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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 DAR ES SALAAM 000107 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E JTREADWELL; INR/RAA: FEHERENRIECH 
STATE PASS TO USAID, USTDA 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR LEGISLATURE VOTES FOR UNITY GOVERNMENT 
 
REFS: (A) Dar es Salaam 10 and previous (B) 09 Dar es Salaam 901 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000107  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
(U) 1. SUMMARY: On January 29, the unicameral Zanzibar House of 
Representatives adopted as law a bill that outlines the parameters 
of a "Government of National Unity" and calls for a popular 
referendum on the plan.  The plan eliminates the office of the 
Chief Minister and instead calls for two Vice Presidents.  The 
"senior" Vice President would be from the opposition party 
garnering the greatest number of votes (i.e. first runner-up) but have 
undefined duties, while the second VP would come from the same party as 
the President and serve as a de-facto Chief Minister.  The second VP 
would also replace the President in the event of death or 
incapacitation. Ministers would be chosen among both parties in 
proportion to their representation in Parliament.  The bill 
appoints a six-member committee (3 ruling CCM party/3 opposition 
CUF) to oversee implementation of the referendum process.  In 
theory, both parties will campaign in favor of the referendum. 
Hotly debated issues like power sharing before October 2010 
elections, or postponing the elections or extending current 
President Karume's term in any way, have been put to rest.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
(U) 2. Late January 29, Zanzibar House of Representatives Chairman 
Ali Mzee Ali (of the ruling Chama Cha Mapunduzi (CCM), translated 
from Kiswahili as "Revolutionary Party") gaveled as adopted a draft 
bill submitted by CUF Minority Whip Seif Bakhari for a Unity 
Government (informal Embassy translation of the bill as adopted 
para. 24). 
 
WHAT THE NEW LAW DOES 
-------------------- 
 
(U) 3. As a practical matter, the Unity Government Bill amends 
Zanzibar's Electoral Act to allow for a popular referendum. 
Zanzibar never before held a popular vote on matters of governance, 
not for past amendments to the Constitution, nor even for its very 
adoption nor for the Union with Tanganyika (creation of Tanzania). 
 
The bill empowers the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) to 
conduct the referendum.  It reaffirms the intent to stick to the 
planned calendar for General Elections (i.e., by October 2010).  It 
also calls on the House to vote into law (should a referendum agree 
to it) a Unity Government, and outlines what key changes to the existin 
ruling structure that would entail (see para. 4 below). 
 
UNITY GOVERNEMNT 
---------------- 
 
(U) 4. The biggest change to Zanzibar's existing government would 
be to abolish the position of Chief Minister.  Instead, there would 
be two Vice Presidents - a "First" Vice President and a "Second" 
Vice President.  The number two VP would be a de facto Chief 
Minister (and would be a position held by the same party as the 
President, likely to be CCM), while the "First VP" (likely to be 
held by CUF) would be largely ceremonial, like the current Union VP. 
Regional commissioners, while still appointed by the President, 
would be "de-politicized" and no longer have a role in the 
legislature.  Ministers would be selected among both parties in 
proportion to their representation in Parliament. 
 
COMPROMISES MADE 
---------------- 
 
(SBU) 5. Prior to the house session, CUF made loud noises about 
extending the rule of Karume, arguing that he was the only one who 
could "guarantee" implementation of any power sharing agreement 
(Karume is limited by the constitution to two five-year terms, his 
second and last term ends with the October 2010 elections).  CUF 
argued that none of the other possible CCM candidates (save "dark 
horse" contender Mohammed Aboud- ref B) were outspoken in favor of 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000107  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
power-sharing, so could not be entrusted to implement a post- 
election unity-government deal.  However, no one outside CUF- 
including Karume himself- was in favor of this idea, and it was 
dropped.  The establishment of a six-person "implementation team" 
is likely the compromise that was reached for CUF to drop that 
demand.   At the same time, CCM hardliners had argued to accept the 
"principals of reconciliation as agreed to by the parties," but 
wanted to leave the details of implementation to the next in-coming 
president.  This was the only key point that CCM eventually gave-in on. 
 
(SBU) 6. Whereas the law is vague about the implementation team, it 
is apparent from the House debate on the matter that its scope and 
mandate would be watered down from what CUF intended. 
CUF wanted "oversight" authorities for the team, endowing it with 
directive authorities across lines of bureaucracy (especially with 
the ZEC), with no less than CCM and CUF party leaders Karume and 
Seif Sharif as members and including the Chief Minister and Attorney 
General.  CCM said there were no CUF equivalents to those latter 
two positions, however.  In the end, the body will serve only an 
"advisor" role to the House, while the members will be picked by 
President Karume.  House Minority Whip Abubakar Khamis Bakary, a 
Constitutional lawyer by training (and drafter of the original 
bill), told us he would likely chair for the CUF side, while 
Constitutional Affairs and Good Governance Minister Ramadan Abdulla 
Shabaan might serve for the CCM side.  The others are unknown at 
this time,  awaiting CCM party wrangling over the deal (see paras. 
5 and 22 below). 
 
(U) 7. The issue of holding a referendum was a key compromise by 
CUF.  In Spring 2008 CCM insistence on this measure was a deal 
killer for the third and final round of peace talks between CUF and 
CCM (called "Muafaka").  Most local observers (and even moderate CCM 
members) agree that a referendum was not technically necessary to 
form a unity government.  Nonetheless, it was a position staked out 
by the CCM national party apparatus.  By honoring that requirement, 
CUF essentially "called CCM's bluff" as to whether CCM would go 
along with power sharing at all.  It also gave political cover to 
CCM moderates who could be publicly seen as supporting 
reconciliation and the CCM party line simultaneously.  Few, if any, 
doubt that a referendum will pass, especially since both party 
leaderships, having supported the referendum bill, in theory are 
committed to campaign in favor of it. 
 
(U) 8. CUF concerns that CCM might not abide by its 2008 ad 
referendum agreement on power sharing were well-founded since at 
the last hour CCM pushed CUF back from Muafaka positions both 
parties once had agreed upon.  The CCM National Executive Committee 
(NEC) had previously acquiesced to a power-sharing deal of one 
Minister (and perhaps a Regional Commissioner) seat for every five 
percent of the vote earned by any party during General Elections.  More 
recently, CUF even agreed to accept the numbers from the flawed 
2005 elections to determine proportionality.  However, this time 
around CCM insisted on sharing posts only "in proportionality to the 
constituency seats" in the House of Representatives, a further 
watering down from the original agreement.  Counting Presidential 
appointees to the House, CCM currently enjoys a two-thirds majority 
there. 
 
(U) 9. CUF fought hard to get some say in selection of local 
leaders, from the community level (called "Shehas"), through 
District Commissioners up to Regional Commissioners.  However, in 
the end CCM pushed back and upheld the status quo: All local 
leaders will remain Presidential appointees.  Meanwhile, 
eliminating Regional Commissioners from the legislature was a fig- 
leaf concession.  CCM made that move on the mainland years ago. 
 
(U) 10. Clearly, the biggest compromise was elimination of the 
Chief Minister role: CUF will not have the partnership role it 
envisioned.  Moreover, "section vi" (see para. 24 below) of the law 
further limits CUF from diverging too much from the CCM party line 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000107  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
in any "Unity Government."  Absent a shared coalition governing 
platform, any CUF Ministers in a CCM-led government would be 
statutorily bound to follow the CCM party line. 
 
HISTORIC DEBATE - AMBASSADOR'S EDITORIAL QUOTED 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
(SBU) 11. As to the atmospherics, much debate was about Zanzibar 
history and the legacy of the revolution - a Zanzibar first.  There 
seemed to be a genuine willingness by some to bury the hatchet, 
whereas several hardliners spoke vehemently about "preserving the 
revolution."  One hardline CCM legislator even went as far as to 
call for an amendment to end multiparty elections.  However, 
because almost a third of the House seats were Presidential 
appointees, an "absolute majority" of Karume loyalists within the 
House CCM ranks carried the day.  In the end, CCM's absolute 
majority leveraged key compromises from CUF.  CUF remained pragmatic an 
united and accepted almost all the changes demanded by CCM and did not 
rise to any of CCM's baiting on or off the floor.  (CUF leaders have 
told us that they believe getting their own ministries and seats at the 
cabinet for the first time since the '64 revolution is all that 
matters.  They can then increase their vote share through superior 
performance and by demonstrating that a vote for CUF is not a 
wasted vote.) 
 
(U) 12. House Chairman Ali Mzee Ali also did a masterful job of 
cajoling, threatening (and using private diplomacy outside the 
House) to engineer a unanimous voice vote (at one point he hinted 
he might do a secret ballot.)   In the end, there was cheering 
across the aisle and even some tears of joy and bewilderment.  Most 
of those in the chambers said the event was tantamount to a second 
"Revolution." 
 
(U) 13. When Mzee Ali made his intervention in the debate, 
switching from Kiswahili to English, he dramatically read a 
paragraph from Ambassador Lenhardt's recent editorial, repeating 
the words of the Ambassador, "For the sake of the people of 
Zanzibar and of all of Tanzania, let 2010 be the year of Zanzibar's 
reconciliation."  Zanzibar Affairs Specialist also noted that the 
House registrar (who maintains official documents of the House) had wit 
him copies of the Ambassador's editorial. 
 
(U) 14. A final surprise to the evening was that after gaveling 
through the Unity Bill, House Chairman Ali Mzee announced the 
creation of a co-chairperson position.  There was immediate 
wrangling between a CUF and CCM candidate, but after several 
interventions, the CUF candidate withdrew his name "in the spirit 
of reconciliation," and Thuwaida Kisasi (daughter of a prominent 
revolutionary who helped topple the Sultan) will be Zanzibar's 
first female Chair. 
 
NEXT STEPS/LIKELY CALENDAR OF EVENTS 
------------------------------------ 
 
(U) 15. The following is a rough activities calendar of upcoming 
Zanzibar political events: 
 
-- CCM Party apparatchiks will now meet and chew on the latest 
developments and work on names for the six-person "implementing 
committee" (as well as start the wrangling for a new President (and 
possible Vice President and ministerial slots). 
 
-- The "Special Committee" of the National Executive Council (NEC) 
- i.e. the Zanzibar Caucus- will meet Feb 2-3 in the margins of the 
ongoing Tanzania's Union Parliament session in Dodoma. 
 
-- The all-powerful CCM "Central Committee" (made up of Kikwete, 
Karume & former Presidents and other heavy weights), will meet Feb. 8. 
 
-- Then, the NEC will meet Feb 9-10 to take a final position on the 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000107  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
recently adopted Unity Bill. 
 
-- A 6-person "implementation panel" (3 CUF/3 CCM) will be 
convened. 
 
-- ZEC will need to get started on conducting a referendum: The 
first order of business would be to complete the Permanent Voters 
List (PVR). 
 
-- A referendum on the proposed Constitutional changes is targeted 
for May. 
 
-- Also in May, parties must declare election candidates to 
ZEC/NEC. 
 
-- Mid-June: Zanzibar House of Representatives reconvenes and 
adopts new modalities for a Unity Government (if approved by 
referendum); this must be finished by early August. 
 
-- Mid-August: Campaign season begins. 
 
(U) 16. General Elections in Zanzibar and the mainland are still 
anticipated by October 2010. (Note: A simple majority vote in the 
House could postpone elections until end of the year without any 
special mechanism -like in 2005 when the Vice President died- but 
neither party currently wants this) 
 
WHO WILL VOTE? 
-------------- 
 
(SBU) 17. Questions remain on how ZEC will set up the referendum 
and whether that and the subsequent General Election will be free 
and fair.  The first round of voter I.D. has been completed already, 
but the second round has been delayed by ZEC "for technical 
reasons."  Most believe that it was paused to await an outcome to 
the Unity Government debate. The controversial issue of the use of 
the Zanzibar I.D. card as the main criterion for voting remains 
(ZanIDs heretofore have been seen to be issued along partisan lines 
by the ruling CCM party). 
 
(SBU) 18. Up to now, opposition CUF has been saying that as much as 
40 percent of eligible Zanzibaris have been sidelined from the 
registration process, particularly in the northern Pemba Island 
areas that constitutes CUF's stronghold, the first place scheduled 
for the next round of voter registration.  Meanwhile, CUF itself 
had heretofore been boycotting the registration process. 
 
UNION REDLINES? 
--------------- 
 
(SBU) 19. At a January 25 meeting with the Ambassador on a 
different topic, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Membe brought up the 
subject of Zanzibar.  The view of the Union Government was that it 
could accept a Zanzibar Constitutional change to allow some form of 
power sharing, but it was dead-set against any extension of 
Karume's mandate or change to the General Electoral calendar. 
Membe's chief concern with the calendar was that it could not 
conflict with CCM party elections, expected in 2013.  At the end, 
Membe said "We are ready to accept any pro-union party." The French 
Ambassador reported a similar conversation with the Foreign 
Minister around the same time frame. 
 
(SBU) 20. A friend of the Embassy on the NEC, a Zanzibari in the 
Union government close to Kikwete, said he was generally satisfied 
with the turn of events.  The main thing for him was that the 
electoral calendar would likely be unchanged and the legislative 
framework for a unity government would already be in place for a 
new (CCM) Zanzibar President to implement.  Our friend said that 
focus should be on the replacement for Karume.  A good-faith 
candidate would implement reconciliation "in spirit," regardless of 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000107  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
whatever specific details of power-sharing were being haggled over 
now. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
(SBU) 21. There remain several unanswered questions, the most 
salient of which might be: why would CUF accept a deal that 
preemptively assumes a CCM victory in the next elections, and, 
having done so, why would CUF agree to such a minor role in the 
next CCM-led government?  "One Minister is more than we have ever 
had," a senior Pemban CUF leader told Zanzibar Affairs Officer (the 
"we" in that sentence referring both to CUF and to the marginalized 
second island of Zanzibar, Pemba - a CUF stronghold).  Another 
reason is that many are tired of the violence.  Absent a deal of 
any kind, few had any doubts that the 2010 elections would be 
bloody (they still might be, if expectations rise too high and 
things go wrong).  Nonetheless, many still question the motives of 
CUF leader Seif Sharif Hamad, and wonder what the "deal inside the 
deal" might be.  All that notwithstanding, CUF took big risks while 
negotiating from a very weak position.  CUF rank and file feel like 
their 15-year struggle for recognition has been validated.  It is 
all smiles in the CUF camp for now. 
 
(SBU) 22. Except for President Kikwete, who has expressed support 
for reconciliation, most national CCM leaders (like the Prime 
Minster responding to a direct question in Parliament January 28) 
have deferred public pronouncement, saying "it's a Zanzibar 
matter."  This is likely an effort not to prejudge upcoming closed- 
door CCM talks (see para. 15 above).  The CCM intra-party debate 
may prove to be white-hot.  Many CCM hardliners (especially those 
on the main island of Unguja and on the mainland who might not 
appreciate the volatile situation on Pemba) continue to grumble 
about why CCM would want to give up anything at all if it did not 
have to.  The mood in CCM for now is a curmudgeonly "harrumph!" 
The ambitious ones in the party are watching the powerful faction 
leaders and waiting to dog pile onto any emerging consensus in hope 
of party rewards. 
 
(SBU) 23. In the dusty lanes and narrow alleys of Zanzibar, most 
people are oblivious to recent events or confused as to what is 
actually happening.  The unity deal has not been fully explained by 
the media.  The politically savvy instantly see the compromises 
made and, fearing abuses, worry about the ambiguities of the 
agreement where power politics will come into play.  They remain 
skeptical but have no other alternatives for now.  The vast 
majority of Zanzibaris are in survival-hibernation mode since the 
main island continues to suffer through a 100 percent collapse of 
the power grid since early December.  Meanwhile, government 
technocrats are scrambling to put electoral structures into place. 
Registration of Voters could begin in late February. The first 
location for the second round of voter screening will be in Konde, 
Northern Pemba, scene of a near riot just last summer.  The 
beginning of the second round of voter ID will be the first real 
test of "reconciliation." 
 
TEXT OF UNITY GOVERNMENT BILL, AS ADOPTED: 
 
(U) 24. Begin text of Zanzibar Unity Government Bill, as adopted: 
 
Having deliberated on a Private Motion tabled by Hon. Abubakar 
Khamis Bakary, the Representative of Mgogoni, Pemba, the House of 
Representatives resolves to accept some of its submissions and 
amend others.  Here below is the resolution by the House of 
Representatives: 
 
(i) The House of Representatives commends reconciliation talks 
between the President of Zanzibar, Chairman of the Revolutionary 
Council and Vice Chairman of CCM- Zanzibar, Dr. Amani Abeid Karume 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000107  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
and Secretary General of CUF Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad held on 
November 5th 2009. 
 
(ii)  Principally, the House accepts that there is a need for 
conducting a referendum to directly solicit citizen consent to the 
proposal for the establishment of the Government of National Unity 
in Zanzibar and in determining its structure. 
 
(iii) The proposed structure is that of having an Executive 
President who shall be a person who has won the most votes in the 
Presidential Election, assisted by two Vice Presidents. The first 
Vice President shall be appointed from a Political Party attaining 
the second position in the presidential election. The Second Vice 
President shall come from the party of the President and shall 
serve as the government's leader in the House of Representatives, 
and he/she shall be the one taking over the Presidency upon the 
occurrence of an unfortunate event. 
 
(iv) The House of Representatives agrees that under this structure, 
the President shall appoint Ministers from among Members of the 
House of Representatives in proportionality to the constituency 
seats their political parties hold in the House of Representatives. 
 
(v) The House of Representatives emphasizes that the formulated 
Government of National Unity shall respect and value the principles 
of the January 12th, 1964 Revolution of Zanzibar. 
 
(vi) The House accepts that the President shall have a 
constitutional authority to reprimand any person within the 
government of national unity who will be seen/found to be 
deliberately frustrating efficient and effective execution of the 
functions of the Government. 
 
(vii) As soon as possible, the Government should submit to the 
House of Representative a proposed Bill for the Amendment of the 
Zanzibar Electoral Act (No. 11 of 1984), with a view to put in 
place procedures, terms and conditions for conducting a referendum, 
as well as giving the Zanzibar Electoral Commission mandate to 
supervise and conduct a referendum on important issues that require 
people's consent or decision. 
 
(viii) If the people of Zanzibar through the referendum consent to 
the formulation of the Government of National Unity, the Government 
should prepare and present to the House of Representatives a Bill 
for the Amendment of the Constitution of Zanzibar to align it with 
peoples' decision/wishes. The amendment shall focus on articles of 
constitution that will need to be changed to accommodate the new 
form of government, including articles 9, 39 and 42. 
 
(ix) The House of Representatives resolves to take Regional 
Commissioners out of politics (i.e. they shall not be members of 
the House of Representatives) and that they shall be appointed by 
the President at his/her own discretion. 
 
(x) The House of Representatives agrees that the procedure for the 
appointment of District Commissioners should remain as it is at the 
moment. 
 
(xi) The House of Representatives approves the formulation of a six 
member committee - three from the Government and three from the 
opposition- to oversee the implementation of this resolution to its 
completion. 
 
(xii) The amendment of the Election Act, the referendum soliciting 
people's consent, and Constitutional amendment should the people 
approve the formulation of the Government of a National Unity, 
should be done before the 2010 general election. 
 
LENHARDT