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PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0452/01 0501630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191630Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6727
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0010
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR NSC SAMANTHA POWER 
DEPT FOR USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM PREL IZ
SUBJECT:  EXAMINING OPTIONS FOR BAGHDAD'S DISPLACED PERSONS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: RefCoords conducted a series of visits to informal 
settlements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) around Baghdad 
province on February 9, 10, 11 and 15.  The visits reaffirmed the 
need to take a tailored, multi-faceted approach to create durable 
solutions for the estimated 180,000 IDPs living in squalid 
conditions in Baghdad's IDP settlements.  Other key takeaways:  the 
"Diyala returns model" of coordinated interventions may have some 
applicability in rural Baghdad areas; some IDPs facing difficult 
conditions may be open to returns but know little of the current 
conditions in their original neighborhoods; almost all of the IDPs 
encountered in Baghdad were renters without strong ties to their 
districts of record and have economic and security reasons for 
remaining where they are; most IDPs prefer resettlement or local 
integration but would require access to government lands; our 
partners should work harder to be present in support of some of the 
most vulnerable clusters we visited.  Problems of government 
engagement were apparent and will be a key to future success in 
finding durable solutions.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) With strong support from U.S. Division-Center, the Baghdad 
PRT, and embedded PRTs at bases around the Baghdad governorate, 
Senior Refugee and IDP Coordinator, Assistance RefCoord, Baghdad PRT 
Deputy Team Leader, and others, visited sites in Khadamiya 
(northwest Baghdad), Mada'in (southwest Baghdad), southern Karradah 
(southwest Baghdad), and Doura (southern Baghdad) from February 
9-15.  Sites around Baghdad have important differences, with the 
best showing government pavement of streets and installation of 
electrical systems (as in el Sadiq in Mada'in) and others 
highlighting the urban poverty found in many developing world slums, 
with large mounds of partially burned garbage, pools of raw sewage, 
and crumbling houses made of mud brick, shards of metal, wood and 
plastic (as in Doura and Karradah).  In all settlements, residents 
described the threats and violence that forced them to flee and 
frustration with government authorities who lacked interest in their 
condition.  The following paragraphs summarize other main 
conclusions and themes, the result of in-depth interviews with IDPs 
and local officials: 
 
Diyala in Baghdad? 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) The "Diyala returns model" of coordinated interventions of 
housing, livelihoods and services by multiple agencies may have some 
applicability in rural districts of the Baghdad governorate.  In 
Mada'in, a rural district southwest of the Baghdad municipality, the 
Khazaliya 1 and 2 villages were flattened by sectarian violence 
after 2006.  The 430 families villages are mostly IDP returnees, and 
about 50% of those who fled have not returned yet, according to 
representatives with the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(ePRT) based in Mada'in.  Many potential returnees own land there. 
The village profile is similar to those we have targeted in Diyala: 
a population willing to return, widespread destruction, an 
agricultural base.  The ePRT and USAID, working with a local 
non-governmental organization in the two settlements, have focused 
on providing agricultural assistance in the villages, using several 
Quick Response Fund (QRF) grants and USAID's Community Action 
Program III (CAP III).  The Mada'in district government has pledged 
to pave the road there.  Comment: Our initial assessment is that in 
Khazaliya, and perhaps other areas of Mada'in district, we could 
QKhazaliya, and perhaps other areas of Mada'in district, we could 
work with our partners to bring additional assistance to destroyed 
villages to create durable solutions.  End Comment. 
 
So Close, Yet So Far...from Home 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (SBU) Some IDPs facing difficult conditions may be open to 
returns but know little of the current conditions in their original 
neighborhoods.  RefCoords visits showed that IDPs usually were 
living just 5-10 miles from their former homes, though they had 
never travelled back to them.  Notably, almost all of this migration 
was into areas closer to the Baghdad city center.  The Musa 
al-Khadim cluster in the beladiyah (sub-district) of Khadamiya, in 
northwest Baghdad, is home to 1,200 IDP families.  It is a 
dilapidated former Iraqi Army base where  mainly Shi'a families 
moved between 2006 and 2008.  A large number of these families fled 
nearby west Baghdad neighborhoods of Hasswa, Khazaliya, Abu Ghraib, 
and Tarmiya as a result of threats and violence against Shi'a.  The 
same was true in other clusters: In el Sadiq, in Mada'in district, 
410 of the site's 420-460 families had fled the Balad Ruz district 
of Diyala province, about 20 miles away.  At the site visited in 
Doura district, families had fled from the district of Mahmoudiya, 
directly south by less than 15 miles.  Comment: Post believes that a 
visitation program to their former areas of residence could be 
arranged with a number of the IDPs mentioned above.  End Comment. 
 
 
The Renters' Dilemma 
 
BAGHDAD 00000452  002 OF 003 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (SBU) A visitation program noted above would immediately run into 
a singular problem:  the fact that the vast majority of the IDPs 
encountered in Baghdad had been renters before they fled.   They 
described both economic and security reasons for their intention to 
remain where they are.  In Rustimiya, in southern Karadah district 
in southeast Baghdad, a site next to a current Iraqi Army (IA) base, 
residents were living among large heaps of garbage in crumbling mud 
homes.  Nearly all were renters or had sold their homes in Diyala 
province where they had fled sectarian violence.  Most disliked 
their current location, but because many residents could work at the 
IA base next door or in the newly active industrial areas nearby, 
most felt they had nowhere else to go.  "Why would we want to stay 
here?  This place isn't even fit for animals," expressed one 
resident.  The need to discover a solution at Rustimiya is urgent 
because the IA has expressed a need to retake the land in order to 
expand, and the IDPs expect to have to depart at some time in the 
near future.  (Note: Almost all of IDPS settlements visited exist on 
land owned by the GOI, either the Finance Ministry or Ministry of 
Defense, which are the two largest landholders in Iraq.  End Note). 
Some IDPs at Rustimiya expressed a reluctant willingness to move 
anywhere they might be provided land and homes. 
 
 
Government Engagement Lacking 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The option of obtaining land grants for IDPs is politically 
sensitive, and government authorities have been unwilling to 
entertain donation of it as an option to date, despite the existence 
of large amounts of land around Baghdad owned by the GOI.  Part of 
their concern -- expressed by Baghdad Governor Salah Abdel-Razzaq in 
a December meeting with Assistance RefCoord -- is that providing 
land or providing any benefits to IDPs at settlements may create new 
sectarian tensions in new areas.  Others also worry that donating 
land -- or providing other assistance for that matter -- at current 
IDP sites may create a pull factor that brings more IDPs or 
squatters into the city seeking benefits.  Complicating matters more 
is the fact that national elections on March 7 and government 
formation over the ensuing several months mean the GOI will be 
unlikely to make important decisions on displacement issues in the 
near future. 
 
¶7. (SBU) GOI engagement to date in Baghdad has been limited: Ninety 
percent of Bahgdad's IDPs are able to access at least partial food 
rations, according to the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), as well as medical and educational facilities.  This access 
is consistent with what RefCoords viewed during their visits. 
However, many IDPs interviewed stated they had missed the deadline 
to register as IDPs and had never been provided assistance or 
informed of available services by GOI authorities.  (Note: MODM has 
registered about 45% of all IDPs in Baghdad, and provided 18% with 
return grants, according to IOM.  Visits by Refugees International 
representatives over the last two weeks also suggested that a high 
percentage of IDPs may be registered with MoDM, even if they have 
not yet had access to MoDM grants.  End note).  This assistance gap 
a source of strong IDP resentment.  During a heated meeting with the 
Khadamiya District Council, in northwest Baghdad, IDP 
representatives stormed out in protect after shouting at their 
representatives that, while the U.S. government cared about their 
Qrepresentatives that, while the U.S. government cared about their 
problems, GOI representatives did not.  The argument erupted when 
the Khadamiya DC, who admitted never having visited their 
settlements, opposed the idea of providing land grants to allow IDPs 
to stay where they were.  In Khazaliya, Mada'in district, meanwhile, 
PRT representatives noted that government approvals of PRT or 
military proposed projects take weeks or months to be approved, 
needlessly delaying urgently needed projects for which funding has 
already been identified.  Comment:  RefCoords will continue to 
engage at the district and governorate district level, and are 
planning an event with Baghdad's District Council IDP 
representatives in the near future.  End Comment. 
 
 
Pushing our Partners 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU) Our partners should work harder to be present in support of 
some of the most vulnerable clusters we visited.  At all of the 
settlements RefCoords visited, we were unable to detect a 
significant UNHCR presence.  At the settlement of el-Sadiq, with 
some 420 families from Diyala province, the UNHCR team assigned to 
the area could not remember having provided assistance there, 
despite its relatively large size.  RefCoord also had difficulty 
obtaining an accurate grid coordinate from UNHCR for the site. 
Other sites in need of assistance, where IDPs were not registered 
 
BAGHDAD 00000452  003 OF 003 
 
 
with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, where health and 
sanitation issues appeared urgent, and where many children do not go 
to school, need greater involvement of both our partners and 
government authorities.  Comment: On February 12, RefCoords reviewed 
our impressions with the UNHCR Representative Daniel Endres, 
stressing the need for UNHCR RICCs and PACs to be much more engaged 
in outreach to the populations they serve.  Endres took the points 
very much to heart and conveyed the concerns to UNHCR staff.  Endres 
said the organization is now working on a plan to rationalize the 
PAC and RICC structures and, following separate monitoring meetings 
with RefCoord, is also working on a 2010 monitoring and evaluation 
framework that includes outcome and impact indicators.  End 
Comment. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU) While temporary assistance must remain a key part of our 
efforts in Baghdad, RefCoords see opportunities for durable 
solutions.  As in Diyala, we found destroyed villages that our 
partners can help reconstruct.  We identified locations where 
carefully developed visitation programs could give IDPs hope of 
starting new lives.  Of course, any solutions must be carefully 
tailored to the individuals in question; given their different 
circumstances, we must take a "retail" approach to every site in 
Baghdad.  Our biggest challenge -- and the biggest opportunity -- 
lies in the GOI's donation of some of its vast land holdings to 
these populations.  Although the GOI is unable to consider such 
solutions now given the upcoming election and transition, we can and 
will begin developing policy recommendations and identifying allies 
-- particularly at the district level -- who can prepare the ground 
for the next government.  In the meantime, we should urge our 
partners to engage more vigorously around Baghdad and advocate with 
the GOI to retain humanitarian access to this huge population, 
ensuring they are not forcefully relocated by the GOI until durable 
solutions can be implemented.  Access may become particularly 
salient for RefCoord and our partners as U.S. forces drawdown, 
reducing our mobility.  End Comment.