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Viewing cable 10KABUL407, REGIONAL COMMAND EAST--BAMYAN AND BAGHLAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KABUL407 2010-02-03 04:19 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO3583
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0407/01 0340419
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030419Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5300
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0005
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000407 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: REGIONAL COMMAND EAST--BAMYAN AND BAGHLAN 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS HOST SECURITY JIRGA TO CONTROL BORDER 
VIOLENCE 
 
KABUL 00000407  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Bamyan Provincial Governor Sarabi and Baghlan 
Provincial Governor Barakzai recently co-hosted a jirga of 
approximately 50 community leaders from the border region of 
their two provinces to resolve a range of issues contributing 
to increasing violence there.  Community leaders on both 
sides of the border want the insurgency stopped and are ready 
to work with provincial authorities, security organizations, 
and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) representatives for 
this purpose.   The jirga was a critical step in resolving 
security issues in the region before they become widespread. 
Demonstrating the commitment to this stabilization process, a 
memorandum of understanding was signed by both governors and 
ANP, NDS, and PRT representatives focused on security.  End 
summary. 
 
VIOLENCE ALONG THE BAMYAN-BAGHLAN BORDER CONTINUES UNABATED 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
2.  (U)  The jirga, a decision-making assembly of male 
elders, was held in Dust-e-Safeed village, Kahmard District, 
Bamyan Province and followed an Independent Directorate of 
Local Governance-sponsored gathering in Kabul several months 
earlier, which Governor Sarabi characterized as a &failure8 
because cross-border attacks on Bamyan originating in its 
northern neighbor, Baghlan, continue unabated.  According to 
Sarabi, for example, part of the Kabul agreement called for 
establishment of three new checkpoints in Bamyan to reduce 
the violence*but two of the checkpoints have since been 
attacked twice each.  Principal jirga participants included 
heads of shuras from the Bamyan districts of Kahmard, 
Saighan, and Shibar that border Baghlan Province, Bamyan 
Afghan National Police (ANP) Chief Awaz, Baghlan National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) Chief Majeed Kkan, Mullahs 
Hafizullah and Bas Mohammad Khan (Tala-Wa-Barfak District, 
Baghlan), Mullah Ismail (Du Abe, Bamyan), Malauwi Eid 
Mohammad (Baghak, Bamyan), and Malauwi Hazardin (Ghandak, 
Bamyan). 
 
BORDER COMMUNITIES READY TO WORK WITH GIROA 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Community leaders on both sides of the border want the 
insurgency stopped and are ready to work with provincial 
authorities, security organizations, and PRTOFFs for this 
purpose.  They realize security is the key to development; 
at the same time, Afghan security officials emphasize the 
importance of community cooperation in defeating insurgents 
and criminals.  Small, standing working groups were formed 
during the jirga comprised of key leaders and government 
officials from both provinces to find ways to stop the 
violence and identify development needs that will enhance 
stability in the eyes of the border populace. 
 
4. (U) Other noteworthy recommendations by jirga participants 
included: 
 
--     Finger pointing is not productive; cross-border 
communities must communicate and cooperate. 
--     Shuras should play a stronger role in security because 
of long-standing community distrust. 
--     Mullahs and other religious leaders must be active 
participants in formal leadership structures and in security 
decisions. 
--     A professional survey team that is acceptable to all 
parties should finally resolve festering border disputes. 
--     More checkpoints should be established and manned 
jointly by ANP and local residents because the latter know 
who belongs in the local communities and who does not. 
--     Criminals must be brought to justice under the formal, 
not informal, justice system--without being able to bribe 
their way out of jail as this undermines faith in GIROA. 
SUPPORTING KIWI PRT LINES OF EFFORT 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) In support of the Afghan process above, the local 
New Zealand PRT will focus on four lines of effort in 
cooperation with its international community and GIROA 
partners: 
 
--     Key Leader Engagements.  PRTOFFs--Kiwi and interagency 
USG representatives--will visit formal and informal, positive 
and negative influencers from both sides of the border to 
explore and shape ideas discussed in the jirga.   Influential 
mullahs, elders, and Community Development Councils will be 
engaged in the Ghandak Valley, as well as Ish Pesta, Kahmard, 
 
KABUL 00000407  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
and Shibar Districts. 
 
--     Development.  The combination of PRT efforts to build 
relationships with key leaders in Shibar and eastern Kahmard 
over the past several months and realization by them that 
development is progressing in safer areas provides a unique 
opportunity:  for the first time, they are reaching out to 
GIRoA by offering cooperation and security in exchange for 
development assistance.  In response, focus communities will 
be identified to initiate development using New Zealand,s 
Small Project Funds (SPF) and CERP Quick Impact Project (QIP) 
funds.  Larger, longer term endeavors will likely be 
identified for additional programming in cooperation with the 
Afghans. 
 
--     Security.  The PRT is working closely with the ANP to 
improve existing security checkpoints and construct new ones 
in the volatile regions of Ish Pesta and Du Abe, and along 
the Ghandak Highway in the Shakari Valley.  Hardening, 
weatherization, and new equipment are required.  As further 
commitment to deepening area relationships to enhance 
security, the PRT is considering establishing a permanent 
presence in Shibar. 
 
--     Rule of law training.  In response to multiple 
requests, training in the basics of rule of law precepts for 
laymen and religious leaders is being pursued. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) The jirga was a critical step in resolving security 
issues in the region before they become widespread and 
perhaps have a negative impact on Bamyan,s viability as one 
of the provinces in RC-East nominally being considered for 
transfer of lead responsibility for security to GIRoA, a NATO 
initiative.  Significantly all the important formal and 
informal leaders of the region participated, including many 
negative influencers.  While there is genuine enthusiasm and 
support to move forward with agreed monthly meetings under 
this traditional governance construct, the situation is 
fragile.  PRTOFFs will work in partnership with GIROA to 
re-enforce the small success and momentum established via the 
jirga.  End comment. 
Eikenberry