VZCZCXRO5521
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0420/01 0481059
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171059Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6663
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000420 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NSC SAMANTHA POWER AND SCOTT BUSBY 
DEPT FOR DHS LORI SCIALABA, BARBARA STRACK AND JUNE TANCREDI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL IZ
SUBJECT:  IRAQ IN-COUNTRY REFUGEE PROGRAM -- MAXIMIZING EFFICIENCY 
AND PROTECTION 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 191 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the second anniversary of the "Refugee Crisis 
in Iraq Act" the in-country refugee program has doubled capacity 
since last year and is functioning more efficiently as it focuses on 
the most vulnerable in the program.  Processing has improved through 
a concerted dedication of Department of State, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and International Organization of Migration 
(IOM) resources.  We expect to see over 4,400 Iraqis arrive in the 
U.S. from the in-country program this year, compared with 1,466 last 
year, and to have a robust pipeline of ready to travel cases moving 
into 2011.  We are now at capacity.  While the number of new 
in-country refugee applications has decreased and more cases are 
being interviewed, there is still a significant backlog and the USG 
continues to hire Iraqis who could potentially qualify for the 
program.  In the face of anecdotal evidence that some applicants are 
not anxious to travel, we have increased our focus on expediting 
cases of the most vulnerable and moving those who are eager to 
travel.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Increasing Efficiency and Capacity 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The in-country direct access P2 refugee program created by 
the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act is operating with increased 
efficiency and capacity.  As a result of larger IOM and DHS teams 
the program is on pace to double the number of refugees processed in 
Baghdad this year.  In FY 2009, DHS sent 6 circuit rides of 5 
officers each and interviewed 4,662 individuals.  In 2010 DHS has 
committed to 9 circuit rides of 6 officers who are expected to 
interview 9,400 individuals.  We expect to see over 4,400 Iraqis 
arrive in the U.S. from the in-country program this year, compared 
with 1,466 last year, and to have a robust pipeline of ready to 
travel cases moving into 2011.  While Baghdad has a queue of 
approximately 27,000 individuals actively moving through the 
process, there are 4,600 individuals that are already approved and 
pending outprocessing and we are currently processing cases at 
approximately the same rate at which new cases are received.  In the 
fall of 2008 approximately 215 new case applications were received 
per week versus the 92 cases per week received in the same period in 
¶2009. 
 
¶3. (U) The processing increase is possible because of physical 
improvements made to the refugee facility in Baghdad, procedural 
improvements by IOM and the commitment of additional State 
Department and DHS resources.  The program moved into its current 
home in a Saddam-era building in the area known as Meadowlands on 
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Prosperity in the International Zone 
(IZ) in May 2009.  While a huge improvement over the trailers 
previously used in a parking garage, the building had only 14 
offices/interviewing rooms and a small crowded waiting room. 
Trailers were subsequently installed which allowed the inside 
waiting area to be divided into three additional offices.  Off-site 
secure storage of case files has further freed up an additional 
office.  These facility changes have resulted in the ability to 
screen an additional 150 cases/360 individuals per month.  IOM is 
utilizing the building to capacity to prescreen enough cases to feed 
into the nine FY10 DHS circuit rides. 
 
¶4. (U) Processing efficiency has been improved by increased staffing 
at IOM's main office in Amman and improved scheduling procedures. 
Qat IOM's main office in Amman and improved scheduling procedures. 
IOM has more than doubled its overseas processing entity (OPE) staff 
in Amman committed to the USRAP and specifically Baghdad.  The 
increase in resources has allowed IOM to improve scheduling 
procedures and ensure that the circuit rides are fully scheduled. 
One of the most difficult challenges of the Iraq program is 
contacting applicants to schedule interviews.  IOM reports a 50% 
success rate of contacting applicants who list one cell phone 
number.  That rate jumps to 75% when there are two numbers listed. 
The most efficient ways to communicate with Iraqis has been through 
email and cell phone texts.  Because of the difficulty in contacting 
applicants, IOM must have at least 650 prescreened cases to schedule 
a circuit ride of 450 cases.  This means that Baghdad must maintain 
a large pool of prescreened cases and continue to prescreen cases at 
a higher rate than DHS can interview.  When scheduling a circuit 
ride, IOM staff in Amman contact the applicant three to four times 
to confirm the interview and over-schedule by several cases to 
account for applicants who will not show for their interviews.  This 
ensures maximum utilization of the interview slots. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The commitment of additional resources to the multi-agency 
security clearance process in Washington has resulted in faster 
Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) results.  We estimate that the SAO 
processing time for Iraqis has been reduced to an average of less 
than 2 months compared with 4 months or longer 6 months ago.  The 
 
BAGHDAD 00000420  002 OF 003 
 
 
policy to no longer require re-running a CLASS namecheck after 
receiving SAO results for Iraqi refugees has resulted in 
significantly fewer repeat SAOs and faster processing time. 
 
------------------------------- 
Focusing on the Most Vulnerable 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) While the above measures to increase processing output and 
normalize procedures have resulted in lowered wait times, we project 
the wait to be 14 months or longer for an Iraqi who applies to the 
program today.  IOM caseworkers and DHS refugee officers have 
anecdotally reported that refugees' threat statements have become 
more generalized over the last year and that fewer report facing 
immediate threat.  This overall decreased sense of urgency is 
corroborated by IOM staff who communicate with USRAP applicants to 
arrange appointments.  IOM further reports that the appointment 
cancellation rate has increased marginally over the last 8 months. 
Another possible indicator of decreased urgency is that the percent 
of cases that have ceased movement in the pipeline because of 
rejection or the applicant choosing to withdraw from the program has 
doubled since summer 2009.  Between April and July 2009 eight per 
cent of cases in the pipeline ceased processing compared with 
sixteen per cent over the last four months. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The wait time combined with the high cancellation rates and 
anecdotal evidence that some in-country applicants are not anxious 
to travel has permitted us to make a concerted effort to target the 
most vulnerable in the program and those who are anxious to flee. 
One of the most significant accomplishments of this effort is the 
improved response time to applicant emails.  Baghdad Info Center is 
IOM's office that receives and processes all in-country applications 
and inquiries.  Due to a heavy backlog, response time was estimated 
to be 12 weeks in the summer of 2009.  Today BIC emails are read 
within 48 hours and answered within 72 hours.  This allows IOM to 
quickly identify applicants who face immediate threat and expedite 
cases when appropriate.  In addition to applicants who self-identify 
to IOM, PRM or RefCoord as needing quicker processing, cases with 
medical conditions are also immediately expedited.  As a result of 
effective procedures approximately 1 in 5 cases are expedited with 
the goal of pushing the more vulnerable cases to the front of the 
queue.  Expedited cases can generally be processed in 2-4 months. 
In November we were able to expedite the case of a vulnerable 
pregnant woman in 5 weeks. 
 
¶8. (U) New procedures have been implemented to move individuals who 
demonstrate an urgency to flee while putting Iraqis who consistently 
delay the process without compelling reasons at the end of the line. 
 Baghdad follows the standard "two no-show rule" meaning that if an 
individual does not show for two appointments without providing a 
compelling reason their case is closed.  Closed cases are easily 
reopened by the OPE if the applicant expresses an interest to 
continue the process.  If applicants tell IOM in advance that they 
will not attend an interview then they are charged with a 
cancellation but not a no-show for statistical and case-closure 
purposes.  The new policy states that those applicants are not 
automatically rescheduled for the next circuit ride but are rather 
put at the end of the scheduling queue unless the applicant 
expresses an immediate need to process.  Post feels this is an 
Qexpresses an immediate need to process.  Post feels this is an 
effective means to focus the circuit rides on Iraqis who are willing 
to commit to the process and feel an urgency to flee.  Another means 
of focusing on the most vulnerable was the creation of a policy to 
schedule no more than five percent of a DHS circuit ride with cases 
of Kurdish applicants who live and work in the Kurdistan region 
(KRG).  This decision was made after consultation with DHS officers 
who expressed concern that many of the Kurdish applicants from the 
KRG were unable to prove that they faced a threat and many stated 
that the only threat they faced was when they took the journey to 
Baghdad for their refugee interview. 
 
¶9. (SBU) While the Iraq in-country refugee queue remains significant 
there is no USRAP back-log in Jordan meaning that an applicant is 
scheduled for a first prescreening interview within a week of 
submitting a complete application or being referred by UNHCR. 
Average USRAP processing time in Jordan is 4 to 6 months.  USRAP 
applicants may easily transfer cases from Iraq to Jordan where they 
may process their cases more quickly while they wait in safety. 
Encouraging applicants who face immediate threat in Iraq to flee to 
Jordan for processing continues to be an important protection outlet 
for vulnerable and urgent cases. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Moving Forward: Limitations and Planning 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The in-country P2 program is functioning efficiently but at 
 
BAGHDAD 00000420  003 OF 003 
 
 
capacity.  The physical limitations of the facility in Baghdad mean 
that we will be unable to increase the number of cases being 
interviewed.  Currently, post estimates that we will be able to 
process on FOB Prosperity through the end of 2012.  Beyond 2012 we 
are unable to predict when the U.S. will be asked to transfer 
possession of the base to the Iraqis. 
 
¶11. (U) Cultural orientation is still not conducted in Iraq because 
of security and facility concerns.  Post believes it is still 
dangerous for USRAP applicants to travel to the International Zone 
and the number of times applicants are required to travel through 
checkpoints should be limited.  However; Post does recognize the 
importance of cultural orientation not only to prepare refugees for 
their arrival to the U.S. but also to inform P2 applicants about 
life as a refugee in the U.S. so they may make an informed decision 
whether to continue processing their USRAP case.  In addition to 
security concerns there are facility dilemmas.  IOM staff fall under 
Chief of Mission authority when in Iraq and as such must abide by 
Embassy security rules.  This means that IOM can only teach CO 
classes in a hardened structure in the IZ.  Such a building that 
could house a CO class and be accessible to Iraqis has yet to be 
located.  Steps have been taken to fill the CO void including 
playing a video of an Amman CO class in the waiting room, handing 
out the Amman CO email address for questions and passing out CO 
material for applicants to take home.  Post will continue to 
brainstorm CO alternatives with IOM and explore the possibility of 
one day holding CO classes in Baghdad. 
 
¶12. (SBU) We continue to make contingency plans for security threats 
and a possible increase in applications or cases needing expedite. 
Despite security improvements in Iraq, the threat of terrorist 
attack against the checkpoint into Meadowlands or any of the 
facilities used for refugee processing remains.  Post has taken 
several measures to improve security including adding concrete 
T-walls around much of the refugee processing building and 
continuing to have security personnel evaluate the checkpoint 
security.  Post has assisted IOM in locating and contracting with a 
second clinic to conduct refugee medical exams so the program is not 
dependent on a single clinic.  IOM's additional staffing in Jordan 
means that personnel can be shifted to the Iraq program if there is 
an influx of cases and urgency.  However, physical limitations mean 
that facility changes will need to be made if Baghdad is called upon 
to process more cases.  The alternative would be to encourage 
threatened Iraqis to flee to Jordan where the program can more 
easily accommodate an influx of cases. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment: As a result of efforts to improve processing 
efficiency and a concerted dedication of Department and DHS 
resources, we are on pace to double the number of USRAP P2 cases 
processed in Iraq this year.  A substantial backlog in the Baghdad 
pipeline remains.  It is unclear how many applicants are eager to 
travel.  There are many factors at play in Iraq that could affect 
the sense of urgency amongst applicants.  Factors include the level 
of violence, whether elections are deemed successful, the economies 
both in Iraq and the U.S., and USG employment trends.  While the 
number of new applications to the program has decreased by 50 
percent over the past year there are reports that USF-I contractors 
Qpercent over the past year there are reports that USF-I contractors 
expect to hire thousands of Iraqi employees to replace third-country 
national employees over the next 8 months.  This could drastically 
affect the number of new applications to the P2 program. 
Anecdotally, IOM caseworkers and DHS officers report that 
applicants' threat statements have become more generalized over the 
last year and that applicants are reporting less urgency for 
immediate flight.  [Note: This is consistent with the evolution of 
threat reports seen in the Special Immigrant Visa caseload.]  The 
program is operating at capacity and has improved methods to focus 
on vulnerability and individuals eager to travel.  End comment. 
 
FORD