VZCZCXRO4800
RR RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0107/01 0340534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030534Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6453
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, DRL/ILCSR - MORGAN, G/TIP - CDEBACA 
STATE PASS USTR FRANCESCKI/GROVES 
STATE PASS USAID BEVER/LAUDATO/SCOTT 
DOL/ILAB FOR STROTKAMP/RIGBY/MCCARTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB EIND ETRD KTIP PHUM SOCI USAID ECON PGOV LE
SUBJECT:  INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR DOL 
CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS - LEBANON 
 
REF: A. STATE 131995 
 ¶B. 09 BEIRUT 65 
 ¶C. 09 BEIRUT 435 
 
 
1/TVPRA: FORCED LABOR AND EXPLOITATIVE 
CHILD LABOR IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
1A. (SBU) As noted in the 2009 TVPRA report, tobacco was the only 
good in Lebanon whose production was documented to include child 
labor.  However, no tobacco from Lebanon was exported, according to 
the regional office of the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
 
1B. (SBU) In addition, the ILO regional office noted that the 
presence of children on tobacco plantations was not exploitation. 
Tobacco farms -- mainly located in the south, and some in the 
eastern Bekaa region -- were family businesses in which all family 
members participated and faced similar hazardous conditions. 
Children were mainly involved in the harvesting of tobacco leaves, 
the hazards of which involved the use of needles, threads, and 
steelheads to string the tobacco to dry. 
 
1C. (SBU) Post's information comes from meetings in late 2009 and 
early 2010 with ILO, Ministry of Education (MOE), and Ministry of 
Labor (MOL) representatives, as well as conversations with 
non-governmental organizations active in combating child labor. 
 
1D. (SBU) According to a 2007 ILO report, the majority of the 
working children in tobacco cultivation were 12-15 years old, 
although some fell in the 9-12 years age range.  As of January 2010, 
the ILO had not updated its 2007 figures. 
 
1E. (SBU) According to a 2007 ILO report, the production of tobacco 
involved around 25,000 child laborers aged 7-17 years old.  As of 
January 2010, the ILO had not updated its 2007 figures. 
 
1F. (SBU) Post obtained conflicting reports on tobacco child 
laborers, school attendance, and GOL efforts to combat child labor 
in tobacco.  The ILO noted that during the tobacco harvesting 
season, school hours were adjusted in coordination with the MOE to 
allow children to work in the fields to prevent dropouts.  In 
addition, the vice president of a prominent NGO based in the south, 
the Association for the Development of Rural Capacities (ADR), told 
us that during the harvesting season schools were empty and the MOE 
unofficially condoned absences.  However, a senior MOE official 
denied that public schools adjusted their teaching hours for any 
reason.  Until the GOL finds an alternative livelihood for families 
dependent on tobacco production and musters the political will to 
address the issue (the GOL's Regie des Tabacs et Tombacs buys all 
tobacco production at subsidized prices), child labor in the tobacco 
sector will remain problematic, Embassy contacts opined. 
 
(SBU) The ILO noted that in early 2009, a prominent multinational 
corporation provided tobacco farmers free machines that 
automatically align tobacco leaves and thread them, a process 
normally done by children.  These machines had eliminated many of 
the hazards for children and decreased the number of children in the 
fields in 2009, ILO representatives said.  After the success of this 
project, the company was looking into raising enough funds to 
provide these machines to all tobacco farmers. 
 
(SBU) In addition, ADR in collaboration with the Spanish government 
ran a 3-year program (2006-2009) that provided remedial classes and 
extra-curricular activities on holidays to children from 12 
different schools working in tobacco plantations in order to help 
them make up absences from the production season.  ADR also actively 
encouraged families in southern Lebanon to switch from tobacco to 
more profitable alternative crops, such as medicinal plants, thyme, 
and olive trees. 
 
 
TASKING 2/TDA 
 
2A: PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF EXPLOITATIVE CHILD LABOR 
---------------------------------------- 
 
(SBU) In 2009, child labor in Lebanon was predominantly concentrated 
in informal sectors of the economy, including small family 
businesses, mechanical workshops, carpentry, construction, welding, 
agriculture, and fisheries.  According to the ILO, an increasing 
number of children were involved in the drug trade, prostitution, 
domestic work (mainly in north Lebanon), and street vending 
 
BEIRUT 00000107  002 OF 006 
 
 
(especially Syrians and Roma selling flowers in restaurants, 
primarily in Tripoli).  ILO representatives noted that Lebanon was 
becoming a transit hub for the trafficking of women from Eastern 
Europe, some of them children, to work as prostitutes in Gulf 
countries, but the ILO lacked figures about the prevalence of this 
practice. 
 
(SBU) Up-to-date figures on child labor in Lebanon in 2009 were 
unavailable.  The ILO noted that its longstanding estimate of 
100,000 child laborers -- commonly cited in literature and by the 
GOL -- was no longer accurate.  Anecdotal evidence suggested the 
number of child workers had risen in 2009 and their distribution 
among sectors had changed, with fewer children working in tobacco 
production and more in the hidden services sector, such as 
prostitution.  The ILO said worsening economic conditions had forced 
parents to remove their children from schools and put them to work 
to provide extra income for the family.  As of January 2010, the ILO 
was working with a private research institute to update its child 
labor figures. 
 
(SBU) The Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), in 
collaboration with the ILO, planned to conduct a labor force survey, 
but the approval of the prime minister had been pending since May 
¶2009.  CAS, in collaboration with UNICEF, recently finished the 
fieldwork for its Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS3), which 
will include a section on child labor, and planned to publish its 
results in the coming months. 
 
2B: LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
------------------------ 
 
(SBU) As of January 2010, new legislation and amendments to current 
laws to bring Lebanon into conformity with UN Convention 182, 
including new provisions on child labor within the Labor Law and 
adopting the list of "worst forms of child labor," were still 
pending cabinet approval and ratification. 
 
(SBU) Although a draft law raising compulsory education from 12 to 
15, in compliance with UN Convention 138, was still pending in 
parliament at year's end, the ILO and MOE expected parliament would 
soon approve it.  Although raising mandatory schooling ages would 
help reduce dropouts, the ILO questioned whether the GOL had 
sufficient administrative capacity to enforce the proposed law, and 
it was unclear if the schools had the capacity to absorb the 
additional students.  In principle, public education was free, but 
families were required to pay registration and other miscellaneous 
school expenses. 
 
(SBU) In 2009, the Higher Council for Childhood (HCC), part of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), was working with UNICEF Lebanon, 
Save the Children Sweden, and World Vision Lebanon on a Child 
Protection Law to further develop Law 422 on the protection of 
children.  Meanwhile, in 2009 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) submitted a draft law on trafficking to the Ministry of 
Justice that was still pending approval in the cabinet at year's 
end. 
 
2C: INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
(SBU) According to the MOL, most accounts of child labor in 2009 
related to hazardous child labor, not forced child labor. 
Representatives of the MOL Child Labor Unit explained that the GOL 
does not differentiate between hazardous and forced child labor 
since the two conditions were difficult to distinguish on the 
ground.  Therefore, we will respond to questions 1-14 jointly, 
unless noted otherwise. 
 
¶1. (SBU) The MOL, via its Child Labor Unit, and the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI), via the Internal Security Forces (ISF), were 
responsible for the enforcement of laws related to hazardous child 
labor and forced labor. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In 2009, there were minimal mechanisms for exchanging 
information between the MOL and MOI.  The MOL expected coordination 
to improve following the adoption, expected in February 2010, of a 
joint monitoring system at the MOL to coordinate nationwide efforts 
on child labor.  (Note: See part 2E for details on the monitoring 
system.  End note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) There was no formal mechanism for submitting complaints 
about child labor violations, but the MOL received informal 
complaints in 2009.  MOL inspectors could enter formal sector 
workplaces based on a complaint, but they also conducted routine 
 
BEIRUT 00000107  003 OF 006 
 
 
workplace inspections.  According to the MOL, inspectors could only 
investigate alleged cases of child labor in the informal sector 
following a complaint.  In such cases, MOL inspectors would summon 
the suspected informal sector employer to the ministry to discuss 
the complaint.  For complaints regarding tobacco farms, which fall 
in the informal sector, MOL inspectors could inspect the farm itself 
if the employer ignored the MOL request to meet.  For complaints 
regarding child labor/forced labor in homes, however, MOL inspectors 
lacked a mandate to enter homes to continue investigations.  The 
MOSA's social workers could enter informal places of work where 
child labor was suspected, but they were only empowered to assess 
the overall welfare of the family entity, not the working conditions 
of individuals, including children. 
 
¶4. (SBU) MOL inspectors received their regular salaries, in addition 
to transportation allowances, compensatory time, and compensation 
for each inspection made.  According to the ILO, salaries were low 
and inspectors lacked the facilities and financial and technical 
support to properly perform their duties. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In 2009, the MOL employed approximately 130 labor 
inspectors and assistant inspectors.  The MOL admitted that the 
number of inspectors was inadequate. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The GOL does not maintain statistics on the number of 
inspections carried out by the MOL. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GOL does not maintain statistics of the number of 
children who were removed or assisted as a result of inspections. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The ISF must report all cases in which protection was 
requested for juveniles -- whether as accused, victims or witnesses 
-- to the Directorate of Juveniles at the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), 
according to a memorandum between the Internal Security Forces (ISF) 
and MOJ.  The head of the MOJ directorate, who lacked any 
information about child labor court cases, noted that most ISF 
officers were unaware of the requirements or lacked clarity 
regarding what information they were required to report.  In 
addition, the MOJ noted that any data on legal cases would be 
inaccurate since some cases involving child labor inspections were 
solved administratively or via warnings instead of entering the 
court system. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Neither the MOL nor MOJ maintained figures or estimates 
about the number of child labor cases that were closed in 2009. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Neither the MOL nor MOJ maintained figures or estimates 
about the number of child labor violations or convictions achieved 
in 2009. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Since neither the MOL nor MOJ maintained figures or 
estimates about the number of child labor cases that were closed or 
opened in 2009, no information on the average length of each case 
was available. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Since neither the MOL nor MOJ maintained figures or 
estimates about the number of child labor cases that were closed or 
opened in 2009, no information about penalties applied in 2009 was 
available. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The GOL lacked resources to effectively combat child labor 
in 2009, but official interlocutors expressed a commitment to combat 
child labor within the resources available and to improve the 
legislative framework to more effectively address child labor 
violations.  In particular, GOL interlocutors expected more progress 
following the establishment of a monitoring system for child labor 
based at the MOL.  (Note: Please refer to part 2E for details on the 
monitoring system.  End note.)  The ILO also noted the MOL's 
commitment to combat child labor in 2010. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The ILO provided ongoing training on best practices for 
MOL labor inspectors in 2009. 
 
2D: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS 
FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
(SBU) The GOL lacked detailed information on child trafficking, 
commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC), or the use of 
children in illicit activities.  As of January 2010, World Vision 
was finalizing an assessment of child trafficking in Lebanon.  The 
HCC noted that Lebanon -- still in the primary stages of addressing 
child trafficking -- was focused on awareness more than enforcement 
and therefore had no record of convictions.  Because of these 
 
BEIRUT 00000107  004 OF 006 
 
 
factors, we received only merged data -- when data existed -- on the 
three categories.  Therefore, we will answer questions 1-13 jointly 
for all three categories, unless noted otherwise. 
 
¶1. (SBU) The HCC, ISF, MOJ, and MOL were jointly charged with 
enforcement of child trafficking, CSEC, and the use of children in 
illicit activities.  There were no figures in 2009 on the number of 
people responsible for and dedicated to related investigations.  The 
HCC had a full-time staff of seven coordinators and 22 outsourced 
social workers.  MOL employed approximately 130 labor inspectors and 
assistant inspectors.  None of the ISF's 23,000 officers focus 
specifically on child trafficking, CSEC, or the use of children in 
illicit activities, according to the HCC. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Because no trafficking law existed 2009, information was 
unavailable regarding funding for trafficking investigation 
activities. 
 
¶3. (SBU) No mechanism existed in 2009 to report violations.  The 
HCC, in collaboration with Save the Children and UNICEF, was working 
on establishing a hotline, but the secretary general of the HCC said 
the project -- still in its primary stages -- lacked a projected a 
time frame for completion. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Because no laws in 2009 specifically included child 
trafficking, CSEC, or the use of children in illicit activities, no 
data on arrests or prosecutions on these charges existed.  If those 
accused of these offenses were prosecuted, charges were listed under 
prostitution, rape, withholding a passport, or similar crimes.  The 
MOJ's Directorate of Juveniles published online the partial data 
that it had collected.  The figures for preliminary investigations 
during 2008 showed 14 accused and 44 victims in the category "rape 
and sexual abuse," while nine others were accused of "prostitution." 
 These were the only figures available for investigations and post 
had no means to independently verify the data. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Neither the GOL nor NGOs maintained information on the 
number of children rescued. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Because no laws specifically included child trafficking, 
CSEC, or the use of children in illicit activities, information on 
the number of arrests or prosecutions for these charges in 2009 was 
unavailable. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Because no laws specifically include child trafficking, 
CSEC, or the use of children in illicit activities, information on 
the number of cases resolved in 2009 was unavailable. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Because no laws specifically include child trafficking, 
CSEC, or the use of children in illicit activities, no figures were 
available on the number of convictions in 2009. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Lebanon's legal framework on child trafficking, CSEC, and 
the use of children in illicit activities differed according to the 
issue.  CSEC and the use of children in illicit activities probably 
fell under the Law on Juveniles (Law 422), according to the HCC, but 
the 2002 law was vague and thus difficult to enforce.  In 2009, no 
legislation existed for child trafficking.  The HCC, as part of the 
MOSA, was working on a draft child protection law that would 
explicitly cover child trafficking, CSEC, and the use of children in 
illicit activities.  In addition, UNODC drafted a trafficking law 
for the MOJ that included a section on child trafficking; UNODC 
expected the MOJ to submit the draft law to the cabinet for approval 
in early February.  (Note: If approved by cabinet, the law would go 
to parliament for approval.  End note.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) Because no laws specifically included child trafficking, 
CSEC, or the use of children in illicit activities, information 
regarding sentences served in 2009 was unavailable. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Because no laws specifically included child trafficking, 
CSEC, or the use of children in illicit activities, information 
regarding the length of time required to resolve cases in 2009 was 
unavailable. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The HCC, in collaboration with World Vision, will begin a 
pilot training program during the first quarter of 2010 on how to 
identify, enforce, and record child trafficking cases.  This initial 
project is not expected to include more than 20 ISF members. 
 
¶13. (SBU) No armed conflict took place in Lebanon in 2009. 
 
2E: GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR 
-------------------------------------- 
 
BEIRUT 00000107  005 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) In the new cabinet's ministerial statement of December 
2009, the GOL vowed to enact policies to "move from social care to 
social development" and "to focus on protecting vulnerable groups," 
including children.  The ministerial statement also prioritized 
"solving the issue of abandoned children and beggars in the 
streets," along with implementing the Convention on Children's 
Rights. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The GOL promised to formulate a plan to combat violence 
against women, as well as legislation to combat trafficking in women 
and children for sexual exploitation and forced labor.  No action on 
these issues was taken in 2009. 
 
(SBU) The MOL is expected to start implementing Phase III of the 
ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) 
in February 2010.  This three-year program will focus primarily on 
child labor in the north and reopen the referral centers -- used to 
file complaints of child or forced labor -- that were closed due to 
violence in the area and a lack of funding.  More importantly, Phase 
III will focus on establishing a child labor monitoring unit at the 
MOL.  This unit, which will include representatives from the MOI, 
the MOE, the MOSA, the MOJ, and the Ministry of Public Health, is 
designed to coordinate child labor policies and enforcement efforts. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Phase III of the IPEC program is expected to start soon in 
northern Lebanon with funding of approximately $1 million from the 
Government of Italy.  The MOL will not provide direct funding to the 
project, but it will pay the salaries of MOL employees in the Child 
Labor Unit who will help implement the project.  Foreign funding and 
MOL contributions to support IPEC and broader efforts to combat 
child labor were not sufficient, according to the MOL, and there is 
no separate allocation for child labor in the MOL budget. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The MOL collaborated with the ILO to plan and implement the 
first two stages of the IPEC program and in the planning of the 
third stage. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to the MOL, formulation of the third stage of the 
IPEC program was successful, and implementation will begin in 2010. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The government did not participate in any commissions or 
task forces on child labor. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GOL did not sign a bilateral, regional or international 
agreement to combat trafficking in 2009. 
 
2F: SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE OR PREVENT CHILD LABOR 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) During 2009, the HCC held a number of awareness campaigns 
and training sessions targeting child labor and forced labor 
throughout Lebanon.  In collaboration with World Vision, the HCC 
held six workshops (from June to October 2009) with stakeholders 
from the public and private sectors, including NGOs, associations, 
and municipalities to raise awareness of child trafficking. 
 
(SBU) The Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI) established a 
child labor unit in 2005 with the help of the ILO.  In 2009 it held 
only one workshop specifically on child labor, but it continued a 
general awareness campaign and distributed booklets on child labor 
during all association events.  Child labor, which was mainly 
concentrated in informal sectors of the economy, was minimal within 
the 800 ALI member companies, all of which must be registered at the 
Ministry of Industry. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The ministerial statement of the new cabinet prioritizes 
social welfare and economic development, but does not specifically 
mention child labor.  ILO and MOL contacts assess, however, that the 
minister of labor will tackle child labor issues. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The HCC awareness workshops were funded by World Vision. 
The government did not independently fund any such programs. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOL did not provide any non-monetary support to child 
labor programs, aside from encouraging MOL employees from the Child 
Labor Unit to attend workshops and conferences that improved their 
understanding of child labor issues. 
 
 ¶5. (SBU) According to the HCC, the MOSA contracted 14 
non-governmental organizations throughout Lebanon to provide health, 
education, and rehabilitation services to children at risk.  MOSA 
contributed about $5 million to these organizations in 2009.  The 
 
BEIRUT 00000107  006 OF 006 
 
 
MOL did not have any programs that provided social services to 
children at risk of or involved in exploitive child labor. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In 2009, the GOL did not sign any bilateral or 
international agreements to combat trafficking. 
 
2G: CONTINUAL PROGRESS 
---------------------- 
 
(SBU) Although several key pieces of legislation to address child 
and forced labor issues have been pending in parliament or in the 
drafting stages for years, political instability has distracted the 
GOL from prioritizing the issue.  The new national unity government 
has pledged its desire to focus on social issues going forward, and 
hopes are high among anti-trafficking and child labor NGOs.  The new 
minister of labor has committed to tackling child labor and 
prioritized modernizing the Labor Law.  As a result, 2010 should be 
a key year in determining the GOL's commitment to addressing issues 
of child and forced labor. 
 
SISON