESSES 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  The success of ONSC is still personality dependent. 
 Aside from Abdali -- and two or three key senior officials 
who were likewise trained in the U.S. and share his vision of 
a robust, American-style interagency -- this vision has no 
advocates within the Afghan bureaucracy.  One objective of 
the UK's advising project is to brainstorm options on ONSC 
with a variety of Afghans, building interest and support 
within the government for the idea of a more effective 
interagency coordination mechanism. 
 
WAY FORWARD 
----------- 
 
¶8. (SBU)  On February 3, the Embassy and ISAF agreed to 
formalize the ad hoc group,s function of organizing support 
for the ONSC.  We agreed to: 
 
-- Designate the Pol-Mil Counselor as the lead USG-point of 
contact for relations with the ONSC on policy oversight and 
administrative support to the ONSC. 
-- Augment Pol-Mil by requesting additional expertise as 
necessary for supporting the ONSC. 
-- USAID,s Office of Democracy and Governance continuing to 
support the ONSC,s capacity building. 
 
 
KABUL 00000636  003 OF 003 
 
 
We will also use the Embassy/ISAF national-level working 
group on Population Security (PSWG) to coordinate donor 
support to the ONSC, as the group already includes all of the 
key actors on ONSC support -- ISAF, the U.K. and U.S. 
Embassies, and NTM-A. 
Eikenberry