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R 071503Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5429
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000472 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCOR EAID AF
SUBJECT: Post London Conference Dinner with Dr. Ghani - Discussing 
Anti-Corruption Strategy and the Road to the Kabul Conference 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Ambassador Wayne hosted a dinner with Dr. Ashraf 
Ghani, who led GIRoA in drafting its final Anti-Corruption Concept 
Paper presented at the London Conference.  The attendees discussed 
the way forward for Afghanistan following the London Conference. 
Dr. Ghani responded to specific questions raised in Reftel regarding 
the implementation of the Afghan Anti-Corruption Concept Paper, 
including what milestones should be established, and steps the USG 
should take in preparation for the Kabul Conference.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 4, Ambassador Wayne hosted a dinner for Dr. 
Ashraf Ghani, with Embassy, ISAF, and UK colleagues.  Dr. Ghani said 
President Karzai asked him to head all of the preparations for the 
Kabul Conference.  Dr. Ghani indicated negotiations concerning the 
specifics of his role had not been concluded.  (Local Government 
Director Jelani Popal independently confirmed that Karzai wants 
Ghani to manage the substantive side of the Kabul Conference.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) As requested in Reftel, post is providing Dr. Ghani's 
responses to the following questions. 
 
Q1: What are the concrete steps the Afghan government intends to 
take regarding the HOO and implementation of the Anti-Corruption 
Concept Paper, and over what period of time? 
 
A:  The Afghan government is committed to complying with the London 
Communique.  According to Ghani, the GIRoA has started drafting the 
"Ferman" (decree), which would strengthen the High Office of 
Oversight (HOO), among other measures. 
 
Q2:  Will President Karzai meet the timelines set out in the 
communiqu?  What milestones are we asking them to meet in the 
run-up to Kabul? 
 
A: Presenting his own views, which are not yet cleared with the POA, 
Ghani suggested GIRoA prepare for the Kabul Conference by 
establishing a series of consecutive, 100-day rolling plans for each 
of the concept papers, including anti-corruption.  Dr. Ghani 
envisioned ten concept papers.  The first cycle of the 100-day 
rolling plans would begin in anticipation of the Kabul Conference. 
GIRoA and the international community would monitor action on the 
rolling plans and modify or update them in succeeding versions.  He 
said any support to the GIRoA in developing the plans should be in 
the form of technical professionals who currently work or have 
worked in government.   Ghani viewed the Anti-Corruption Concept 
Paper as the basis for the first anti-corruption rolling plan, with 
implementation of specified actions in the Concept Paper to take 
place over the next five years.  (Note:  Using 100 day increments 
for measuring achievement early in the process could be helpful to 
establish deliverable Afghan results while maintaining steady 
progress to satisfy the IC donors. End Note).  In terms of short- to 
medium-term actions GIRoA could take, Ghani stated efforts should 
focus on the "low-hanging fruit," or establishing goals to 
demonstrate real and immediate accomplishments to the Afghan people. 
 He indicated most of the Government's efforts should focus on the 
"five Ministries that are the strongest and control 80% of Afghan 
government expenditures." (MAIL, MOF, MRRD, MoPH and MOE). 
 
Regarding milestones the U.S. should seek from GIRoA, post will 
engage Afghan officials during the drafting of the rolling 
implementation plans and executive order(s) to assist in developing 
language to advance HOO independence, including establishment of a 
regular Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Mission (IMEM), and 
specifying how HOO leadership would be recruited and vetted. 
 
Q3:  How will [the Afghan Government] formalize the "Ad Hoc 
Monitoring Mission," i.e., its broad framework, composition 
(international or otherwise) and authority?  What are we 
recommending as the minimum requirements, and is there a line in the 
sand?  What do we recommend if they do not agree to substantial 
international participation or representation in the IMEM? 
 
A:  There appears to have been a communication gap within the Afghan 
team in London on this particular issue.  Because the Afghan team 
had not discussed the idea with President Karzai, the concept was 
diluted in the communiqu.  According to Dr. Ghani, the IMEM needs 
to be raised again with the President which he said he would do. 
 
Ambassador Wayne stressed the importance of the original concept as 
was discussed in the Anti-Corruption Concept Paper, a position the 
UK supported in informal discussions.  Post will suspend further 
action pending the outcome of the Ghani/Karzai discussions.  If 
there is no movement on this issue, the issue will be raised 
bilaterally between the USG and the POA. 
 
Q4:  How will the future director and senior staff of HOO be 
selected, in what timeframe, and how will they be insulated from the 
Executive Office? 
 
A: Informally, the UK agrees with Post's opinion that the HOO needs 
new pro-active and independent executive leadership to bring about a 
real change in management to the organization. 
 
KABUL 00000472  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Post will encourage GIRoA to consult on possible candidates to 
demonstrate Afghan commitment to strengthening the HOO.  Absent 
evidence of commitment, these issues will have to be addressed at a 
higher level. 
 
In discussing HOO independence, and Afghan commitment to 
implementing strong anti-corruption measures, Ghani admitted the IC 
wants to establish firm "lines in the sand."  In terms of "sticks," 
Ghani agreed that beyond moral persuasion, cutting off funding for 
the HOO would not have a significant impact on the Government, 
though it may be a necessary step for purposes of proper management 
of USG resources.  He suggested (protect strictly) the USG consider 
establishing conditions related to direct funding to other 
Ministries, specifically the Ministry of Finance and USG support of 
the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), or other current or 
future USG direct funding instruments. 
 
Dr. Ghani indicated that the US should avoid creating a perception 
by President Karzai that its support for anti-corruption is limited 
to using law enforcement to target key political allies.  Ghani 
suggested the USG should employ other measures to promote the 
anti-corruption agenda, for example working directly with more 
receptive ministries such as the Finance Ministry.  Finally, Ghani 
said any initiative should be viewed, to the maximum extent 
possible, as Afghan-originated rather than foreign-imposed. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a general comment by Dr. Ghani, he compared the 
opportunities ahead for the Afghan government to the Franklin 
Roosevelt Administration at the beginning of the "New Deal."  He 
concluded that in the end it was necessary to make existing programs 
work better.  He recognized however that efforts are needed to 
address the "drivers of anti-corruption" to achieve any measurable 
results. 
 
EIKENBERRY