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Viewing cable 10KABUL538, Afghan Government Requests Intervention in Contract Dispute

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KABUL538 2010-02-11 12:48 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #0538/01 0421248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111248Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5548
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL 0004
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
UNCLAS KABUL 000538 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RPM, IO, EEB/TRA, S/SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A 
MONTREAL PLEASE PASS TO USMISSION ICAO 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: EAIR EAID PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: Afghan Government Requests Intervention in Contract Dispute 
with ICAO 
 
1. (SBU) This is an action request for U.S. Mission to ICAO, U.S. 
Mission to NATO and FAA.  See paragraph 8. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary: The Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation 
(MOTCA) is increasingly agitated by the performance of contractors 
working for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
While successful in auditing several Afghan airlines, contracted 
safety inspectors have made little progress in training Afghans or 
creating policies and handbooks for MOTCA, tasks specified in the 
contract agreement.  MOTCA has asked ICAO to audit the project and 
send management staff to Kabul for monitoring.  During a visit by 
FAA Acting Deputy Administrator David Grizzle, MOTCA officials asked 
the USG to intervene and urge ICAO to fulfill the conditions of its 
contract.  Rather than address MOTCA's concerns, ICAO has asked NATO 
for help in identifying new donors and expressed a desire to remove 
oversight from the Minister - effectively sidelining Afghan 
leadership of this important project.  Post requests the Department 
seek assistance from the U.S. Mission to ICAO and FAA in engaging 
the organization and putting this expensive contract back on track. 
End Summary. 
 
3. (SBU) Using donor funding, MOTCA contracts with ICAO's Technical 
Cooperation Bureau (TCB) for two projects in Afghanistan: a $16.8 
million training program for air traffic management at Kabul 
International Airport (KIA) ending June 2010 and a one-year aviation 
safety contract that cost $1.2 million and will expire in March. 
The air traffic management project supports transitioning KIA 
operations from ISAF to Afghan civilian control and creating 
professional standards at the airport. 
 
4. (SBU) These programs have been in place for two years, under the 
supervision of highly paid ($20,000/month) ICAO-employed 
international contractors.  In a November 1 letter to ICAO Project 
Manager Steve Irwin, then-Minister of Transport Hamidullah Farooqi 
complained the contractors have not executed their assigned tasks 
and instead spend most of their time at the Ministry.  He said 
contractors have only trained 16 Afghans in basic air traffic 
control, and of those, ten had already received Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA)-sponsored training.  The contractors have not 
compiled manuals, equipped the Civil Aviation Training Institute or 
purchased $5.1 million of equipment necessary for training as 
specified in the MOTCA - ICAO scope of work.  Several USG employees 
who work directly with MOTCA have confirmed the absence of these 
activities.  In the letter, Farooqi said MOTCA will not release the 
final $1.8 million due to ICAO until he receives full accounting of 
the program. 
 
5. (SBU) On December 13, Farooqi sent a letter to ICAO Secretary 
General Raymond Benjamin requesting that ICAO complete a full 
external and performance audit of the program by February 1.  A 
provision allowing such an audit is included in the contract.  ICAO 
responded January 5 that it was searching for an auditor after the 
firm it usually employs declined to take the case. (Note: This 
letter did not reach MOTCA until February 9, when Post received and 
forwarded it. End note.) 
 
6. (SBU) In a series of meetings in early February with FAA Acting 
Deputy Administrator David Grizzle, Deputy Minister of 
Transportation Raz Alami asked Grizzle to intercede in this 
sensitive matter. (Note: Following Afghan elections, Farooqi was not 
reappointed as Minister.  We expect a new Minister to be in place in 
March.)  Alami said he was hesitant to escalate the conflict 
directly due to Afghanistan's relationship with ICAO, which will 
audit its airports and aviation security. 
 
7. (SBU) Rather than addressing MOTCA's concerns and threats to 
withhold further funding, ICAO has approached NATO for assistance. 
The ICAO project manager reported February 6 that ICAO plans to ask 
NATO to help it obtain donor funding for a $100 million extension 
and expansion of the existing program -- circumventing the Afghan 
Government and its concerns.  The ICAO representative said he 
believes somebody "above" the Minister of Transportation needs to 
oversee the contract.  This contradicts USG goals to build capacity 
within MOTCA, which has so far shown proper financial management of 
this program.  NATO has consistently attempted to assist ICAO 
without taking into account feedback from MOTCA, which we also 
believe is counterproductive.  Post is working with MOTCA to form a 
Civil Aviation Working Group composed of major donors, in which this 
and other capacity building issues can be addressed.  This group is 
tentatively scheduled to meet for the first time in April. 
 
8. (SBU) Action Request: Post requests the Department ask the U.S. 
Mission to NATO to provide more information regarding NATO plans to 
support and seek funding for this program.  Post also requests the 
Department seek U.S. Mission to ICAO and FAA Headquarters to raise 
this issue at the highest levels of ICAO and remind the organization 
 
of its obligation to work through the Afghan Government and abide by 
the terms of the contract. 
 
EIKENBERRY